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 Abstract 
Matthias Mösch 
“The Faust Myth in William Gaddis and Thomas Pynchon: Postmodern Negotiations 
of Western Modernity” 
 
This thesis examines the Faust myth in post-war American fiction, giving special 
consideration to works of William Gaddis and Thomas Pynchon.  
The main texts analysed are Gaddis’s The Recognitions (1955) and Pynchon’s V. 
(1963) and Gravity’s Rainbow (1973). I present these works, which are 
underrepresented in broader studies of the literary tradition of the myth, as substantial 
contributions to the latter, while demonstrating how their thematic and stylistic 
proximity can be explained through their use of the myth itself. I thereby meet two 
desiderata: a location of Gaddis’s and Pynchon’s Faustiana in specific currents of 
twentieth-century intellectual history and a qualitative comparison between both 
authors against the background of postmodern mythography. 
Locating their works in the tradition of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Thomas 
Mann, I analyse how both authors employ the myth in order to satirise the underbelly 
of Western modernity. In turning the myth against the founding principles of America 
itself, they suggest that the vision of a New Eden has been a Faustian wager from the 
start. In doing so, they transform the image of the heretical soul-seller into that of a 
representative of the dominant forces of their time. Playfully demonising the reckless 
individualism, technicism, and voracious materialism of their contemporaries, they 
provide an astonishingly differentiated portrait of human self-aggrandisement that 
reverts into mechanisms of dehumanisation, a feat that is reflected in their manifest 
use of the works of Oswald Spengler, Max Weber, Eric Voegelin, Norman O. Brown, 
and Herbert Marcuse.  
While Gaddis’s and Pynchon’s early novels remain a matter of negative theology in 
refraining from providing totalising suggestions as how to fare with the sold ‘soul’ of 
the West, I argue that these satirical disputes, via their use of apophaticism, 
indirection, and allusive complexity, convey a distinctly ethical message that speaks 
against the alleged nihilism and relativism of postmodern fiction. 
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Introduction 
[I]n the absence of any ethical standards external to your 
belief and love in God, the danger is always lurking that 
you will use your love of God as the legitimization of the 
most horrible deeds. 
—Slavoj Žižek, The Monstrosity of Christ2 
 
But the novel’s task, unlike that of history, is to stretch 
our intellectual, spiritual and imaginative horizons to 
breaking point. 
—Christine Brooke-Rose, “Palimpsest History”3 
 
My thesis traces the employment of the Faust myth in American postmodern fiction, 
specifically the works of William Gaddis and Thomas Pynchon. This project is a 
scholarly desideratum in two respects. Firstly, Gaddis’s The Recognitions (1955), 
Pynchon’s V. (1963), and Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) are hardly treated in overviews 
of American Faustiana despite their obvious connection to the myth.
4
 Secondly, 
despite their thematic and formal proximity, these works have not yet been compared 
sufficiently in qualitative terms. While critics, for instance Tony Tanner, have 
frequently pointed to Gaddis’s possible influence on Pynchon, actual examinations 
are sparse.
5
 Given the copious intersections between the latters’ thematic focal points, 
                                                 
2
 Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, ed. Creston Davis 
(Cambridge, Mass./ London: MIT Press, 2009), 270. 
3
 Christine Brook-Rose, Stories, Theories and Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
189. 
4
 The only overviews of the literary Faust tradition including discussions of Gaddis and Pynchon are 
Paul Goetsch, Machtphantasien in englischsprachigen Faustdichtungen: Funktionsgeschichtliche 
Studien (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008) and William E. Grim, The Faust Legend in Music 
and Literature, vol. 2 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). Brief treatments of American Faustiana 
can be found in Osman Durrani, Faust: Icon of Modern Culture (Robertsbridge: Helm, 2004); Leslie 
Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel (New York: Criterion Books, 1960); David Hawkes, 
The Faust Myth. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Cathy Waegner, “Der Teufel im American 
Dream. Zur Fausttradition in der Neuen Welt”, Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik 17, 
no. 66 (1987): 61-84; Theodore Ziolkowski, The Sin of Knowledge: Ancient Themes and Modern 
Variations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
5
 Tony Tanner, Thomas Pynchon (London/ New York: Methuen, 1982), 90. One of the few 
publications examining relations between Gaddis and Pynchon is Steven Moore, “‘Parallel, Not 
Series’: Thomas Pynchon and William Gaddis”, Pynchon Notes 11 (1983): 6-26. The following works 
compare both authors more or less briefly: Gregory Comnes, The Ethics of Indeterminacy in the Novels 
of William Gaddis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 6-7;  Frederick R. Karl, “Gaddis: A 
Tribune of the Fifties”, in In Recognition of William Gaddis, ed. John Kuehl and Steven Moore 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 174-98;
 
Thomas Moore, The Style of Connectedness: 
“Gravity’s Rainbow” and Thomas Pynchon (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1987), 20-21; 
Elaine B. Safer, The Contemporary American Comic Epic (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1989); Nicholas Spencer, After Utopia: The Rise of Critical Space in Twentieth-Century American 
Fiction (Lincoln/ London: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Brian Stonehill, The Self Conscious 
Novel: Artifice in Fiction from Joyce to Pynchon (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1988); Steven Weisenburger, Fables of Subversion: Satire and the American Novel, 1930-1980 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995). 
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it is astonishing that so little critical attention has been paid to the middle ground 
between plain dismissals and paranoid musings.
6
 Indeed, the relationship between 
these works, a Künstlerroman and two novels concerned with war and technology, 
may better be described in terms of contiguity than direct succession. What binds 
them together is not merely a deep engagement with sanctimonious religiosity, 
cultural entropy, and the dehumanising effects of capitalism and repressive 
techniques.
7
 Being of the conviction that the question of lineage is closely related to 
that of mythography, I contend that their novels are firmly located in the Faust 
tradition and that a reading through the lens of the myth not only provides a viable 
means of conceptualising the latter’s complexity and diversity but also addresses 
substantial ‘linking features’ between them. The two tasks I pursue in the following 
are therefore to argue that both author’s works need to be considered as crucial 
twentieth-century contributions to the literary Faust tradition and to demonstrate how 
the vast array of thematic concerns shared by Gaddis and Pynchon is manifest 
precisely in their use of this myth. 
The principle of my analysis is ‘bottom up’. Rather than pressing Gaddis’s and 
Pynchon’s works into the service of theory, I establish, by working from within the 
primary texts, a network of relations to the intellectual and literary histories indebted 
or at least strongly contiguous to the myth of the soul-seller.
8
 My close readings 
therefore focus on relations to literary sources ranging from the fourth-century 
Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust (1808, 
                                                 
6
 As regards wild speculations, the most notable claim was made by ‘Wanda Tinasky’ (presumably 
Thomas Donald Hawkins), who proclaimed that the “novels of Gaddis and Pynchon were written by 
the same person”. T. R. Factor, ed., The Letters of Wanda Tinasky, (Portland: Vers Libre, 1996), 48. In 
terms of dismissive readings, Thomas Moore’s is paradigmatic. Stating that The Recognitions “lacks 
Pynchon’s scientific and occult interest” (The Style of Connectedness, 20-21), he dismisses Gaddis as a 
potential precursor of Pynchon, ignoring the former’s extensive treatment of science, technology, 
alchemy, and heresiology. 
7
 I refer to technique here as the rational organisation of information, materials, and humans alike for 
the sake of efficiency and control; cf. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson 
(New York: Random House, 1964), xxv. 
8
 Gaddis’s debut, as Joseph Conway points out, “may be safely contextualized in specific Euro-
American currents of early to mid-twentieth century intellectual history”, a proposition valid for 
Pynchon’s V. and Gravity’s Rainbow as well. Joseph Conway, “Failing Criticism: The Recognitions”, 
in William Gaddis, “The Last of Something”: Critical Essays, ed. Crystal Alberts et al. (Jefferson: 
McFarland and Company, 2010), 85. Joseph Tabbi makes a similar call for investigating into the 
Gaddis’s relations to European literary traditions: “William Gaddis and the Autopoiesis of American 
Literature”, Paper Empire: William Gaddis and the World System, ed. Joseph Tabbi and Rone Shavers 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 90-117. For the intellectual tradition of Pynchon see, 
amongst others, David Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1980), who points to literary relations, and Moore (The Style of Connectedness, 198), 
who discusses relations to Weber, Arendt, and others. 
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1832) to Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain (1924) and Doctor Faustus (1947) as 
well as the critical history surrounding these, as formulated, for instance in Oswald 
Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918, 1923), Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1920), and Norman O. Brown’s Life Against Death 
(1958). The prominence of these intertexts and the relative marginality of Christopher 
Marlowe’s Faustus indicate that Gaddis and Pynchon draw from a legacy of the myth 
that transforms the heretical soul-seller into a representative of the industrial, 
economic, and cultural hegemony in the West. Emphasising the socio-political 
dimension of devilish bargains, they provide an ideological critique of modern 
American society, questioning the saintliness, if not sanity of God’s ‘chosen’ people. 
In this respect, Gaddis and Pynchon follow the agendas of Washington Irving, 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Herman Melville, satirising the hubristic individualism and 
materialism of their contemporaries and relating both to the Puritan Covenant and its 
secular offspring, the American Dream.
9
 In an equal measure, they portray their own 
culture as paradigmatic of wider currents in Western modernity, which relates them 
intimately to the works of Goethe and Mann. Although it would be an overstatement 
to say that Gaddis and Pynchon aim to better the reader, as Gregory Comnes argues in 
Gaddis’s case in The Ethics of Indeterminacy (1994), there is a distinctly ethical core 
at the heart of these novels that draws its energy from an ambiguity and ironic 
allusiveness in the tradition of the two German authors.
10
 Pynchon’s and Gaddis’s 
“serious unseriousness”, as Tanner puts it,11 their rhizomatic arrangements, and their 
aesthetic-ethical concerns are intimately related to Goethe’s ‘serious jests’ and textual 
mycelia.
12
 More crucially, they share with the German poet an ambivalent assessment 
                                                 
9
 Tanner, for instance, argues that the problems Gaddis explores in The Recognitions are “at the heart 
of American Literature, and in looking back to Hawthorne while it looks ahead to Pynchon, his novel 
reminds us of the continuities which we might otherwise, perhaps, overlook”. Tony Tanner, City of 
Words: American Fiction, 1950-1970 (London: Cape, 1971), 400; cf. Peter William Koenig, 
“Recognizing Gaddis’ ‘Recognitions’”, Contemporary Literature 16, no. 1 (1975): 71.  
10
 For a discussion of Pynchon’s ethics see, for instance, Judith Chambers, Thomas Pynchon (New 
York: Twaine, 1992). 
11
 Tony Tanner, The American Mystery: American Literature from Emerson to DeLillo (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 234. Elaine B. Safer similarly notes that even if Pynchon (and 
Gaddis) uses absurdity and ghoulish humour, they certainly do not dismiss themselves with a joke (The 
Contemporary American Comic Epic, 49); cf. Michael Bell, who compares Pynchon’s humour with 
that of Mann: “Pynchon no longer aspires to be the ironic but humanistic ‘lord of counterpositions’, yet 
there is still a comic race against cynicism which […] allows a non-cynical laughter to keep barely 
ahead whatever sinister possibilities may be closing in.” Michael Bell, Literature, Modernism and 
Myth: Belief and Responsibility in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 210. 
12
 See Goethe to Humboldt on 17.3.1832, cited in Albrecht Schöne, ed., Faust, by Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 2003), 3.391. In many respects, Gaddis and Pynchon’s 
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of modern Western civilization, in which human emancipation has reverted into a 
machinery of exploitation and social repression. In Faust, as Astrida Orle Tantillo 
observes, Goethe does not only address the achievements and perils of Western 
modernity in general but also provides, as “insight into the foundational principles of 
American society and its shortcomings”.13 I think the same holds true for the novels 
of Gaddis and Pynchon that, as Steven Weisenburger notes, continually probe into the 
“core contradictions and dilemmas of the twin projects ‘America’ and ‘Modernity’”.14 
Eventually, their satirical disputes over the soul of the West, as it were, do also stand 
in the tradition of Mann, whose Zeitromane had long been mistaken as nihilistic.
15
 
What both authors share with the latter, apart from a complex humanism and playful 
mythopoeia, is his sharp observations of the interrelation of fiction and ideology, and 
not least his reservations about intramundane salvation.
16
 As such, I contend, they 
provide a body of work that partly speaks against the alleged break of postmodern 
literature with traditional mythical themes and forms and against its alleged nihilism 
and relativism.
17
 
                                                                                                                                           
narratological agenda is already laid out in the literary tradition of Faust. Crude humour, encyclopaedic 
construction, and intertextual excesses are an integral part of many Faustiana. Goethe, the postmodern 
avant lettre, for instance, spoke of his isomorphic arrangement of seeming membra disjecta that existed 
in form of a lose bricolage until its final composition as a rhizome (cf. Schoene, ed., Faust, 2:53). 
13
 Astrida Orle Tantillo, Goethe’s Modernisms (New York: Continuum, 2010), 1. 
14
 Steven Weisenburger argues this in Pynchon’s case in “Gravity’s Rainbow”, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Thomas Pynchon, ed. Inger H. Dalsgaard, Luc Herman, and Brian McHale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 44. 
15
 See Robert S. Ellwood, The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph 
Campbell (New York: State University of New York, 1999), 178. 
16
 Discussing the “pedagogical dispute over […] the soul of the West” in The Magic Mountain, Mann 
expressed his animosity toward totalitarianism in aesthetic-ethical terms, relating them to religion and 
the illusory capacities of his own profession: “Illusion is a matter of art, but a lie is unacceptable, 
aesthetically and morally, and it is apparent that these two areas of art and truth-telling are more closely 
related and even to a great extent overlap, contrary to what their respective advocates surely believe”. 
Thomas Mann, “My Times”, trans. Scott Denham, New England Review 27, no. 4 (2006): 199. He 
concludes with a statement that might be as well Pynchon’s: “For in totalitarianism one is not saved by 
truth (this is not part of its nature at all): rather one is ‘saved by faith,’ by the dictated and forced belief 
in a single myth that promises salvation” (ibid., 200). This observation resonates deeply in Gaddis, who 
notes ironically in “Old Foes with New Faces”, for instance, that both priests and writers are “in the 
same line of business: that of concocting, arranging, and peddling fictions to get us safely through the 
night”. William Gaddis, Agapē Agape and Other Writings (London: Atlantic Books, 2002), 189 
(hereafter cited in text as AA). 
17
 The thoroughness of the authors’ social criticism and their refusal of a firm referential framework in 
which the latter would be embedded prompted early critics, on whom the satiric character of these 
novels was lost, to attest a form of nihilism or relativism. This and their ‘difficult’ style, brandished by 
figures like B.R. Myers, Jonathan Franzen, Jonathan Yardley, and Dale Peck, has given rise to ever 
recurring debates about authorial obligations and the purpose of fiction in general. While most of these 
arguments may count as severe cases of deliberate misunderstanding of both authors’ thought that 
writing against totalising worldviews and the tyranny of the straight sense necessitates a certain degree 
of ambiguity and paradox, the main emphasis of such criticism on stylistic matters also obscures the 
substantial ethical-aesthetical critique they provide to the favour of matters of marketability. For details 
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The introductory part of my thesis examines what I would like to term the ‘dialectic 
of demonization’. I present the myth of the soul-seller as an exercise in ideology 
employed by both representatives of an ascending Christian hegemony and its critics 
as a means to demonise and depoliticise competing worldviews and social practices. I 
show that this modern myth is predominantly used to negotiate core principles of 
Western modernity in general and the rise of Northern America as a world power in 
particular. 
Chapter 1: After clarifying the concept myth in relation to ideology and literature 
and discussing early uses of the Faust figure as a site of power struggles between 
different religious and scientific world views, I show how the representation of the 
magus-scholar shifted in a secularised framework from damnable heretic and 
epicurean rogue to a figure operating in mutual agreement with the dominant forces of 
his time. I do so by analysing what is arguably the most influential literary version of 
the myth, Goethe’s Faust. Drawing from Georg Lukács and Marshall Berman, I 
demonstrate how the two parts of this epic drama assess the human quest for self-
creation and development by means of ‘magic’, money, and technology in distinctly 
ethical and aesthetical terms. I then demonstrate how the German philosopher of 
history Spengler expanded Goethe’s vision into a morphological world history that 
presents Western modernity as a Faustian age, in which man, attempting to realise the 
dream of ultimate mastery, inevitably becomes enslaved to his creations. Explaining 
the deterministic nature of this portrait of history, I show why Spengler’s work 
appealed not only to thinkers like Martin Heidegger or Theodor W. Adorno but also 
to Gaddis, Pynchon, and their contemporaries, who found evidence of its apocalyptic 
propositions throughout the affluent society in post-war America and could perceive it 
as a counter-narrative to that of Manifest Destiny. 
Against this background I will give a brief overview of North American Faustiana 
in the second chapter. After showing how stories about deals with the devil were 
employed as tools of social mastery in Puritan settlements, I argue that the emergent 
American literary tradition of the myth used Faust as a means to re-evaluate the vision 
of a New Eden, criticising their forefathers’ sanctimonious attitude towards salvation, 
their harsh materialism, and the social imbalance engendered by their work ethic. 
                                                                                                                                           
on the debate see Rone Shavers, “The End of Agape: On the Debate around Gaddis”, in Paper Empire: 
William Gaddis and the World System, ed. Joseph Tabbi and Rone Shavers (Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 2007), 161-81. 
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Discussing the reception of Goethe’s and Spengler’s works among authors such as 
Karl Schapiro, Norman Mailer, and Jack Kerouac, I then present the continuation of 
this critical tradition in American thought and literature throughout the twentieth 
century. In an accompanying excursus on the socio-historical works of Weber and 
Eric Voegelin I argue that the vision of the community of God’s chosen people 
residing in a shining ‘city upon a hill’ can indeed be read as a Faustian narrative.  
Part II discusses how Gaddis uses the Faust myth in his debut novel and some of 
his critical writings in order to satirise the religious dogmatism and the ‘grab all you 
can’ mentality of American post-war society. Revising earlier Gaddis scholarship, I 
argue for the centrality of the myth in this postmodern artist’s novel by observing its 
two main intertextual strands, the Clementine Recognitions, an early Christian 
romance, and Goethe’s Faust, before setting them into relation with the most obvious 
(yet least textually present) candidate for comparison, Mann’s Doctor Faustus. 
Chapter 3: In an analysis of the religious and social dimensions of the novel, I 
elucidate how Gaddis challenges Protestant soteriology and predestinationist dogmata 
by means of the story of Simon Magus, the first Faust figure in Christian heresiology, 
as conveyed in the Clementine Recognitions. Satirising the New England ‘culture of 
guilt’, which is held to account for fostering authoritarian habits and social rifts, 
Gaddis traces the ‘malformation’ of the novel’s protagonist, Wyatt Gwyon, a lapsed 
Protestant and unsuccessful painter. 
Chapter 4: The main part of my discussion of Gaddis examines the artistic 
dimension of the novel, tracing how the young artist at his wits’ end turns to the very 
systems engendering his sense of alienation. Making a pact with a ring of art dealers, 
he comes to find the parameters of perfection he is missing in both art and society by 
forging Renaissance masterpieces. Reading this wager from the perspective of 
Mann’s novel, I argue that the very sense of depravity as induced by his Puritan 
upbringing lures Wyatt into collaborating with the ‘devils’ of capitalism, while a 
misconstrued sense of vocation (in Weberian terms) enables him to delude himself 
into the role of a redeemer of art. A final section examines how the novel’s 
protagonist breaks free from his bargain by engaging in an artistic modus operandi 
between ivory tower and commoditisation and turning to an ‘agapistic’ ethics.18 
                                                 
18
 For a brief definition of agapē see Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 220-24. For the concept of agapistic communities 
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The third part of my thesis treats the Faust myth in the early work of Pynchon. I 
argue that V. and Gravity’s Rainbow are considerably shaped by the myth despite 
their subtleness as regards allusions to other Faustiana. Observing the author’s use of 
‘secondary’ sources, such as Spengler’s vision of decline, Mann’s Magic Mountain, 
and Brown’s psychoanalytical reading of history, all of which considerably draw from 
Goethe, I argue for a deliberate method of indirection in accord with Pynchon’s 
radical resistance to totalising concepts, including that provided by mythology. 
Chapter 5: An opening analysis of Pynchon’s debut novel V. highlights the 
intersection between Pynchon’s and Gaddis’s concerns, especially in terms of a 
scathing socio-cultural analysis of post-war America, while laying the ground for the 
political focus of Pynchon’s work. Discussing the use of allusions to Goethe and 
Mann in the stories of two main characters in V., I examine how ontologically and 
epistemologically alienated subjects willingly surrender their humanity to objects and 
abstractions in order to bypass their frailty and existential rootlessness. 
Chapter 6: The major part of this section is dedicated to Pynchon’s magnum opus, 
Gravity’s Rainbow. My central concern here lies with the author’s depiction of the 
German (and implicitly American) military-industrial complex as a suicidal ‘System’ 
that follows a Spenglerian narrative of entropic decline. After discussing the Faustian 
machineries and mechanisms emergent in the novel, I provide an analysis of the most 
Faustian of Pynchon’s characters, the rocket engineer and SS officer Weissmann, 
whose quest for transcending the limitations of the conditio humana reiterates the 
lethal logic of the ‘System’, of which he is part and parcel. In my discussion I reassess 
traditional positions in Pynchon scholarship by demonstrating how the author uses 
allusions to Goethe and Rainer Maria Rilke in order to valorise this quest in ethical 
terms. Finally, I analyse the way in which Pynchon subverts anti-Faustian narratives, 
in particular those propounded by Brown, in order to demystify the jargon of 
American countercultural movements. 
In a concluding step I examine how Pynchon negotiates the question of complicity 
in the vitae of three seemingly innocent characters, the engineers Kurt Mondaugen 
and Franz Pökler and the American lieutenant and ‘protagonist’ of the novel, Tyrone 
Slothrop. Discussing relations between V., Gravity’s Rainbow and Mann’s Magic 
Mountain, I argue that Pynchon provides a lucid political allegory of the Faustian pact 
                                                                                                                                           
in Gaddis, see Birger Vanwesenbeeck, “Art and Community in William Gaddis’s The Recognitions”, 
Mosaic 42/3 (2009): 150-52. 
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Germany made in the chaotic atmosphere of the Weimar Republic, showing how 
humans suffering from their own limitations are gathered into a totalitarian order and 
all too readily give away their soul to pursue their dreams of escape. In the main part 
of this section I extend the discussion of complicity by examining Faustian 
connections to the Puritan culture that forms the subtext of Pynchon’s criticism. After 
showing how Gravity’s Rainbow indicts the Protestant work ethic and the nascent 
New England industry because of its creation of power imbalances and the 
transformation of nature as alma mater into a necropolis, I critically reconsider one of 
Pynchon’s most prominent reprobates, the antihero and sexual adventurer Tyrone 
Slothrop. Showing Pynchon’s employment of elements from Goethe, Brown, and, 
again, The Magic Mountain, I analyse this character as a microcosmic representative 
of a young disempowered generation of Americans that forfeits the possibility of 
gaining a ‘soul’. Exposing the contradictions of Slothrop’s scavenger hunt for military 
supremacy in the post-war ‘Zone’, I argue that this forfeiture is not solely a matter of 
internalised repression or indoctrination but also a failed emancipation, a wilful 
suspension of human responsibilities that is as double-minded as that of the Fascist 
engineers. 
Conclusion: After pointing out the main intersections between Gaddis’s and 
Pynchon’s works and summarising the specifics of their mythical agenda, I discuss 
both authors’ indications as regards alternatives to the Faustian condition. I argue that 
despite notions of ‘selves-who-can-do-more’ or ‘keeping cool but caring’, The 
Recognitions, V., and Gravity’s Rainbow remain instances of a negative theology. 
They concur with Léon Brunschvicg’s dictum “[a]s long as you think only salvation, 
you turn your back on God”,19 yet they suggest no religious agenda against such 
egotism. Not capable anymore of Goethe’s belief in the fundamental goodness of man 
or even Mann’s ironic humanism, their peculiar Jeremiads suggest only few ‘better 
ways’. Refusing to succumb to cynicism or plain condemnation, however, they pass 
on the slow hard work of ethical commitment to the reader. 
                                                 
19
 Cited in Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seán Hand (Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 48. 
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Part I: The Dialectic of Demonization 
Chapter 1: Faust and the Forces of Modernity 
[T]here is no surer index of creative power than the creature’s refusal to 
submit or remain constant to his creator’s intentions. The greater the 
creature’s life, the greater his freedom. His very rebellion exalts his author: 
God knows… 
—Paul Valéry, “To the Wary but not Unwilling Reader”20 
 
1. Faust between Myth and Ideology 
Although the objects of examination in this thesis are literary texts, it would be naïve 
to examine a myth so thoroughly subjected to theological, political, and 
(counter-)cultural uses solely from the perspective of literary studies. Myths do not 
exist as pure versions but only in mediated form, and as such they primarily have a 
social function.
21
 Myths are ‘foundational stories’, to employ Jan Assmann’s 
definition, stories told to illuminate the present from the past, irrespective of the 
facticity of this past.
22
 As a means of making sense of the world, their archaeological 
and teleological meaning provides orientation and conveys a set of idealised 
behaviour patterns, thereby serving as a normative and formative agent that 
pronounces order and helps in establishing or maintaining communities.
23
 Not taken 
as a heuristic taxonomy, or as an epistemological or moral yardstick, however, myths 
can become reified and “misconstrued as an actual materialistic explanation of the 
world”.24 Since myths establish a world-view that does not allow for “the kind of 
criticism and argumentation that we associate with the term rational”,25 they lend 
themselves to dogmatic uses as a means to depoliticise, naturalise, and universalise 
beliefs, to “render them self-evident and apparently inevitable”.26 In such cases, as the 
                                                 
20
 Valéry, Plays, 3. 
21
 See Stephanie Wodianka, “Zur Einleitung: ‘Was ist ein Mythos?’ - Mögliche Antworten auf eine 
vielleicht falsch gestellte Frage”, in Mythosaktualisierungen: Tradierungs- und Generierungspotentiale 
einer alten Erinnerungsform, ed. Stephanie Wodianka and Dietmar Rieger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 
5. 
22
 Jan Assmann, Das Kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen 
Hochkulturen (München: Beck, 1999), 52, 143.  
23
 Karl Simms, Paul Ricoeur (London: Routledge, 2003), 58. Hence, Frank Kermode distinguishes 
myths from fictions, considering the former agents of stability and the latter agents of change. Frank 
Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 39.  
24
 Paul Ricoeur, A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdš (New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf), 19, 487. 
25
 John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1984), 286. 
26
 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 5. 
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history of myths and their appropriations shows, what is meant to illuminate the world 
can all too easily revert into deliberate obscurantism, from which scholarship is by no 
means exempt.
27
 For these reasons I refrain from using typologies devised by 
Northrop Frye, Joseph Campbell, or C. G. Jung and follow Bruce Lincoln in 
considering myth as “ideology in narrative form” instead.28 
Although the story of Faust is relatively young, emergent at approximately the 
same time as that of Don Quixote and Don Juan, it has, perhaps more frequently than 
any other myth, become an arena of ideological negotiations. Half legend, half 
cautionary tale, it is not aimed at providing a theogony or cosmogony but primarily 
serves as a test case in eschatological matters.
29
 Its diabolic core stems from the 
Bible—God and Satan’s wager on the latter’s ability to pervert a good man (Job 1:6-
12), and the temptation of Christ (Matthew 4:1-11)—while the magician part can be 
traced back to texts that emerged during religious trench fights in the early history of 
the Church, reaching back as far as Saint Irenaeus’s tract Adversus Haereses (ca. 180) 
and the late fourth-century Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, a work hereticising the 
Gnostic Simon Magus, who was also known by his Latin cognomen Faustus.
30
 As a 
story of forbidden fruits, it is related the tales of Epimetheus and Pandora or Adam 
and Eve but differs from them in that the magician needs no tempter to bring about 
his own doom, which renders the name Faustus, ‘the favoured one’ or ‘the fortunate’, 
somehow ironic. 
                                                 
27
 Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and Roland Barthes’ Mythologies are still 
valuable works as regards abuses of myth in this respect. For an introductory treatment of ideological 
ramifications of mythography see Ellwood, The Politics of Myth. 
28
 Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 147. In support of this qualification I would like to add that myth does not stand 
in contradiction with Louis Althusser’s classic definition of ideology as the “imagined relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence”. Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 109. Both, however, differ in 
terms of their social function. As Ben Halpern argues, the “social function of myth is to bind together 
social groups as wholes or, in other words, to establish a social consensus. The social function of 
ideology is to segregate and serve special interests within societies in the competition of debate”. Ben 
Halpern, “‘Myth’ and ‘Ideology’ in Modern Usage”, History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961): 137; see 
Eagleton (Ideology, 6) and Roland Barthes, “Myth Today”, in Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers 
(London: Vintage, 1993), 151-54. 
29
 Although it emerged in form of legends around the mid-sixteenth century, Faust was first termed a 
“myth” by Jakob Burkhardt 23 years after Goethe’s death, the word myth being a modern phenomenon 
in Western languages appeared in German about 1800 and in English about 1839.  
30
 E.M. Butler calls the story of Simon Magus the “first fully developed legend of the fortunes and fate 
of the black magician”. E.M. Butler, The Myth of the Magus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 73. For further forerunners of Faust see Philip Mason Palmer and Robert Pattison More, The 
Sources of the Faust Tradition: From Simon Magus to Lessing (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1936). 
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Under the name Faust proper, the myth was first popularised in the Historia von D. 
Johann Fausten, published by Johann Spies in Frankfurt am Main in 1587. A doctor 
in theology fallen in bad company, Faust transgresses his personal horizons with the 
aid of the devil. He does this on a contractual basis, trading his eternal soul for a 24-
year period of epicurean excess, and he follows his desires so relentlessly and 
stubbornly that it appears that he actively wants to fall.
 31
 Approaching the day of his 
doom, the scholar bitterly laments. However, unable to make the leap of faith 
“required to ensure his salvation”, he is delivered to the devil, and his death, although 
gruesome, appears not only ‘justified’ but also ‘deserved’.32 As the author of the 
Historia suggests, the latter is the case not because of Faustus’ sinfulness but because 
of his desperatio, his disbelief in the redeeming power of divine grace. 
Child of an era of conflict between spiritualism and materialism, more specifically 
of discrepancies between Christian ideals and the worldly focus of sciences, the 
Historia is the first literary treatment of a figure symbolic of early modern advances 
in knowledge.
33
 Nevertheless, even though this version of the myth encompasses 
general Christian beliefs and positions towards emergent scientific paradigms, its 
Protestant tenor cannot be overlooked. The doctor appears neither as a renaissance 
man nor a proper precursor of the Enlightenment intellectual but rather as a projection 
screen of conservative Lutheran attempts to counteract the political aggrandisement of 
competing religious groups.
34
 As Gerald Strauss argues, the religious shakeup at the 
time of Counter Reformation provided unique opportunities to renegotiate cultural 
attitudes and values on a vast scale, and Lutheran and Reformed institutions seized 
the opportunity of acculturating the masses to habits and codes of behaviour thought 
                                                 
31
 This characteristic is highlighted in Christopher Marlowe’s play, whose Faustus “seems almost to 
take a perverse pride in the conviction of his own unique depravity”. Pauline Honderich, “John Calvin 
and Doctor Faustus”, The Modern Language Review 68, no. 1 (1973): 10. 
32
 Ibid., 1; see Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, ed. David Kastan (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2005), 5.1.53-54, 5.2.43, and 5.2.74-75. 
33
 Science’s stress on autonomous will to gain insight was irreconcilable with the religious paradigm 
that all knowledge came from God and the scripture and that belief was a necessary precondition for 
accessing this knowledge (expressed in Anselm of Canterbury’s credo ut intelligam), which gave rise 
to concerns that scriptural authority might be replaced by that of science. Spies’ Faust represents to 
some extent this challenge to authority, renouncing his upbringing as a good Christian and appearing 
publicly as a physician, astrologer and mathematician. 
34
 See Gerald Strauss, “The Faust Book of 1587”, in Faust through Four Centuries: Retrospect and 
Analysis, ed. Peter Boerner and Sidney Johnson (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1989), 28. For the 
Lutheran politics behind the Historia see Hawkes, The Faust Myth, 28-29. For a discussion of the 
treatment of science in the Historia see Albrecht Classen, “New Knowledge, Disturbing and Attractive: 
The Faustbuch and the Wagnerbuch as Witnesses of the Early Modern Paradigm Shift”, Daphnis 35, 
no. 3/4 (2006): 515-35. 
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fitting by the elite: order, reason, and orderly and reasonable conditions of uniformity, 
orthodoxy, and the authority of the written word.
35
 Based on the legendary Georg (or 
Johann) Faust, who likened himself to Simon Magus and held it was not necessary to 
venerate God since he had godlike powers himself, the Historia was not only aimed at 
condemning non-canonical learning but also written as a vehicle of social formation 
and against competing soteriological models. Seen as a part of this agenda, the 
Historia fulfilled two purposes, namely to replace plebeian folklore with approved 
cultural codes and to detach people from alternative religions by ridiculing 
Catholicism and demonizing “cunning folk” in competition with the Church and its 
services.
36
 A standardised story following the aesthetics of saintly legends, yet a 
distinctly modern narration with claims to facticity and authenticity, it edifies the 
reader by supplementing Faust’s entertaining misdeeds with the voice of a didactic 
narrator and thus provides “a negative print with which to identify, an ideal Christian 
counterpart”. 37  In linking vice, disorder, decadence and uncivil behaviour with 
sorcery and black magic, the Historia stands also in the tradition of the so-called 
Teufelsbücher, highly popular tales branding any deviation from the rationales set out 
as obedient Christian behaviour “as an act of apostasy, ultimately a denial of 
Christ”.38 The early American reception of the myth, as I demonstrate later, can be 
understood as an extension of such endeavours. 
Although the shift in representations of Faust-characters from trickster to 
knowledge seeker occurs in the Historia, as Theodore Ziolkowski argues,
39
 it is 
Christopher Marlowe’s Faustus who is famously associated with a fatal attitude 
towards curiosity. The ‘hero’ of The Tragicall History of the Life and Death of Doctor 
Faustus (1604, 1616), inspired by the 1592 translation of the chapbook, abandons 
theology and the canonical sciences, which he regards as too limited, turning to 
necromantic or ‘damned’ books in order to unlock nature’s treasury and become lord 
of the elements. Emancipated from religion, the realm of learning here exceeds mere 
                                                 
35
 Strauss, “The Faust Book”, 29. 
36
 See Strauss, “The Faust Book”, 32. As Strauss argues, most offensive to the hegemony were “the 
religious practices of the ordinary folk. They were superstitious, licentious, disorderly, irrational […] 
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 Marguerite De Huszar Allen, The Faust Legend: Popular Formula and Modern Novel (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1985), 15, 54. 
38
 Strauss, “The Faust Book”, 31; see Ziolkowski (The Sin of Knowledge, 14) and Hawkes (The Faust 
Myth, 34). 
39
 Ziolkowski, The Sin of Knowledge, 61. 
 18 
lust for knowledge for its own sake (the experiendi noscendique libido condemned by 
Augustine) and appears as a tool of self-empowerment.
40
 Marlowe’s scholar, 
however, is thereby not simply representative of figures ranging from Giordano 
Bruno to John Dee. If Peter Sloterdijk argues in the case of Faust that “[w]anting-to-
know is an offspring of the desire for power, the striving for expansion, existence, 
sexuality, pleasure, enjoyment of the self”,41 the knowledge-seeker’s allegiance with 
the ‘devil’ reflects nothing else but the underbelly of Thomas Hobbes’s (and Francis 
Bacon’s) scientia potentia est. 
While Faust’s career in the seventeenth and eighteenth century was confined to 
puppet plays and occasional allusions, it was satires like Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist 
(1610) that capitalised on mocking the (self-)deified scholar figure.
42
 The upsurge of 
sciences as well as the Enlightenment movement sweeping over Europe, however, not 
only prompted the Romantics to attack the mechanistic, rationalized view of the 
universe, most famously expressed in William Blake’s dread of “single vision and 
Newton’s sleep”;43 it also lead to a reactivation and revalorisation of the myth. Lord 
Byron (Manfred, 1817), Christian Dietrich Grabbe (Don Juan and Faust, 1829), and 
Nikolaus Lenau (Faust, 1836), amongst others, made Faust a heroic transgressor, 
doomed titan, and obsessive pursuer of love and the infinite.
44
 Romantic Faustiana, 
however, had more to offer than rebel poses in the tradition of Manfred or Klinger’s 
German Sturm und Drang novel Fausts Leben, Thaten und Höllenfahrt (1791). 
Friedrich Schelling’s Naturphilosphie, influential for a range of authors from Goethe 
to Novalis and Coleridge, offered a model alternative to the clockwork universe, a 
conception of the world as an organism, permeated by one soul found in nature and 
                                                 
40
 One exception to the generally critical treatment of the lust for knowledge in the Faust tradition is 
Lessing’s plans for a literary Faust drama and the fragment in his seventeenth Literaturbrief (1759). An 
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man and determined not by Newtonian mechanics but a dynamic polarity of forces. 
Crucial in terms of the latter is Goethe’s version of the myth. While Goethe gave in 
Faust’s famulus Wagner a new name to cold scientific ambition without real insight 
into the consequences of one’s doings,45 he also transformed the swinish epicure and 
heretic into a character suffering from the diverging narratives of religion, natural 
philosophy and experimental sciences. His Faust crucially differs from earlier 
versions in that it refrains from condemning its protagonist and making overt religious 
statements. Turning the oppositional heretic into a representative of nascent personal 
and social economies, it also dramatizes the emergence of a modern dynamic world 
system. As Tantillo argues, the text, emblematic of Goethe’s general position, thereby 
describes a dual response to modernity: “a liberal response that promotes faith in 
progress, secularism, and individualism, and a conservative that views change with 
suspicion, suffers a sense of loss, and seeks to maintain traditional values”.46 Since 
such complex negotiation of human action and erring plays a substantial part in the 
works of Gaddis and Pynchon (and forms one of the main intertextual reference 
points), I will now discuss both parts of the dramatic poem in more detail. 
 
   
2. Faust as a Representative of Western Modernity  
Goethe’s epic drama, owing more to J.V. Andreae than to Spies or Marlowe, 
expounds on an epic scale how frustration with the human condition can drive the 
discontented to an ultimately deluded quest for self-realisation.
47
 In contrast to his 
literary precursors, Goethe does not present this pursuit as damnable. In the “Prologue 
in Heaven”, God makes his chosen ‘servant’ (cf. Job 1:8) a test case about the 
goodness of mankind and thereby also an experimental verification of theodicy.
48
 
Betting whether Faust can be brought from the right path with the demon 
Mephistopheles, who sees nothing but bestiality in human doings, especially those 
                                                 
45
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 20 
informed by “Reason” (F, 285), God wants to demonstrate that mankind’s aspirations, 
although erroneous (F, 317), are in essence sanctionable. Commissioned to lure the 
scholar to his own “downward course” (F, 226), Mephistopheles is therefore not a 
manifestation of theological ‘evil’ but a force of nihilism in the service of good.49 
Bound to the superordinate bet with the Lord, the daemon remains a catalyst that 
merely augments, while ironically questioning, what is already present in this 
representative of mankind (cf. F, 1659).
50
 
 
 
2.1. The Questing Self – Goethe’s Faust, Part One 
At the beginning of the scholar’s tragedy, Faust is intellectually and financially 
bankrupt (F, 364, 374). In his Gothic vault amidst the mildew of scholasticism he 
exclaims, reiterating Cornelius Agrippa, that “all our search for knowledge is in vain” 
(F, 364). Armed with diverse analytical tools that have merely undermined his search 
for a unifying vision, he cannot find the spirit of life in the networks of specialised 
sciences, and having developed a culture remote from the totality of life, he bitterly 
longs for fulfilment. Faust experiences at first hand the logic of science 
Mephistopheles, here spokesman of the poet, ridicules: 
 
When scholars study a thing, they strive 
To kill it first, if it’s alive; 
Then they have the parts and they’ve lost the whole, 
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 The numbers in brackets refer to lines in the following edition: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: 
Part One, trans. David Luke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) and Faust: Part Two, trans. 
David Luke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, both hereafter cited in text as F). 
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 Mephistopheles is a highly paradoxical figure. His identification as the “strange son of chaos” (F, 
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Frankland, Freud’s Literary Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 58. Freud’s 
reading has incited some critics to analyse the demon as a representative of cultural entropy. Jackson, 
for instance, argues that Mephistopheles’ message is “that there is no absolute meaning in the world, no 
value, and that […] all that can be discovered is a sinister absence of meaning. ‘His’ ‘demonic’ 
enterprise consists in revealing this absence, exposing the world’s concealed vacuity” (Fantasy, 57). 
One needs to note, however that the demon appeals here to Faust’s own potential nihilism, for behind 
the latter’s search lies always the suspicion that the world is only an “empty fake” (F, 2407). 
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For the link that was missing was the living soul. (F, 1936-39)
 51
    
 
It is this “soul” Faust sets out to seek. Thus, irreconcilably torn between dependence 
on earthly sensuous experience and intellectual aspiration, he resorts to “magic’s 
assistance” (F, 377).52  
At first, Faust demands access to a “vision of Nature’s forces/ that bind the world, 
all its seeds and sources/ And innermost life” (F, 382-82) in the sign of the 
macrocosm. This holistic vision inspires him, yet it only remains a representation. 
Faust wants direct access. Conjuring up the Earth Spirit and considering himself equal 
to it, he rejoices:  
 
I, God’s own image! […]  
 The mirror of eternal verity! 
 I fed upon its light and clarity 
 Within myself, all mortal limits gone […] (F, 614-17) 
 
In fact, however, he is unable to bear what is granted to him, quivering at the sight of 
the spirit and painfully learning that he is neither a god (F, 439) nor an Übermensch 
(F, 490), as he is reminded by the Spirit: “You match the spirit you can comprehend” 
(F, 512). Goethe, as Berman holds, brings here  
 
the Übermensch into being not so much to express modern man’s titanic strivings but rather to 
suggest that much of the striving is misplaced. Goethe’s Earth Spirit is saying to Faust, Why 
don’t you strive to become a Mensch—an authentic human being—instead.53  
 
Faust’s realisation of his own limitations is so shattering that he is ready to commit 
suicide. On hearing the sound of Easter bells (F, 769-70), however, which evoke in 
him memories of love and togetherness, he perseveres. Invigorated, he wants to 
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embark “[o]n a new journey to the heaven’s ends”, but rather than following the 
vision of care and community, he seeks “pure activity in a new sphere” (F, 704-5). 
This agenda finds its first expression in his retranslation of the Genesis, by which he 
substitutes “deed” for the “word” that marked all beginning (F, 1237, cf. John 1:1). 
Faust’s retranslation is partly a substitution of self-gratification for the divine, but the 
inscription of his own authorship into the sacred text(-ure) also indicates his turn to 
action that is to be the imperative of his project of becoming a God.
54
 In the bet with 
Mephistopheles that immediately follows, Faust deposits his soul on the condition 
that should the demon provide him with the experience of a ‘moment’ (Augenblick) 
worth holding on to, he will forfeit this immortal part of himself.
55
 Here, Faust has in 
mind not the attainment of “mere pleasure” (F, 1765) but the perpetual “realization, 
the development of all his individual possibilities”.56 In the following tour de force 
through the little and the big world, Goethe then dramatizes Faust’s hubristic 
misunderstanding of this natural tendency to develop all one’s potentials.57 If man 
creates and perfects himself through his labour, as Hegel would have it, then the mode 
of Faust’s self-perfection is irreconcilable with his intentions. Having renounced all 
that is human in his pact, Faust is told:  
 
Alas, alas,  
You have destroyed 
The beautiful world!  
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At a blow of your clenched fist 
It falls, struck down 
By a demigod, it disappears. 
Into the void […]  
Let it be built anew 
More splendidly, let it come to birth 
Again, within you […] (F, 1617-21)  
 
When he then proclaims after his signature in blood—  
 
And in my inner self I will embrace 
The experience allotted to the whole 
Race of mankind; my mind shall grasp the heights 
And depths, my heart shall know their sorrows and delights. 
Thus I’ll expand myself, and their self I shall be, 
And perish in the end like all humanity. (F, 1770-75)   
 
—it transpires that his search for the living spirit is superseded by a quest for self-
augmentation, in which Faust’s ego, as it were, encounters nothing but itself. Tracing 
affinities between the cultural ideal of individual self-development and socio-
economic developments in the emergent modernity, Berman interprets this bet as the 
demand for a “dynamic process that will include every mode of human experience, 
[…] and that will assimilate them all into his self’s unending growth”.58 Faust thereby 
embraces a set of paradoxes “crucial to the structure of both the modern psyche and 
the modern economy”, in which everything created and achieved needs to be 
overcome, if not destroyed, in order to pave the way for new creation and 
achievement.
59
 However, if restless activity as a means of self-determination (F, 
1754-59) thereby becomes the paradigm of wining “that crown of our humanity” (F, 
1804), it is also a curse for Faust, who will lose his soul as soon as he ceases to strive: 
“once I stand still, I shall be/ A slave—yours or no matter whose” (F, 1710-11). His 
pact has created a paradox. Drawing from magically granted powers, he precludes any 
organic growth, while his egocentricity and the systemic character of his devotion to 
immediate experience negates any experience of a moment, in which he would be 
suspended, as such. In order not to lose himself, however, he depends on constant 
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action and gain.
60
 He thereby hastens from experience to experience, engaged in a 
dynamic of illimitable accumulation, an “economy of self-development that can 
transform even the most shattering human loss into a source of psychic gain and 
growth”.61 Whether it is Valentin’s life, Margareta’s innocence, or his own love, 
everything is sacrificed for his sustainment.  
 
 
2.2. Building a World: Modernity and Its Discontents in Faust, Part Two   
[T]he most effective subjugation and destruction of man takes 
place at the height of civilization, when the material and 
intellectual attainments of mankind seem to allow for the creation 
of a truly free world. 
—Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization62  
 
If Faust negotiates the emergence of the modern subject, it is also an allegory of 
socio-political processes marking occidental modernity. Shifting from the medieval 
atmosphere of the scholar’s study and ending in the midst of the industrial revolution, 
as Berman argues, the second part of Faust dramatizes the emergence of a 
“distinctively modern world-system”, a “far-reaching realm of production and 
exchange, ruled by giant corporate bodies and complex organizations, which Faust’s 
thought is helping to create”.63 
After his devastating romantic endeavours in the first part, Goethe’s scholar again 
sets out to grasp absolutes. He awakens in the prologue, bathed in the “dew of Lethe” 
(F, 4629), unburdened of his guilt about Margareta’s death. He has also shed off his 
old, ‘romantic’ self, broken free from the vaults of the ‘little world’, and now sets out 
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to master the ‘big world’. Contemplating the nature of ‘supreme existence’, he stares 
at the sun, ‘seizing’ its energy, but becomes painfully aware that this one source of 
life is unattainable: “we tried/ To set the torch of life alight—alas/ A sea of flames 
engulfs us” (F, 4708-10). Dazed, he turns his back on the sun and observes a rainbow 
instead, in which the pure light of the sun is fractured and the opposites of ‘fire’ and 
water are ‘united’. In analogy to his failed recognition of Nostradamus’s sign in the 
first part, Faust again turns from the absolute to earthly activities, considering the 
rainbow as a symbol, a “mirror” of human activity (F, 725): “Life is ours by colourful 
refraction”. 64  Pure light, that is truth, can only be inferred from phenomena, 
reflections. However, Faust’s vision of the rainbow as a pointer toward the indirect 
attainment of the fullness of life appears as mistaken as his self-augmentation by 
means of discreet experiences. The rainbow, as Goethe explains in his Theory of 
Colours (1810), does not represent totality. By analogy, Faust’s endeavours lack the 
will to harmonious growth.
65
 For Goethe, everything “that man attempts to 
accomplish, whether it is realized by deed, word, or some way, must arise out of a 
unity of all his powers; everything partial is objectionable”.66 The growth “of the 
discrete and dominant capacities” in man, then, as Lukács explains, “should be 
accompanied rather by a harmonious growth of the whole man”.67 The last scene of 
Faust, specifically the gesture of Gretchen as Penitent, suggests that such 
development is impossible without conscious love. For Goethe, the passion of 
individual love, “precisely because it is both the most elementary, the most natural 
[…], and also, in its present individualized form, the finest fruit of culture”, if taken as 
an end in itself, represents the “most genuine fulfilment of the human personality”; 
conversely, an experience of its power “unifies the personality [and] effectually raises 
everything in man to the highest level attainable”.68 Hence, “Eternal Womanhood/ 
Draws us on high” (F, 12110-11). Faust, however, cannot yet comprehend this and 
finds his first setback when he conjures up the ‘ideal form’ of beauty, Helen of Troy, 
and causes an explosion by trying to seize the simulacrum (F, 6561). After a brief 
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Arcadian interlude, Faust then abandons his aesthetic ideals and thrusts himself into 
‘real’ action. Distinguishing himself in economics, politics, and warfare, he puts his 
abilities to a test by creating a world, that is, by deciding to colonise a swampy coast. 
In contrast to the first part of the tragedy, it is no longer magic that is to establish a 
path to Nature’s seeds and sources but man’s work alone (cf. F, 11403-07). 
Faust becomes a builder, and connecting his personal interests with the economico-
political forces that drive the world, he also learns how to destroy. Mephisto and he 
lend their minds and magic to the emperor to renew his power and obtain carte 
blanche to develop the coastal region. In doing so, Faust tries to find a way to act 
effectively against the feudal and patriarchal world, to create a new social 
environment, a new space for a “free people on free land” (F, 11580), who shall 
engage in pure activity (cf. F, 705). In order to fulfil his vision, he intends to reclaim 
the “alienated earth” from the sea and rule the “unruly waves” (F, 11541-43). As 
Tantillo points out, Faust’s drive towards capitalism (and technology) occurs only 
when he “has given up on the arts, aesthetics, and nature”. 69  Goethe does not 
unambiguously condemn the endeavour but is highly critical as to how it is exerted. 
Once striving to reunite with the living forces of the alma mater, Faust now devises 
an ethical-aesthetical formula for mankind’s “economic and technological struggle for 
the subjugation of nature”, the realisation of which comes at the cost of human lives, 
if not an entire paradigm of existence.
70
 Turning the world into a planned garden, 
Faust is annoyed by the sight of Philemon and Baucis, an old couple who represent 
the values of the pre-modern world and has them removed as their house stands in the 
way. The old couple thereby become the “first embodiments in literature of a category 
of people that is going to be very large in modern history: people who are in the 
way”,71 disposed of as obsolete, rendered “dirt”, in Zygmunt Bauman’s terms. If this 
has distinctly totalitarian implications, Faust’s order of removal, as Berman holds, 
does even more so, as it represents a “characteristically modern style of evil: indirect, 
impersonal, mediated by complex organizations and institutional roles”.72 
Eventually, the process of development that transforms wasteland into a “thriving 
physical and social space” is to recreate “the wasteland inside the developer”.73 After 
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hearing about the killing of Philemon and Baucis, Faust is haunted by Care (Sorge), 
the anxiety of self–preservation, but determined to achieve full self-realisation in the 
face of death, for better or worse, he dismisses her, and with that, again, his human 
condition.
74
 Care, however, is itself not easily dismissed and strikes him physically 
blind: 
 
FAUST [blinded]. 
Night seems to close up upon me deeper still, 
But in my inmost soul a bright light shines. 
I hasten to complete my great designs: 
My words alone can work my mastering will. 
Rise from your sleep, my servants, every man! 
Give visible success to my bold plan! 
Set to work now with shovel and with spade: 
I have marked it all out, let it be made! 
With a well-ordered project and with hard 
Toil we shall win supreme reward; 
Until the edifice of this achievement stands, 
One mind shall move a thousand hands. (F, 11499-510) 
 
Faust, this modern consciousness, has become blind in a physical sense, has unlearned 
and lost all sensual perception of the world. As he knows the realm of Care but does 
not accept it as the limit of his action, his exclusive reliance on the light inside himself 
then describes a tragic mistake of a modern anthropology no longer based on 
religio.
75
 In his deluded self-apotheosis Faust thus arrogantly likens himself to the 
Lord in that he believes his will is sufficient to direct a thousand hands, and fleeing 
Care he hastens to complete his plan, calling his servants to render his idea reality. 
Blind, however, he depends on helpers and instruments and is also prone to deceit. 
Hearing the clashing of the spades of his ‘forced labourers’, pressed into service by 
“[i]nducements, money, force” (F, 11554), he sees his vision, and with that the 
beautiful moment worth holding onto, fulfilled: “Then to the moment I might say:/ 
Beautiful moment, do not pass away!” (F, 11581-82). Faust dies, but his plan remains 
in the realm of the hypothetical, for the sound of activity that prompts him to forfeit 
his soul is not the start of his project but the digging of his own grave. 
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If Faust has partially failed, he is nevertheless spared damnation: “He who strives 
on and lives to strive/ Can earn redemption still” (F, 11936-37). Adorno may 
therefore have a point in exposing the violence of such a deus ex machina, in which 
the law (the pact between Faust and Mephistopheles) is suspended in the economy of 
divine grace, and in which the natural order disappears in an entirely different order, 
forcing onto the atrocious an intact theodicy.
76
 Hasty dismissals of this absolution do 
not fully acknowledge the complex humanism negotiated behind the Catholic veil. 
Faust is received in heaven, where he is to be bettered by the Penitent’s love, not 
God’s grace. Goethe thereby brilliantly indicates not a last minute pardon but a modus 
vivendi, the content of which, as Lukács argues, “evinces the extension of Goethe’s 
conception of an eternal perfection of the human race” that implies an “essential 
pantheistic dialectic of evolution”.77 Faust is absolved upon the specific condition 
that, drawn on high by Eternal Womanhood, his ‘immortal part’ is to be bettered and 
he himself is to learn how to develop in a human way, to engage in a ceaseless effort 
to develop and improve himself within the realm of the given, not in a beyond where 
the soul is laid to rest. 
 
 
3. Faustian Civilization – Spengler’s The Decline of the West 
He was […] a philosopher of culture, whose opinions, 
however, were directed against culture insofar as he 
affected to see all of history as nothing but a process of 
decline. 
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus78 
 
It is safe to say that Goethe’s play prefigures to a great extent the projects of Weber, 
Arendt, and Marcuse in dramatizing the coordinates of a disenchanted, economised, 
industrialised, and bureaucratised ‘second garden’ in which neither grace nor freedom 
prevail but their opposites. Goethe’s analysis of the modern condition has indeed been 
glossed with so many critical commentaries that a positive evaluation of his hero has 
become rare.
79
 The specifically negative connotations of the term Faustian, however, 
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are mainly rooted in the work of Spengler,
80
 who was the first to provide a 
comprehensive formulation of the Faustian view of modernity in the two volumes of 
his immensely popular The Decline of the West.
81
 
Drawing from Goethean morphology, as laid out in The Metamorphosis of Plants 
(1790), Spengler conceived of the world as an organism and its history as a 
procession of different cultures he conceptualised in terms of life-cycles and annual 
seasons: rise (spring/adolescence), peak (summer/maturity), fall (autumn/age), and 
terminus (winter/death). The latter stage of each culture is a civilization. Spengler saw 
his own culture, the origins of which he located not in antiquity but the Middle Ages, 
as the last stage of the bigger circle. The occident, with its transition from “word” to 
“deed”, then, is marked by the doings of Faustian man. With his will to power and 
passion for infinity, Faustian man, who is less inspired by the myth itself than by 
Nietzsche, knows nothing of pacts but engages in a quest for the augmentation of 
human power.
82
 Like Wagner, Faust’s famulus, the representative of cold scientific 
rationality, Faustian man’s “aspirations carry him towards action, technology and 
conquest”, to applied rather than theoretical knowledge.83 Where Goethe’s scholar 
longs to be united with nature as alma mater, Faustian science and technology 
perfects the exploitation of nature (DW, 1:301), striving to know her “seeds and 
sources” (F, 381) in order to incorporate them in a technological apparatus that 
“delivers sacred Causality over to man” (DW, 2:504). Attempting to bring about the 
dream of ultimate mastery, however, the Faustian engineer-cum-entrepreneur engages 
in a destructive endeavour and inevitably becomes “the slave of his creation[s]” (DW, 
2:504). While markets create a simulacrum, a “second world” (DW, 1:481), the 
economy-driven machine-industry neither realises human potential nor “liberate[s] 
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humanity for more activity” but makes both worker and entrepreneur dependent while 
exhausting natural resources.
84
 Spengler gives the pithiest summary of this project in 
Man and Technology (1932):  
 
To construct a world for himself, himself to be God—that was the Faustian inventor’s dream, 
from which henceforth arose all projects of the machines […]. The concept of the booty of the 
beast gets thought to the end. Not this or that, like fire, which Prometheus stole, but instead 
the world itself with the mystery of its force gets dragged into the structure […]85   
  
As these processes are irreversible for Spengler, the “destined end-state of all Faustian 
‘nature’” is a decline into stasis. He conceptualises this “Destiny” by means of the 
second law of thermodynamics (DW, 1:422). Amongst the symbols of decline, he 
writes, 
 
the most conspicuous is the notion of Entropy, which forms the subject of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. […] The basic element of the Faustian world-picture is not the Attitude but 
the Deed and, mechanically considered, the Process and this law merely puts the mathematical 
character of these processes into form as variables and constants. (DW, 1:420) 
 
As a symbol, entropy thereby describes History’s “gently-sloping route of decline”, 
that will lead to a “spiritual crisis that will involve all Europe and America” and bring 
an end to the “tyranny of Reason” (DW, 1:424). Enlightenment has reached its apex 
and now enters free fall.
86
  
To some extent, Spengler’s account prefigures the critique formulated in Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s seminal Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947).87 In fact, although it 
was mostly the right-wing literati who criticised the rationalisation of the world since 
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the end of the nineteenth century, criticism of the unwholesome, disenchanting, and 
deadening effects of apostatised reason, mostly associated with science and urban life, 
could be found on the entirety of the political spectrum.
88
 However, what makes 
Spengler’s view unique amongst the manifold works concerned with decline and 
disenchantment, from Friedrich Schiller’s “On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry” (1795), 
Jacob Burkhardt’s Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1890), Johan Huizinga’s 
The Waning of The Middle Ages (1924), Weber’s work, or even the ninth of 
Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940), is his propagation of a 
negative form of amor fati. As the invasive dynamic of economic and industrial 
processes does not allow for alternative ideologies (DW, 1:410), humans impede their 
freedom of conscience and can only modulate within “narrow limits”, which in 
Protestant terms would be the preordained station in life: “We have not the freedom to 
reach to this or that, but the freedom to do the necessary or nothing” (DW, 2:507). 
Only incident “erodes the edge of fate”, in Pynchon’s words “Murphy’s Law, where 
salvation would be” (GR, 471).89 There is, however no deliverance through chance or 
fate at the end of the Faustian age. As Gilbert Merlio observes: 
 
Spengler saw, just as Nietzsche, a second religiosity emerging at the end of the cultural cycle: 
as the explanatory possibilities of physics and other sciences are exhausted, a desire for 
metaphysics emerges again, which, however, will only be met by idolatry, not true religion.
90
  
 
And as there is equally no political progress at the end of the cultural cycle, Faustian 
man has to bow before the power of history. Spengler’s fatalism led many of his 
critics to accuse him of plain nihilism.
91
 Although these accusations may not stand 
uncontested, his emplotment of history and dismissal of civilization’s ability to alter 
the completion of this ‘inwardly necessary evolution’ (DW, 1:424) conjure up a 
notion of fate that, just like religious ‘paranoia’, displaces any human agency and 
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obligations toward an imaginary higher power.
92
 Even more problematic is Spengler’s 
methodology of presenting cultures as organisms and world-history as their collective 
biography (DW, 1:104). His idiosyncratic efforts to elaborate homologies of and 
analogies between disparate phenomena, for instance, may rank only second to that of 
Frazer’s The Golden Bough or Graves’s The White Goddess. A piece of parodic 
criticism by Robert Musil is revealing in this respect:  
 
There are lemon-yellow butterflies, and there are lemon-yellow Chinese. In a certain sense, 
then, one can say that the butterfly is the winged, middle-European, dwarf Chinese. Butterflies 
and Chinese are both familiar as images of sexual desire. Here the thought is formulated for 
the first time of the previously unrecognized commonality between the great ages of 
lepidopteral fauna and Chinese culture. That butterflies have wings and the Chinese do not is 
only a superficial phenomenon.
93
 
 
Although Musil rightly attacks Spengler’s epistemological relativism, his totalising 
world-view, and lack of scientific methodology (that resembles Pynchon’s Herbert 
Stencil in that it reveals more about the historian’s mindset than history itself), the 
vision provided by The Decline of the West was deemed fitting for the state of affairs 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. As Heidegger writes: “Spengler’s 
proposition is only the negative, though correct, consequence of Nietzsche’s word 
[sic], ‘The wasteland grows’”.94  
 
 
4. Appropriations and Transgressions  
[W]hatever lived as German stands now as an 
abomination and the epitome of evil.  
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus95 
 
While such re-interpretations of the myth may not fully acknowledge the complexity 
of Goethe’s drama, his quester nevertheless became an allegory for the ‘German soul’ 
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and then an apotheosis of the full catalogue of the nation’s transgressions.96 This was 
mainly possible via the revalorisation of the Romantics, for whom the soul-seller 
became “an eloquent rebel” and spokesman for iconoclasm, the breakdown of taboos, 
and self-redemption outside the bounds of religion, and in a second instance to 
nationalist appropriations of the myth that turned such sensibilities into a justification 
for national supremacy and, beyond that, limitless domination.
97
  
Berman, drawing from Lukács, points to a dialectical relationship between these 
impulses in arguing that Faust dramatizes larger tensions in modern European 
societies. The social division of labour produces a large class of relatively 
independent producers of culture and ideas. This climate fosters the emergence of 
artistic, scientific, legal, and philosophical specialists who create a dynamic modern 
culture. However, because this division keeps advancements and their potentials from 
the surrounding world, the latter find themselves within a stagnant society and are 
“torn between inner and outer life”.98 During the era of European Romanticism, this 
tendency had a special resonance in countries in which one’s stagnant society was 
considered to lag behind those of other countries, which often resulted in inner 
tensions that were to be released in revolutionary settings. Describing such a culture, 
Faust also perceptively prefigures a situation in Germany in the late nineteenth 
century that saw, according to critic Thomas Moore, not only an increasing 
specialisation of knowledge and bureaucratization but also an increasing interest in 
volk-mysticism.
99
 It was in this climate that Faust became the most popular image of 
the German intellectual and scientist and also a figure of national heroism, a titan 
whose doings determined the course of history. This ‘heroic’ image was then taken to 
extremes in twentieth-century German nationalist appropriations of Goethe’s 
drama.
100
 Fusing the de-demonized image of the soul-seller with equally distorted 
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versions of Fichte’s idealism and Nietzsche’s will to power, the latter presented 
Faust’s march towards peril as the tragic greatness of the inevitably doomed, whose 
immodesty, lapses, and perpetrations were evils allegedly necessary for the 
achievement of progress and greater humanity. The national myth was thus fully 
turned into ideology, naturalising and depoliticising political aims by means of poetic 
authority and world-historical ‘evidence’. Faust’s marriage with Helena, for instance, 
was taken as a symbolic legitimisation of imperialism, his building project seen as the 
laudable creation of a new Lebensraum, and the removal of Philemon and Baucis as 
an indicator of an unconditioned will to power. In the knapsacks of German soldiers, 
Faust eventually made its way to the front. As Werner Sombart wrote: “Militarism is 
heroic spirit enhanced to martial spirit. […] It is ‘Faust’ and ‘Zarathustra’ and 
Beethoven scores in the trenches”.101 
If Goethe was thus appropriated, then Spengler, as Herminio Martins argues, set 
forth “an image of technology and science, which became […] virtually hegemonic in 
Germany during the Weimar Republic and in the Third Reich”, while his overt 
racism, militant nationalism and destinarian view of history could easily be pressed 
into the latter’s service.102 Overwhelmed by a world seemingly sinking into chaos, the 
Weimar Republic, as Siegfried Kracauer argues in his discussion of the ‘doomed’ 
atmosphere during the German nineteen-twenties, saw no other political alternative 
than tyranny or anarchic chaos.
103
 While both options may have seemed equally 
dreadful and/or spectacular, the “malicious conservatism” (DF, 297) of the 
Spenglerians, to use Mann’s phrase, in tendency agreed more with the authoritarian 
model. Spengler’s prophecy of the fate of the West could therefore easily be 
restructured into a propagation of Caesarism and imperialistic ‘renewal’, by which the 
exhausted occident would gain vital injections while fending off the ‘barbarism’ 
threatening to invade from the East. As the narrator of Mann’s Doctor Faustus holds: 
“what people mean by the breakthrough to world power to which destiny has called 
us is a breaking out into the world” (DF, 324). To cite just one example of this logic: 
three years before Hitler rose to power, to mention but one example, Heidegger, in 
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many respects influenced by the philosopher of history, called for a “powerful leader 
who could restore the inner greatness of Dasein by renewing the mystery and terror of 
existence”.104 That the terror which came to be predominant in the Third Reich was 
firmly based on technology and rational organisation has long become common 
knowledge, despite the neo-romantic and anti-rational image Nazism gave itself.
105
 
And if Horkheimer and Adorno’s 1947 work conceptualised such rationales, 
Mephistopheles already captures their gist:  
 
The little earth-god still persists in his old ways, 
Ridiculous as ever, as in his first days. 
He’d have improved if you’d not given 
Him a mere glimmer of the light of heaven: 
He calls it Reason, and it only has increased 
His power to be beastlier than a beast. (F, 281-86) 
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Chapter 2: Faust in America  
1. The Puritan Complex 
Separating the Church and religion means forfeiting the 
ability to separate religion and madness 
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus106 
 
The American legacies of this myth, especially its twentieth-century transformations, 
“cannot be fully explained as a mere combination of European folk culture and 
Calvinistic teachings”, for its lines of transmission are too rhizomatic and complex.107 
Yet the unsurprisingly Puritan tenor of its early reception in the U.S. suggests that the 
motif of bargaining with the devil can be seen as an extension of the early Protestant 
ideological agenda. Faust was one of the “familiar figures inherited along with the 
English culture of the seventeenth century”, 108  but while the bogus scholar, as 
indicated, was relegated to the domain of light entertainment or erudite marginalia in 
England and continental Europe, in the New World he made frequent appearances in 
sermons and religious tracts. The English translation of the Historia was among the 
most popular publications in seventeenth-century New England,
109
 and its ‘realistic’ 
style made it not only available for edifying purposes but also as a tool of religious 
propaganda. While Increase Mather, for instance, considered the historical Faust an 
“example of heresy and irresponsible lifestyle and with that a proof of the existence of 
the devil and witchcraft”,110 the first American Faust, authored by Increase’s grandson 
Thomas Walter, features not merely a lengthy discourse on predestination but uses the 
soul-seller as a means to demonize an adversary.
111
 Cotton Mather’s ‘documentation’ 
of the Salem witch craze, although it makes no mention of the conjurer, is indicative 
of the political ends to which accounts of deals with the devil were used in the worst 
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case. As a section of his The Wonders of the Invisible World (1693), based on 
narratives from the witch trials, reads:  
 
The New-Englanders are a People of God settled in those, which were once the Devil’s 
Territories; and it may easily be supposed that the Devil was exceedingly disturbed, when he 
perceived such a People here accomplishing the Promise of old […] We have been advised by 
some Credible Christians yet alive, that a Malefactor, accused of Witchcraft as well as 
Murder, and Executed in this place more than Forty Years ago, did then give Notice of, An 
Horrible PLOT against the Country by WITCHCRAFT, and a Foundation of WITCHCRAFT 
then laid, which if it were not seasonably discovered would probably Blow up, and pull down 
all the Churches in the Country.
112
 
 
However, if the figure of the magus did not merely reflect what the prevailing 
hegemony deemed damnable but also served to expose the latter’s dogmata and 
paradoxes, this holds especially true in the Puritan case. Faust’s excesses appear to 
stand in stark opposition to Protestant virtues, yet there are intersections that far 
exceed the personal characteristics shared between Luther and the magician-scholar 
(both turning from the prevailing religious paradigm, both being academics, both 
negotiating, although in different ways, with the devil). Faust’s adversaries were not 
at all against the radical individualism he represents,
113
 neither did they refrain from 
advancing science and the acquisition of knowledge as such.
114
 As Daniel Bell argues, 
Goethe’s Faust is a modern figure because he strives without relation to the past, with 
the result of repeating mistakes.
115
 I hold that if American civilization, separating 
itself from its European origins, undertook a similar manoeuvre, the emergent 
American literary tradition of Faust texts can be understood as part of a critique of 
such discontinuity. With the rigorous rule of the founding fathers and the witch trials 
still in memory, authors writing after the revolution began to reassess the popular 
fantasies of new beginnings, a second Eden or New Jerusalem. The English 
Romantics had already shown how to use the myth in order to criticise fantasies of 
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power and the obsessive pursuit of absolutes, from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
(1818) to Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer (1820) to James Hogg’s 
Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), which attacks Scottish Calvinism and 
Antinomian predestinationism in particular. American authors employed the same 
principles and appropriated the myth of the knowledge seeker, turning it against the 
all too worldly interests of the Saints. 
One of the first American literary examples, Washington Irving’s “The Devil and 
Tom Walker” (1824), addresses this issue by indicting the excessive materialism of 
Irvin’s contemporaries by means of the myth. Set in 1721, this tale narrates the rise 
and fall of a miser who makes a career with the aid of “Old Scratch”, to the peril of 
the former’s soul. Early in the story Tom loses his way in a forest near Boston and 
there meets the devil, who shows him a considerable number of trees marked with the 
names of successful men, the ‘who’s who’ of the colony being at the same time a 
catalogue of the souls in his possession. Cloaking his story in a folkloristic-historic 
ambience, Irvin implies that the social imbalances and exploitative capitalism among 
his contemporaries stem from colonial times.
116
 Similarly, Hawthorne uses the 
Faustian metaphor as an ethical framework with which he interprets the “situation of 
the New Adam in the New World” as a series of missed chances and wrongdoings in 
the name of “good”. 117  While in The Scarlet Letter Hester Prynne’s status as a 
punished transgressor enables the author to cast an ‘outsider’ perspective onto the 
sanctimony of the Saints, their recklessness, and lust for domination, the protagonist 
of “Young Goodman Brown” (1835) directly learns from the devil:  
 
I have been as well acquainted with your family as with ever a one among the Puritans; and 
that’s no trifle to say. I helped your grandfather, the constable, when he lashed the Quaker 
woman so smartly through the streets of Salem; and it was I that brought your father a pitch-
pine knot, kindled at my own hearth, to set fire to an Indian village, in King Philip’s war. 
They were my good friends, both.
118
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It is also Hawthorne, who, according to Leslie Fiedler, is the first American author to 
identify the Puritan experience as a Faustian pact.
119
 When Brown writes, drawing 
from E. M. Butler, that “[t]he Lutheran notion of inescapable damnation takes over 
the Faust legend and makes it a profound symbol of modern man”,120 he describes the 
same power of blackness Melville identified in Hawthorne’s writings, a power that  
 
derives its force from its appeal to that Calvinistic sense of Innate Depravity and Original Sin, 
from whose visitations, in some shape or other, no deeply thinking mind is always and wholly 
free.
121
  
 
Faced with a world in which all that purports to be in the service of good secretly 
serves the adversary, a world where Christ ultimately might as well be the devil, then, 
“then only Faustian doubt can deliver us from the ultimate con game, the trap of 
religious belief”, as Fiedler notes in his discussion of Melville’s The Confidence Man 
(1857).
122
 This is certainly one reason why Hawthorne and Melville embarked on 
challenging orthodox claims by capitalising on wickedness and hell-fire, as 
epitomised in the secret motto of Moby Dick (1851), as well as on the devil’s talent 
for inducing doubt and ambiguity in seemingly self-evident and indisputable matters.  
 
 
2. Faustus Returns: Modern American Faustiana   
No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but 
there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. 
—Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics
123
 
 
After its initial reception in the 1600s, interest in Faust was renewed when Faust 
farces and puppet plays regained the stage and Gothic romances, such as Beckford’s 
Vathek (1786) and Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer, became popular. As Cathy 
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Waegner observes, together “with a growing adaptation of the Faustian archetype in 
the first half of the nineteenth century went the reception of Goethe’s Faust I” that led 
to the so-called Faust Renaissance in the 1830s and 40s.
124
 Edward Everett and 
George Ticknor of Harvard University gave lectures on the play and published 
criticism in the North American Review, and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow worked 
extensively on Goethe. What is most remarkable, however, is the sheer wealth of 
translations and English adaptations.
125
 The popularity of the myth then intensified 
again by the middle of the twentieth century. Some of Schubert’s lieder were based on 
poems from the drama, several operas such as Berlioz’s La Damnation de Faust, 
Gounod’s Faust, and Boito’s Mefistofele became rapidly popular. A production of 
Gounod’s version was given at the opening of New York’s Metropolitan Opera in 
1883, and had such a long run that “New Yorkers started referring to their new theater 
as the Faustspielhaus”.126 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the events in Germany between 1933 and 
1945 lead to a transformation of the image of Faust so profound that, according to 
Pynchon critic David Cowart, Nazism came to replace the metaphysical evil of the 
religious tradition.
127
 Accordingly, after Faust had been put on trial in Mann’s 1947 
novel, the interest in the myth of the soul-seller seemed to be waning. “Since 1960, 
we seem to have moved on to some extent from the concept of the great global crisis, 
and perhaps feel less need for symbolic figures representing Man wrestling with his 
demons”, André Dabezies wrote at the end of a century that must have surely wished 
to leave its struggles behind.
128
 However, this statement neither fully acknowledges 
the transformations of the Faust myth in the 1960s nor its re-emergence in America 
that dissociated Faust from Romantic tropes and national stereotypes. Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki had made clear that mankind’s bargaining with the devil was not restricted 
to Fascist Europe. Moreover, there was also an increasing awareness that Germany’s 
fatal convergence of technological expertise and irrationalism were to be found in 
other settings as well. Thus, a range of thinkers, from Karl Schapiro to Brown, was 
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reluctant to let Germany carry “all the sins of the Western world” (LD, 15).129 
Since the myth describes a “revolt against human limitations”, 130  it is easy to 
conceive of the well-attested hostility of American culture against “the idea of limit” 
as Faustian.
131
 Yet if aspects reflected in early Faustian texts “vary with the relative 
status accorded to man and his intellect, compared with the value placed on obedience 
to the prevailing hegemony, whether of church or state”, twentieth-century American 
Faustiana betray a striking consistency as regards the latter, partly because of the 
increasing reception of Faust II that lent itself to socio-economic readings and made 
the myth available as a yardstick for American conditions.
132
 The basic proposition of 
the drama is retained, and so is the new image of Faust as a representative of a 
prevailing hegemony pursuing supremacy at unjustifiable costs. Max Lerner, for 
instance, in America as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States Today 
(1957), saw Americans as a mixture between Tamerlane and Faust, while Brown, in 
Life Against Death, measured the devilish qualities of the Protestant ethic by means of 
the myth. While Goethe, Hawthorne, and Melville play a crucial part in such 
reassessments, their most influential source was certainly, although paradoxically, 
Spengler.
133
 The “systemic nature” of the latter’s portrait of Western Faustianism was 
deemed suitable as a description of the United States, since these, according to 
Weber, “represented the ‘highest development’ of the decline of the West into the 
controlled frenzy of producing wealth as an end in itself”.134 This was most appealing 
to those who “found evidence throughout the affluent society of a grand design in 
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which science and technology were combining to dominate, decode and finally copy 
the natural world itself”.135 Thus, Spengler’s suggestions found correlatives in various 
works written in the 1960s and 70s, from Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964) to 
Andrew Hacker’s The End of the American Era (1970), who share with the 
philosopher the suspicion that Western history may not be progressive but rather a 
“falling away from innocence into routine, mechanization and chaos”.136 Spenglerian 
thought is also strongly present in American fiction from the 1920s onwards, from 
John Dos Passos’s Manhattan Transfer (1925) and Henry Miller’s The Tropic of 
Capricorn (1934) to Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1962).137 As 
John Lardas has shown in his treatment of the religious vision of Kerouac, Ginsberg, 
and Burroughs, Spengler was no less influential for the Beat Generation.
138
 The most 
explicit use of the Faust myth amongst the Beats can be found in Jack Kerouac, who 
fused his perusal of the German philosopher of history with that of Goethe in Doctor 
Sax: Faust Part Three (1959), an autobiographic coming of age novel, written, as 
James T. Jones notes, “to represent the state of the soul in the twentieth century, 
specifically in ‘America the final home of Faust’”.139 Kerouac’s romanticised image 
of Fellahin culture, however, and his concluding suggestion that the “universe 
disposes of its own evil”, is far more optimistic than Gaddis’s or Pynchon’s, who 
were in fact familiar with Spengler’s apocalyptic narrative.140 Gaddis had read The 
Decline of the West at the age of twenty and was overwhelmed by the latter’s 
worldview.
141
 Such visions of doom also appealed to Pynchon,
142
 not only to his 
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juvenile fascination with “any idea of mass destruction or decline” but also his 
concerns with Puritan sensibilities.
143
 As Spengler writes: 
 
The Predestination doctrine of Calvin and Pascal—who […] dared to draw the causal 
conclusion from Augustinian dialectic—is the necessary absurdity to which the pursuit of these 
secrets by reason leads. They lost the destiny-logic of the world-becoming and found 
themselves in the causal logic of notion and law; they left the realm of direct intuitive vision for 
that of a mechanical system of objects. […] in this wise the Destiny idea—in the language of 
religion, God’s Providence—[…] is made to appear as a nature-force that is bound by 
irrevocable law and to turn the religious world-picture into a rigid and gloomy system of 
machinery. And yet was it not a Destiny again […] that the English Puritans, who were filled 
with this conviction, were ruined not through any passive self-surrender but through their hearty 
and vigorous certainty that their will was the will of God? (DW, 1:141) 
 
 
3. Max Weber, Eric Voegelin, and the Underbelly of Puritanism  
As argued, and yet to be demonstrated, especially the Faustiana of Gaddis and 
Pynchon draw from a legacy of the myth that by no means argues from a Protestant 
point of view but turns the table in the dialectic of demonization by questioning the 
relations between Puritan theology, materialism, and politics. As regards this 
characteristic, connections to Goethe, Spengler, and Mann cannot be overlooked. Yet 
there are also strong currents of socio-political thought in the work of both authors 
that critically negotiate those ‘civil theologies’ that acquired dominant status in the 
U.S. Specifically the works of Max Weber and the political philosopher Eric Voegelin 
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are crucial in this context, not only because they treat the American model as 
symptomatic of Western civilization but also, as I content, because they need to be 
read as complementary to the Faustian narrative derived from Goethe and Spengler. 
In the following I will therefore briefly (and anachronistically) discuss the socio-
economic dimension of Puritanism, that is, firstly its political agenda as formulated by 
Voegelin, and secondly its “economy of individual salvation” that developed into the 
spirit of capitalism, as famously described by Weber.
144
 
Following Weber, and less explicitly Spengler, Voegelin presented the history of 
modernity as a “history of collapse”.145 He considers the essence of modernity as a 
progressive institutionalisation of ‘political’ or ‘inner-worldly’ religions, which he 
later termed ‘Gnostic’, that is, religious groups that do not find their “realissimum in 
the ground of the world” but discover the divine in “partial contents of the world”.146 
This shift, as he argues, was caused by the self-destruction of medieval philosophy 
and the Church’s loss of its claim on spiritual leadership to spiritually retrogressive 
(later secularised) ‘sects’. Through the latter’s “immanentisation of the eschaton”, that 
is, the interpretation of the symbols of Christian civilization as experiences to be 
realised within the world, the State becomes the truly ‘real’ that endows humans with 
a sense of life that is part of a supra-human reality, a community of the ‘people of 
God’. Since intramundane salvation was the prime objective of Voegelin’s Gnostics, 
they most efficiently “released human forces for the building of a civilization”,147 a 
process he describes in his introduction to The Political Religions as “religiously evil, 
Satanic”.148 Such ‘Satanism’, he argued, could not only be found in the rationales of 
Joachim de Flora or milleniaristic groups such as the Münster Anabaptists but most 
explicitly among English Puritans.  
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If it has become a commonplace to hold that the offspring of Protestantism helped 
to shape the subjective consciousness necessary for modernity as regards economics 
and empirical sciences, Voegelin argued that Hooker, Winthrop and their 
contemporaries also helped to shape what Milan Zafiriovski calls the spirit of 
authoritarianism, a “practice of total or absolute mastery of the social and natural 
world” that ultimately became “authoritarian rule or domination”. 149  In The New 
Science of Politics, Voegelin describes the establishment of the denomination as a 
crude political manoeuvre of that sort: in order to challenge the old government, 
Puritans demonized it while presenting themselves as good. If the old government is 
of the devil, then social evils cannot be reformed and defects of the government 
cannot be repaired, which leaves no other option than revolution.
150
 In order to 
represent themselves as a redemptive institution, however, the Puritans depended on 
the authority of the Bible. Where the Scripture deviated from their image, it had to be 
made compatible. This appropriation necessitated a Gnostic step of positing that only 
those inspired by the Holy Ghost are able to understand it properly, which in turn 
resulted in a division between the elect and the ignorant rest.
151
 The propagandistic 
message entailed in such a division, a characteristic shared by Gnostic religions, is of 
immense appeal, as Giovanni Filoramo summarises:  
 
disengage yourself from the mass doomed to perdition; disengage yourself from those groups, 
the psychics, who claim to regulate the salvation of the masses; become one of us, join the 
club of elect souls predestined to salvation.
152
  
 
With increasing secularisation, as Voegelin argues, the theocratic structures and 
polarities of the community of “God’s people” remained while the contents changed 
from a universal kingdom with God as the peak of the hierarchy into the direction 
prefigured by the Leviathan, setting the “‘command of God’ […] synonymous with 
inner-worldly formulas such as ‘command of history’, ‘historical destiny’, ‘command 
of blood’”.153 As the latter terms indicate, Voegelin perceived “the totalitarianism of 
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our time”, Fascism and Communism, as the endpoints of the Puritan “search for a 
civil theology”,154 and despite his apodictic diction, his and more tenable analyses (by 
Shmuel Eisenstadt, Michael Walzer, or Zafirovski) have identified enough parallels to 
argue that the (secularised) manifestations of Puritanism can indeed be read as 
correlates of Goethe’s builder and the Caesarianism of Spengler’s Faustian 
civilization.
155
 Hence, the intellectual groundwork is ready to hand for Gaddis, who 
identifies the all-too saintly Saints as demiurgic spirits in his mock-Gnostic 
appropriation of theological romances, and for Pynchon, who equates Puritanism with 
totalitarianism.
156
 
If Puritanism was outwardly authoritarian, it was no less so in terms of its internal 
politics, that is, its distinction between elect and reprobate. As Zafirovski argues, it is 
eventually the Puritan covenant in its interpretation by the elect that enabled the 
‘Saint’ to perform the total mastery of the social world.157 If according to the Lutheran 
doctrine of election there are no means whatsoever of “attaining the grace of god for 
those to whom God had decided to deny it”, then individuals were expected to submit 
fully to the ‘preordained’ status quo.158 The “individual should remain once and for 
all in the station and calling in which God had placed him, and should restrain his 
worldly activity within the limits imposed by his established station in life”.159 John 
Winthrop’s sermon “A Model of Christian Charity”, delivered on board the Arabella 
on 8 April 1630, implemented this social schism as one creed of the American arch-
pact. Yet again, with increasing secularisation there emerged a discrepancy between 
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the theological basis of the binary distinction and its actual socio-economic grounds.  
Especially in the latter respect, as Weber indicated, Puritanism betrayed a set of 
paradoxes no less dubious than those of Faust. When (Marlowe’s) Faust “renounces 
theology for the literary”, as Graham Hamill argues, he renounces the logic of the 
divine “gift and replaces it with the logic of endless exchange”, in which the soul 
becomes negotiable.
160
 In some sense this mirrors the Protestant emphasis on 
scripture that peaked in the authoritarian spirit of puritan “bibliocracies” in New 
England.
161
 Yet, there are more parallels. In his classic, although partly discredited 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber gives an account of the 
religious roots of modern occidental materialism. “The impulse of acquisition, pursuit 
of gain, of money” that encouraged the uniquely Western technical “utilization of 
scientific knowledge” and “rational capitalistic organization of free labour”, 162 
according to Weber, has nothing to do with capitalism per se but springs from 
Protestant religions, in which the idea of “good works” turned into an obligation to 
work as a sign of God’s grace. In Puritanism, to briefly present Weber’s hypothesis, 
every individual is predestined to either salvation or damnation. Although good works 
cannot merit salvation, their accumulation is a “technical means […] of getting rid of 
the fear of damnation”.163 Over the course of time the nature of good works assumed 
a purely economic character that became eventually identified with life itself: time is 
money, and the more the better. As Weber argued, at the turn of the twentieth century 
the spirit of religious asceticism had long vanished, but “capitalism, since it rests on 
mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer”, and material goods, what were 
once good works, “have gained an increasing and finally inexorable power over the 
lives of men”. 164  Brown summarises this in his psycho-historical reading, which 
resurfaces in Gravity’s Rainbow, as follows:  
 
Luther sees the final coming to power in this world of Satan in the coming to power of 
capitalism. The structure of the entire kingdom of Satan is essentially capitalistic: we are the 
Devil’s property. […] From the standpoint of original Protestant theology, the deification of 
capitalism and of the calling is the deification of the Devil, or at least an utter confusion 
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between God and the Devil. From the psychoanalytical point of view, if the Devil is Death, 
and if capitalism is the Devil, then modern Protestantism’s alliance with capitalism means its 
complete surrender to the death instinct. (LD, 221, 224) 
 
The American Faust myth also reflects a second aspect Weber identified in the 
secularised Protestant ethic. Weber thought he had discovered “not only an element 
contributing to the development of a unique spirit of modern capitalism but also a 
spiritual discipline of enormous consequence that transformed and fortified the 
natural self of the Puritan believer into a hardened tool of divine purpose”.165 While 
the illusion that accumulation could eventually vouchsafe salvation gradually 
diminished, the covenant also effectuated substantial social changes. The Puritans’ 
initial view of the New World, as David Mogen holds, was of a “wilderness where 
they would be severely tried, a land of darkness threatening to extinguish the 
precarious light of Christianity”.166 Walzer notes that the covenant gave the Saints “a 
sense of vocation and discipline which would free them” not only from perceived 
sinfulness but also from “the fear of disorder”.167 Since they “lived always on the very 
brink of chaos”, they “maintained their position only through a constant vigilance 
and, indeed, a constant warfare against their own natural inclinations”, 168  which 
fostered a spirit, a “psychotechnology” of systematic self-control, as it were,169 while 
institutionalising “suspicion and mutual surveillance” as a form of social compact.170 
The canon of Protestant virtues enabling such self-control (or self-repression, as 
Brown would have it) is amalgamated in Weber’s formula of worldly asceticism that 
stands at the cradle of modern economy. The journey’s end of this process is life in a 
‘Shell as Hard as Steel’ (or “Iron Cage”, as Talcott Parsons mistranslates), and the 
“mechanized petrification” of pure utilitarianism, of specialists without spirit “trapped 
in a socioeconomic structure of their own making”. 171  Whereas Faust willingly 
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renounces his spiritual integrity for the sake of (partly) imaginary powers, however, 
the descendants of the Saints are bereft of such choice. Weber writes:   
 
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was 
carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate world morality, it did 
its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now 
bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day 
determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism.
172
  
 
As I will argue in the following, Gaddis’s and Pynchon’s protagonists can be read as a 
reductio ad absurdum of these principles. Both Wyatt and Slothrop are born into an 
iron cage, an economic and industrial order as immobilising as the Puritan doctrines 
with which they are infused. Both follow a peculiar ‘calling’, in which they subject 
themselves to the coordinates laid out by their Puritan origins.
173
 In submitting 
themselves to soteriological quests (in Wyatt’s case to redeem art, in Slothrop’s to 
redeem the accumulated guilt of his ancestors), they perpetuate the very values and 
principles prescribed by the religious indoctrination they so eagerly want to abandon, 
while being unable to come out of their “own vain shell” (TR, 690). Gaddis and 
Pynchon present one of the pitfalls of Puritan self-discipline here, the Icarus-flight of 
selves drawing strength from a pact with an imaginary force that allows them to 
pursue their visions of transcending limitations. This pursuit, however, engenders 
nothing but isolation and alienation. The Recognitions and Gravity’s Rainbow 
therefore negotiate to a remarkable degree an observation addressed in Mann’s Magic 
Mountain and Doctor Faustus. As Mann summarised the gist of the two novels in his 
essay “My Times”: 
 
there is a real question whether man, for the sake of his intellectual and metaphysical security, 
would not rather have terror than freedom.
174
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Such an agenda is discernible in both characters’ quests: the inability to live in the 
open, the preference to inhabit a closed system of religion or paranoia (the difference 
between which is not essential in both works), deeming themselves damned, suffering 
from the dualism inscribed by the doctrine of unconditional election, yet perpetuating 
it to the point of breakdown. The epigraph of the first part of The Recognitions—“Es 
wird ein Mensch gemacht” (TR, 3)—already hints at such life in a closed circuit by 
referring to the homunculus in Goethe’s Faust, a product of cold science, a pure spirit 
unable (but longing) to exist outside the vas hermetica.
 
The same holds for the 
multitude of disenchanted ‘young professionals’ in Gravity’s Rainbow. 175 The 
distinctly Weberian touch of this wager is owed, as discussed, to particular American 
circumstances but also prefigured in Mann’s Doctor Faustus, the wish to ‘break 
through’, to escape a world that is perceived to be stagnated, disenchanted, and 
exhausted, a wish to engage in something ‘meaningful’, even if it is offered by the 
devil. Rather than making a perpetual effort to become integrated beings, however, 
both Wyatt and Slothrop will engage in a Faustian wager in order to overcome their 
limitations before eventually deciding to “live deliberately” (TR, 900) or become a 
vital multiplicity of “offshoots” (GR, 742). 
Since I argue that the ‘key’ to the mythography of Gaddis and Pynchon is, like in 
Mann, an amalgamation of concepts by Goethe, Spengler, and Weber, this brief 
outline provides the coordinates of my following analyses. After tracing how both 
portray a world bent towards death and decline, I will examine their characters’ fatal 
bargains before showing how they indicate ways of humane development. 
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Part II: Faustian Themes in William Gaddis’s The Recognitions 
 
Chapter 3: Heretical Negotiations in the Work of William Gaddis 
I thought I was the first one to discover that the 
world was filled with false values and I was 
going to tell them. 
—William Gaddis176 
 
The employment of Faustian themes in Gaddis’s “bop version” (TR, 661) of the myth 
has hitherto been neglected, if not dismissed in literary scholarship.
177
 John Johnston, 
for instance, denies the integral relevance of the Faust theme, arguing instead for a 
Deleuzian aesthetic of repetition and difference in which the myth is marginalised to 
one of many.
178
 Klaus Benesch similarly holds:  
 
even though the search for redemption (in the Clementine Recognitions) and the search for 
truth (in the Faust legend) constitute important undercurrents in Gaddis’s text, the novel as a 
whole seems to be driven more specifically by a self-reflexive inquiry into the wide-ranging 
ramifications of repetition/recognition as pivotal techniques in the cultural accretion of 
knowledge.
179
  
 
What both critics neglect is not just the fact that Gaddis employs the Faust theme 
consistently throughout the novel, even though its better known versions only surface 
intermittently. The myth, I contend, is crucial as regards the theme of accruing 
knowledge, especially in terms of the interrelation of unstable epistemological 
frameworks and ethics that is also highlighted in Gaddis’s affinity with Hans 
Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if’.180 As shown in the first part of my thesis, the Faust 
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myth can neither be fully conceptualised as a quest for truth nor as an interaction with 
a devil of sorts. Its modern varieties are not primarily religiously biased negotiations 
of heresies but about the achievement of human supremacy and perfection by means 
of techniques at the cost of the conditio humana itself. The latter exactly describes 
Gaddis’s basic concerns. As the author notes, The Recognitions was an “attempt to set 
the then current life in a large perspective”, and I argue that the Faust myth plays a 
pivotal role in this agenda.
181
 It does not only set into perspective the ascent of the 
Apollonian age, the height of which Pynchon later describes in Gravity’s Rainbow.182 
It also provides a key angle for assessing the demise of Gaddis’s artist figures, who 
have long been mistaken for as advocates of his own aesthetic or innocent victims of 
the logic of capital. Gaddis, again, stated in an interview: “The suggestion that I write 
about business destroying the innocent artist is simplistic”, adding that any attentive 
reader will notice that his “artists [are] digging their own grave”.183 They most often 
do so by conning themselves into complicity with the commodity based systems and 
‘grab-all-you-can’ mentality of a society that has exchanged “the remnants of the 
things worth being for those presumably worth having”.184 As I will argue in my 
analysis of The Recognitions, this insight is not only exemplified in the rise and fall of 
the novel’s protagonist, the painter Wyatt Gwyon, but is also the basic narrative of 
Goethe’s Faust, the individual working with the dominant forces of one’s time toward 
one’s peril while deeming oneself in the service of a higher cause. 
After briefly treating Gaddis’s conception of myth and The Recognitions as a ‘last 
Christian novel’, I will therefore discuss his use of the two main narrative templates 
between which the novel’s perspective shifts, that is, the Pseudo-Clementine 
Recognitions and Goethe’s Faust.185 The first part of my analysis focuses on Gaddis’s 
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satiric take on religious soteriology. Discussing his employment of the ‘oldest 
version’ of the Faust myth, I argue that The Recognitions subverts Christian and 
particularly Puritan soteriological dogmata. It thereby satirises orthodox claims, be 
they formulated by Saint Paul or the Synod of Dort, but also offers itself to be read as 
an ideological inversion of the Faust myth. 
The second part of my analysis is a close reading of Wyatt’s bargain with a ring of 
art dealers. After briefly examining Gaddis’s own assessment of art production among 
his contemporaries, in which a sense of artistic community and inspiration are 
sacrificed for the cult of personality and originality, I show how The Recognitions 
conveys a Spenglerian vision of the U.S. post-war metropolitan art world that draws 
its material mainly from Huizinga. Synthesising the artistic and religious dimension, I 
will then point to intersections with the central concerns of Mann’s Doctor Faustus 
and argue that Wyatt’s wager is strikingly close to that of the latter’s protagonist, the 
composer Adrian Leverkühn. Wyatt’s deal with the devils of materialism does not 
only enable him to overcome an impasse of art production and his own limitations. 
With his paranoid recreation of the Flemish Primitives’ work ethic he aspires to ‘forge 
gold’, to redeem art from its status as a commodity, and by doing so he also intends to 
redeem his own ‘fallen’ self. In his bargain, however, he will remain within the 
Puritan coordinates he has come to detest through his upbringing and, even more so, 
be fully complicit with the capitalist principles against which he purportedly acts. 
In a concluding section I will show how The Recognitions then merges the stories 
of Faust and the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions in order to model the painter’s 
‘salvation’. Here I show how Gaddis ironically depicts Wyatt’s abandonment of the 
need to atone for his sense of depravity in an instance of ‘redeeming love’ that 
triggers his ‘metanoia’, a conscious turn from both his New England past and life in 
the ivory tower of art. Relating this turn with his newly discovered practice of 
‘restoring’ old masterpieces, I argue that the novel ambiguously depicts this move 
both as a liberating gesture that paves way to existential openness and as a 
destabilising dismissal of epistemological frameworks. 
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1. Faustian Layers 
Und Faust ist nicht mein wahres Ich. 
—Nikolaus Lenau, Faust186 
 
In some senses, Faust can be said to be a guiding myth for almost the entirety of 
Gaddis’s oeuvre, and even his modus operandi resembled Goethe’s life-long labour 
on Faust.
187
 The former’s artistically productive interest in the soul-seller can be 
traced to his earliest literary works. Agrippa’s On the Vanity and Incertitude of all the 
Arts and Sciences (1530), which stands behind Faust’s first monologue, for instance, 
is reflected in various forms of Gaddis’s lasting discontent with capitalised reason. 
Several poems published in the Harvard Lampoon bear witness to the ‘madness’ of a 
world “governed entirely by science” and knowledge for knowledge’s sake, that is, 
without values.
188
 The myth here becomes a blueprint for the fatal quest for 
knowledge, be it inside or outside sanctioned avenues: “From dreams of god-like 
knowledge you will wake/ To fear, in which your very soul shall quake”.189 Gaddis’s 
first treatment of Faust is his poem “Non Disputandum”, which appeared in the June 
1944 edition of the Harvard Lampoon, not long before he left university without a 
degree: 
 
Could I sell my illusive soul 
And draw my name upon the scroll        
Of Mephistopheles, 
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To gambol as did Goethe’s Faust       
Remain perpetually soused        
Sans limits, sans degrees, 
 
I’d seek his stygian address, 
Assail the gates, demand access        
To pleasure sempiternal; 
 
Then live incessantly in lust,        
Devour the cake, abjure the crust,       
Plunge in deceit diurnal; 
 
Cavort relentlessly in sin,        
And laugh and love, and frail and spin       
To pay the toll. 
 
But life’s insidious demand        
Prevails; there is no devil, and        
I have no soul.
190
 
 
Most fascinating about these adolescent tercets are the first and last stanzas, the 
renunciation of metaphysical concepts of evil and human essence. One can also 
already see an ironic inversion of the myth and with that the nucleus of the parody 
that was to form the core of The Recognitions. As Gaddis writes: “When I started this 
thing … it was to be a good deal shorter, and quite explicitly a parody on the FAUST 
story, except the artist taking the place of the learned doctor”.191 As to why he chose 
Goethe’s epic poem, Gaddis noted:  
 
…  in this story I think the Faust theme is obvious, isn’t it? Here’s the man, perfectly 
prepared but unsatisfied with possible outlets; sold over to sinful comission sic  that is, to 
falsifying art which is the thing he holds most sacred so it is the most evil he can do; with his 
mind corrupting Esme until she is lost; damned himself; and at last redeemed through love 
[…]
192
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This parody was originally to end on such an explicitly redemptive note, but at a later 
stage Gaddis cut out the child “who was to represent purity (like Helen of Troy in 
Faust), and reduced Esme to a suggestion of the innocence which (as with Gretchen) 
could have redeemed Wyatt”.193 While these alterations may have obscured to some 
extent the underlying narrative of both parts of Faust, the Goethean core was also 
supplemented by other texts associated with soul selling and questing. The most 
palpable of these are: The Recognitions of Clement, Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor 
Faustus, Henrik Ibsen’s Peer Gynt, and C. G. Jung’s The Integration of the 
Personality.
194
 As regards these, the data from Moore’s Reader’s Guide provides a 
fairly comprehensive picture: there are less than ten references to the Pseudo-
Clementine Recognitions, about four to Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus and about twenty 
to Goethe’s text.195 The Recognitions of Clement occur in two epigraphs and a few 
quotations in the main text, all of which focus the theme of salvation and are strongly 
associated with the bargain inspired by Goethe’s drama.196 Several more allusions 
refer to St. Clement of Rome and his papal monogram (an anchor). References to 
Marlowe’s text predominantly occur in chapters II.2 and II.3, mostly in association 
with the Seven Deadly Sins (covetousness in particular). Allusions to Faust are 
similarly featured in the chapters with Brown and Valentine, although some occur 
outside the central axis of the novel but spread further out, comprising a wide variety 
of alterations. Elements from Peer Gynt appear mostly in association with the art 
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dealer Recktall Brown (half Mephistopheles, half Ibsen’s troll king) and Wyatt’s 
deluded perception, a feature that is, in turn, related to Goethe’s blind protagonist. 
Marlowe’s and Goethe’s texts are less directly featured in the last part of the novel. 
Although Ibsen’s is still referred to, the focus is shifted to Pseudo-Clemente and 
several catchphrases from Jungian psycho-alchemy, which extensively draws from 
Jung’s reading of Goethe. In brief, the revised novel was to display: 
 
Also the Flying Dutchman, condemned to sail without ever making port. 
Also the hero of the Odyssey, but here a no-hero on a voyage no-voyage to a Penelope no-
Penelope until he finds her. 
 Also Peer Gynt, and his Where have I been all this time? 
Also and most importantly Christ, but here suffering death-in-life, and resurrection, that is! 
the guilty idealism at first; the crash of personality; then, the two brought together (not 
compromised) through love […]
197
   
 
However, rather than readily dismissing elements of the myth in The Recognitions as 
more or less relevant residues among “many myths of redemption”,198 I think the 
consistency with which so many echoes of Pseudo-Clemente, Marlowe, and Goethe 
are placed within the novel raises serious doubts about the marginality of the myth. 
Given Gaddis’s concern with forgery and originality it is no wonder that he 
simultaneously exploits and subverts his sources by juxtaposing different versions of 
a myth that has hardly one ‘original’. More importantly, however, there is also a 
palpable relation to the interplay of quest motifs as prefigured in The Magic Mountain 
and later expounded on in Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow.199 Like Mann’s novel, The 
Recognitions can in fact be understood as a search for salvation.
200
 Like Hans Castorp 
and Tyrone Slothrop, Wyatt pursues the purest and highest, a mode of perfection 
described in alchemical terms as the lapis philosophorum or, in his words, the forging 
                                                 
197
 Gaddis working notes, cited in Koenig, Splinters, 66. 
198
 Ibid., 30. 
199
 I will discuss this relation in detail in the context of Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow. Gaddis was in 
possession of a 1927 edition of Mann’s novel, but it is beyond my knowledge whether he had read it 
before or while composing The Recognitions. Similarly, although Gaddis was familiar with the Atlantic 
Monthly, which had published his “‘Stop Player. Joke No. 4.’” in 1951, I could not ascertain whether 
he was familiar with Mann’s essay “The Making of the Magic Mountain” (discussed later), which 
appeared in the same periodical in 1953. 
200
 Gaddis writes in a working note: “since the whole of the thing [The Recognitions] argues against the 
Reasonable pragmatic dismissal of history without real sin or real salvation which we’ve managed, and 
the no-hero’s story is one of working out a number of myths to redemption, the RECOGNITIONS is a 
direct reflection, or recognition, of this. His work is recognition, which is what art is I believe” (cited in 
Koenig, Splinters, 66). 
 58 
of gold (TR, 689). Yet, whereas Mann and Pynchon present their initiates as more 
(Castorp) or less (Slothrop) innocent fools, Gaddis’s painter pursues his quest for 
redemption in a manner akin to that of Mann’s Faustian composer Leverkühn. In 
order to substantiate this claim, and since an adequate representation of the socio-
cultural economies of Gaddis’s novel is unfeasible without a treatment of its 
theological dimension, I will first examine the latter before turning to Wyatt’s failed 
endeavour to redeem what he perceives to be fallen art. I will start my analysis with a 
brief discussion of the soteriological trench fights in Gaddis’s first Faustian source. 
 
 
2. Quests for Salvation: The Recognitions of Clement 
–Scatological?  
–Eschatological, the doctrine of last things … 
–Good lord, Willie, you are drunk. Either that or you’re 
writing for a very small audience. 
—William Gaddis, The Recognitions201 
 
Gaddis’s earliest source associated with the Faust myth is certainly not merely “talk, 
talk, talk” (TR, 372) as one of his characters suggests. Although Clement is posited as 
a protagonist, it soon transpires that he is much more a trajectory for the reader’s 
identification, an exemplary test case in eschatology, for the Pseudo-Clementine 
Recognitions are less about an individual’s struggle for salvation than a thorough 
negotiation of rivalling systems of belief represented by Clement’s guide Saint Peter 
and the latter’s adversary, the ‘father of all heretics’, Gnostic Simon Magus.202  
Over ten books the reader follows the voyages of Clement. The Roman’s doubts 
over whether there is life after death have him first seek consolation in philosophy. 
Dissatisfied with what the discipline has to offer, however, he turns from the vain 
science and tries to verify the immortality of his soul as follows:  
 
I shall proceed to Egypt, and there I shall cultivate the friendship of the hierophants or 
prophets, who preside at the shrines.  Then I shall win over a magician by money, and entreat 
him, by what they call the necromantic art, to bring me a soul from the infernal regions, as if I 
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were desirous of consulting it about some business. But this shall be my consultation, whether 
the soul be immortal.
203
 
 
Before actually pursuing such pagan lapse, Clement hears of the Messiah’s promise to 
give “eternal life to every one who will hear Him” (CR, 147). Thus, he wanders 
toward Judea and, as Christ is not to be found, eventually makes acquaintance with 
Peter, who systematically instructs him in the doctrines of Christianity, including 
harsh refutations of Jews, Pharisees and Samaritans. The main body of the text then 
serves as a verbal exemplification of the latter as it mainly encompasses Peter’s public 
disputations with Simon of Samaria (Simon Magus), in which the Christian version is 
demonstrated to be superior to Gnostic beliefs. From Orphic rites to matters of 
astrological predetermination, any rival system is refuted as an expression of “folly”, 
“ignorance”, “presumption”, “evil” and “drunkenness”. Predictably, the comparison 
between Peter and Simon strongly disfavours the Gnostic, for as much Peter is cordial 
and modest, so is Simon portrayed as the great antagonist, power-monger and 
demonic magician, wicked and vain, whose repetitively paratactic boasting 
culminates in an expression of uttermost self-deification, the hubristic claim of man to 
be God: 
 
I can change my countenance, so that I cannot be recognised; but I can show people that I 
have two faces. I shall change myself into a sheep or a goat; I shall make a beard to grow 
upon little boys; I shall ascend by flight into the air; I shall exhibit abundance of gold, and 
shall make and unmake kings. I shall be worshipped as God […] (CR, 198) 
 
With such a gesture he not only prefigures a motif recurrent in Faust texts;
 204
 he also 
presents an attractive alternative to Christian soteriology. His account unfolds as 
follows:  
 
Simon took Luna to himself; and with her he still goes about, as you see, deceiving 
multitudes, and asserting that he himself is a certain power which is above God the Creator, 
while Luna, who is with him, has been brought down from the higher heavens, and that she is 
Wisdom, the mother of all things, for whom, says he, the Greeks and barbarians contending, 
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were able in some measure to see an image of her; but of herself, as she is, as the dweller with 
the first and only God, they were wholly ignorant. (CR, 199)
205
 
 
The doctrinal import of this “piece of showmanship”, of going about with Wisdom 
brought down from heaven, becomes apparent in other versions of Simon’s account: 
 
…  he took with him a woman called Helena whom he said he had found in a brothel in Tyre 
and who according to him was the latest and lowliest incarnation of the fallen “Thought” of 
God, redeemed by him and a means of redemption for all who believed in them both.
206
 
 
As impressive as this might be, Simon cannot convince the Christians, and he is 
quickly discredited (spiritually and personally) and flees. Only well into the second 
half of the text is another theme introduced. Clement gives an account of his youth 
from which one learns that his mother Matthidia followed a horrible vision and went 
into hiding with his twin brothers Faustinus and Faustus.
207
 His sorrowful father 
Faustianus followed them, leaving Clement behind. On hearing the story, the 
Christian prophet offers help in reuniting the family. The reestablishment of familial 
bonds now becomes the explicit goal. The spiritual counterpart of travel, however, the 
voyage to salvation, remains a remarkably dominant ‘subplot’, for only the aid of 
Saint Peter leads to the recognition of kin, effectively rendering true faith a 
precondition of personal consolation and social practice (i.e. the acknowledgement of 
one’s ‘neighbour’). Clement soon finds the mother and the twins in the foreign lands. 
Not much later they also encounter the father, but before their final recognition the 
voyagers are engaged in yet further discussions with heretics, to finally encounter 
Simon Magus again. As one of his last ‘tricks’ the magus projects his face onto 
Clemet’s father so that Faustianus cannot be recognised by his family. When the 
Gnostic is finally defeated and, thanks to Peter’s theological superiority and 
benevolence, regrets his presumption, he wants to undo his spell, however, only to see 
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that the father’s face has already been restored through the accomplishment of Christ 
(CR, 468). When Faustianus regains his own face and the family is reunited for good, 
Simon himself is crudely defaced. Ironic as regards the latter, as John Sutter notes, 
certainly is that “another of Gaddis’s sources for The Recognitions argues that the 
Simon Magus of the Clementine Recognitions is [Saint] Paul ‘under a mask’”.208 
 
 
3. Sacrilege in the Service of Its Adversary  
If American post-war society represents a world in which everything that poses as 
good is in the service of the ‘adversary’, it is no wonder that Gaddis employs a great 
deal of ‘wickedness’ and ‘hell fire’ like Hawthorne and Melville. In 1927, T. S. Eliot 
wrote that the blasphemy so crucial to Christopher Marlowe’s work necessarily 
implies belief: “But Marlowe, the most thoughtful, the most blasphemous (and, 
therefore, probably the most Christian) of his contemporaries, is always an 
exception”. 209  In an unused prefatory note to The Recognitions Gaddis directly 
reflects on Eliot’s remark: 
 
Then, what is sacrilege? If it is nothing more than a rebellion against dogma, it is eventually 
as meaningless as the dogma it defies. …  Only a religious person can perpetrate sacrilege: 
and if its blasphemy reaches the heart of the question; if it investigates deeply enough to 
unfold, not the pattern, but the materials of the pattern, and the necessity of a pattern; if it 
questions so deeply that the doubt it arouses is frightening and cannot be dismissed; then it has 
done its true sacrilegious work, in the service of its adversary: the only service that nihilism 
can ever perform.
210
  
 
Gaddis, as Knight observes, tends to “approach the positive via the avenue of the 
negative”.211 Such a strategy is first and foremost manifest in The Recognitions in the 
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plethora of artistic and personal failures this narrative encyclopaedia of collapse 
depicts. It is even also so manifest in Gaddis’s use of black humour, but most 
explicitly in his fondness for aporia.
212
 As he explains: 
 
NEW (for me) WORD: APORIA (from a Gertrude Himmelfarb review)/ ‘difference, 
discontinuity, disparity, contradiction, discord, ambiguity, irony, paradox, perversity, opacity, 
obscurity, anarchy, chaos’/ LONG LIVE!213 
 
But despite such heretical turbulences, one should not interpret Gaddis’s intention to 
write the “last Christian” novel “solely as an emancipatory gesture”, as Birger 
Vanwesenbeeck argues, for too many textual indicators suggest the opposite, not least 
the fact that he borrowed for his own services the title of the “first Christian novel” 
(TR, 373), as one of his characters calls the theological romance.
214
 Even if Gaddis 
attempts nothing less than to debunk religious grand narratives, he conveys a sense of 
admiration for the past. And even though he does question the sanity of those 
concocting soteriological fictions as tools of sovereignty, be it Saint Paul’s vision or 
Puritan doctrines of salvation, he does not abandon the search for transcendence and 
thereby does not dismiss the latter entirely as a form of ‘escape’, as I would argue 
Pynchon does.
215
 The Recognitions, as Vanwesenbeeck notes, follows  
                                                                                                                                           
regards specific sensibilities (a certain exuberance, sense of mystery, and veneration of the past), both 
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an eschatological poetics that constitutes as much a heretical gesture bent on provocation as 
that it reflects an attempt to ground oneself within a pre-existing literary tradition, no matter 
how ill- or non-defined.
216
  
 
As further representatives of this tradition one could mention Spengler, Huizinga, and 
partly Graves, who all describe the ‘end of something’, but also certainly Goethe, 
whose Faust, as argued, describes in the emergent modern world system the decline 
of an older order. It is no surprise that Gaddis, who held that he was writing the last 
Christian novel, does not unconditionally laud the ‘new’ but presents the American 
socio-cultural transformations after the Second World War with a nostalgic tenor. 
What the novel laments, as Christopher Knight argues, is the loss of a cultural grand 
narrative.
217
 To the same degree it pillories a form of social entropy, the eradication of 
a sense of togetherness in one’s work and life and the systematic undermining of 
possibilities of connecting to a “self who can do more” (TR, 253) in a socio-cultural 
simulacrum solely determined by instrumental rationality and economic principles. 
While Gaddis draws from versions of the Faust myth in order to characterise these 
transformations in religious and mythical terms, he substantially uses Huizinga in 
order to contextualise them culturally. His implied correlation between the emergent 
Renaissance and the art world in post-war America thereby also provides an answer to 
why the Faust myth is selected as the novel’s core. Both periods are characterised by 
a sense of loss, the exhaustion of creative possibilities, the failure of epistemological 
frameworks, and not least a shift from ‘authentic’ art of social and spiritual import 
toward reckless individualism and the fake. In this context, Faust does not only 
represent a model of the deluded overreacher who succumbs to carnal pleasures and 
simulacra. The Faustian search for self-made redemption, the transcendence of one’s 
own limitations, is also presented as a symptom of the sensitive mind in search for a 
better life, the desperate grasping of an individual that has lost credulity in the order 
of things. Thus, even if Gaddis’s attempt at writing the last Christian novel appears no 
less hubristic than the flight of the magus, it still suggests a longing for a holistic 
universe; it is, to use one of its character’s words, “not entirely a pose” (TR, 651). 
                                                                                                                                           
crucifixion and resurrection, but upon a theory taken from a hallucination of these improbable events” 
(“The Recognitions and Carpenter’s Gothic”, 118). 
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The most crucial difference between the ‘first’ and ‘last’ Christian novel however, 
is the latter’s aversion of absolutism. Just as one can identify in Pynchon a 
unconditioned refusal to subscribe to absolutisms and religious anti-intellectualism, 
Gaddis’s heretical destabilisations of reified doxa, be they religious or scientific, and 
his exploitation of the first Christian romance indeed challenges single visions and 
religious ‘myths’. Such multi-perspectival dialogue comes to the fore in Wyatt’s 
psychaomachia, as represented by three major characters of the novel, Wyatt’s 
Puritan aunt May, the materialistic art dealer Recktall Brown, and the art critic, lapsed 
Jesuit, and ascetic Gnostic Basil Valentine, who are equally decisive for the spiritual 
‘education’ of the young Clement/Faust. More crucially, however, Gaddis expounds 
and subverts the soteriological absolutisms conveyed in his source. As Kirsten 
Grimstad notes, the “heritage of Simon Magus consists of …  two opposing stories 
of damnation and redemption playing against one another”, with the Christian 
prevailing in the Pseudo-Clementines.
218
 Gaddis’s treatment, in contrast, is highly 
ambiguous, for despite the epigraph of the novel provided by the anti-heretic 
Irenaeus, there resides a devilish incertitude in the “pervasive system of equivocation, 
inversion, and paradox that permeates the very fabric” of his text.219 In his Outline of 
a Theory of Practice, Pierre Bourdieu gives a well-known definition of orthodoxy as a 
straightened opinion as opposed to heterodoxy, that is, the notion of competing 
possibilities that neither excludes choice (hairesis) nor an assessment of the sum total 
of alternatives not chosen.
220 
Such a definition already implies how orthodox claims 
of self-evidence and indisputability can be challenged: either by a critique of the ways 
that have been chosen or, more subversively, by retaining heresy (choice) on the 
horizon of perception through its circulation in the discursive field.
221
 Gaddis, 
following such principles, ensures to undermine seemingly self-evident notions ab 
ovo. The novel starts with an exemplary exercise in relativism with the account of the 
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death of Wyatt’s mother Camilla that satirises Puritan predestinationism by rendering 
her death and burial a farcical series of accidents. Camilla, as problematic a “virgin” 
mother as Mary in the Gospel of Truth (TR, 13), dies on a cruise: “On All Saint’s Day 
…  God boarded the Purdue Victory and acted: Camilla was stricken with acute 
appendicitis” (TR, 4). Despite the mock-providential tenor, it is unclear whether 
divine intervention or human failure eventually lead to the loss of her life, for the 
counterfeit ship’s doctor Sinisterra is far better in making the sign of the cross than in 
surgery (TR, 4-5). Camilla’s husband, Reverend Gwyon, does not want to transfer the 
corpse back to New England (an unthinkable lapse in the mind of his relatives), so 
that although her Protestant “cadaver was obviously heretical in origin” (TR, 6), she is 
nevertheless buried among Catholics in the Spanish town San Zwingli.
222
 The ironic 
compensation of this incident follows several hundred pages later in the novel with 
Camilla’s cockeyed canonisation. Since the graves are not labelled, her corpse is 
mistaken for the one of a “martyr”, a girl who was raped to death by a man who 
followed a superstitious account that venereal disease can be cured by sleeping with 
virgins. A similar relativism is exerted in the character of Reverend Gwyon. When he 
finds his son ill with fever and the doctors unable to procure a cure, he identifies the 
emblem of medicine, the caduceus as “the scepter of a pagan god, the scepter of 
Hermes. Hermes, the patron of eloquence and cunning, of trickery and theft, the very 
wand he carried when he conducted souls to Hell” (TR, 46).223 The irony in his tirade 
against ‘paganism’ is that he not only bears the name of the shape-shifter of Welsh 
myth, that is, that he himself is a pagan in disguise, but most of all that he later saves 
the life of his fatally ill son by sacrificing the Barbary ape Heracles in a Frazerian 
ritual of homeopathic magic.
224
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Although the sheer abundance of such twists spans over the whole encyclopaedia 
of ideas, from Averroes to Zoroaster, the most daring paradoxes in The Recognitions 
are found in the domain of doctrines of salvation. Gwyon’s ancestor, the missionary 
John H., for instance, had to hear from “Indians whose myth he had tried to replace 
with his own” that his version of the truth was “rank presumption” (TR, 8) before he 
was eaten, and Gwyon eagerly points out in one of his sermons that Moses is accused 
of witchcraft in the Koran (TR, 55, cf. 913). The guild of Flemish painters admired by 
Wyatt as a community of purists and redeemers, are identified as an association of 
philistine rent-a-painters obsessively trying to avert the horror vacui of a world 
without God’s graceful gaze. As amusing as these relations may be, they constantly 
urge us to reassess if not entirely abandon our notions of saintliness in Gaddis’s 
universe, in which not only the devil is the father of false art (TR, 646) and “the evil 
spirits practice mimicry” (TR, 535-36, 719) but in which Saints are counterfeits of 
Jesus and Jesus a counterfeit of God (TR, 483). Crucial in this respect are the two 
epigraphs taken from Pseudo-Clemente framing the Faust-core narrative of the novel. 
The first Pseudo-Clementine epigraph, taken from the section “Self-Love the 
Foundation of Goodness”, opens the chapter in which Wyatt and Brown agree on 
their collaboration (TR, 78). The passage reads: 
 
First of all, then, he is evil, in the judgment of God, who will not inquire what is advantageous 
to himself.  For how can any one love another, if he does not love himself?  Or to whom will 
that man not be an enemy, who cannot be a friend to himself?   In order, therefore, that there 
might be a distinction between those who choose good and those who choose evil, God has 
concealed that which is profitable to men , i.e., the possession of the kingdom of heaven, and 
has laid it up and hidden it as a secret treasure, so that no one can easily attain it by his own 
power or knowledge . (CR, 267)
 225
 
 
Naturally, since the competing systems of belief provide no space for rational 
argumentation, they can only operate along the coordinates of credulity and 
credibility. In the later chapters of book 3 of the Recognitions of Clement the problem 
is solved as Peter lays out the concept of Christian love, which does not conceal its 
characteristics of commoditisation: those who love the possession of heavenly 
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kingdom love God before everything else (CR, 267-8); those who have no affection 
for God and let him not enlighten their mind are placed in darkness and cannot see 
any light (CR, 273). What Peter thereby presents is an exemplary demonstration of 
the quid pro quo-triad of religious devotion, Divine grace, and recognition.
 
Gaddis satirises this bargain in a discussion between the Christian composer 
Stanley and his friend Anselm about Voltaire, which contains, not quite incidentally, a 
further reference to the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions:  
 
—but somewhere I came across some words of his, “If there were no God, it would be 
necessary to invent him” …  even Voltaire could see that some transcendent judgement is 
necessary, because nothing is self-sufficient, even art, and when art isn’t an expression of 
something higher, when it isn’t invested … , it breaks up into fragments that don’t have any 
meaning …  
—You sound like Simon Magus, invested, for Christ sake, Anselm said, putting a dirty hand 
on Stanley’s shoulder. (TR, 617) 
 
Anselm’s reply refers to a passage in the Recognitions where Simon’s followers are 
offered “to be invested with the highest honours” and “believed by men to be gods” 
(CR, 197) if they help him in satisfying his desire to be with the woman Luna. 
Anselm declares Stanley’s investment-gain analogy as “heretic” (TR, 617) since it is 
for him nothing else but an attempted acquisition of spiritual consolation. The 
allegation appears less paradoxical when one bears in mind that the text by Pseudo-
Clemente already depicts not only the namesake of Simony but also Clement’s less 
pious intention to bribe a magician in order to test the immortality of his own soul. 
Such examples, I think, are employed in order to suggest that refusing to bear 
existential uncertainty and succumbing to soteriological ‘commodity fetishism’ as an 
‘easy way out’ amounts to a Faustian bargain. The acquisition of a certitudo salutis 
means to forfeit one’s soul and is no less ‘vulgar’ and illusory than the bargains 
offered by Simon Magus or Mephistopheles. As the epigraph of the novel’s epilogue 
describing the breakdown of Stanley’s investment fiendishly states: “Aux Clients 
Reconnus Maladies l’ARGENT ne sera pas Remboursé—Notices posted in brothels, 
Rue de l’Aqueduct, Oran” (TR, 901).226 
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4. Contemporaries 
A lot of moderns make sudden changes dictated by the total uncertainty of 
what they’re doing, which they call inspiration 
—William Gaddis, The Recognitions227 
 
In a letter to J. Robert Oppenheimer Gaddis expressed the thought that his novel was 
about “the massive character of the dissolution and corruption of authority, in belief, 
in ritual and in temporal order…”, about our histories and traditions as “both bonds 
and barriers among us”, and our art, which “brings us together and sets us apart”.228 In 
the following I will first elucidate this notion of art, relating it to the aesthetics of 
Gaddis and his contemporaries. Art, one might say, is a bridge for Gaddis, whose 
protagonist does not incidentally design bridges for a living. The symbol of 
connection, a literary trope so vividly expressed in Hart Crane’s The Bridge, however, 
is fractured in The Recognitions. When Wyatt and his wife discuss one of the bridges 
his company designed, ironically a “road bridge at Fallen Ark Gap”, he quotes a 
saying: “The arch never sleeps” (TR, 96). Steven Moore has identified Gaddis’s 
source for this saying and its context, J. R. Ackerley’s Hindoo Holiday: 
 
The Hindoo never builds an arch; he prefers the rectangular form, the straight stone beam 
resting on uprights; for then there is pressure in only one direction, downwards.
229
 
 
If one takes seriously what is not said in Ackerley’s lines, one gains an idea what the 
arch means for Wyatt, and eventually for Gaddis. There is pressure in the arch in 
more than one direction, not only downwards but also upwards, and strictly speaking 
also sideward, as if it simultaneously pushed away what it connects. It thereby 
establishes connection as well as separation. As Heidegger writes in “Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking”:   
 
The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly 
causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the 
bridge.
230
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But in setting things off against each other, the bridge, as Heidegger continues, also 
gathers the earth as landscape; it creates locations; it lets things appear within what is 
present.
231
 
Related to this notion is a communal model of art production central to Gaddis’s 
own way of working. This notion, directly opposed to that of the individualist artist, is 
that of the “self who… can do more” (TR, 253). This ‘self’, the notion of which was 
inspired by a verse by Michelangelo, represents, as Vanwesenbeeck argues, “an 
enlarged subjectivity that, like the multitudinous self of Walt Whitman’s Leaves of 
Grass (1855), […] engages with its artistic others”.232 As Joseph Tabbi points out in 
his afterword to Agapē Agape, this 
 
capacity for imaginative projection into the lifeworld, thought, and language of another 
person, whether living or dead, through music, literature, the visual arts, or conversation—this 
is the ethical burden of agapê in the arts.
233
 
 
Gaddis expressed in “The Secret History of the Player Piano” that he saw such 
potentials radically undercut in an environment dominated by “entertainment and 
technology” (AA, 4), where everybody could be his or her own ‘artist’ by consuming 
prefabricated artistic expressions, as epitomised in the player piano. As a wonderful 
fictive dialogue between Huizinga and Benjamin in Agapē Agape shows (AA, 25), the 
question is not about the aura of an artwork. It is, as the narrator laments, about  
 
the heart of it, where the individual is lost, the unique is lost, where authenticity is lost[;] not 
just authenticity but the whole concept of authenticity, that love for the beautiful creation 
before it’s created. (AA, 26) 
 
Gaddis therefore presents the player not merely as a reproduction machine depriving 
music of a sort of magical touch. He locates it in a series of specific processes taking 
place between 1880 and 1930, all aimed at the “elimination of failure through 
analysis, measurement, and prediction”.234 The instrument, in his view, 
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emerged as a distillation of the goals that had surrounded its gestation in an orgy of 
fragmented talents seeking after the useful, Rockefeller organizing his world as Darwin the 
last one and Mrs. Eddy the next, Pullman organizing people and Spies labor, Eastman and 
McCormick patents and parts, Woolworth cash and Morgan credit, Frick power with his own 
property and Insull with other people’s, Gibbs physics, Comstock vice, and Hollerith the 
census, while Spencer programmed ethics and Freud the psyche, Taylor work, Dewey facts, 
James things, Mendel, Correns, Tschermark and De Vries […] heredity, a frenzied search for 
just those patterns in communication and control.
235
  
 
The motivation for this search aimed at organisation and the elimination of chance 
and failure, according to the narrator of Agapē Agape, is so frenzied “because we’ve 
always hated failure in America” (AA, 11): 
 
that’s what America was all about, what mechanization was all about, what democracy was all 
about and deification of democracy a hundred years ago and this technology at the service of 
entertaining Sigi’s stupefied pleasure seeking trash […] (AA, 5) 
 
Questions of mock snobbism aside, the reference to Freud’s pleasure principle, a 
mechanism that enables Gaddis to present the nascent American technocracy along 
the lines of Plato’s Republic and Bentham’s utilitarianism, does ironically expose that 
art, in such a model, becomes a paradigmatic expression of concerns about control 
and conformity. Thus, it is not only possible for the narrator to state that the player 
piano “came into being from some Civil War battlefield like Christ” (AA, 5-6).236 He 
can also detect aspects of a Faustian bargain in the American culture industry, to 
borrow Adorno’s term:  
 
this romantic illusion of participating, playing Beethoven yourself that was being destroyed by 
the technology that had made it possible in the first place, the mechanization exploding 
everywhere and the phantom hands the, Kannst du mich mit Genuss betrügen yes that, If I 
every say to the moment don’t go! Verweile doch! Du bist so schön! No match for the march 
of science that made it possible […] (AA, 13-4) 
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This thematic strand converges with the other extreme against which Gaddis writes. 
Like Goethe (or Thomas Bernhard, for that matter), he does not advocate artistic 
originality for its own sake, and like Goethe, who saw in Lord Byron a liberal 
anarchical individualist but also an ideological representative of the nascent capitalist 
era (“Much money and no authority”), 237  Gaddis points to the downside of the 
romantic personality cult. For him, the culture industry turns the artist “into a 
performer, into a celebrity like Byron, the man in the place of the work” (AA, 4). 
These two factors, as I will demonstrate later in more detail, technique and the 
creation of aura through public relations, play also a crucial part in Wyatt’s forgeries:  
 
Tragedy was foresworn, in a ritual denial of the ripe knowledge that we are drawing away 
from one another, that we share only one fear, share the fear of belonging to another, or to 
other, or to God; love or money, tender equated in advertising and the world, where only 
money is currency […] (TR, 103)   
  
Since The Recognitions not merely detects these factors in post-World-War II 
movements such as Abstract Expressionism but also quite harshly mocks the latter for 
their alleged isolation from the social sphere (in analogy to Doctor Faustus), it makes 
sense to provide a brief sketch of the cultural background of the novel.  
When Gaddis returned from his travels through Europe and Latin America in 1952, 
he noticed that America had become the political and cultural centre of the world, that 
it “was the world”.238 He must have sensed, like many others, what the Spanish artist 
and writer Jorge Oteiza, in his “Letter to the Artists of America” had stated in 1945:  
 
We find ourselves in an incomparable situation, full of hope for a grand creative ideal, a 
situation that could be compared only with those moments in which the Gothic world or the 
world of the Renaissance were about to begin. More than a mission of commentators, ours is a 
vocation of new and extraordinary actions.
239
 
 
The task Oteiza bestows on the artist in such a situation is as follows: 
 
The social importance of the artist resides in the extent to which he is a creator of myth, or, if he 
is engaged in the reproduction of them, the conditions under which he sets out to realize them. 
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Myth is an invention of art in an act of social projection onto nations. It is an image of a world 
and a historical guide to a society. It is fable, religious necessities projected into the spatial and 
action geometries of the artist […]
240
 
 
Myth is for Oteiza “a kind of spiritual redemption created by society”, and the artist’s 
duty in problematic times is to “assume the mission of creating myths and an even 
more effective and profound way of utilizing them”.241 Oteiza’s request to the artists 
of America here intersects with Gaddis’s opinion on the individualism and the ‘make 
it new’ aesthetic pervasive at the centre of American art production. In a 1949 letter 
written in Sevilla, Gaddis states: 
 
The US myth(lesness) leaves no place for going backwards; unlike such a country, which has 
taken refuge in its (RCCH [Roman Catholic Church]) myth & myth-history (Philip II y antes), 
has no forward looking; US still trying to prove its legitimacy; here dead past is lived in as 
valid.
242
    
 
Although his analysis of the “US myth(lesness)” is not exactly detailed, Gaddis has a 
point in stressing that there seemed no place for going backwards in America. One 
reason for this, as one of his characters holds, is that “[t]here is no place for history to 
accumulate” (TR, 655). The ‘young’ nation’s eagerness to demonstrate its political 
and cultural legitimacy here converged with a renewed emphasis on expansionism 
and unconditional individualism. While the terror of the past provided the fiercest 
apology for such rationales in political and economic terms, it fostered in cultural 
terms a withdrawal into subjectivist seclusion, in which everyone and everything 
exists in “its own vain shell” (TR, 690). In contrast, Gaddis capitalised on insisting on 
the bygone and supplementing historical and mythical perspectives to the flatness of 
the cultural ‘New Eden’ that had, in his view, “turned into a counterfeit of itself”.243 
Gaddis frankly stated that he saw many of these factors embodied in Abstract 
Expressionism. It is unclear to what extent he had immersed himself in theories about 
contemporary American art, but as a professional fact checker, manic collector of 
newspaper clippings, and Village resident he must have been aware of individual 
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trends and certainly also the intimate connections between “the nouveaux riches and a 
blossoming American avant-garde”.244 It is, however, doubtable, as I would argue, 
that he saw the American artist merely at one crossroads, forced to choose between 
the marketplace or the ivory tower,
245
 especially since the Abstract Expressionists 
also stood for an aesthetics and ideology diametrically opposed to that venerated by 
Gaddis. The latter made no secret of considering most of contemporary art production 
along the lines of Bernard Berenson’s Aesthetics and History (1948).246 As Berenson 
wrote:  
  
Nowaydays we are in the midst of a decline which, like all cultural declines, ignores its 
symptoms and euphorically images that it is revolutionizing the world when it is merely 
playing the infant, …  daubing and kneading with paint and clay.
247
 
 
Such aversion, as indicated, exceeds the domain of aesthetics, but also touches upon 
religious, epistemological, and mythopoeic matters. In 1945 Barnett Newman saw the 
shifting mode of painting as a response to the war: “Hiroshima showed it to us. We 
are no longer then in the face of a mystery. …  The terror has indeed become as real 
as life”.248 Three years later, in his essay “The Sublime is Now”, Newman addressed 
the problem again: “if we are living in a time without a legend or mythos that can be 
called sublime, if we refuse to admit any exaltation in pure relations, if we refuse to 
live in the abstract, how can we be creating sublime art?”.249 As part of their solution 
to this question, painters such as Newman and Rothko, let themselves inspire by 
Aeschylus, for instance, or Jewish Mysticism.
250
 This preoccupation, not exclusively 
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caused by the terror and ‘demystification’ experienced in the Second World-War but 
also by a revived interest in religion, is summarised by Harold Rosenberg in “The 
American Action Painters” (1952):   
 
Based on the phenomenon of conversion the new movement is, with the majority of the 
painters, essentially a religious movement. In almost every case, however, the conversion has 
been experienced in secular terms. The result has been the creation of private myths.
251
 
 
These private myths, rather than being collective vehicles, stand in an individual 
relation to artist and spectator. Rosenberg, again, formulates the extreme point of the 
latter: “The big moment came when it was decided to paint just TO PAINT. The 
gesture on the canvas was a gesture of liberation, from Value – political, aesthetic, 
moral.”252 The rhetoric of liberation circulating around Rosenberg’s apotheosis, even 
if seen as a prerequisite for new conceptions of art in hindsight (Warhol’s Brillo box 
was made in 1964), provoked many harsh responses. At the same time, however, 
Abstract Expressionism did not follow a fully contingent or infantile aesthetics, nor 
was it entirely apolitical. The biographies of painters such as Rothko alone indicate 
how these artists struggled to overcome traumas, and their relations to the so-called 
“new humanism” testify to their concerns, 253  while their interest in mythology 
expresses a wide-ranging engagement with the question of how to avert the dead end 
of conceptual art. In defence of these ‘private myths’, Nancy Jachec argues that when 
people lose the “self-consciousness traditionally embedded in myth, the result is an 
amoral technocracy”.254 However, her almost homeopathic notion of myth, I think, is 
problematic since it tends to neglect the fact that such ‘private’, free-floating 
approaches, as opposed to socio-political modulations, are always in danger of 
serving a Biedermeier mentality. The Recognitions certainly does not hold fire in this 
respect, both as regards artistic ivory towers and art as a means of consolation. 
Significant in terms of the latter is Gaddis’s employment of Huizinga. 
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5. Horror Vacui: Johan Huizinga and William Gaddis  
Gaddis uses the Dutch historian’s Study of Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France 
and the Netherlands in the fourteenth and fifteenth century firstly to force a 
connection between two historic periods, the nascent Renaissance and America’s 
ascent as the dominant Western power. In doing so he evokes an atmosphere of shock 
and perceived dissolution but also suggests parallels with the economic and 
ideological mechanisms Huizinga identifies at the cradle of modern history. Since 
both aspects are crucial for understanding Wyatt’s devilish bargain, yet hardly given 
sufficient critical attention, I will provide a brief overview before discussing the 
Faustian core of The Recognitions. 
Huizinga lays the ground for his account by emphasising the violent tenor of life 
and an immense “contrast between suffering and joy, between adversity and 
happiness” in waning Middle Ages. 255  The resulting need to overcome such a 
discrepancy finds expression in three main routes: (1.) forsaking the world, (2.) an 
amelioration of the world itself, not as continual reform but in the form of individual 
salvation, and (3.) dreams, ideals and illusions (WMA, 36). Huizinga focuses on three 
manifestations closely related to the latter: chivalry, religion, and art.  
Although the concept of chivalry is virtually irrelevant for a treatment of society in 
The Recognitions, it plays a considerable role in Wyatt and Stanley’s notions of 
integrity and honour as associated with art. In Wyatt’s case, the honourable and good, 
which Huizinga traces back to the kalokagathia of the Hellenes (WMA, 75), 
manifests itself via his obsession with the Guild of painters in Flanders (TR, 250) and 
the purity, honesty and righteousness he sees in their oath. Stanley, on the other hand, 
when he elaborates on his belief that there is “a moment when love and necessity 
become the same thing” (TR, 465), reiterates Huizinga’s line: “[t]o formalize love is, 
moreover, a social necessity, a need that is the more imperious as life is more 
ferocious. Love has to be elevated to the height of a rite” (WMA, 105). Gaddis, 
following Huizinga, however, does more than imply that chivalry clashes with “the 
reality of things” (WMA, 65). Although it is a source of energy, it is also “a cloak for 
a whole world of violence and self-interest” (WMA, 75), and that honour is as 
egotistic. Most strikingly, Huizinga considers the illusion of chivalry as directly 
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influenced by what Miguel de Cervantes already ironically presents as dangerous: 
“life borrows motifs and forms from literature” (WMA, 76). One further formulation 
particularly strikes the reader: “In order to forget the painful imperfection of reality, 
the nobles turn to the continual illusion of a high and heroic life. They wear the mask 
of Lancelot and of Tristram” (WMA, 78). This masking, already existent in early 
Faustiana, has not only become central in texts such as O’Neill’s play The Great God 
Brown but plays a most crucial role in Pynchon’s V. and Gravity’s Rainbow, and not 
least in The Recognitions, where Wyatt, fully subscribing to the formula larvatus 
prodeo, hides behind an almost innumerable number of masks, from that of John Huss 
and Hugo van der Goes to the Flying Dutchman, Peer Gynt, and lastly Faust, in order 
to bear his life.   
In terms of religion, Huizinga names two dominant factors: the extreme saturation 
of the religious atmosphere and a marked tendency of thought to embody itself in 
images (WMA, 147). Since all domains of life are saturated with religion to such an 
extent that one is in danger of losing sight of the distinction between spiritual and 
temporal things (WMA, 151), there is no object or action, “however trivial, that [is] 
not constantly correlated with Christ or salvation” (WMA, 147). The figure of Christ 
and the cross, and this thought was of interest for Gaddis, does not signify universal 
redemption but strengthens the suffering: “In early childhood the image of the cross 
was implanted on the sensitive heart, so grand and so forbidding as to overshadow all 
other affections by its gloom” (WMA, 185). The craving for salvation here meets the 
oppressive “insistence on psychic suffering: the mourning, the fear, the empty feeling 
of everlasting separation from God, the hatred of God, the envy of the bliss of the 
elect” (WMA, 209). Against such a background, every personal action is assessed by 
the individual for its soteriological value, every incident for its soteriological promise. 
Since man cannot measure the space between him and God, he fills in the void with 
symbols and objects promising relief: “However emphatically divines insisted upon 
the difference between sacraments and sacramentalia, the people would still 
confound them” (WMA, 148).256 
As regards art, most of Huizinga’s arguments will be observed later in context. One 
needs to mention briefly, however, that art is characterised by the same tendency as 
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religion, “to leave nothing without form, without figure, without ornament” (WMA, 
237). In paintings, the “form develops at the expense of the idea, the ornament grows 
rank, hiding all the lines and all the surfaces. A horror vacui reigns, always a 
symptom of artistic decline” (WMA, 238); the “more crushing the misery of daily 
life, the stronger the stimulants that will be needed to produce that intoxication with 
beauty and delight without which life would be unbearable” (WMA, 239).257 This 
“art, which we admire”, Huizinga concludes almost complacently, “bloomed in the 
atmosphere of that aristocratic life, which repels us” (WMA, 247), and he then gives 
various accounts of base work undertaken by superior painters, including one about 
posters designed by Hugo van der Goes, “advertising a papal indulgence at Ghent” 
(WMA, 236). 
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Chapter 4: Culture as Bargain: Art, Society, and Alienation in The Recognitions  
1. Artist as Faust 
      The art has no enemies except the ignorant 
—Arnold of Villanova
258
 
 
There are copious connections between the Faust myth and art.
259
 The scope of texts 
depicting Faustian artists comprises Lenau, Hawthorne, Wilde, Corelli, Klaus and 
Mann, Miklhail Bulgakov, and many more. In general, Faust, even when he is not 
engaged in the ‘holy art’ of alchemy, is a creator, a modeller. His translation of John 
1.1, for instance, reflects a reinterpretation of God’s word as verbal performance but 
also transfers biblical authority into the human realm. As regards the moral evaluation 
of Faust’s creativity, Gaddis’s literary predecessors almost invariably condemn the 
doctor: trying to forge a world he undoes himself. Pseudo-Clemente ruthlessly 
humiliates the shape-shifting Simon; Marlowe’s self-fashioner meets his peril, be he a 
tragic hero or not; Lenau’s Faust-cum-painter commits suicide, unable to differentiate 
between fantasy and reality: “I am a dream with pleasure and guilt and pain/ and 
dream a knife into my heart.”260 The exploding avatar of Helen incapacitates Goethe’s 
striving doctor, and his son Euphorion, homage to Lord Byron and the personification 
of creativity, is not allowed to survive. Marie Corelli’s The Sorrows of Satan (1895) 
describes the rise and downfall of the writer Geoffrey Tempest. Klaus Mann’s 
Mephistophelian comment on his brother-in-law Gustav Gründgens leaves the Nazi 
collaborator crying: “Why do they pursue me? Why are they so hard? All I am is a 
perfectly ordinary actor…”.261 
The most obvious candidate for a comparison with The Recognitions is of course 
Mann’s Doctor Faustus, Mann’s Faustian parable about the devils of Nazism. 
Although it has hitherto not been secured to which extent Gaddis had been aware of 
Mann’s text,262 there are extensive formal and thematic parallels between the two 
novels. Since Brownson and Heffernan have already pointed to some intersections, I 
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restrict myself here to a brief discussion, while pointing in my later analyses to further 
relations in more detail. Both novels show a pastiche style and both embark on a 
mythopoeic tour de force, comprising a range of myths and fairy tales about souls lost 
and gained, for instance Hans Christian Anderson’s tale of the mermaid (DF, 246, 
396-7; TR, 346, 359).
263
 Both share ‘stock themes’ of Faustiana, such as references to 
hermetic philosophy and alchemy, and both copiously employ previous versions of 
the myth. While Gaddis mainly draws from Goethe, Marlowe, and Pseudo-Clemente, 
Mann’s main literary reference point is the Historia, which he employs to give his 
narration a distinctly Lutheran tenor. Furthermore, both show influences from 
Nietzsche and Spengler, and both feature extensive discussions about art, society and 
religion.
264
 As regards the latter, both embed the story of their protagonists in a wider 
social context, combining Künstlerroman and Zeitroman. Parallelising the vita of the 
transgressive composer-cum-Nietzsche figure Adrian Leverkühn with the political 
events in Germany before and during World War II, Mann presents fascism as the 
transcendence of bourgeois life as a Dionysian intensification of the self to 
superhuman power that ends in collapse and subjugation.
265
 One finds a similar 
suggestion of interrelated alienation in Gaddis’s novel in that society and artist are 
presented in a pars pro toto relation, mutually signifying and determining each other. 
The most substantial parallels, however, are between both artist’s sense of religious 
and artistic redemption. Both become artists disconnected with contemporary culture 
and art production, and both enter a Faustian wager. Mann’s composer suffers from 
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the impossibility of artistic innovation and turns to the ‘devil’ in order to overcome 
the doldrums of music.
266
 Wyatt, on the other hand, turns to the devils of materialism 
in order to achieve an imagined restoration of a lost model of Christian communal art 
production.
267
 Wyatt and Leverkühn are exposed to religious extremes in their 
formative years, Protestantism on the one hand and occult religion on the other (DF, 
10, 16). As much as Leverkühn’s “creative talents are inhibited by his ability to ‘see 
through’ everything”,268 suffering from “the cursed proclivity to see things in light of 
their own parody” (DF, 144), Wyatt is coloured by an immense cynicism motivated 
by the same ability. While Adrian’s career starts with parody, he seeks genuine 
musical expression, which he considers possible only in renewed ties of music to a 
community and from a sense of service, or vocation. As Harvey Goldman notes:  
 
Adrian’s response to the dilemma of culture is a complex fantasy of redemption, expressed in 
the language of service. The first dimension of the fantasy is embodied in his desire […] for 
an imagined community of the future to redeem art (and thus himself) from its isolation and 
lack of validation: he proposes that art abandon its present autonomy and grandiosity and 
return to a ‘more modest, happier [role] in the service of a higher union,” which would 
eliminate the “idea of culture” […]. Though much of the avant-garde imagined the salvation 
of self and society through art, Adrian sees art not only as a ‘means of salvation’ but also in 
need of salvation itself […]
269
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The very same coordinates, as I will demonstrate, also hold for Wyatt’s endeavour to 
simultaneously redeem the perceived depravity of art and his own self.
270
 Like 
Adrian, who wants “to reduce music to the level it had once held within the 
worshipping community during what he considered a happier age” (DF, 91) at an 
early stage of his career, he proposes a return to a model community of artists in the 
service of God as represented by the Flemish Primitives. Paradoxically, both artists 
aspire to achieve their goals with the aid of the ‘devil’. The pillars of society eroded, 
Leverkühn believes that only a pact with greater evil can win redemption, which is 
why he can consider himself akin to a criminal. Furthermore, as Goldman argues, 
Adrian’s feeling of personal worthlessness and his estrangement from God “lead him 
to a redemptive ‘pact’ with the devil to realize [his] goals, free him from inhibition, 
and make possible his ‘breakthrough’” to a new mode of musical composition.271 
While Wyatt is motivated by the same impulses, on the other hand, his ‘pact’ imposes 
severe restrictions onto him, as he chooses to work according to the aesthetic 
guidelines of the Guild of Flemish painters. Despite such superficial differences, 
however, both aesthetics are qualitatively similar. The two artists, despite their sense 
of depravity, elaborate in their ‘pacts’ a fiction of self-aggrandisement. A key factor 
here is the Weberian notion of ‘calling’. As Goldman argues,  
 
Doctor Faustus most fully reveals the ascetic ideal of the calling as a vehicle for redeeming 
the self through the acquisition of power, and how the search for power is related to a 
redemptive fantasy of belonging contained within it. The calling, that is, is the key to a 
redemptive project to empower the self while also winning it a form of social approval and 
connection, if only abstractly—through the substitution of an abstract ultimate ideal in place 
of a socially concrete one.
272
 
 
It is exactly though his pact Adrian that remains within the orbit and dualisms of 
Christianity. There is also a strong correlation with The Recognitions here, which is 
unfortunately not discussed by Brownson or Heffernan. Adrian’s power, as the 
agreement with the devil prescribes, gained from ascetic renunciation, is, as Goldman 
suggests, intimately related to Calvinistic and Puritan asceticism. This parallel is 
accentuated by his “rigid predestinationism”, for “despite the explicit references to 
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Adrian’s Lutheranism, the novel portrays him more as a Calvinist than a Lutheran”.273 
As Adrian tells his friends and followers in his own version of the Lamentation of 
Doctor Faust: 
 
long before I dandled with that poisonous moth, my soul, in its conceit and pride, was upon 
the road to Satan, […] for as you must know, man is made and predestined for bliss or for 
hell, and I was born for hell. (DF, 523)  
 
Eventually, it is Adrian’s inability to “conceive of self and culture in terms other than 
the ones laid out in the dualisms of Christianity” that “condemns him to move in a 
circle from which there is no escape, despite the fantasy of breaking out”. 274 
Similarly, Wyatt, like Edward Bast in J R, “labors under the never-waning pressure of 
a Protestant work aesth-ethic that he can’t redeem”.275 Thus, the lifestyle of both, 
composer and painter, is characterised by self-infringement and suffering. Forsaking 
love is a part of this bargain: while the Devil wants Adrian cold (DF, 264), Wyatt 
shows a consistent inability to love (a feature also reminiscent of Hawthorne’s Marble 
Faun, in which artistic grandeur is achieved only at the cost of social alienation). In 
many respects Adrian’s longing for meaning through service results in the 
confirmation of self-hatred in a fantasy bond with the devil. The same admixture of 
self-loathing and hubris is also in the background of Gaddis’s novel. ‘Service’ here 
becomes a figure of self-abnegation but also self-legitimisation through submission to 
a higher ideal. To subordinate the self to an object or ideal is not only to have one’s 
tasks laid out and the parameters of perfection prefigured. It is in both cases a fiction 
that enables access to meaning which both artists cannot derive from themselves.
276
 
Especially in the case of The Recognitions, this is an aspect that has been neglected in 
early discussions of Wyatt’s craft. He does not copy but create in the manner of the 
Flemish Primitives, thereby attempting to recreate their entire life-world. 
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In parallel to this religious dialectic stands Adrian’s compositional technique that, 
as Adorno and others have noted, suggests itself as a parable of fascism. Adrian’s 
‘strict style’ (dodecaphonic principle) exemplifies that “[f]reedom always has a 
propensity for dialectic reversal” (DF, 203). His “system of rational organization” 
(DF, 204) breaks though the exhausted possibilities of music, but it expels any 
element that does “not fulfill its thematic function within the overarching structure” 
(DF, 511). Although Leverkühn wants to resolve “music’s magical essence into 
human reason” (DF, 207), he only achieves a system of dominance that transposes the 
latter into magical essence (DF, 208). The resulting number-game of serial music 
represents for Adorno “a closed system”, in which the “configuration of means is 
directly hypostasized as goal and as law” that eventually “treats music according to 
the schema of fate, divesting itself of any implication of meaning present in the music 
object itself”.277 What remains on formal grounds, then, is a totalitarian mechanism, 
in which the freedom of the individual element is sacrificed to the totality. The 
coldness of the system here correlates with that of Adrian, who eventually aspires to 
undo the humanistic message of Beethoven’s Ninth symphony.278 In Wyatt’s work 
ethic Gaddis addresses similar relations. While the specific emphasis he puts on the 
relations between religion, economy and power is less overtly political than Mann’s 
or Pynchon’s at the first glance, his depiction of Wyatt’s New England hometown 
leaves no doubt that there is more than one common denominator between the ideal 
Puritan, Weber’s money-grabbing entrepreneurs, and what Adorno and others called 
the ‘authoritarian personality’. Furthermore, as I will argue later in more detail, 
Wyatt’s notion of necessity in painting may be understood as a stance against the 
Greenwich Village narcissism, as Lisa Siraganian rightly points out, but it is also 
reminiscent of Adrian’s strict style. What Wyatt learns from his teacher Koppel in 
Munich is that “when you paint you don’t just paint, […] you have to know that every 
line you put down couldn’t go any other place, couldn’t be any different” (TR, 
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144).
279
 However much aimed against hubristic notions of romantic genius, his 
aesthetic thereby not only betrays an inhuman character (“All of our highest goals are 
inhuman ones”, TR 589) but also becomes oppressive for the artist, who is almost 
always on the verge of bursting under the burden of the order to which he 
subscribes.
280
 Wyatt lives up to Goethe’s dictum that all that is art and artificial 
“requires a closed space” (TR, 872; cf. F, 6684), which is one reason why he becomes 
a forger. As Gaddis notes:  
 
[t]he tangible framework of forgery presents Wyatt a context for accomplishment, a tradition 
of delimited and delineated perfection in painting. Forgery makes him feel safe, and confident, 
and able to accomplish his work.
281
 
 
Yet, although he thrives in this tradition, filling the framework provided by it with the 
minutest details, “sometimes the accumulation”, as he laments, “is too much to bear” 
(TR, 113-14).  
Against this background it does not make much sense to locate Wyatt solely in the 
“alienated genius” tradition. As Joseph Conway notes, “readers do Gaddis disservice 
when they take at face value Wyatt’s priestly pretensions, or make Gaddis himself 
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into a figure martyred for the eternal sanctity of art”.282 Following this suggestion, I 
will show how Gaddis’s Faustian painter works exactly with the very forces against 
which he purports to act. Unlike other Fausts, however, he eventually manages to free 
himself from both the Puritan and the devilish pact. Thus, while Adrian’s Icarus flight 
(DF, 530) ends in isolation and a death coloured by a “mystical notion of salvation” 
(DF, 532), Wyatt abandons his self-renunciation and sense of guilt and decides to live 
his sins “through” (TR, 896). The Weberian homunculus in the Iron Cage will learn to 
become a human being. 
 
 
2. Manhattan Middle Ages: Socio-Cultural Exhaustion in Post-war America 
Technology and comfort—having these, people speak of culture 
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus
283
 
 
The Recognitions characterises contemporary life as debased and fallen. The imagery 
of pandemonium in the novel is indeed so consistent and overwhelming that one is 
inclined to believe the narrator when he indicates in a Wycliffite phrase that “[i]n this 
world God must serve the devil” (TR, 50). The pervasiveness of suffering and 
violence in the novel mocks any notion of theodicy. There is, it seems, nothing one 
can shore up against the horror of a world where people jump from the Empire State 
building by hundreds (TR, 945), where the ruins of Berlin are just as good as those of 
Rome (TR, 909), where individuals “with a fake concentration camp number 
tattooed” on their arms supervise “discussion s  on Suffering” (TR, 943-44), where 
local Civil War monuments are “dwarfed in deference to greater wars” (TR, 391), and 
where the pursuit of happiness is identified as a “sublime delusion” (TR, 369). 
As regards cultural activity, this America is flat, exhausted, fake. A distinctly 
modern space with no continuity outside the capitalist order, it is “a land where 
everything was calculated to wear out, made from design to substance with only its 
wearing out and replacement in view, and that replacement to be replaced” (TR, 310). 
But however the individual predispositions of ways to art are portrayed in The 
Recognitions, the primary constant is that socially ‘meaningful’ art has become 
impossible. An irreconcilable rift between artists, markets, and society is only bridged 
by the dollar. Caught between the poles of sanctimonious iconoclasm in New England 
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and the all-devouring culture industry in New York, the “origins of design (TR, 98, 
322) have become inaccessible. The ‘authentic’ art of the streets, the Graffiti folklore, 
so to speak, is only tangible in the borders, in minute fissures of the narration: “Jesus 
was a communist; Hitler was right” (TR, 341).284 O tempora, o mores! At a party in 
Brown’s gallery, a Royal Academy member cynically holds that paintings represent 
the spirit of the times, but the times are bad enough without these paintings (TR, 661). 
What is expressed here is the renunciation of authentic art: art as the mimesis of the 
hardened and alienated, scarred art, art that stresses the irreconcilable, suffering.
285
 
Such suffering is substituted by capitalised Suffering, it is enrobed in the cloak of 
martyrdom or moral relativism. 
Only a few characters are given a glimpse of creativity. Wyatt has a sort of 
epiphany when he sees Picasso’s ‘Night Fishing in Antibes’. Stanley is granted 
atonement when he dies in a collapsing church during the performance of his 
composition. One of the few artists whose work comes closest to common notions of 
‘original’ production is Otto Pivner. Otto merely records what circulates in the 
discursive field, pieces of conversations he overhears, but his agents and reviewers 
refuse his play because some parts of it sound too “familiar” (TR, 296). Where the 
intellectual vacuum is filled with verbal commodities, mimetic art can only be 
plagiarism. Only the poet Esme, schizophrenic heroin addict and innocent Gretchen 
figure, manages to fade through the accumulated chaos into simplicity, 
 
where nothing was created, where originality did not exist: because it was origin; where once 
she was there work and thought in causal and stumbling sequence did not exist, but only 
transcription […] (TR, 299)  
 
This participation in the realm of origin allows her literally to be the poem (TR, 300), 
to be song, simply to be, but the ironic feat involved in such an existence as poeta 
vates is that she (accidentally) ‘produces’ Rilke poems. ‘True’ art as a celebration of 
creation and communal participation is something impossible to locate in Gaddis’s 
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Greenwich Village of the late forties. Such impossibility is elegantly expressed in 
Rilke’s eighth Duino Elegy: 
 
Always facing creation, we perceive there 
Only a mirroring of the free and open, 
Dimmed by our breath… 
 
And we, spectators always, everywhere, 
Looking at, never out of everything! 
It fills us. We arrange it. It collapses. 
We re-arrange it, and collapse ourselves.
286
 
 
What remains, then, is reproduction, impersonation, and work for the industry, and 
especially as regards the avant-garde movements in the Village one suspects that any 
attempt to transgress the status quo of commoditised bourgeois art is always already 
in the service of the latter. This comes most explicitly to the fore in the work of Max 
Schling, one of the novel’s most notorious artists, who seems to be a living exegesis 
of the ‘mindless’ kneading Bernard Berenson ascribed to the Abstract Expressionists. 
Although Max is said to be “good with composition”, he “works like painting was 
having an orgasm” (TR, 184) or simply modifies some ‘objects trouvé’, such as the 
workman’s shirt he uses as the basis for his artistic pseudo-commentary on class 
antagonisms, the “Workman’s Soul” (TR, 199), or even bits of paintings by 
established artists. For Max, the production of artworks is less the careful arranging of 
constellations that Wyatt is concerned with; it appears pragmatic, an almost visceral 
mechanism aimed at the sole purpose of artistic survival. Adorno pleads for an 
aesthetics of collage and the tracing of true art along the fractures of the individual 
fragments the artwork is made of.
287
 He writes that the “fragment is that part of the 
totality of a work that opposes totality”, and he adds that one tendency of artworks is 
to “wrest themselves free of the internal unity of their own construction, to introduce 
within themselves caesuras”.288 Times in which totality is no longer possible bring 
forth fragmented artworks. Max’s art reflects this: 
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—And these pictures he’s showing now, the abstract paintings he’s selling now, don’t you 
know where he got them? […] [T]hey’re all fragments lifted right out of Constable canvases 
[…] (TR, 623) 
 
Even if this primarily seems to mock Clement Greenberg’s opinion that the “avant-
garde, both child and negation of Romanticism, become the embodiment of art’s 
instinct of self-preservation”,289 it much rather demonstrates what Agamben describes 
as follows:  
  
Alienating by force a fragment of the past from its historical context, the quotation at once 
makes it lose its character of authentic testimony and invests it with an alienating power that 
constitutes its unmistakable aggressive force.
290
  
 
How then is the self-preservation of such art depicted? Although Max’s work is rather 
ignored than admired, it is one of the few ones in The Recognitions that are spared 
destruction. On a further level, such survival is depicted in Max himself. Unlike 
Stanley or Wyatt, he is an artist without a sustaining ideological framework. He just 
gaily lifts from others and successfully sells. For him, as for so many other characters, 
“[a]rt is a work of necessity” (TR, 465), but refraining from specifying what kind of 
necessity he is referring to, he merely provides what seems to be expected in 
conversations about his work. The artwork’s ‘truth content’ and the message it 
conveys are effects created by its title and by discourse about it. Accordingly, one of 
his companions explains what is so admirably despicable about Max’s art: “I hate 
him, Otto said, […] because he’ll survive” (TR, 466-67). Gaddis presents such artistic 
survival in the literal sense. While Stanley is buried under a church that collapses 
during the performance of his work, Wyatt ceases to be an artist in the common sense, 
and so does Otto. The last thing one reads about Max, however, is that he lives in the 
Parisian Banlieu and “paints pictures for a well-known painter who signs them and 
sells them as originals” (TR, 944). He has settled down and undertaken a decisive turn 
in his career, for his habitual plagiarism has become an institutionalised plagiarism for 
another artist: surviving art is alienated art. 
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Such diminishing expectations were to remain a stock device in Gaddis’s novels, 
for instance in J R where Edward Bast’s attempt to compose a masterwork is 
constantly undermined by material demands, so that he starts composing “nothing 
music” (JR, 112) and “Zebra music” (JR, 202) for a living, only to end up writing a 
piece for unaccompanied cello with a piece of crayon. They are, however, not 
Gaddis’s alone. The trope of exhaustion and finitude is itself inexhaustible, as can be 
seen in the strongest correlative to Gaddis’s Greenwich Village, the group of loafers 
and artists known as the Whole Sick Crew in Pynchon’s V. 291  Here, Dudley 
Eigenvalue, “[p]atron of the arts, discreet physician to the neo-Jacobean school”, 
muses about the group’s decadence: 
 
But they produced nothing but talk and at that not very good talk. A few like Slab actually did 
what they professed; turned out a tangible product. But again, what? Cheese Danishes. Or this 
technique for the sake of technique—Catatonic Expressionism. Or parodies on what someone 
else had already done.
292
  
 
For Pynchon, just like Gaddis, parody and impersonation are signs of cultural 
exhaustion: 
  
“Mathematically, boy,” he [Eigenvalue] told himself, “if nobody else original comes along, 
they’re bound to run out of arrangements someday. What then?” What indeed. This sort of 
arranging and rearranging was Decadence, but the exhaustion of all possible permutations and 
combinations was death. (V., 298) 
 
Accordingly, the work of the Catatonic Expressionist Slab is “the ultimate in non-
communication” (V., 56). Nothing can be communicated because both content and 
mode of communication have emptied themselves. All that is left is technique and 
parody, which are both, in turn, bound to deplete. The Crew, as the Eulenspiegel 
character Rachel Owlglass accuses them, “does not live, it experiences. It does not 
create, it talks about people who do. Varèse, Ionesco, de Kooning, Wittgenstein, I 
could puke. It satirizes itself and doesn’t mean it” (V., 380).293  
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If times of violent transition have the reputation of triggering artistic innovations, 
then the times depicted in The Recognitions are equally disreputable as those in V. 
Like Albrecht Dürer’s Melancholy Angel, artistic activity is stranded in a land 
without wind, “left to look disconsolately at tools of cultural activity that have lost 
their shaping function”.294 Most of the characters in the novel live from fragments 
they are helplessly trying to remould, as they are themselves lived fragments, be it the 
composer Stanley, the aspiring writer Otto, or the kitchen philosopher Anselm. The 
dissociated pieces of life cannot be glued together, except in the comic strips in the 
newspapers, “where life flowed in continuum” (TR, 288). In this respect Gaddis, like 
Pynchon, is also very close to Spengler, who states in The Decline of the West that 
when a “Civilization has worked itself out fully to the definitive form”, this “betokens 
the end of the living development of the Culture and the exhaustion of the last 
potentialities of its significant existence” (DW, 2:48). Even more negatively biased 
are Spengler’s notes to an unfinished artists’ novel: 
 
The comical novel; diabolical: as artistic work today is a lie. Everybody is a fool or someone 
who deceives himself. The grand nonsense of such a quixotism. Not chivalry dies here but art. 
The last legitimate successors of Dante, Bach and Rembrandt. The whole art business – once 
the profoundest expression of the ascending soul – is chatter today because the soul is dying. 
Depict remorselessly how people fabricate music and philosophy amidst the barbarism of the 
metropolis, behind doors, useless for the world. …  Not he is incapable of doing something; 
there is nothing left to be capable of doing.
295
 
 
The Recognitions contains similar implications. It is Paris, for instance, elsewhere in 
the novel portrayed as the epitome of fully actualised culture, which Wyatt perceives 
in the following way: “There was a pall on every face, a gathering of remnants of 
suspicion of the end, a melancholia of things completed” (TR, 69). Gaddis captures 
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the aporia in late 1940s art movements in similar terms when he has his protagonist 
confessing to the art dealer Recktall Brown: “It’s as though…there’s no direction to 
act in now” (TR, 143). It is no accident that this magazine reviews Wyatt’s first 
forged Memling as a newly discovered original, for where the progression of the 
‘real’ fails, the aporia of the fake prevails, becomes apotheosis. Simultaneously, as the 
‘authentic’ is rejected and pushed to the fringes, another form assumes its place in the 
circuit: sacramental art, artefacts to which one attaches soteriological capacities, 
pseudo-religious fetishes engendering “fictions to get us safely through the night”, to 
use a phrase from Gaddis’s essay “Old Foes with New Faces” (AA, 189). Gaddis 
follows Spengler and Huizinga here: the acquisition of artworks has ceased to be of 
broader social import and merely signifies a philistine gesture of ascertaining 
individual consolation. We are not shown any barbarism to which such circumstances 
could be the response; we are only shown barbarism. Shock, bourgeois retreat, and 
the loss of absolutes in a universe whose centre does not hold any longer spur the 
peddling of sacramentalia.
296
 
Rather than making such pacts with the forces of capitalism a simplistic allegory of 
a ‘sold soul’, however, Gaddis embeds them in a network of failed counter-cultural 
activities, as it were, and therefore complicates any notions of ideological dismantling 
or overcoming the logic of money. The character Agnes Deigh, for instance, realises 
the futility of redemptive hopes, famously expressed some ten years after the 
publication of The Recognitions by Marcuse: “We are the great refusal” (TR, 757). 
With Great Refusal, the phrase that influenced a generation of Americans and, 
ironically, had appeared long before in Dante Alighieri with entirely different 
connotations, Marcuse means “the protest against that which is” (ODM, 66).297 The 
role of artworks in times until the Renaissance, he asserts, was to posit an alternative 
realm. However, Marcuse laments that in modern times even “works of alienation are 
themselves incorporated [in modern times] into this society and circulate as part and 
parcel”; in short, “they become commercials” (ODM, 67). What originally pointed to 
the transcendence of life, art as a counterforce, is lost. Rather than being capable of 
signifying religious devotion, the artwork is used to express and shape consumerism; 
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it is, as a spiritual commodity, “a dense encystation of needs, desires, fantasies; it is 
the matrix of all forms of social regulation”.298 Attempts to alienate oneself from the 
world as signified by religious masterpieces have been incorporated in The 
Recognitions as a reaffirmation of consumerism and imminence. It is Agnes Deigh 
who becomes an example of the impossibility of both refusal and escape. Her attempt 
to commit suicide fails wretchedly, and so does the symbolic import of her suicidal 
gesture; she, the Agnus Dei, cannot atone for others and be a model of redemption.
299
 
In brief, Gaddis conveys a strong sense that the tools of cultural activity remain 
encystations of fantasies. As Adorno writes in his Aesthetic Theory: 
 
As a result from its inevitable withdrawal from theology, from the unqualified claim to the 
truth of salvation, …  art is condemned to provide the world as it exists with a consolation 
that …  strengthens the spell of that from which the autonomy of art wants to free itself.
300
 
 
Rather negative in this respect, The Recognitions does not even allow religion or 
religious art ‘proper’ to constitute a viable alternative. Exemplary in this respect is 
Stanley, whom Gaddis uses predominantly as a contrast figure for Wyatt and whose 
art perhaps best exemplifies how in Gaddis’s work “[e]very solution to the problem of 
order—be it aesthetic, philosophical, or theological—seems to carry within its own 
undoing”.301 Stanley “gladly believes what Wyatt cannot accept: that he is the man for 
whom Christ died”. 302  With this he accepts a framework, faith and the Church, 
rejected by other artists. His palindrome, “Trade Ye No Moneyed Art” (TR, 177) is a 
textual spot of resistance against both cultural commodification and the “word of 
Satan, No, the Eternal No” (TR, 599). Eventually, it also serves him as an aid against 
the “modern disease”: 
 
—That’s what it is, a disease, you can’t live like we do without catching it. Because we get 
time given to us in fragments, that’s the only way we know it. Finally we can’t even conceive 
of a continuum of time. Every fragment exists by itself, and that’s why we live among 
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palimpsests, because finally all the work should fit into one whole, and express an entire 
perfect action, as Aristotle says, and it’s impossible now, it’s impossible, because of the 
breakage, there are pieces everywhere… (TR, 615-16) 
 
The disease he is referring to, the one Gaddis described in his letter to Oppenheimer, 
is entropy.
303
 As regards his everyday life, Stanley’s fight takes on quixotic tones. 
Obsessed with a crack in the ceiling of his flat, permanently carrying a hammer and a 
chisel with him, avoiding underground travel (TR, 319), and being dominated by 
fantasies about his ill mother, he appears as a comic version of Roderick Usher. Yet 
his miserable life among palimpsests does not keep him from aspiring to spiritual 
oneness in the domain of art. Striving for perfection, Stanley tries to emulate 
composers such as Gabrieli and Corelli, who, according to him, “touched the origins 
of design with recognition” (TR, 322). Not unlike Wyatt, whose notion of devotion 
plays into submissive martyrdom, Stanley advocates “love for something higher, 
because that’s the only place art is really free, serving something higher than itself" 
(TR, 632). In contrast to the latter, however, his intention is liberation, not selfish 
redemption, and accordingly he sacrifices himself for his work, literally enacting the 
suggestion that “every piece of created work is the tomb of its creator” (TR, 323). 
When the composer travels to Rome in order to eventually perform his piece of 
music, he undertakes a Herculean unifying process, merging his notes into a final 
score. Among his “stack of palimpsests”, however, Stanley makes “more mistakes 
than he ha[s] ever before” (TR, 827), and a subtle hint informs us about the diabolic 
currencies undercutting his endeavour, for when he finally performs his piece in the 
church of Fenestrula a tritone, “the devil’s interval”, has already sneaked into “the 
work he had copied” (TR, 956). The “walls quivered, still he did not hesitate. 
Everything moved, and even falling, soared in atonement” (ibid.). The last lines of the 
novel read: “He was the only person caught in the collapse, and afterward most of his 
work was recovered too, and it is still spoken of, when it is noted, with high regard, 
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Human Beings, in which the mathematician refers to religious and philosophical conceptualisations of 
entropy, for instance St. Augustine’s discussion of chaos as a “negative evil” in the sense of 
“incompleteness”. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society 
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own position may be best summarised with a dictum by Mr. Gibbs in J R, who holds that “Order is 
simply a thin perilous condition that we try to impose on the basic reality of chaos” (JR, 20). For a brief 
discussion of Gaddis’s work in relation to entropy see Stephen Schryer, “The Aesthetics of First- and 
Second-Order Cybernetics in William Gaddis’s J R”, in Paper Empire: William Gaddis and the World 
System, ed. Joseph Tabbi and Rone Shavers (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 86.  
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though seldom played” (TR, 956).304 Stanley might indeed fail in his attempt to bridge 
“the gulf between people and modern art” (TR, 632), and immanence in the form of 
brute gravity literally crushes his endeavours. As bleak as this appears, Gaddis, as I 
want to demonstrate here, is not entirely negative as regards the possibilities of art 
after art’s exhaustion, for amidst the moment of collapse there are also indicators, 
albeit ex negativo, how art can persist against that which is. Stanley’s breakdown, I 
contend, is no ultimate sign of defeat since his work, though seldom played, is at least 
remembered and respected.
305
 Thus, even though chance undoes the artist, the 
collapse, to use an argument by Adorno, is also a  
 
cryptogram of the new […]; only by virtue of the absolute negativity of collapse does art 
enunciate the unspeakable: utopia. In this image of collapse all the stigmata of the repulsive 
and loathsome in modern art gather. Through the irreconcilable renunciation of the semblance 
of reconciliation, art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of the 
unreconciled […]306 
 
I think one finds similar suggestions in Wyatt’s metanoia at the end of the novel. 
Having laid out the mythographic principles with which Gaddis operates, I will 
now turn to an analysis of his protagonist’s career from failed artist to forger. In doing 
so I will show how The Recognitions utilises the myth of Faust in order to satirise the 
materialism of post-war America while remaining critical towards Wyatt’s 
reactionary agenda. 
 
 
3. Wyatt Gwyon, Faustian Forger 
God creates from nothing, we create from ruins!  
We have to beat ourselves to pieces  
first before we know what we are  
and what we are capable of! – Appalling fate! 
—Christian Dietrich Grabbe, Don Juan und Faust 307 
 
[A]rt has grown impossible sans the Devil’s aid 
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus
308
 
                                                 
304
 As regards the assessment of the ending of the novel, Johnston questions whether most critics’ 
assessment of Stanley’s [Wyatt’s] end as a victory and his “epiphany on the hill as a sign of 
redemption” is not too simplistic (Carnival, 106). 
305
 What comes to mind is the forgotten hymn by William Slothrop that concludes Gravity’s Rainbow. 
306
 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 41. 
307
 Christian Dietrich Grabbe, Don Juan und Faust: Eine Tragödie in vier Akten (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
2005), 21 (my translation).  
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In Gaddis scholarship, the classical approach is to see in Wyatt an “enormous artistic 
talent that can  find no inspiration worthy of its powers”, no meaningful activity, and 
who is thus deluded by evil forces into producing cultural commodities.
309
 The 
culmination of this is his pact with the devilish art dealer Brown. His fate, in such 
readings, reflects the “plight of the artist in America”, who suffers from the loss of a 
socio-aesthetical unity, the devaluation of art’s social function in a disenchanted 
world, and, emergent from this, the impression that all cultural activities are equally 
‘worthless’.310 While such readings are valid in some respects, I hold that Gaddis 
provides a more differentiated account. Despite the predominant references to 
Goethe’s text, the background to the Faustian wager Gaddis depicts is very similar to 
Mann’s Doctor Faustus. Like Leverkühn, Wyatt tries to overcome his personal and 
artistic aporia with the aid of the ‘adversary’ and thereby experiences dialectical 
reversal of liberation into unfreedom. Wyatt subjects himself and his work to the 
‘graven rules’ of the Guild of Flemish painters, thereby aiming to achieve a model of 
artistic exchange and meaningful art production beyond the parameters of relativistic 
individualism and commerce. The irony involved in this, however, is that Gaddis 
suggests that the spheres of religion, art, commerce, and crime are not discrete but 
insidiously interlocked. 
 
 
3.1. Portrait of the Artist as a Young Protestant 
A first factor to be considered is Wyatt’s upbringing. The painter’s youth is marked 
by the loss of his mother and the disinterest of his father, but even more so by the 
religious indoctrination by his “Christian mentor” (TR, 19) Aunt May. 311  In her 
increasingly neurotic self-perpetuation and (a)social reproduction of faith, this 
decidedly political Calvinist (“NO CROSS NO CROWN”, TR 40) embodies the 
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 Mann, Doctor Faustus, 523. 
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 Koenig, “The Writing of The Recognitions”, 21. 
310
 Ibid. 
311
 Don Roger Cunningham aptly characterises May as a fanatic in Cabala to Entropy: Existentialist 
Attitudes and the Gnostic Vision in Gaddis’s ‘The Recognitions’ and Julio Cortazar’s ‘Rayuela’ 
(Dissertation. Indiana University, 1980), 48-49. He substantiates his argument with a passage from 
Gabriel Vahanian’s Wait Without Idols that fully relates to Weber’s and Voegelin’s observations, as 
discussed in my second chapter, and Pynchon’s depiction of Puritans. Vahanian writes: In the decay of 
Puritan New England society “the transcendental sic  vision of man’s destiny capitulated before an 
immanentist vision of the universe … Such an attitude is but the religious disguise of man’s pretension 
to become like God, the self-righteous and perverse hallowing of man’s attempt to deify himself”. 
Gabriel Vahanian, Wait Without Idols (New York: George Braziller, 1964), 51-55. 
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principles of pastoral power.
312
 In purporting to be a prophet of redemption, May 
remorselessly propagates the Puritan complex of depravity, guilt and predestination. 
She has the boy internalise the five doctrines of the synod of Dort (unconditional 
election, limited atonement, total depravity, irresistibility of grace, final perseverance 
of the saints) and with that the conviction that “there was no more hope for the 
damned than there was fear for the Elect” (TR, 35). The latter provides the fatal basis 
of Wyatt’s struggle with belief, epitomised in his question whether he is the man “for 
whom Jesus Christ died” (TR, 127, 348, 440). Circulating May’s currency of guilt, he 
falls from the Ur-Christian triad of faith, hope and love into the pits of what Don 
Roger Cunningham describes as the New England guilt-culture: “guilt is the result of 
separation from God, but when approached on this level it creates despair, which 
perpetuates the separation”.313 The latter is a central motif of The Recognitions. As 
Gaddis comments, the novel “at once sets Guilt in view …  Then guilt goes on, in 
the body of the thing, being built up from the bottom (and Sigismundo’s ‘the greatest 
sin of man is being born’)”.314 It appears that Wyatt comes to count himself among 
the reprobate, to think that suffering is the only legitimate activity of man on earth. 
Thus, feeding on the “pitilessness of the Bosch painting”, with which he is in close 
contact, he elaborates “a domain where the agony of man took remarkable directions” 
(TR, 35). Misrecognising cause and effect, May interprets the boy’s unease as an 
expression of ‘evil’: 
 
—Did you see the guilty look on his face? His sinful… 
—Sinned! Where has he sinned… already… 
 …  
 —Not his sin then, but the prospect, she came on … , —the prospect draws him on, the  
prospect of sin (TR, 33) 
 
                                                 
312
 For the concept of pastoral power see Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, in Power: 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. 
(London: Penguin, 2002), 333. 
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 Cunningham, Cabala to Entropy, 69. 
314
 Cited in Koenig, Splinters, 39. The frame was to feature an I-narrator who was responsible for a 
friend’s death. The personal notion of guilt arisen from neglected responsibility, however, was to make 
way to one that is more culturally entrenched, as expressed in Watt’s Protestant lineage as “lives 
conceived in guilt and perpetuated in refusal” (TR, 13). As mentioned, the working note and several 
quotations in the novel (“Pues díme Sigismundo, dí: El delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido”: TR, 
393, cf. 820, 876) refer to Sigismundo in Calederón’s La Vida es sueño. 
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May clearly exemplifies how prohibitive law generates sin, for her indoctrination with 
guilt and her aversion to originality considerably contribute to the boy’s straying from 
the path.
315
 If such misguidance needed an objective correlative, it can be found on 
the highway to Aunt May’s New England town where the warning arrow in the curve 
points the wrong way (TR, 30). Wyatt’s first drawing, significantly of a robin,316 
provokes May to deliver a fateful kitchen sermon, for to sin is “to falsify something in 
the Divine Order” (TR, 34) and mortal creative work is “definitely one of His 
damnedest things” (TR, 33): 
 
— Then  why do you try to take his place? Our Lord is the only true creator, and only sinful 
people try to emulate Him […] That is why Satan is the Fallen Angel, for he rebelled when he 
tried to emulate Our Lord Jesus. (TR, 34) 
 
Lucifer’s attempt ‘to become original’ is strongly related to the Lutheran notion that 
the Devil is the ape of God, an imitator of the latter through ‘simian mimicry’, and 
everyone trying to be original is deemed to be of his party.
317
 Thus, G. K. Chesterton 
can ironically describe the poet Lucian Gregory in The Man Who Was Thursday 
(1908) as “a blend of the angel and the ape”, and Wyndham Lewis can entitle his 
artist satire The Apes of God (1930).
318
 Such is the traditional view: the world is made 
by the Creator, and artistic human endeavour can only be directed at reading the 
‘book of the world’ by means of allegoresis.319 However, the prohibition of originality 
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 Slavoj Žižek discusses the creation of sin by prohibitive law concisely in The Puppet and the 
Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 15, 49-50. 
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 In Goethe’s Faust the soul is often likened to a bird. From the start Mephistopheles compares Faust 
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Picador, 2002), 38. 
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 Such notions are then to be challenged in Romanticism with the topos of Prometheus as bringer of 
light and Shaftsbury’s notion of the artist as second-maker and creative work as a human prerogative. 
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of pre-existent materials. In Gaddis’s times, originality in art is then crucially reassessed. Bernard 
Berenson, in Aesthetics and History, points out “originality may even be considered a trait of a 
decaying civilization” (cited in Knight, „Flemish Art“, 60). Adorno dismisses the Romantic concept of 
genius because, “works are not creations and humans are not creators” (Aesthetic Theory, 224). 
“Because of its element of something that had not existed before,” he proceeds, “the genial was bound 
up with the concept of originality: thus the concept Originalgenie. As is well known, prior to the age of 
genius the idea of originality bore no authority (ibid., 226). 
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backfires in The Recognitions. Aunt May allows Wyatt to copy paintings. Her naïve 
assumption is that mimesis of mimesis is less sinful. The child, internalising the 
doctrine that the creative God must not be imitated in his originality, begins copying 
paintings. The effects of May’s cockeyed permission to copy paintings, as the narrator 
informs us, is that Wyatt’s painting “was hardly original, but derived from the horror 
of the Breughel copy in his father’s study, and the pitilessness of the Bosch” (TR, 35). 
Ironically, the prohibitive law thereby not only contributes to Wyatt’s later criminal 
acts of forgery, but also lays the basis of the painter’s delusion that his work is within 
the divine scheme and eventually may contribute to some sort of redemption. As 
Julián Jiménez Heffernan argues, Wyatt’s later obsession with agony, suffering, and 
pain is “of strictly Lutheran or Calvinistic origin”; it is “the spiritual agony that 
precedes atonement”.320 This notion is highly reminiscent of the Thomistic debate in 
Doctor Faustus, more specifically Adrian’s opinion that a “sinfulness so hopeless that 
it allows its man fundamentally to despair of hope is the true theological path to 
salvation” (DF, 262). Moreover, as the plethora of allusions to Wyatt’s secrecy and 
guilt indicate, he, like Leverkühn, never leaves the orbit of Puritanism and perpetuates 
in his attempt to redeem art the very principles of agony and suffering inscribed into 
the soteriological system. 
The second motivating factor is related to Wyatt’s father. Exposed to Gwyon’s 
relativist structuralism in the manner of Frazer, Graves, and Frederick Cornwallis 
Conybeare, which is directly opposed to Aunt May’s Puritan fundamentalism, Wyatt 
learns the mechanisms of elusiveness and ambiguity that help him survive the pact 
with Brown, but the multitude of contradicting views on religion also contribute to his 
existential insecurity. Gwyon raises in Wyatt the suspicion that Saints are counterfeits 
of Christ and Christ a counterfeit of God (TR, 483), who is presumably not an original 
either but a counterfeit of Mithras (cf. TR, 57). Consequently, when Wyatt copies the 
Bosch painting in his youth and encounters this “original” again in Brown’s 
apartment, unable to determine whether it is a counterfeit or not, the crucial question 
for him is whether the Christian world-view is valid or not: “And if what I’ve been 
forging, does not exist?” (TR, 381). This question becomes even more pressing as 
Wyatt’s father, who becomes a divine figure for the son, turns away from the latter. 
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 Heffernan, “The Recognitions by William Gaddis”, 78. 
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Gaddis invites here a religious but also a Freudian reading.
321
 Freud’s thesis that God 
is nothing other than an exalted father is paraphrased in the very first chapter: “There 
was some confusion in his mind when his father returned, for somehow his father and 
the Lord were the same person” (TR, 20).322 Another seemingly ‘insane’ act of the 
boy substantiates this reading: 
 
Wyatt was four years old when his father returned […] He was in celebrant spirits that spring 
day, and observed the solemn homecoming by emptying the pot on which he mediated for an 
hour or so each morning into a floor register. (TR, 18) 
 
Read against Freud’s “identification of excrement as the primordial form of gift,” one 
might understand this gesture as religious; Wyatt offers the paternal deity an 
innermost piece of himself that “oscillates radically between the sublime and […] the 
excremental”.323 Wyatt’s experience with the paternal/God figure, however, is one 
characterised by loss: “his father, withdrawing into his study with a deftness for 
absenting himself at crucial moments akin to that talent of the Lord, had become 
unattainable” (TR, 35, cf. 27). Such feeling of unattainability never leaves the son and 
substantially contributes to his later pact. 
There is, however, a further element in Wyatt’s apparent inability to produce 
originals. The young painter leaves his few attempted original works “off at the 
moment the pattern is conceived but not executed” (TR, 52, cf. 55). Although he 
offers no definitive explanation, Gaddis makes available the implication that this habit 
is related to another form of fear from loss. Wyatt secretly begins a painting of his 
mother Camilla, who is consistently attributed with Gnostic and Platonic imagery, for 
instance as a “shred of perfection” (TR, 15).324 He does so, of course, from memory, 
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 Wyatt’s quest also bears distinctly Oedipal implications; see Dominick LaCapra, “Singed Phoenix 
and Gift of Tongues: William Gaddis’s The Recognitions”. Diacritics 16, no. 4 (1986): 46. Yet 
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especially the lunar symbolism in the Classical Walpurgis night and the Helena act). 
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but is yet again unable being able to complete it. Reverend Gwyon glances at the 
painting now and then, and   
 
in the momentary absence of his stare and the force of his own plastic imagination, it might 
have completed itself. Still each time he returned to it, it was slightly different than he 
remembered, intractably thwarting the completion he had managed himself. (TR, 57) 
 
The unfinished painting, as Wyatt explains later, signifies a stage in the work process 
he does not want to transcend because “[t]here is something about a… an unfinished 
piece of work […] do you see? Where perfection is still possible. Because it’s there, 
it’s there all the time, all the time you work trying to uncover it” (TR, 57). The 
Platonic implication of this is naturally that a painting will always remain a 
representation, or copy, of an idea, and like Helen in Faust, the ideal of aesthetic 
perfection is unreachable, for it evaporates as soon as Wyatt tries to seize it. Yet with 
completion comes also the recognition of possibilities lost. As he argues: “when I 
attach the signature […] that changes everything, when I attach the signature and… 
lose it” (TR, 251). What then remains is a “melancholia of things completed” (TR, 
69).
325
 Since Wyatt draws his self-validation only from work, the perfection of art 
thereby becoming a means of self-perfection, however, his sense of self is questioned 
as soon as his activity ceases. Thus, a Puritan Faust in the best manner, he is 
compelled to continue working, and his later forgeries, the most crucial element of 
which is technical incompletion, are a perfect field of exercise for this compulsion.
326
 
Wyatt finally manages to escape from New England and studies painting in Munich 
with a teacher called Koppel. Koppel’s approach to art finds recognition in Wyatt, for 
it provides an artistic justification of what the boy has learned from his aunt. Notions 
of necessity and purity thereby substantiate her prohibition. Koppel, averse to the 
concepts of Originalgenie, proclaims: 
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Camilla seem to recur in Wyatt’s subsequent forgeries as if he suffered from a Wiederholunsgzwang. 
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That romantic disease, originality, all around we see originality of incompetent idiots, they 
could draw nothing, paint nothing, just so the mess they the right way, so you could only do it 
in your own way. When you paint you do not want to be make it original… Even two hundred 
years ago who wanted to be original, to be original was to admit that you could not do a thing 
the right way, so you could only do it in your way. When you paint you do not try to be 
original, only you think about your work, how to make it better, so you copy masters, only 
masters, for with each copy of a copy the form degenerates…you do not invent shapes, you 
know them, auswendig wissen Sie, by heart […] (TR, 89) 
 
The Platonic implications of Koppel’s tirade, ironically reported by Wyatt from 
memory (‘by heart’), are by no means straightforward. Benesch has pointed out that 
Koppel’s “auswendig” not only refers to a mnemotechnical modus but also implies a 
turning inside out of the remembered: wenden ‘to turn’, auswenden ‘turn inside 
out’.327 I would argue that Koppel’s remark does not merely reflect a Platonic move 
toward ideas by repetition of forms as a technique of unconcealment. Firstly, 
anamnesis is highly suspicious in a world where memories are “rotting rooms” (TR, 
701, 711); secondly, the act of tuning the inside out also implies the latter’s inversion. 
Koppel’s dictum, diligently followed by Wyatt, amounts here to a mode of violence 
that is hardly different to the aesthetic Fascism of the plastic surgeon Schoenmaker in 
Pynchon’s V., who brutally realises his ‘idea’ of the perfect woman at the cost of the 
latter.
328
 As regards Wyatt, violence and suffering do not only constitute crucial parts 
of his modus operandi. His forgeries provide him with an ideal interplay between 
perfection and destruction. Wyatt seeks perfection, and the assembly of constellations 
of elements remembered from the masters provides him with such. Devoting his life 
to ‘perfected limitations’, that is, an exegesis of rules set by the Flemish Primitives, 
Wyatt inhabits a well-defined system. Yet his forgeries (paradoxically) also leave him 
with a sense of retained possibilities, since incompletion is a crucial element of them, 
for what eventually adds to their saleability is not only the accurate reproduction of 
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them: “Praxiteles’ statue of Phryne. Who the hell do you think was hiding inside his block of stone but 
a high-class whore” (TR, 185, cf. 76). 
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materials and techniques or the profusion of minute details but also their physical 
corruption. As Wyatt holds:  
 
It is, it’s the most difficult part. Not the actual damaging it, but damaging it without trying to 
preserve the parts that cost such… well, you know that’s where they fail, a good many 
painters who did this kind of work, they can’t resist saving those parts […] (TR, 242)329 
 
Having failed as artist in Paris, Wyatt tries to sustain himself by restoring paintings 
and producing blueprints for an architect (he designs bridges, just like Dion Anthony 
in O’Neill’s The Great God Brown). Wyatt’s discontented wife Esther then provides a 
final push. Strictly speaking, she incites him to produce paintings of his own: “If you 
could finish something original, she said” (TR, 89). However, since her “search for 
Reason [is] always interrupted by reasons” (TR, 79), she is not able to talk reason into 
Wyatt. On the contrary, “like other women in love, salvation was her original 
purpose, […] and, like most women, she could not wait to see him thoroughly 
damned first, before she stepped in” (TR, 78).330 Thus, despite good intentions, she 
spurs Wyatt’s ambition:  
 
Copying lines, copying plans, one bridge after another. Oh, all right, it isn’t silly but you 
could do better, you could do more. Honestly, Wyatt, the way you go day after day with your 
job ad your reading and your… fooling around, and you could do more. (TR, 84) 
 
This notion of being able to ‘do more’ does not so much reflect the concept of a ‘self 
who can do more’ as discussed earlier. It is no coincidence that the novel’s 
Mephistopheles, Recktall Brown, appeals to the vanity of Wyatt, who shares with van 
der Goes the “tremendous passion, aiming at just a fraction more than he could ever 
accomplish” (TR, 230).331 During their first encounter, the dealer provokes the painter 
by asking “do you want to tell me you can do more than patch up old pictures?”, and 
                                                 
329
 Knight discusses in this context Wyatt’s sense of debilitation in relation to perfection, or completion 
(Hints and Guesses, 41; cf. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 229: “Every step toward the perfection of 
artworks is a step toward their self-alienation”). This interpretation, I dare argue, does not acknowledge 
that in these cases the “imperfection” through destruction is aimed at creating an aura of authenticity 
and veneration, i.e. that the aesthetic reduction, like the profusion of minute details in the remainder of 
Wyatt’s paintings, is eventually determined by the marketability of his forgeries. 
330
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 See Knight, Hints and Guesses, 70. 
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the answer is “Of course I can” (TR, 142). Even though Wyatt eventually accepts 
Brown’s offer because it is the only one available to him, the latter will lead to the 
fulfilment of his Faustian potentials.
332
 Yet this is not a simple succumbing to innate 
‘sinfulness’ but characterised by a fetishized relation to work and salvation that is 
hardly different to the Protestant work ethic, as I demonstrate in the following. 
 
 
3.2. The Father of False Art: Wyatt’s Bargain 
We know from Gaddis’s notes that the art dealer Brown is meant to be the epitome of 
‘evil’: base matter in its full depravity. The fierce procto-pun of his name clearly 
reflects Freudian connections between money and anality, and fittingly, he has his 
own way of dealing with the art crisis. “Art today is spelled with an f” (TR, 143) is his 
simple equation. Like Mephistopheles, he is a cynic (introduced in association with a 
dog: F, 1147; TR, 135) who describes himself as a necessary evil in the service of 
good (F, 1336; TR, 141), and like Mephistopheles he is a facilitator and mediator. 
Brown mediates, not only between the producer Wyatt and the customer but also 
between Wyatt’s ivory tower and the outside world: “one comes to grips with reality 
only through the commission of evil” (TR, 235). Accordingly, Recktall, characterised 
metonymically via possessions, his diamond ring or “his set of gold teeth” (TR, 
223),
333
 is “real as hell” (TR, 247) and also business: “Business is cooperation with 
reality” (TR, 243).334 His conviction that “[m]oney gives significance to anything” 
(TR, 144) intuitively grasps what J. M. Bernstein describes as the logic of capital: 
“the destruction of all natural boundaries, all given teleologies […] indefinite 
expansion, and its consequent drive for universality”.335 And where the dollar sign 
becomes a universal signifier, an end in itself, the cause, means, and aim of human 
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activity, ethics become obsolete; thus it is no wonder that Brown resents any moral 
objections to money as sanctimonious:  
 
What I get a kick out of is these serious writers who write a book where they say money gives 
false significance to art, and then they raise hell when their book doesn’t make any money. 
(TR, 749) 
 
Instead of investing into ‘serious’ books, Brown therefore thinks of a “novel factory”, 
an “assembly line” (TR, 243, 356) or mass products “tailored to the public taste” (TR, 
243).
336
 He makes good money with chalk toothpaste and  
 
from some simple chemical that women use for their menstrual periods, such a delicate 
necessity that the shame and secrecy involved make it possible to sell it at some absurd price. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Brown exploits his customers’ shame and secrecy as well as their spiritual needs. He 
publishes a highly popular book the reviewers call “soul-searching”, which prompts 
his critic Basil Valentine to retort: “Soul-searching! […] People like that haven’t a 
soul to search” (TR, 353).337 The Mephistophelian character, however, a “Master 
Dicis-et-non-facis” (DF, 106), to use Mann’s words, always delivers less than he 
promises, widening the gulf of desire between demand and gratification,
338
 while 
hiding the secret that his ‘magic’, money, is not a universal agent by continually 
proclaiming the converse. Thus, he eventually signifies “a promise of magic 
unfulfilled” (TR, 223), and what appears to others as “occult powers” (TR, 226) is 
simply the ability to find their weak spot. 
In addition to exploiting Wyatt’s “desperate attempts to reconcile the ideal with 
reality” (TR, 383) as Basil Valentine holds, Brown exploits the painter’s need for a 
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father figure. His appropriation of Wyatt as a substitute son is not only reflected in his 
mediating position à la Mithras or the concomitant alcoholism of Gwyon, Wyatt and 
himself, but also in his continual employment of the phrase “my boy” (TR, 143) to 
address his protégé and his promise to take care and “watch out for” (TR, 365) him. 
This pseudo-paternal relationship may recall Charles Dickens’s Fagin, but it is also 
strikingly similar to the psychogram of the Bavarian painter Christopher Haizman 
discussed in Sigmund Freud’s “A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis”.339 
Freud argues that Haizman, who had lost his father early, fantasised about making a 
pact with the devil in order to obtain a father-substitute. 
 
The position would simply be that a man, in the torment and perplexity of a melancholic 
depression, signs a bond with the Devil, to whom he ascribes the greatest therapeutic 
power.
340
 
 
Haizman’s question, “Poor Devil, what can you offer to me?” (F, 1675), is thus 
answered, in Freud’s reasoning, by the devil: “Myself.” Gaddis also plays with such 
possibilities when he has Wyatt speculate whether he and Brown are psychological 
projections of the notorious Reverend Gilbert-Sullivan: 
 
—You and I, Brown. You and I. You are so damned familiar.   
—You’ve got to get hold of yourself, my boy. 
—If we are, as he says, projections of his unconscious. Then the intimacy is not at all 
remarkable, is it. (TR, 361)
341
 
 
The intimacy is indeed remarkable, but it is not, as I would argue, because Brown is a 
figment of Wyatt’s imagination or because both are projections. Brown is too base, 
too blunt to be something other than real. Rather, Wyatt knows very well that he, as a 
failed painter, bargains for entirely prosaic reasons:  
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—My dear fellow, the priest is the guardian of mysteries. The artist is driven to expose them. 
 —A fatal likeness, then. 
—A fatal dissention, and a fatal attraction. Tell me, does Brown pay you well? 
—Pay me? I suppose. The money piles up there. 
—Why? 
—The money? It… binds the contract. (TR, 261) 
 
Thus, Freudian implications aside, it is eventually criminally acquired money that 
connects Wyatt and Brown. Despite the former’s comment “I suppose”, he is clearly 
aware that the money accumulates in the bank account shared with the dealer. The 
money binds the contract. Thus, if “the devil is the father of false art” (TR, 464), 
Wyatt is unmistakably his son.  
If Christopher Leise is right in arguing that Gaddis’s “writing congratulates art-
works that expose America’s thinking of gold synecdochically, as one kind of 
discourse that serves in place of the full set of numerous, competing discourses which 
compose contemporary life”,342 then one has to add that the synecdochic reduction 
Wyatt is exposed to in his career is only possible because all other dominant 
discourses in The Recognitions have already embraced economic principles. In his 
‘moral education’ by Aunt May, for instance, Wyatt is conditioned along two 
coordinates of the Protestant work ethic: (1.) hard work is the expression of gratitude 
where “ a nything pleasurable could be counted upon to be, if not categorically evil, 
then worse, a waste of time” (TR, 13); (2.) money “might be expected to accrue as 
incidental testimonial” (TR, 14) of election, and in accordance with John Wesley’s 
credo “grow rich”, Wyatt’s descendants disapprove of almost everything else except 
compound interest.
343
 May even goes so far as to employ mercantile lexis when she 
contemplates “wholesale damnation” for the non-Christian world (TR, 38). The 
currencies of this rhetoric of guilt and election culminate in a phrase which prefigures 
Pynchon’s take on the economic genealogy of New England: they “had done their 
work, passed on the heritage of guilt. The rest was not their business” (TR, 23). These 
coordinates are directly called upon in the pact with Brown, who lures Wyatt with 
hard work, good rewards, and the prospect of sin. 
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Moreover, the maxim of the redemption of time, as constantly invoked by Wyatt, 
sporadically understood in criticism as lamentation over his ‘wasted’ youth, indeed 
expresses an economy entrenched in the very pathology of the text. The employment 
of the phrase is indebted to Eliot’s ‘Burnt Norton’, to which Gaddis frequently alludes 
in the novel, but Wyatt’s repeated stress on Saint Paul sets it in a broader context. The 
Christian concept of redeeming time dates from Pauline teachings (“See then that ye 
walk circumspectly, not as fools, but as wise. Redeeming the time, because the days 
are evil”, Eph. 5:15-16); it is again invoked in St. Augustine’s Confessiones in the 
context of redeeming wasted years.
344
 During the Reformation, the desideratum of 
redemption acquired aspects of an “urgent pragmatism”,345 especially in the teachings 
of Calvin, who comments on Eph. 5:16 as follows: 
 
Since the age is corrupt, the devil appears to have seized tyrannical power; so that time cannot 
be dedicated to God without being in some way redeemed. And what shall be the price of its 
redemption? To withdraw from the endless allurements which would easily pervert us …
346
 
 
Such strategies against idleness became imperative in the preaching of John Wesley, 
who is included in the ‘rogues’ gallery’ in Gaddis novel. Wyatt tries to ignore the 
dollar bill as a universal soteriological agent, yet the economic dimension of his work 
is present from the very beginning of his career. Not only does he raise the money 
necessary for his escape from New England by selling the Bosch; his teacher Koppel, 
as it later transpires, gives his rhetoric of ‘corruption’ an entirely new dimension by 
selling an early Memling counterfeit by Wyatt (TR, 95).
347
 The latter’s first encounter 
with the world of art critics establishes that the painter could not care less about 
money. Trying to sustain himself by producing art of his own in Paris, the expatriate 
has to learn: “il faut tojours en avoir sur soi, de l’argent” (TR, 69). An opportunity to 
earn easy cash is introduced by the critic Crémer (the name recalling an old fashioned 
German word for merchant). The critic offers to review Wyatt’s few original 
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paintings and tests the painter’s will to success by quoting a remark by Degas that 
“the artist must approach his work in the same frame of mind in which the criminal 
commits his deed” (TR, 71). Crémer’s suggestion of bribery, however, is refused, 
which results, to no surprise, in a scathing review in the magazine Le Macule that 
damages Wyatt’s reputation by describing his paintings as “sans vie, enfin, un esprit 
de la mort sans l’espoir de la Résurrection” (TR, 74, cf. 665). The basic lesson of the 
failed Simonian investment is: no money, no resurrection.  
In similar terms, Wyatt hardly notices the ‘heaped up gold’ in his bank account. 
However, hard work is the key phrase in his and Brown’s agreement. When they meet 
for the first time, Wyatt already has done a job for the dealer: 
 
 —You did some wok for me. 
 —For you? 
 —A Dutch picture, a picture of a landscape, an old one. 
 —Flemish. Yes, I remember it. That painting could hang in any museum… 
—It does. …  You couldn’t tell it had been touched. Even an expert couldn’t tell […] 
(TR, 141) 
 
On a mythical level, this recalls a motif expounded on in Irving’s “The Devil and 
Tom Walker”, the thought of having collaborated with the devil from the start. 
Brown’s then attempts to codify their corroboration. The subtext of their discussion is 
centred on the different meanings of work, recognition and redemption. Whereas 
Wyatt exclusively attributes spiritual meanings to these keywords, Brown’s stresses 
materialistic denotations. Wyatt’s talk about the perfect necessity of hard labour is 
thus met with a quick retort: “People work for money, my boy” (TR, 144):  
 
 —You know…Saint Paul tells us to redeem time. 
 —Does he? Recktall Brown’s tone was gentle, encouraging. 
 —A work of art redeems time.  
—And buying it redeems money, Recktall Brown said. (TR, 144)
 348
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Sensing that he is losing ground, Brown subtly changes his tactic:  
 
—Can you tell me you’ve never thought of this before? 
—Of course I have. They were suddenly face to face. –It would be a lot of work. 
—Work! Do you mind work? (TR, 145) 
 
Here, Brown openly expresses what is latent in the Puritan concept of double 
predestination, and, although the decision to collaborate is never explicitly expressed, 
he finds a ready response in Wyatt’s Puritan secrecy and guilt (TR, 95).  
 
 
4. Frameworks and Counter-Currencies  
About suffering they were never wrong, 
The Old Masters: how well they understood 
Its human position; how it takes place 
—W.H. Auden, “Musée de Beaux Arts”
349
  
 
As my brief examination of the preconditions of Wyatt’s bargain shows, The 
Recognitions describes the desperate search for meaning that constitutes the starting 
point of Goethe’s Faust. Yet its specific emphases, as I hold, are more intimately 
related to Mann’s Doctor Faustus. Socially and spiritually alienated, Wyatt engages 
in a pact with what he opposes, and despite his priestly behaviour it is questionable 
whether he is fully unaware of the import of his bargain. As argued in the case of 
Agnes Deigh’s ‘Great Refusal’ and Stanley’s composition, Gaddis complicates 
possibilities of transcending the given. He finds one model to overcome society’s 
pitfalls by ‘forging gold’. The Flemish painters he forges represent to him a modus 
operandi opposed to the materialism of the American art industry. Even more so, he 
considers the alchemy of their aesthetics as a tool to overcome alienated art, and 
eventually his own alienation. He fuses artistic and alchemical concepts (ars and 
technê) to achieve a soteriological effect. It appears, however, that on the false 
premises that redemption is possible by means of an aesthetic category, Wyatt 
eventually serves “the false while knowing it is false”.350 
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4.1. God’s Gaze 
The importance that Wyatt attributes to his Christian-alchemical framework is 
nowhere more explicitly expressed than in the following two quotations. When he 
suspects that the Hieronymus Bosch painting owned by his father was a copy, he 
wails, “Copying a copy? is that where I started?” (TR, 381), and when he learns that it 
was the original, he exclaims with the same vigour: “Yes, thank God! […] Thank God 
there was the gold to forge!” (TR, 689). This painting is of uttermost importance in 
Gaddis’s novel, for it provides one frame of the protagonist’s mind-set. Chance has it 
that Wyatt’s father owns the original ‘The Seven Sins and the Four Last Things’ (see 
Fig. 1). The painting was smuggled to America as a souvenir, and although it is 
indeed the original, “some fainaiguing had been necessary at Italian customs, 
confirming it a fake to get it out” (TR, 25). Since the painting is a tabletop and 
Puritans are pragmatic, the young painter ends up eating every day from the former. 
What he internalises from this is the following: in the centre of the tabletop is the eye 
of God; in the pupil there is Christ, displaying his wounds (offering salvation), and in 
the outer ring (the iris) is mirrored what God sees: the sins of the world. Such 
concepts, although anatomically inaccurate in this case – the iris reflects, not the pupil 
– were common in Bosch’s time. In the medieval epithet cordis speculator God is 
considered the seer of hearts. Sebastian Brant’s Ship of Fools (1494) suggests that it is 
a mirror, “where each his counterfeit may see”.351 Similarly, Nicolas de Cusa, in his 
Vision of God (1453), equates the Divine Eye with a mirror. He writes:  
 
Lord, Thou seest and hast eyes. Thou art an Eye […] Thy sight, being an eye or living mirror, 
seeth all things in itself […]Thou seemst to me at times such that I may think Thee to see all 
things in Thyself, as in a living mirror, wherein all things shine forth.
352
 
 
And finally he posits the syllogism: “Absolute Power is Absolute Sight, which is very 
perfection” (ibid.). To be seen by God, in this equation, means uttermost 
transparency, pre-established harmony, but also a subjection of those he sees to his 
power. This notion is reflected in the Bosch tabletop employed in The Recognitions: 
the translation of the upper inscription of the tabletop is “For they are a nation void of 
counsel, neither is there any understanding in them. O that they were wise, that they 
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understood this, that they would consider their later end”; the lower is “I will hide my 
face from them, I will see what their end shall be” (Deuteronomy 32: 28-29, 20).353 
The inner eye represents “a mirror wherein the viewer is confronted by his own soul 
disfigured by vice”; at the same time, he “beholds the remedy for this disfigurement 
in the image of Christ in the centre”. 354 The inscription under the resurrected Christ 
figure, cave, cave dominus videt, means ‘beware, beware, god is watching’. As a 
dramatic device, the redemptive possibilities represented by Bosch’s Christ in The 
Recognitions parallel the function of divine grace in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus. In 
economic terms, God’s grace is, strictly speaking, also an interruption of the credit 
and debit of the Mephistophelian contract.
355
 For the painter Wyatt, the dominus videt 
becomes the precondition of his life and work, not only for Christian soteriological 
reasons but also because he thinks it was the premise under which the Flemish 
Masters painted:  
 
There [in late Middle-Ages] was nothing God did not watch over, nothing, and so this… and 
so in the painting every detail reflects… God’s concern with the most insignificant objects in 
life, with everything, because God did not relax for an instant then, and neither could the 
painter then. Do you get the perspective in this? he demanded, thrusting the rumpled 
reproduction before them. —There isn’t any. There isn’t any single perspective, like the 
camera eye, the one we all look through now and call it realism, there… I take five or six or 
ten… the Flemish painter took twenty perspectives if he whished, and even in a small painting 
you can’t include it all in your single vision, your one miserable pair of eyes […] (TR, 251) 
 
Wyatt posits three things here. The first is a direct opposition to the limitation of the 
human gaze: working in the sight of God means absolute transparency and 
significance.
356
 Secondly, following the Bosch paradigm of dominus videt, he aspires 
redemption through imitating, not entirely modestly, the deity: “God did not relax 
[…] neither could the painter” (ibid.).  
The conceptual approach behind Wyatt’s views on perspective in painting shows 
strong relations to the theories of the art historian Erwin Panofsky. In Perspective as 
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Symbolic Form, Panofsky demonstrates a profound knowledge of Renaissance art on 
the basis of Ernst Cassirer’s theories of “symbolic forms”.357 This theory conceives of 
perspective as a symbolic form through which art does serve the discovery of reality: 
Latin perspectiva for him means Durchsehung.
358
 The non-perspectival art of ancient 
and medieval times allowed for no, that is, unlimited points of view. The world in the 
painting is fully accessible as allegory. The Renaissance sees the emergence of linear 
perspective. The Flemish Primitives were at an intermediate point of such 
transition.
359
 Painters like van Eyck and van der Goes did neither follow the paradigm 
of earlier eras nor the single view of mathematical perspective, but employed what 
can be called “empirical perspective”.360 In Panofsky’s words, the “road leading to 
[the] new unity passes first of all […] through the destruction of the existing unity, 
[…] the crystallization and isolation of the individual elements that were previously 
limited by mimetic-corporeal and perspective-spatial binds”. 361  The shift in (or 
emergence of) perspective has crucial consequences for the space within the painting. 
Ancient and medieval painters conceived of a closed space, whereas the concept of 
infinite space, “though it had long been part of artistic intention, had not yet been 
rationalized or rendered in mathematical form”.362  
For Panofsky, the Southern Renaissance therefore arrived at a total rationalisation 
of space that liberates the latter from finiteness but binds it to human consciousness. 
The ultimate goal of this tendency is that perspective may be conceived of “both as 
the consolidation and systematization of the outside world as an extension of the 
sphere of the I”. 363  Here, Panofsky identifies early tendencies of the Cartesian 
revolution and the introduction of Kantian transcendentals. Panofsky, however, and 
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Gaddis later, is critical towards such tendencies; the wording of his criticism directly 
reflects back on what exactly is gained and lost by rationalisation and subjectivity: the 
perspectival conception of space, he writes, “seems to reduce the divine to a mere 
content of human consciousness, but at the same time it broadens human knowledge 
to the point of making it capable of taking in and containing within itself the 
divine”. 364  God’s “absolute sight” is devoured by human consciousness. It is 
Mephistopheles in Marlowe’s play who notes that hell is a state of mind. And it was 
philosophers such as Derrida and Adorno who had to remind us that the conditions set 
by Descartes and German Idealism, the supreme reign the mind, reason, and self, 
could easily turn into a “devouring rage at all that is different”.365 If consciousness 
becomes a pitfall, however, perspective becomes another. The human point of view 
devours the divine gaze, but if we brush this notion against the grain we cannot help 
but notice that linear perspective, creating a point of view, simultaneously binds the 
beholder of a painting to this point, and thereby limits recognition. 
Such implications are made explicit in Gaddis’s treatment of the Bosch tabletop 
and strongly related to epistemological questions negotiated in Wyatt’s aesthetic of 
‘recognition’. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, Gaddis does not only use the 
Flemish Primitives in order to exemplify the latter but also Cubist paintings. Most 
pointedly, Wyatt experiences a quasi-epiphany on seeing Picasso’s ‘Night Fishing in 
Antibes’ (see Fig. 2). In order to elucidate the painting’s appeal to him, I briefly 
discuss the significance of space and perspective in Cubist painting. Space became a 
major pictorial obsession for Cubist artists like Braque, Gris, and Picasso.
366
 For 
Braque, the “areas of empty space, what one might call the ‘Renaissance vacuum’, 
became as important as the subjects themselves”;367 there is a growing awareness not 
only of spaces within the painting but also the space between painting and spectator. 
The altered concept of space highlighted in Cubism is caused by a different 
approach to perspective. Renaissance perspective “makes the single eye the centre of 
the visible world. Everything converges on to the eye as to the vanishing point of 
infinity. The visible world is arranged for the spectator as the universe was once 
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thought to be arranged for God”.368 Cubism, as a formalistic art, concerned with the 
re-appraisal and re-invention of pictorial procedures and values,
369
 attempted 
emancipation from visual experiences, which resulted in artworks simultaneously 
representational and anti-naturalistic.
370
 Ever since the “Italian Renaissance artists had 
been guided by principles of mathematical perspective, whereby artist viewed subject 
from single viewpoint”; the breaks with this traditional perspective in Cubism “was to 
result …  in what contemporary critics called ‘simultaneous’ vision – the fusion of 
various views of a figure or object into a single one.”371 For the Cubists, accordingly, 
“the visible was no longer what confronted the single eye, but the totality of possible 
views taken from points all around the object (or person) being depicted.”372 The 
French painter Jean Metzinger described this in his “Note on Painting” (1910) as the 
“abandonment of the burdensome inheritance of dogma; …  the clever mixing, again 
and again, of the successive and the simultaneous”.373 
Gaddis himself is very close to this aesthetic in his technique of deliberate 
fragmentation, repetition, variation, indirection, and apophaticism. Influenced by 
Nietzsche and Hans Vaihinger, he asserts that “things don’t happen […] in a single 
light”, because “the instant a thing happens it has happened, and when it has 
happened it has happened in a thousand ways none of which alone is true”.374 He 
thereby confirms Jacques Rivière’s renunciation of perspective: 
 
[p]erspective is an accidental thing as lighting. It is the sign, not of a particular moment in 
time, but of a particular position in space. It indicates not the situation of the objects, but the 
situation of the spectator.
375
 
 
What Wyatt tries to achieve in his forgeries is similar; like Cubism, however, without 
contradictions.
376
 Wyatt, for instance, lauds one of his forgeries as follows:  
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Do you get the perspective in this [painting]? […] There isn’t any single perspective, like the 
camera eye, the one we all look through now and call it realism, there… I take five or six or 
ten… […] even in a small painting you can’t include it all in your single vision, your one 
miserable pair of eyes […] (TR, 251) 
 
Even if he might not be fully correct with his view on the perspective of Flemish 
painters, he has a point in stressing that art, in theory, is able to provide what is 
unattainable in life. The realism of one “miserable pair of eyes” is limited, and with a 
point of view come misrecognitions and contradictions. Even if things happen in more 
than one light, one cannot fully grasp them. If the fullness of life cannot be seized by 
man’s limited capabilities, art can nevertheless mediate between the two: 
 
—Night Fishing in Antibes, yes, yes… […] when I saw it, it was one of those moments of 
reality, of near-recognition of reality. I’d been… I’ve been worn out in this piece of work, and 
when I finished in it I was free, free of all of a sudden out in the world. In the street everything 
was unfamiliar, everything and everyone I saw was unreal; I felt like I was going to lose my 
balance out there, this feeling was getting all knotted up inside me and I went in there just to 
stop for a minute. And then I saw this thing. When I saw it all of a sudden everything was 
freed into one recognition, really freed into reality that we never see, you never see. You don’t 
see it in paintings because most of the time you can’t see beyond a painting. […] You can’t 
see them any time, just any time, because you can’t see freely very often, hardly ever, maybe 
seven times in a life.  (TR, 91-2) 
 
Ideal art is clarity and purity. As the account indicates, the revelation of truth by and 
the access of reality through art are rare, however, and it is even harder to produce 
such ‘windows’ to recognition. When Wyatt describes his work before bargaining 
with Brown he observes, not without bitterness: 
 
How… how fragile situations are. […] Why, all this around us is for people who can keep 
their balance only in the light, where they move as though nothing were fragile, nothing 
tempered by possibility, and all of a sudden bang! something breaks. Then you have to stop 
and put the pieces together again. But you never can put them back together quite the same 
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way. You stop when you can and expose things, and leave them within reach, and others come 
on by themselves, and they break, and even then you may put the pieces aside just out of reach 
until you can bring them back and show them, put together slightly different, maybe a little 
more enduring, until you’ve broken it and picked up the pieces enough times, and you have 
the whole thing in all its dimensions. But the discipline, the detail, it’s just… sometimes the 
accumulation is too much to bear. (TR, 113-114) 
 
Against the background of the anti-Romanticism of Wyatt’s teacher Koppel, 
Heffernan sees a relation to Adorno’s notion of genius here.377 As Adorno writes in 
Aesthetic Theory:  
 
The genial remains paradoxical and precarious because the freely discovered and the 
necessary cannot actually ever be completely fused. Without the ever present possibility of 
failure there is nothing genial in artworks.
378
 
 
Playing advocatus diaboli, I would argue that the reverse is not necessarily true: 
failure is no guarantee for genius. Even more so, if one considered Wyatt as a genius 
along these lines, one would have to apply the same to Stanley and Max. If one 
observes another of Adorno’s coordinates of genius, one must admit that it holds true 
for all three artists working with palimpsests, bricolage and copying: 
 
The genial is a dialectical knot: It is what has not been copied or repeated, it is free, yet at the 
same time bears the feeling of necessity; it is art’s paradoxical sleight of hand and one of its 
most dependable criteria. To be genial means to hit upon a constellation, subjectively to 
achieve the objective, it an instant in which the methexis of the artwork in language allows 
convention to be discarded as accidental. The signature of the genial in art is that the new 
appears by virtue of its newness as if it had always been there […]
379
 
 
This holds true for all three artists, who create within the field between freedom and 
necessity something new that appears to have always been there. But genial or not, 
there are two contradictions as regards Wyatt’s paintings. Firstly, they are wares, as 
he will come to learn, that is, the aesthetic category is invariably subordinate to that of 
market values.
 
What therefore comes to mind is Adorno and Horkheimer’s dictum 
that “[p]ure works of art which deny the commodity society by the very fact that they 
                                                 
377
 Heffernan, “The Recognitions by William Gaddis”, 82-3. 
378
 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 225. 
379
 Ibid. 
 117 
obey their own law were always wares all the same”.380 Newness is only relevant in 
the context of Wyatt’s paintings insofar as new goods are demanded by the market, 
just as the profusion of minute details in his paintings adds to their “ability to return a 
generous profit”.381 The second aspect is that the function Wyatt attributes to his art is 
the reestablishment of a lost modus operandi with distinctly social and metaphysical 
implications as represented by the ‘alchemy’ of the Flemish Primitives. In the 
following I will therefore discuss what it means for Wyatt to have “taken the Guild 
oath […], to use pure materials, to work in the sight of God” (TR, 250), to work 
beneath a few, grave, rigid laws, as it were (cf. TR, 186). Moreover, I will discuss 
why his restitution of both artistic and social perfection is an endeavour bound to fail. 
 
 
4.2. Alchemy and Magic  
What was valuable [in modernism] was the kind of art which 
mirrored a world in which you could recognize yourself. Quite why 
this is thought valuable is extremely hard to say. The answer 
probably has more to do with magic than aesthetics.  
—Terry Eagleton, After Theory
382
 
 
When Wyatt discovers that the Bosch tabletop he forged was the original, he 
exclaims: “Thank God there was the gold to forge” (TR, 689, 949), a line Gaddis 
wanted to be understood as the key to the novel.
383
 At this point, Wyatt’s Christian 
notion of redemption meets a second soteriological model, the alchemical making of 
gold.
384
 Since al-kîmiyâ, the holy art of producing gold and the technê of 
redemption,
385
 is so central to Wyatt’s soteriological agenda, a more detailed 
observation is in place. Moreover, negotiations of alchemy are an intrinsic element of 
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the Faust myth. Not only does Faust ‘speculate the elements’, as Mann puts it; the 
myth frequently ridicules the confusion between gold as a spiritual category and as a 
commodity. Marlowe’s Faustus intends to heap up gold, Andreae’s Turbo ridicules 
alchemical money-making, and Goethe, whose drama features pervasive association 
of monetary with ‘phallic’ power, has his Margarete say: “Gold’s all they care/ About, 
gold’s wanted everywhere” (F, 2802-3). Gaddis follows suit in this respect by using 
the theme in order to satirise modern scientism and materialism. 
Historically, alchemy is far from a homogenous category but comprises Gnostic 
and Neoplatonic ideas. It has been categorised as an astronomia inferior with 
relations to the Cabbala, and is also found under the labels of pansophism, theosophy 
and the ars hermetica. Since the Middle Ages alchemy has been categorised as 
physica as well as scientia theoretica, but also assigned to the scientiae practicae. 
Roger Bacon differentiates between alchemica speculativa and alchemica practica; 
for him the alchimicus is a philosopus and an artifex.
386
 Paracelsus then demarcates 
the change from traditional alchemy to iatrochemistry (medical chemistry).
387
 
Moreover, in Paracelsian thought alchemy becomes a philosophia mystica in 
conjunction with theosophy. Central to alchemy is the ars transmutaoria or 
chrysopoeia. The alchemist is the artist (artifex) who brings nature to perfection by 
means of the amelioration of metals in an operation of several stages. The underlying 
notion is that everything in nature aspires to perfection, that is, all metals continually 
strive to become gold. The alchemists distinguish between the aurum nostrum and 
vulgar gold.
388
 There is much obscurity involved in the former kind, but the Rosarium 
Philosophorum, for instance, is at the same time quite clear that the colour of the 
human soul is red.
389
 The alchemists believed in the finality of nature: if nothing 
“impedes the process of gestation, all ores will, in time, become gold”.390 Metals that 
had remained imperfect were to be transmuted into gold with the aid of the lapis 
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philosophorum,
391
 and books like the Aurea catena Homeri (1723) provided hermetic 
explanations of nature including recipes for the production of the lapis.
392
 Assuming 
the place of the Earth-Mother, the artifex accelerates the process of perfection in his 
opus, which is aimed at producing the Philosopher’s Stone, or the Elixir, with which 
matter is turned into gold. Arnold of Villanova wrote “there abides in Nature a certain 
pure matter which, being discovered and brought by Art to perfection, converts to 
itself all imperfect bodies that it touches.”393 The Philosopher’s Stone completes and 
consummates the work of nature, but it also gives expression to an “old dream of 
homo faber: collaboration in the perfecting of matter while at the same time securing 
perfection for himself.”394 Transmuting nature means also the transmutation of man.  
Gaddis considerably draws from such notions, firstly to satirise cold scientific 
rationality and materialism, and secondly, suggesting, like Mann, that alchemy is not 
“just making gold” (TR, 129), but also a modus of self-redemption. Even if Gaddis 
depicts the alchemists as fools and ‘cronies’, he remains ambivalent. Paracelsus is 
mentioned, Raymond Lully, and Michael Maier (TR, 77, 131, 132), with some sense 
of pity as victims of the Enlightenment and materialism, but also with some sense of 
admiration. For the alchemists, nature is a hierophany (religion and alchemy were not 
mutually exclusive from the point of view of the alchemist). In modernity, as Eliade 
writes, the “visionary’s myth of the perfection, […] of the redemption of Nature, 
survives, in camouflaged form, in the pathetic programme of the industrial societies 
whose aim is the total transmutation of nature” into something that is feasible, 
consumable, sellable.
395
 This is the greed of Marlowe’s Faustus “Heap up gold,/ And 
be eternised from some wondrous cure”.396 Instead of aspiring perfection, Faustus is 
tempted by power, and he aspires possession, excited by the prospect to exploit “all 
the wealth our forefathers hid/ Within the massy entrails of the earth”.397 This is also 
the “repetitive drudgery” of modern technology as compared to the “hard and 
honourable work” of magic, Pynchon describes in his introduction to Jim Dodge’s 
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novel Stone Junction.
398
 Purely positivistic science falls under the same category in 
The Recognitions: 
 
Science in magnitude, biology and chemistry as triumphantly articulate as subordinates are 
always, offer no choice but abjure it in frantic effort to perfect a system without alternatives, 
the very fact of their science based on measurement; and measurement, designed to predicate 
finalities, refusing the truth which shelters in possibility […] (TR, 469) 
 
Materialism and science reduce the world to an either/or, they pose as the new Christ 
in the state of the player piano described in Agapē Agape. Not incidentally, the frenzy 
of invention and perfection goes hand in hand with “art without the artist” (AA, 9), 
for either/or-artificiality is substituted for artistic potentiality. The world of Mr. 
Pivner, Otto’s father, is the epitome of such reductionism:  
 
[I]n the foremost shambles of time Mr. Pivner stood, heir to that colossus of self-justification, 
Reason, one of whose first accomplishments was to effectively sever itself from the …  
chaos of the past. Obtruding over centuries of gestation appeared this triumphal abortion: 
Reason supplied means and eliminated ends. (TR, 290) 
 
However, one reads, the “means themselves had become an end constantly 
unfulfilled” (TR, 291). Gaddis, in his ironic allusiveness, undermines the reduction of 
perfection to pure materialism, as the following lines exemplify: 
 
Zosimus, Albertus Magnus, Geber, Bernhardus, Trevisanus, Basilius Valentinus, Raymond 
Lully, Khalid ben Yezid, Hermes Trismegistus, have they been transcended by our 
achievements?  For today (at a cost of $10,000 an ounce) it is possible to transmute base metal 
into gold. (TR, 131) 
 
Considering that the average price of an ounce of gold in 1950 was $ 40, the absurdity 
of such scientism is obvious. Most ironic allusions to alchemy in this manner refer to 
Otto, Wyatt’s ‘famulus’, who is presented as an exemplary case of the pitfalls of 
materialism, that is, of making the ‘lesser gold’.399 Otto understands gold as follows: 
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Coined or in heavy bars, or exquisite dust it came into his mind, to be fashioned in that busy 
workshop in less time than it takes to tell (for it was more an assembly line than a 
manufactory) into cuff links, cigarette cases, and other mass-produced artifacts of the world 
he lived in, mementos of this world, in which the things worth being were so easily exchanged 
for the things worth having. (TR, 131) 
 
In the alchemical continuum, materialism is represented by two connected symbols in 
The Recognitions, the colour green and base matter. Green is associated in alchemical 
symbolism with Venus or the Green Lion that represents the still immature matter in 
the alembic, a description not unfit for the adept Otto.
400
 Gaddis employs the colour 
adjective in its full polysemy. As a property of paper money, it signifies a degraded 
state of gold, a counter-image to perfection, as provided in Otto’s quest for money. 
Otto does not aspire redemption but thinks of reality as “the things you can’t do 
anything about” (TR, 119). All he wants is to acquire wealth and renown. He, who 
feels intrinsically undefined (TR, 129), a massa confusa often associated with faeces 
(TR, 203, 466), is reliant on the greenback, the lesser gold (cf. TR, 520). As Pynchon 
will later write in Gravity’s Rainbow: “Shit, money, and the Word, the three 
American truths” (GR, 28). Gaddis returns to this trinity in JR, where annual school 
budgets foresee only twelve hundred dollars for books but twelve thousand for paper 
towels (JR, 25). As one of the characters of the novel holds, this is “what America’s 
all about, waste disposal and all” (JR, 27). In Otto’s case, the ‘modern device’ of 
money fails, melts into air, when he mistakenly comes into possession of five 
thousand fake (“queer”) dollars that initiate his ruin.401  
The second, related image is that of base matter. In redeeming such matter, 
represented by Brown, Wyatt intends to redeem art, but also sets up an “alchemical 
paradigm that acts as a touchstone for the redemption of his soul”.402 
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4.3. Fractures 
The inquisitio lapidis philosophorum (search for the Stone) is often the symbolic 
expression of the pilgrimage to Christ. In order to be purified, matter has to undergo 
dissolution. This ‘deadening’, as Eliade notes, “was sanctified by the death of Christ 
who assured its redemption”.403 The alchemists 
 
projected on to Matter the initiatory function of suffering. Thanks to the alchemical 
operations, corresponding to the tortures, death and resurrection of the initiate, the substance 
is transmuted, that is, attains a transcendental [sic] mode of being: it becomes gold.
404
 
 
Wyatt experiences the association of art and suffering from his infancy onward, be it 
in Aunt May’s domain, where original art is sinful and Christians “approve of the 
suffering of another” (TR, 47), or his literal suffering via the loss of his mother. As an 
adult, he admires the stringency of suffering in flamenco music, its arrogance, its 
precision, and its lack of sentimentality: 
 
These things have their own patterns, suffering and violence, […] the sense of violence within 
its own pattern, the pattern that belongs to violence like the bullfight, that’s why the bullfight 
is art, because it respects its own pattern […] (TR, 112) 
  
Ironically, the Spanish flamenco means ‘Flemish’ (TR, 111), and someone even 
describes Wyatt as “muy flamenco” (TR, 110). Although for Wyatt the precision and 
privacy of suffering (TR, 116) is opposed to public capitalised Suffering (TR, 943-
44), his apotheosis is equally on the verge of hypostasising the concept.
405
 Wyatt 
projects his suffering on art as the alchemists did.
406
 When he follows an “aesthetic of 
disciplined agony”,407 he sees himself in direct opposition to the romantic notion of 
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the genius, namely as the servant of art,
408
 in that “where he celebrates the contingent 
objectivity of artistic technique as opposed to the pitfalls of romantic subjectivism”.409 
Art, consequently, becomes for him an objective correlative to “expiation” (TR, 591) 
and automatically gains moral value. Instead of rendering his struggle into expression, 
however, he substitutes idolatrous martyrdom for his own suffering, which is 
ultimately a hubristic gesture. Rather than bearing the fragile situations he describes, 
rather than living with and within disruptions, which would make him a genius in 
Adorno’s sense, he reverts to religious doxa disguised in alchemical formulas, and 
despite his rhetoric he evades the problem of how art can be morally transformative 
under the capitalist paradigm but merely propounds to work in the sight of God. The 
enlightened self reverts to the myth of the martyr as a hero, “who serves something 
higher than himself with undying devotion” (TR, 32). However, he devotes himself to 
the guild and the masters because they are also ideal projection screens, and imitating 
them allows for an indulgence in religious idolatry and self-pity posing as self-
abnegation. Moreover, while the alchemical reading suggests itself in this context—
“the alchemist takes up and perfects the work of Nature, while at the same time 
working to ‘make’ himself”—,410 so does the Protestant notion of service. When 
Wyatt rants “What is it they want from a man that they didn’t get from his work? 
What do they expect? What is there left of him when he’s done his work?” (TR, 95), 
such opinions certainly address the interrelation between personality cult and 
commoditisation, that is, stardom in the service of commerce. However, they equally 
serve Wyatt as a justification for forfeiting his own personality. Rather than 
attempting to develop a social mode of existence that comprises connectedness and 
meaningfulness, Wyatt’s counter-socialised personality draws its entire sense of self 
from the opus. In this respect, there is no difference between the artifex working in 
the sight of God and the Puritan in his calling. Gaddis leaves no doubt that this is a 
deluded endeavour. If Wyatt’s frequent self-description as a homunculus in a shell 
and the fact that the forger is referred to merely by means of the personal pronoun 
throughout the entire mid-section of the novel were not indicative enough, the 
painter’s resorting to alcoholism in order to emulate van der Goes’s madness is. 
Adorno writes that those “who produce important artworks are not demigods but 
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fallible, often neurotic and damaged, individuals” – and the more damaged Wyatt, the 
better his forgeries.
411
 Thus, while in Mann infection enables grandeur, in Gaddis one 
has the impression that delusion is sought as a necessary predisposition of the latter: 
simulated disease, simulated genius. Moreover, Wyatt’s alchemy, as I show in the 
following, is co-opted by a magic of a different kind. 
In the context of evaluating artworks and reproduction, it has become customary to 
refer to Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, an 
essay Gaddis was acquainted with, and to differentiate between an aura of authenticity 
with a unique value (ritual value) that is then lost or superseded by a discursively 
constructed value (exhibition value).
412
 In The Recognitions, however, such 
distinctions are problematical. First of all, Wyatt does not mechanically-soullessly 
reproduce paintings but he creates ‘genuine’ paintings by emulating the conditions 
necessary for the establishment of ‘authenticity’. He carefully selects his pigments, 
the oil, or the eggs for gesso; but, more crucially, he becomes van der Goes (even to 
the point of simulating van der Goes’s madness). Deluding himself into indebtedness 
to both God and the Guild of Dutch Masters, he is able to forge what Benjamin calls 
the ritual value perceivable in the artwork’s aura.413 He can thereby belie himself and 
the taste of his times: “Most forgeries last only a few generations, because they’re so 
carefully done in the taste of the period, a forged Rembrandt, for instance, confirms 
everything that that period sees in Rembrandt” (TR, 230). The produced aura, 
however, is only possible in complicity with the exhibition-value, the art-dealers who 
‘deaden’ the work and sell it, for no matter what kind of painting we see, the forgery 
of van Eyck or van der Goes or an original by Picasso, what remains qua aesthetics is 
a vague feeling of recognition that needs verbal affirmation as an external signifier of 
the ceritudo salutis. The devil himself, Brown, explains how the market works: 
“Nobody wants copies. […] The ones who can pay want originals. They can pay for 
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originals. They expect to pay” (TR, 145). Why do Brown’s customers care for old 
masters when so many “hip” modern paintings are available? Firstly, they “can pay” 
and “expect to pay”, that is, they want artworks to be obvious signifiers of their 
wealth, taking age and veneration as sufficiently obvious characteristics. Forging, it is 
implied, does not primarily serve aesthetic functions but satisfies, however 
momentarily, the desire of accretion: “When the Roman Republic collapsed, art 
collecting collapsed, art forging disappeared. […] Instead of art they had religion” 
(TR, 245). Gaddis insinuates here that the fundamental principles of such an economy 
are identical to those involved in concepts of sin and indulgence, pilgrimage and 
religious relics. Secondly, if Brown’s art customers are of the same kind as those who 
buy his chalk toothpaste, the chemical women use for their menstrual periods, and the 
crucifixes, then they want affirmation rather than rupture. The inversion of discourse, 
the buyer’s “shame and secrecy” (TR, 243), traits that Gaddis identifies as 
intrinsically Puritan, enable the sale. The reified artwork, whose discovery is 
documented in newspapers,
414
 whose authenticity is certified in art magazines, and 
whose display in Brown’s private gallery document its reification as a genuine article, 
cannot be unsettling because it does not speak anymore. The “Age of Publicity” (TR, 
736) having superseded the ages of faith and reason, the artwork itself is deadened. 
As Basil Valentine holds:  
 
—There is always an immense congregation of people unable to create anything themselves, 
who look for comfort to the critics to disparage, belittle, and explain away those who do. (TR, 
651) 
 
Such power is conditioned, as argued, by the impossibility of distinguishing between 
original and copy, between work and reproduction on a phenomenological basis. 
Valentine confirms that only solid knowledge of the origins of an artwork or credulity 
makes the distinction: “If the public believes that a picture is by Raphael, and will pay 
the price of a Raphael, …  then it is a Raphael” (TR, 239). Against this background, 
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 There is a decidedly political dimension to the “discovery” of some of the forgeries: “An original 
Memling, right from Germany. A guy I know in the army there, this thing has been marked down as 
lost on the reparations claims” (TR, 231). It also transpires that “Hungary was attempting to sell in the 
West masterpieces from Budapest’s National Art Gallery. […] The informants said that some of the 
paintings were being shipped to the United States as diplomatic luggage in the hope of interesting 
American art collectors” (TR, 329-30). A severe implication of this is that American cultural life 
thrives on the European catastrophe.  
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it is doubtful that Gaddis was naïve enough to suggest, as Lisa Siraganian holds, that a 
fake painting “cannot rely on its integrity to compel conviction in order to sell itself, 
and so must by definition rely on an outside economy: the economy of the critic and 
art buyer”- while the original does not. 415  The paradigms Gaddis develops from 
Huizinga acknowledges that “Medieval Christian art would have been unthinkable 
without an iconographic and institutionally mandated and mediated discursive space 
(the church itself, an ideological as well as an architectural site)” – religious rhetoric 
serves as the discursive space for Wyatt and Stanley – but also that in “romantic and 
modern art […] the demand for originality obscured the necessity of discursive 
precedence”.416 In terms of reception, the shallow partygoers serve their purpose in 
lauding Max Schling’s colours and the emptiness of his paintings. The work itself has 
become “a fully discursive phenomenon”.417 “The origin of the artist is the work of 
art, the origin of the work of art is the artist”, states Jacques Derrida, reiterating 
Heidegger.
418
 In The Recognitions both art and artist exist by virtue but also at the 
mercy of salesmen and public relations. Brown and Valentine do and undo. They are 
the real creative agents, so powerful they can literally create a painter, for instance Jan 
van Eyck’s brother: “—What are you talking about? Brown demanded. —We decided 
he exists, this Herbert [sic]” (TR, 255).419 This manoeuvre reflects the performative 
trick of Faust’s Bible translation in all respects, the search for an ‘absent God’ in 
signs (the text of the Gospel) and the substitution of the word with action. Eventually, 
it is a seizure of authority for the sake of one’s own interests—a feat not only 
Valentine and Brown but also Pynchon’s Mephistophelian characters also capitalise 
on.
420
 Against the background of such creation ex nihilo, it is no wonder that Wyatt’s 
alchemical credo that the work is everything and the artifex nothing acquires an 
unintentionally cynical quality.
421
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 Ironically, even though he erases himself by subscribing to the authority invested in the Flemish 
Primitives, a kernel of him remains. On seeing Wyatt’s pseudo-van Eyck painting The Annunciation, 
 127 
To summarise, Wyatt’s Faustian delusion may be presented as parody in The 
Recognitions, but it has serious implications. Firstly, he does not take into 
consideration what has been formulated by Oteiza: “A man can repeat himself, but a 
generation, and therefore art itself, can never be repeated”.422 Since the world of the 
Flemish Primitives cannot be recaptured, Wyatt, as a forger, continues his previous 
job as a restorer by “patching up the past” (TR, 142-44). Secondly, as Agamben has 
observed, “the authority invoked by the quotation is founded precisely on the 
destruction of the authority that is attributed to a certain text by its situation in the 
history of culture”.423 Wyatt quotes from other paintings insofar as he copies parts 
from various paintings to assemble them, together with a minimal remainder of 
himself (the encystation of his desire for Camilla), to something “new”. In doing so, 
however, he undermines the authority of the Flemish Primitives he allegedly 
cherishes. The destruction of the authority represented in van Eyck and van der Goes 
is nowhere clearer than in Wyatt’s ‘quotations’ that are used for the spiritual market. 
Moreover, by inscribing the authority of the Flemish Painters to himself, he also 
devalues his own artistic abilities. The latter leads to an aspect described by Bourdieu:  
 
The world of art, a sacred island systematically and ostentatiously opposed to the profane, 
everyday world of production, a sanctuary for gratuitous, disinterested activity in a universe 
given over to money and self-interest, offers, like theology in a past epoch, an imaginary 
anthropology obtained by denial of all negations really brought about by the economy.
424
 
 
Therefore, in feeding back the Flemish masters into the economy, Wyatt follows what 
John Berger calls “bogus religiosity”.425 Locating moral energy in saleable objects, he 
produces art-indulgences,
426
 and believing in art as transformative practice, he is all 
the more, in Adorno’s terms, self-deceptive.427 Thus, forgery in The Recognitions also 
means a waste of talent, the talent of being oneself and the talent of perfecting one’s 
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own work and style. The notion of the ‘self who can do more’ here takes on a 
different meaning. Wyatt, despite some glorifying statements by other characters (or 
literary critics, for that matter), is neither the better self of a community of artists nor 
does he produce the significance he wishes to achieve. Going into hiding in his 
alchemical workshop and labouring until he is drained of himself, he conceives of his 
part of the deal as the opus, making “gold down there, out of fingernail parings” (TR, 
173), as another character ironically observes. But even if he convincingly frames 
himself by thinking that he can produce art outside the commodity system, he is no 
better craftsman than Mr. Feddle, who restricts himself to forging signatures by 
Melville and Dostoevsky, neither is he morally superior to the bricoleur Max Schling. 
By signing the paintings as a second maker, he forges the signum in an environment 
where Nihil cavum neque sine signo apud Deum has to make do without the Divine. 
But what remains is the realisation that his enterprise has always been about the 
‘lesser gold’ and his forging an act of solely legal significance: 
 
—That’s the only thing they can prosecute you for in court, you know, if you’re caught. 
Forging the signature. The law doesn’t care a damn for the painting. (TR, 251)   
 
The framework has become a way to frame, to con oneself. 
 
 
5. Attempts at Redemption  
According to the principle by which it is only in the burning house 
that the fundamental architectural problem becomes visible for the 
first time, art, at the furthest point of its destiny, makes visible its 
original project. 
—Giorgio Agamben, The Man without Content428 
 
When Spies’ Faust is starting to have second thought about his allegiance, the demon 
coerces him into renew the contract with the devil. Although Wyatt eventually breaks 
free from his delusion, he does so not without being tempted by other dubious modes 
of salvation and will undergo yet further transformations without, as it seems, ever 
arriving at a definitive sense of being redeemed. 
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5.1. Hastening Towards Destruction 
Wyatt realises that there is no salvation to be found in forgery and sets out to destroy 
all that is false. Gaddis, again, makes a Pseudo-Clemente epigraph available as an 
ironic comment on this turn of events, when Wyatt wants to break free from his 
business partners and seeks refuge at his father’s house (TR, 434): 
 
This is as if a drunk man should think himself to be sober, and should act indeed in all 
respects as a drunk man, and yet think himself to be sober, and should wish to be called so by 
others. Thus, therefore, are those also who do not know what is true, yet hold some 
appearance of knowledge, and do many evil things as if they were good, and hasten 
destruction as if it were to salvation. (CR, 305-6) 
 
The first irony involved in this soteriological warning is that is presents a deadlock: 
since the drunk does not know when he is drunk, he can hardly be sure if he is not 
deluded in judging Christian salvation the right approach.
429
 Gaddis expounds this 
trope by literalising the metaphor in presenting his major characters as drunkards.
430
 
On a less blatant level this state of drunkenness is strongly associated with a 
Leviathan world, a society corrupted to the bone. More substantially, intoxication is 
an indicator of Wyatt’s soteriological confusion and his attempted homecoming in the 
subsequent chapter, for when he flees from his infernal partners towards salvation, he 
merely exchanges one form of destruction for another. Returning to his father, Wyatt 
attempts to be a prodigal son and atone for his crimes by becoming a “priest”. His 
Catholic slip of tongue is placed quite intentionally as an indicator questioning the 
soberness of his intention to become a minister (cf. TR, 413). His intended metanoia, 
awry from the start, quickly turns into a matter of life and death.
431
 Wyatt, hitherto 
gaily confusing Charles Fort’s Book of the Damned and Anselm of Canterbury’s 
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 The trope of drunkenness is also common in documents of Valentinian speculation and other 
branches of Gnosticism. Jonas, for instance, discusses a Mandean text in which intoxication is aimed at 
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where everybody is preoccupied with salvation, literally drunk yearning for redemption, humans have 
turned their eyes from each other and recognition of the actual state of affairs has become impossible. 
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credo ut intelligam (“What I mean is, do we believe in order to understand? Or 
understand in order to be… be fished for”: TR, 382), tries to muster the belief that he 
is the “man for whom Christ died” (TR, 440, cf. 127). He indicates to his father that 
he wants to shake off his own Adamic “old man” in order to become a “new self” (St. 
Paul’s Colossians 3:9-10 is invoked in two other key passages of the novel: Otto’s 
failed homecoming and Stephen’s final moments). Gwyon follows his son’s wish, 
guides him through the confessional part of repentance,
432
 and then proposes to take 
his hope of killing the sinful self literally, for the Reverend, having long turned to 
Mithraism, wants to initiate him as a Mithraic priest. The initiation, it transpires, 
requires the adept to be killed: “No one can be reborn without dying. No one can be 
Mithras’ priest without being reborn” (TR, 432). Although the clash of Christian and 
syncretistic pagan soteriology leads Wyatt to identify himself with Christ and Gwyon 
to sacrifice a bull, such scenes do more than demonstrate the ludicrousness of both 
men’s pursuits: the effect of understanding religious metaphor in literal terms 
becomes destructive. When Wyatt realises that his attempt is bound to fail, he 
prepares to flee from his father’s parsonage, intending to commit himself to 
“damnation” and a “life without love” (TR, 442). “Yes, back there, that’s the place! 
They’re waiting! Yes, the harrowing of hell” (ibid.), he euphorically shouts before 
destroying the Bosch tabletop.
433
 
 
 
5.2. Basil Valentine: The Lure of the Ivory Tower  
Against his intentions, Wyatt soon changes his mind again and tries a second time to 
flee from all he perceives as evil. Eager to break free from his criminal past he has set 
his ‘alchemical’ workshop on fire with the unforeseen effect that the entire building 
burns down. Yet Wyatt thinks he can purchase absolution by revealing to the crowd 
of art critics at a ‘Walpurgisnacht’ party at Brown’s that the recently appeared 
masterpieces are sham by presenting their “charred fragments” (TR, 680). However, 
he does so in vain. At this point Valentine seizes the opportunity to tempt Wyatt with 
his own vision of salvation.  
                                                 
432
 Their conversation (TR, 430-32) represents the second part of Gaddis’s satiric version of the 
tripartite ritual of repentance (contritio cordis, confessio oralis, satisfactio actis).   
433
 It is a copy; Basil Valentine secretly had the original replaced and taken back to Europe (TR, 689). 
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In order to do so, he first exploits Wyatt’s remorse while dismantling his 
idealisation of the Flemish Primitives. It is shown with a good deal of material from 
Huizinga that even in the Early Renaissance the oppositions between sacred and 
profane, between salvation through paintings and the satisfaction of self-interest with 
commodities could no longer be upheld, possibly because they have never been 
viable. When Valentine contests the spiritual import of Wyatt’s role models, he 
pinpoints this discrepancy: 
 
and you think it was different then? …  In a world where everything was done for the same 
reasons everything’s done now? For vanity and avarice and lust? …  Yes, I remember your 
little talk, your insane upside-down apology for these pictures, every figure and every object 
with its own presence, its own consciousness because it was being looked at by God! Do you 
know what it was? What it really was? that everything was so afraid, so uncertain God saw it, 
that it insisted its vanity on His eyes? Fear, fear, pessimism and fear and depression 
everywhere, the way it is today, that’s why your pictures are so cluttered with detail, this 
terror of emptiness, this absolute terror of space. Because maybe God isn’t watching. …  
Separation, he said in a voice near a whisper, —all of it cluttered with separation, everything 
in its own vain shell, everything separate, withdrawn from everything else. Being looked at by 
God! Is there separation in God?  (TR, 689-90) 
 
As Valentine’s tirade proceeds, criticising the circumstances of Renaissance art 
production, another Huizinga line is his basis:  
 
Flanders in the fifteenth century, do you think it was all like the Adoration of the Mystic 
Lamb? […] And your precious van Eyck, do you think he didn’t live up to his neck in a loud 
vulgar court? […] Do you think a van Eyck didn’t curse having to whore away his genius 
[…]?  (TR, 689-90). 
 
The societal ‘reality’ behind the Flemish Primitives as Valentine presents them, then, 
is mildly shocking, and it appears that repellent circumstances of production and the 
prostitution of the artist are constants in art history. 
Such criticism is by far not disinterested but embedded in a greater agenda. 
Valentine’s sterile aesthetic represents the direct opposite to Brown’s materialism, 
and it tempts Wyatt towards an extreme to which he himself has strong affinities, 
namely of leading a “life without love” (TR, 442) in the ivory tower of art. His drive 
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to ascetic aestheticism is concisely expressed in a portmanteau word with which 
Gaddis characterises Valentine:  
 
Basil Valentine, who is the Gnostic presumption… is finally stricken down with insomnia, for 
his very refusal to realize and grant the worth of matter, that is, of other people. The essence 
of his gnosticism is largely an implacable hatred for matter. It is that element of aesceticism 
sic  common in so many religious expressions turned, not upon the self, but upon humanity. 
And it is his very inability to accomplish this hatred entirely, and to entirely refuse love 
(which he can only understand as power over the object loved, over all, in the theory in which 
he works; over Wyatt, who denies and escapes it himself…) that undoes him …
434
 
 
A neurotic, Valentine must compulsively wash his hands out of discontent with 
matter. Repelled by the “wetness” of females (TR, 235) but attracted by the brittle, 
reproachful look of Wyatt’s Stabat Mater (TR, 336), he is certainly not pro creation. 
His association with what could be called the “lavender gang” controversially 
contributes to the image of the passionless, sterile inhabitant of the ivory tower.
435
 A 
less aesthetically refined example is represented in the visceral betrayal of his own 
body. His insomnia is presented as an effect of his joyless reason devouring itself, and 
the dampness he emits from his lower regions when affectionately talking to Wyatt 
(TR, 684) cynically undercuts his favourite line “semper aliquid haeret” (TR, 336). 
Gaddis shows some empathy with the character. Valentine is pitifully aware of his 
shortcomings when he tells Wyatt that he knows that he hates people where the 
painter wishes he could love them (TR, 386), and his offer of asceticism, refinement 
and moderate homoeroticism (“the kind of thing that…it won’t be vulgar”: TR, 692) 
is proposed in sincere admiration of Wyatt. Such a benevolent perspective, however, 
ranks far behind harsher ones that cannot be fully categorised as satirical. Valentine, 
for whom “sophistication becomes an end in itself” far away from the plebs,436 does 
not only fall under the category of the Kantian man of taste accumulating cultural 
capital; he also follows the same elitist agenda identified by Andreas Huyssen as a 
distinct feature of male-centred modernism.
437
 Even more so, his attitude towards 
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political power betrays, according to Steven Moore, the same reasoning that “lead 
Pound and Eliot […] to favor authoritarian governments”.438 For the art critic, who 
holds that there “are so few beautiful things in the world […] that they must be 
protected” (TR, 386): 
 
any sanctuary of power. . . protects beautiful things. To keep people… to control people, to 
give them something... anything cheap that will satisfy them at the moment, to keep them 
away from beautiful things, to keep them where their hands can’t touch beautiful things, their 
hands that... touch and defile and... and break beautiful things… (TR, 924) 
 
Valentine’s agenda appeals to Wyatt for both its asceticism and its authoritarian 
implications. Moreover, the critic’s doctrine of lovelessness also finds recognition in 
the latter, who is neither able to maintain close relationship with his wife nor with his 
lover Esme.
439
 Eventually, Valentine also presents to Wyatt the notion of a ‘self who 
can do more’, as discussed in the previous chapter, albeit with an insidious twist. For 
Valentine, “this other… more beautiful self who… can do more than they can” is 
unreachable for the futile present-day “vulgar selves” (TR, 253). Rather than 
representing a mode of community and mutual inspiration, however, such self is an 
aristocratic ideal and a symptom of social separation. 
In this respect, The Recognitions does leave any doubt that art for its own sake is 
not the solution to shortcomings as represented by the culture industry, a point that 
cannot be stressed enough. Gaddis even goes so far as to effectively demonize the 
homophile art critic. When Wyatt is about to turn from his partner in crime, the latter 
renews his offer of personal partnership and reveals what he considers to be the only 
secret “worth having”. This secret, for which G. B. Shaw’s essay “The Perfect 
Wagnerite: A Commentary on the Nibelung’s Ring” (1883) is the source, lies in the 
“power of doing without happiness” (TR, 552). Valentine then makes his final plea 
for the ivory tower, but Wyatt literally hands Valentine back this secret by stabbing 
him almost to death (TR, 692). When Brown’s servant Fuller wants to help the 
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wounded, he is warned: “But… no, don’t touch him. You never know what they 
may… have in their hair” (TR, 692). Wyatt suspects Valentine to grow horns on his 
head, that is to be of the devil’s party – not, however, the Christian devil, as LaCapra 
suggests,
440
 but of the devil of the Gnostics, the “depressingly sterile creator” 
Ialdabaoth, to use Žižek’s phrase. 441  No matter how violent Wyatt’s act may 
eventually be, he nevertheless identifies Valentine as what he is. When the former 
says “[t]his man is your father” (TR, 691), he does not only imply that the 
misanthrope is a human being and with that part of the material world but also that 
Valentine’s notion of art is as false as Brown’s. As Ingendaay argues, unable to kill 
the message of lovelesness, the painter tries to kill the messenger Valentine.
442
 Just as 
Valentine survives, however, so does the message, and Wyatt will yet undertake more 
radical steps escape from it, finally opting for human social capabilities rather than 
preservation of art through seclusion from the social sphere. 
 
 
5.3. A Parody of Gnostic Redemption 
 
For agape …  is a stranger to desire. Not being marked by 
privation, it has only one desire—to give—which is the expression 
of its generosity. 
—Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition443 
 
[A] human being belongs to this earth, he should be fully at home 
on its surface, able to realize his potential through an active, 
productive exchange with it. 
— Slavoj Žižek, The Monstrosity of Christ
444
 
 
The mirror of God’s eye is broken. Wyatt realises that a restitution of the view of the 
Flemish Primitives, their devotion to God’s unifying gaze, is as much idolatry as his 
own attempt to create redemptive art. He leaves New York, seemingly dismissing 
Panofsky’s second task of paradigm shifts, that is, the reassembly after the breakage. 
It is also at this point that the novel merges the narrative of Faust with that of the 
Clementine romance. Gaddis does so by alluding to Simon Magus’s soteriological 
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story. Wyatt’s turn is dramaturgically staged as an encounter with an inverted 
‘Helena’, embracing the joy and vulgarity Valentine so detests. In Spain, he and Yák 
(Sinisterra) start a business as mummy forgers. Although he is alchemically ‘reborn’ 
as one Stephen, he is just as sinister as before: women cross themselves on seeing him 
and dogs bark at him in the street (TR, 784). Things brighten up, however, when the 
‘expatriate’ Faust meets the ‘lowest incarnation’ of the fallen Gnostic wisdom in a 
cheap hotel in Madrid:  
 
Look, what was that blonde I met in the hall? 
Silence submits to the thud of an Ideal ash hitting the floor. …  —Just what you say, a 
blonde. Forget her. 
—But I don’t even know her yet. 
—So that saves you the trouble. You don’t want to get mixed up with that flashy piece of 
goods. See? (TR, 796-97) 
 
The “flashy piece” called Marga (who is soon to be supplemented by a brunette called 
Pastora), is not only identified as Helen by the colour of her hair here but by two 
strands of associations. Firstly, the brand of Sinisterra’s cigarettes, Ideal, calls upon 
the canonical epithet of the ideal woman Helen of Troy. Secondly, after a vulgar 
outburst by Yák, Gaddis gives another hint: 
 
Copulo ego sum, Eh? Carne, O te felicem!  
And Mr Yák had shaken his head, and muttered something about “That flashy piece of 
goods down the hall,” at which he was instantly threatened with blindness as happened to 
Stesichorus, —for slandering Helen. (TR, 800)445 
 
The Marga-Pastora episode marks two obvious diversions from the Simonian account 
of redemption. The first one is that Stephen does not become godlike; the second is 
that instead of being a magus-redeemer, Stephen is redeemed by the two Spanish 
women. He appears increasingly sociable, and Marga teaches him Spanish, which he 
comments happily with “That’s love” (TR, 802), but the positive effects of being with 
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both women are not only manifest in convivial drinking sessions, as an allusion to yet 
another text indicates. After little time with his ‘redemptresses’, Wyatt has a strange 
dream in which he hears a child crying in his sleep (TR, 807). The passage evokes 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, references to which frequently occur in The 
Recognitions. In Dostoevsky’s novel, Mitya falls asleep and dreams of poor peasants 
with weeping babies, his dream signifying his ability to feel empathy. In Gaddis the 
dream similarly indicates a progress from Wyatt’s cool egocentricity to Stephen’s 
emotional development.  
The most crucial lesson he learns from Pastora, however, is the renunciation of 
salvation as a commodity fetish.
446
 When Stephen frequently has sex with her, Yák 
accuses him of using the girl as a prostitute. Stephen does contradict the accusation 
but explains with admiration how she forbade him to play with her breasts: “No, son 
para la niña, she didn’t want me to… to take what was… wasn’t mine” (TR, 809). 
Thus, although her gesture is not entirely devoid of notions of profitable exchange, for 
she does want Stephen’s love in turn (“Me quieres?”: TR, 804) and accepts his 
money, her withholding of certain ‘goods’ is in fact a refusal of mercantile 
principles.
447
 As opposed to Esther, who demands everything, and Esme, who gives 
everything, Pastora gives only what she intends for him, but neither as a service, 
sacrifice, nor as a gift that obliges the recipient to return anything in exchange. As 
Stephen explains later, Pastora gave him a daughter, “born out of, not love but borne 
out of love”, and “when it happened, …  the present reshaped the past” (TR, 897-
98). Stephen accepts that he cannot take what is not his and with that starts to learn 
how to overcome the mistake of treating the ‘redemeptress’ as a commodity fetish and 
salvation as something to be possessed. The strength of Gaddis’s treatment of this 
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 Pastora was to be associated with Luna or Sophia in an earlier version of the novel by means of 
Camilla’s Byzantine earring, suggesting a lineage of different incarnations of the Epinoia or Sophia 
from Camilla to Marga and Pastora. As Cunningham points out, Stephen intends to set the diamonds 
from Brown’s ring in Camilla’s earrings to give them Pastora (Cunningham, Cabala to Entropy, 153). 
The (intended) donation alludes to the same situation in Peer Gynt (IV, 6), which, in turn, is based on 
an allusive inversion of Goethe’s Faust. Ibsen uses the words “Das Ewig-Weibliche ziehet uns an!” in 
this context. Ziehet an (‘attracts us’) is a deliberate misquotation of Goethe’s ziehet hinan (‘draws 
upward’: F, 12110-11). The Recognitions is abundant of similar misquotations, for instance “Zwei 
Brüste wohnen ach! in meiner Seele” (“Two breasts, alas! are dwelling in my soul”: TR, 392), which is 
an even cruder inversion of Goethe’s lines (F, 1112) that hardly refers to the life-giving breasts of 
Mother Nature (F, 455-56). Yet, however ‘debasing’ such references may be, for Wyatt’s relation to 
Esme as well as to Marga(reta) fairly well reflects Faust’s two perceptions of women as either a doll 
(F, 2651, 3476) or angel (F, 2659, 3494), Gaddis manages to doubly invert the evaluation of Eros from 
debased to ennobling. The latter can be best seen by contrasting Wyatt’s relationship with Pastora to 
that with Esther. 
447
 For an analysis of this notion see Žižek, On Belief, 69. 
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theme is that such ‘redemption’ does not ennoble the criminal, for Stephen remains a 
forger and murderer (of his fellow student Han, as one learns about on the very last 
pages of the novel) instead of being washed clean from his sins.
448
 His guilt-ridden 
denial of life, however, is confronted with a love that is, in Christian terms, 
‘merciless’. The Wyatt who has no love to give learns to want the loved one with “all 
of his predicates”.449 And to love the other person with “all” their predicates, as Žižek 
notes, exactly means to “love the Other BECAUSE of his limitation, helplessness, 
ordinariness”, not for the surplus they promise.450 That Wyatt effectively ‘pays’ for 
Pastora does therefore not merely contribute to the romantically prosaic depiction of 
virgin mothers and saintly heroin addicts in the novel. It seriously dismisses the 
‘investment’ propagated in Simon Magus’ story as well as the romantic debasement 
of women to soteriological agents in Gaddis’s sources, be it Senta in Wagner’s Flying 
Dutchman, Solveigh in Ibsen, or Gretchen (as the Penitent) in Faust. In this respect 
the ‘vulgar’ episode signifies a break with the commodity system of guilt and 
salvation, art and money, significance and emptiness, and is lastly also a prolepsis to 
the ending of the novel. Stephen commits himself to yet another voyage, not for 
redemption but the encounter with the old man of St. Paul’s Colossians, his temporal, 
sinful, fallen self. 
 
 
6. Erasure and Inconclusiveness 
[T]the new can appear only through the destruction of the old 
—Agamben, The Man without Content
451
 
 
Wyatt’s end ultimately remains ambiguous, for he simply leaves the texture of the 
novel some sixty pages before the latter ends, by no means giving testimony whether 
                                                 
448
 In the last part of the novel Stephen tells the writer Ludy out of the blue, as it were, about his 
fellow-student Han in Munich in an account hardly understandable without knowledge about the 
chapter Gaddis and his editor Catherine Carver agreed on to carve out from the published version of 
the novel. Stephen provides fragments of the omitted subplot on pages 878-879. Han and Wyatt make a 
trip to the Jungfrau mountain where the former wants to have sexual intercourse against the will of the 
latter. Years later both meet by chance in Africa, where Wyatt kills his companion in self-defence. 
Han, as one can infer from Stephen’s fragmented accounts, is not only an aggressive homosexual, he is 
also of the devil’s party, as Han has “a face tattooed on his fundament” (TR, 879), a devil-face or 
devil’s kiss. Pynchon provides a striking parallel to the latter in Gravity’s Rainbow (GR, 329). 
449
 Girogio Agamben, The Coming Community, transl. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis/ London. 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 2. 
450
 Žižek, On Belief, 147. 
451
 Agamben, The Man without Content, 105. 
 138 
he affirms or renounces Gaddis’s appropriations of Pauline soteriology and agapistic 
ethics. In focussing on the apophatic characteristics of the novel, however, one should 
not underestimate the “transformational possibilities” implied by the breakdown and 
re-emergence of its protagonist.
452
 
Like Mann, Gaddis criticises the politics and aesthetics of redemption for better or 
worse, but like Pynchon, he also devises in his ‘mock-version’ of Faust a socio-
cultural allegory that, however tentatively, also implies ways beyond the lamented 
conditio Americana, human development outside the vas hermetica and outside 
economic circuits. Despite its nostalgic tenor, The Recognitions is not a laudatio 
tempora actis. Neither does Gaddis use his Faust as a negative identification figure to 
imply a Christian model but draws from the heretical elements embedded in the myth, 
ironically undercutting the soteriological bargains comprised under the terms 
predestination, grace, and good works, and pointing towards a modus vivendi in 
which the notion of ‘fruitful exchange’ is rid of economic connotations. In this 
respect, Joseph Conway is absolutely right in stating that Gaddis “refuses to give up 
the folly of searching for transcendence”.453 Although the novel remains ambiguous 
about Wyatt’s ‘fate’, his final turning to love (erotic and agapistic) prevails over both 
May’s notion of universal guilt as an indebtedness to the Lord’s grace and Valentine’s 
‘possession’ of renounced happiness.454 Accordingly, one does not do full justice to 
Gaddis’s debut in assuming that it concludes entirely without recognition. Wyatt has 
an anagnorisis, but while Clement of Rome accepts the Christian dogma in disfavour 
of the Gnostic, it is not convincing to state that Wyatt definitively commits himself to 
either offer.
455
 Whereas in Pseudo-Clement recognition is a “final proof of Divine 
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 Ingendaay, following LaCapra, points to the transformational possibilities of Wyatt’s ‘rebirth’ (Die 
Romane, 42). In terms of the latter see Gaddis (cited in Koenig Splinters, 36): “I say I don’t want the 
end to seem trite, an easy way out; because I don’t want it to sound as though Wyatt has finally found 
his place in company with a simple stupid and comparatively unattractive woman who loves him … I 
simply want the intimation that, in starting a drawing of his daughter, Wyatt, seeing her in her trust and 
faith (love), is beginning. He may not yet understand, but the least we can do is start him, after all this, 
on the right way”.  
453
 Conway, “Failing Criticism”, 85. 
454
 Wyatt’s final act does not negate religious implications per se but critically comments back on the 
systems represented by May and Valentine. He abandons faith as a social reproduction of prohibitive 
law and turns to love as a means of salvation. 
455
 Even if the geographical symbolism is overwhelming, Wyatt’s “homecoming” to the rocky 
landscape of Spain cannot be read as a return to the church (as the “rock” in Matthew 16:18). Similarly, 
he emerges from the waters, hermetically transformed with a new name and even experiences 
something comparable to the Gnostic kairos but does not transcend as do the pneumatikoi but remains 
within the realm of the given. In respect to the latter I contradict Koenig, who argues for an epiphany 
(“The Writing of The Recognitions”, 23). 
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Providence”,456 The Recognitions is far less affirmative. Rather than retuning to a 
family or home, Wyatt simply wanders off, renouncing both soteriological doctrines 
expressis verbis, being pro material world, pro love and pro sin and desire. As he 
exclaims:  
 
Look back, if once you’re started in living, you’re born into sin, then? And how do you atone? 
By locking yourself up in remorse for what you might have done? Or by living it through. By 
locking yourself up in remorse with what you know you have done? Or going back and living 
it through. By locking yourself up with your work, until it becomes a gessoed surface, all 
prepared, clean and smooth as ivory? Or by living it through. By drawing line in your mind? 
Or by living it through. It was sin from the start, and possible all the time, to know it’s 
possible and avoid it? Or by living it through …  to have lived it through, and live it through, 
and deliberately go on living it through. (TR, 896) 
 
Wyatt’s new approach gives a crucial twist to Pauline theology. As Žižek notes 
apropos the latter (cf. 1 Corinthians 15:45-49): “We raise from the Fall not by 
undoing its effects, but in recognizing the longed-for liberation in the Fall itself”.457 
As Wyatt contends, “it’s only the living through that redeems it” (TR, 898), that sheds 
off the ‘old man’.458 And his decision to “simplify” and “to live deliberately” (TR, 
900) is in accord with this.
459
 
Eventually, Wyatt’s last episodes also provide an equally ambivalent (or rather 
tongue-in-cheek) perspective on art. After Brown’s death and his own transformation 
into Stephen, Wyatt exchanges the search for God and Christian redemption with the 
acceptance of his sinfulness and imperfection. With that he also leaves the perfected 
limitations of his art behind, by turning to the open, both in life and on the canvas.
460
 
While he, by then half blind, restores paintings by Titian and Valdés-Leal, he 
dismisses the Flemish Primitives: 
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 Koenig, Splinters, 59. 
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 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, 81, 85. 
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 The cross reference to Paul is provided in a statement by Otto, who relates his old man, Mr. Pivner, 
to the old self in Colossians 3:9-10 with the words “put off the old man, says the Bible” (TR, 481). 
Basil Valentine takes up the association in a reference to the homicide/suicide of Wyatt’s ‘multiple 
personality’: “This so-called homicide of yours, …  putting off the old man” (TR, 546, 553). 
459
 As Moore notes in his Gaddis Annotations Project, Wyatt’s intentions to ‘live deliberately’ and treat 
people ‘as if they were real’ are inspired by Thoreau’s Walden (1854), which Wyatt reads. 
460
 I use open here in Heidegger’s sense, as Being experienced in an unsheltered way; see Martin 
Heidegger, “Why Poets?”, Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 212. 
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[I]n the Middle Ages when everything was in pieces and gilding the pieces, yes to insure their 
separation for fear there was no God… before the Renaissance. […] Everything vain, 
asserting itself… every vain detail, for fear… (TR, 875) 
 
Wyatt now pleads against the accumulation of cultural, even spiritual capital and 
poses as decidedly pro simplification (“to front only the essential facts of life”, to use 
Thoreau’s words). He admires the fearlessness of Titian and el Greco, painters of the 
Italian and Spanish Renaissance, also of Valdés in the Baroque era, their ability to 
bear spaces not cluttered with vain detail: “El Greco is all one… one” (TR, 807); 
these “painters weren’t afraid of spaces” (TR, 875). 461  Should his laudation be 
reliable, one could conclude that he has finally given up trying to fill the material, 
depictorial and spiritual void. As a person, he seems to have extinguished his Oedipal 
urges; in religious terms he has turned from soteriological obsessions, and as a 
‘painter’ (if one can use the term for a restorer) he has accepted empty space. The 
homunculus (cf. chapter 2.3) would then have found his Galatea (Pastora) and 
embarked on becoming a real being. His turn, however, also bears distinct 
implications that liberation never occurs without violence and destruction. Wyatt, it 
seems, does not give up the hope of finding originals behind the layers of pigments, 
behind the pasteboard reality. His adherence to the Platonic search for older, that is, 
more valid and venerable strata behind the real, can be traced in all dominant thematic 
complexes of the novel, be it religion, art, literature, or alchemy, and even his final 
restoration is not devoid of implications that he still seeks essences, real forms 
underneath the surface layer of pigments: “It was there all the time, and all Praxiteles 
did was to remove the excess marble, and here…here is the… the one I just restored, 
the Valdés Leal…” (TR, 875).462  Whereas the Early Flemish painters excessively 
cover empty spaces with detail and ornament, Praxiteles’s (and Stephen’s) quasi-
Platonic gesture of removing excess is directed to the opposite. The motivation for 
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 Comnes (The Ethics, 80) points out some relations to Rilke, especially Rilke’s concept of Platzangst 
(the fear of spaces) and his admiration of El Greco. It may be an ironic coincidence that Zeitblom in 
Doctor Faustus describes the catatonic Leverkühn as resembling “a nobleman by El Greco”, 
commenting this “What a sardonic trick of nature […] that she is able to create the image of highest 
spirituality where the spirit has departed!” (DF, 533). 
462
 His ‘restoration’ is related to a story Otto narrates some four hundred pages earlier, a story he heard 
from “some friend” (Wyatt): “It was a forged Titian that somebody had painted over another old 
painting, when they scraped the forged Titian away they found some worthless old painting underneath 
it, the forger had used it because it was an old canvas. But then there was something under that 
worthless painting, and they scraped it off and underneath that they found a Titian that had been there 
all the time. […] I mean he didn’t know […], but it knew, I mean something knew. I mean, do you see 
what I mean? That underneath that the original is there, that the real… thing is there” (TR, 450-51). 
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doing so is that the Flemish painter, in Gaddis’s account, is afraid that everything on 
earth and in life is in vain, that there is infinite emptiness underneath the surface 
reality, whereas the Platonist hopes that there is an ideal form underneath the surface. 
However, as John Johnston holds, one of the concluding implications of the novel is 
that Platonic assumptions are exhausted.
463
 Petrus van Ewijk argues in similar terms:  
 
Near the end of the novel, Wyatt, or at that point Stephen, is witnessed scraping off paintings, as 
if he were trying to dig through all the layers in hope of finding something. But he of all people 
should know that there is only a blank canvas underneath.
464
  
 
In fact, an alcoholic with impaired sight, Wyatt thinks he restores the paintings by 
removing dirt, excess accumulation on the painting’s space. To what extent he does 
so, however, can be inferred by the immediate response of his dialogue partner: 
“Hahauuuu!” (TR, 875), and “But you can’t …  take that painting and … and do 
what you’re doing” (TR, 872). In fact, he scratches the paint off the canvas without 
even realising it. However, although Johnson’s and van Ewijk’s arguments constitute 
a valid reading, I think Gaddis produces, again, a stalemate which one cannot 
approach with an either/or dichotomy. If Wyatt/Stephen is a failed alchemist, as 
Comnes argues, in that he reverses the creative act and is unable to produce ‘gold’, 
then he is certainly also a failed Platonist.
465
 Nevertheless, both failures are employed 
in a unifying gesture that suggests a way out of the stalemate. Wyatt’s restoration of 
Titian and El Greco constitutes an unintended yet crucial aesthetic turn. Wyatt 
destroys art but in doing so also, I think, restores its possibilities. Heidegger’s notion 
of clearance (Lichtung) and especially Agamben’s call for the destruction of 
aesthetics come to mind. In The Man without Content, Agamben suggests: 
 
Perhaps nothing is more urgent—if we really want to engage the problem of art in our time—
than a destruction of aesthetics that would, by clearing away what is usually taken for granted, 
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 Johnston, Carnival, 20. For a contradictive reading see Ingendaay, Die Romane, 52. 
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 Van Ewijk, “Life must be lead in the dark”, 385. Tanner has made a similar point by arguing that a 
literal reading of The Recognitions should not exclude the possibility that Stephen by then is simply 
mad, “alcoholism, inanition, and a series of extraordinary adventures having taken their toll” (City of 
Words, 398). Yák’s concern that Wyatt might have “caught something” from Pastora substantiates such 
a reading (TR, 809, cf. 815). 
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 Comnes, The Ethics, 79. 
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allow us to bring into question the very meaning of aesthetics as the science of the work of 
art.
466
 
 
I would like to argue that Wyatt, in erasing the paintings, undertakes such a clearing. 
Trying to uncover the ideal form behind appearances, Wyatt undoes completion. 
“[D]enuding the canvas of Rubens’s nudes”,467 he restores artistic as well as personal 
potentials. However dim, there is still an implication of hope that the fragments will 
be reassembled, which is why I do not fully agree with van Ewijk’s suggestion that 
without a framework Wyatt “fades away and turns into nothing”. 468  Abandoning 
God’s gaze, turning sine signo cavum apud deum into all is empty of sense, provides 
the basis for the human liberty, or duty, to make sense of oneself and to “live 
deliberately”. He turns from hubristic partial development to holistic growth. While 
he thereby transcends his ‘iron cage’, he remains within the bounds of the conditio 
humana. And although it is unclear if he “reach[es] at last the human state” (F, 832), 
Goethe’s message of possible humane development is not contradicted. 
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 Agamben, The Man without Content, 6. De la Durayante elucidates this as follows: “Art’s having 
ceased to play a shaping role in our culture—it’s loss of an ‘authentic’ or ‘original’ status—has become 
[…] so accepted […] that it does not attract special notice. […]To make this absence felt, Agamben 
attempts to clear away that which has obscured our vision” (Giorgio Agamben, 27). 
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 Safer, “Ironic Allusiveness”, 94. 
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 Van Ewijk, “Life must be lead in the dark”, 385. 
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Part III: Faustian Civilization in Thomas Pynchon’s V. and Gravity’s Rainbow 
There is no longer a mythological presence of evil, the presence of 
a Mephisto or Frankenstein embodying its principle. 
Our evil is faceless and imageless. It is present everywhere in 
homeopathic doses, in the abstract patterns of technology. 
—Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact469 
 
But jeremiads are useless unless we can point to a better way. 
—Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death470 
 
Despite their proximity to Faustian themes and sensibilities, soul-sellers lead a 
spectral existence in Pynchon’s texts. As overtly as the literary tradition of the myth is 
employed in Gaddis’s The Recognitions, as absent it seems in Pynchon. Whereas the 
former constructs his Faust tale in concentric circles around an alleged original, 
providing copious allusions to Pseudo-Clemente, Marlowe, Goethe, and Ibsen, 
Pynchon, hardly includes any references to such texts. As regards viable textual 
indicators, the magician-scholar is mentioned only in three of Pynchon’s works: the 
short story “Mortality and Mercy in Vienna” contains an allusion to the title of 
Goethe’s work, the confessions of Fausto Maijstral in V. are modelled in some respect 
after the first part of the drama,
471
 and the legendary “German fellow” is named in 
Mason and Dixon.
472
 As a representative of occidental civilization, however, Faust’s 
presence seems to be all pervasive, reaching from resonances in Vineland (1990) and 
Against the Day (2006) to the plethora of themes and memes in V. and Gravity’s 
Rainbow.
473
 Unfortunately, the richness and complexity with which Pynchon uses the 
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 Peter Serracino-Inglott, “The Faustus of Malta: Fact and Fiction in Pynchon’s V.”, in Pynchon, 
Malta and Wittgenstein, ed. Petra Bianchi, Arnold Cassola and Peter Serracino-Inglott (Malta 
University Publications, Msida, Malta, 1995), 39-54. 
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 Mason gives an account of how he allegedly spent the eleven days that were skipped in 1752 when 
Britain adopted the Gregorian calendar. Making use of this surplus time he reads through the restricted 
sections of the Bodleian library: “all the Knowledge of Worlds […] lay open to my Questions”, which 
reminds Dixon of “Faust”. Thomas Pynchon, Mason & Dixon (London: Vintage, 1998), 558. 
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 For reasons of space I will not provide more extensive examinations of Faustian connections in 
Against the Day, Mason & Dixon, and Vineland but take V. and Gravity’s Rainbow as paradigmatic 
(and the most fruitful) examples of Pynchon’s use of the myth. Cowart briefly discusses the character 
Frenesi in Vineland as Faustian but concludes that both “the myth and mythical identities prove 
unstable” in the novel (Thomas Pynchon and the Dark Passages of History, 117). He also occasionally 
employs the term Faustian in order to characterise Western civilization as presented in Mason & Dixon 
and Against the Day, however, without going into detail (ibid., 15, 18). Alexander Theroux identified 
in the title a reference to 2 Peter 3:7, in which the heavens and the earth are reserved unto fire “against 
the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men”. Alexander Theroux, “Fantastic Journey”, Wall 
Street Journal (24 November 2007), W8. There are also resonances of Faust in the title (thanks to 
Terry Reilly for pointing out this connection). Nikola Tesla, who is featured in the novel, writes in his 
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myth has not been given sufficient critical attention. While the Faustian connections 
in Pynchon have been pointed out from the very infancy of Pynchon scholarship, 
albeit without leading to differentiated examinations,
474
 Faust scholars have only very 
reluctantly acknowledged his contribution to the literary tradition of the myth.
475
 One 
reason for this is certainly that Pynchon’s use of myth, as Peter Schaub has argued, is 
never systematic, “for it is both a parody of literary modernism and a serious 
invocation of mythic analogues within a ‘disenchanted’ civilization”.476 Moreover, as 
the relations of his work to Marlowe, Goethe, Dostoevsky, and Mann are very 
implicit and often characterised by inverted or ironic allusiveness, to employ Elaine 
Safer’s term, such reluctance is unsurprising. 477  V., for instance, has only more 
recently been read as a Spenglerian vision of history, and relations to the myth in the 
confessions of Fausto Maijstral have only been cursorily examined by Serracino-
Inglott.
478
 Pynchon’s third novel proves an even more complicated case. The two 
attempts to present Gravity’s Rainbow as “a Goethe in greasepaint”, to use Joseph 
Slade’s phrase,479 Kathryn Hume’s monograph and a section in William Grim’s work 
on Faust in literature and music, have elucidated many parallels and thematic relations 
between Pynchon’s novel and Faust: in terms of characters, there are correspondences 
between Slothrop as the seeking Faust (part one) and Weissmann as Faust the 
emperor and builder (part two), whereas Mephistophelian chaos and stasis relates to 
the principles of entropy and disorder. The cold scientific rationality of Faust’s 
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assistant Wagner is copiously represented in Pynchon’s cast, most explicitly in the 
Pavlovian psychologist Pointsman. Greta Erdmann, the plaything of the German film 
industry, monopolises the character of Gretchen, and although Katje is richly 
associated with succubae and the ‘simulacrum’ Helena, her transition from a 
collaborator to a member of the Counterforce is not unlike Gretchen’s penitence. In 
terms of scenic relations, Slothrop’s contact with Säure Bummer’s dope and his 
transformation into Rocketman relate to Faust’s rejuvenation in the Witch Kitchen 
scene.
480
 The novel features a Nordic and a classical Walpurgisnacht, one on the 
Brocken, and one in form of a party on the ship Anubis, which is directly referred to 
as “very Walpurgisnacht” (GR, 463). While Blicero’s construction of the Rocket 
00000 corresponds closely with the megalomaniac construction project in the second 
part of Goethe’s play, its Easter (or rather April Fool’s Day) launch stands in direct 
contrast to Faust’s resurrecting Easter walk, and the rocket’s final descent ironically 
comments back on Faust’s final redemption.481 Although such connections can be 
furthered, from Byron the Bulb as Euphorion to the Zone-Hereros as the Volcano 
Pygmies of the Classical Walpurgis Night (F, 7606-21), Hume, whose 
mythographical observations have not been spared criticism, rightly points out that 
such relations are never systematic but often merely invoke “Faust as Western 
cultural hero” in order to comment upon specific characters and actions at hand.482 
Eventually, even though the “spirit of Faust hovers over” Gravity’s Rainbow,483 
tangible intertextual relations between the novel and the myth are less straightforward 
than Hume and Grim present them.
484
 Firstly, the nuances of the term Faustian as 
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 Grim argues that “The Easter launch of Rocket 00000 […] is in direct contrast to Faust’s 
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Theory of Colours, not in Faust. Moreover, while references to the “Mothers” are more likely to be 
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well-known twenty-fifth chapter of the latter’s Doctor Faustus reverberates in Säure Bummer’s and 
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discussed in the first part of my thesis, are not always reflected in their works (Grim 
differentiates between the Goethean and Spenglerian variety but Hume does not). 
Secondly, most critics’ focus on Pynchon’s relations to Goethe or occasional generic 
reference to ‘Faustian man’ in their discussions of his texts, does by no means justice 
to the complexity with which he negotiates the subject. In fact, it is hardly 
acknowledged that as regards Faust-related literary influences, the work of Mann is at 
least as crucial as that of Goethe, if not more. In his 1974 monograph Joseph Slade 
had already pointed out that when Gravity’s Rainbow 
 
appeared, most critics dwelled on Pynchon’s similarity to Joyce. However, we should note 
that a more logical affinity would be with Thomas Mann”, who “has many times been called a 
literary equivalent of Max Weber.
485
  
 
Surprisingly, however, and this has not yet been treated in Pynchon scholarship it is 
not Mann’s Doctor Faustus but The Magic Mountain that is most dominantly present 
in both V. and Gravity’s Rainbow. It is so not as a ‘silent partner’ like in the case of 
Doctor Faustus and The Recognitions, but in distinct and traceable relations. Some 
themes of Mann’s novel briefly feature in V., especially in the Mondaugen chapter, in 
which the naïve engineer and voyeur Mondaugen, residing in an enclave of decadence 
amongst death, is seduced by a most dangerous power. The parallels between The 
Magic Mountain and Gravity’s Rainbow, on the other hand, are so pervasive and 
conclusive that it is surprising that they are hardly acknowledged at all in Pynchon 
scholarship, especially those works concerned with affinities between the two authors 
(for instance Serracino-Inglott or Thomas Moore). In order to close this gap, a 
comparative analysis of both authors’ ‘pedagogical’ dispute about the ‘soul’ of the 
West will therefore be one major focal area of my later analyses. To mention the most 
                                                                                                                                           
Gustav Schlabone’s discussion about dodecaphony, but so does Adorno’s Philosophy of New Music. 
Slothrop’s rainbow vision toward the end of the novel (GR, 626) is indeed the most complex example 
of this sort. On a first glance the scene seems to be taken from the respective experience in the second 
part of Goethe’s Faust. A theme of redemption, however, it may as well allude to Hans Castorp’s 
vision of a rainbow in the “Snow” chapter of The Magic Mountain, as a direct comparison of the two 
texts reveals. Again, this intertextual relation can easily be supplemented with another of Pynchon’s 
sources. “Meaning is the play, or interplay, of light. As in schizophrenia, all things lose their 
boundaries, become iridescent with many-colored significances. No things, but an iridescence, a 
rainbow-effect. Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben. An indirect reflection; or refraction; broken 
light, or enigma”, Brown writes in Love’s Body (New York: Vintage, 1966), 246 (hereafter cited in text 
as LB). 
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 Slade, Thomas Pynchon, 185. 
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conspicuous already briefly: not only do both authors, as Slade argues, invest their 
work  
 
with mythological associations on a vast scale, in a manner both deliberate and mocking, 
utilizing both central myths of Western civilization and popular culture myths. Orphic myths 
[…] jostle against Faustian legend.486 
 
Like Pynchon’s, Mann’s Zeitroman contains copious allusions to the first part of 
Goethe’s drama, the Venus mountain of Tannhäuser, Parzival, Tristan and Isolde, 
Grimm’s Fairy Tales, and the Nekya (or katabasis). And like Mann, Pynchon features 
séances, comic allusions to Freud, Krafft-Ebing, erotic aspects of technology, the 
romantic-transgressive mood with which a generation was led to war, and plenitude of 
plot-relevant songs. Besides providing one keystone in terms of Slothrop’s 
mythopoeic journey between Faust and Grail quester, as well as his peculiar libidinal 
sensibilities, the Magic Mountain thereby also establishes also an angle on crucial 
themes of Pynchon’s alchemical Bildungsroman: time, decadence, determinism, war, 
and the diminishing possibilities of humane life amidst death.
487
 
Rather than dismissing Pynchon’s peculiar mixture of too much and nothing as a 
mere contiguity to Faust, I therefore argue that Pynchon draws considerably from the 
legacy of the myth in charting the “toll of the West’s appetite for knowledge and 
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he divines it, in his deathly dream, before he is snatched […] into the European catastrophe”. Thomas 
Mann, “The Making of the Magic Mountain”, Atlantic Monthly 191, no. 1 (1953): 45. 
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power”, 488  albeit in a highly indirect manner that resists dogmatism and non-
negotiable mythemes. If the Urphänomen of life lies in form-preserving instability 
and multiplicity, an assertion found in Goethe, Mann, and Pynchon, then the latter 
effectively draws from this principle as a form of epistemological resistance to 
technological and totalitarian rationality. As Joseph Tabbi points out,   
 
[t]hrough the excessive proliferation of multiple textual realities, Pynchon would avoid 
imprisoning himself within his own structuring metaphors, in a sense deconstructing his on 
text in advance. But if in doing so he also resists suggesting a narrative source in some 
determinate ur-meaning […], he is careful at least to locate each trajectory in its particular 
historical circumstance. […] As readers we might benefit from a similar resistance to 
interpretative strategies that either totalize or reduce it to fragments.
489
  
 
However, if Pynchon challenges eschatological and deterministic models in such a 
manner, he does so, like Gaddis, without slipping into relativism or pure enigma, for 
although the quests of characters like Weissmann and Slothrop may appear like 
abstract hermetical tales (cf. F, 12104-11; MM, 715), they can and do in fact 
“converge on a vanished historical reality” that is firmly inscribed into the texture of 
Gravity’s Rainbow.490 
The latter, then, accounts for some crucial deviations from the plot and ideology 
conveyed in traditional Faustiana. Firstly, Pynchon’s elective, yet critical affinity with 
Weber, Brown, and Marcuse indicates a refusal to represent Western civilization as a 
satanic project from which one could only escape by conforming to specific religious 
doctrines. Even if the many characters in Pynchon’s third novel, if not the novel itself, 
as Quilligan holds, search “for a means of salvation”, Pynchon indicates that he 
refrains from Christian soteriology.
491
 As John Krafft, Molly Hite, and Inger 
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Dalsgaard have observed, God’s disappearance from Pynchon’s novelistic universe 
and Gravity’s Rainbow in particular has left only systems traps and “Baby Jesus Con 
Game[s]” (GR, 318), and all attempts to transcend the modern wasteland not merely 
increase the latter’s growth but are invariably identified as either romantic delusions 
or manifestations of totalitarian ideology. Moreover, Pynchon’s anti-Puritan bias, like 
Gaddis’s, by no means excludes the share of the Protestant work ethic in shaping the 
modern West but presents its spirit as one of the cornerstones of the latter’s 
Faustianism. The most superficial perusal of V. or Gravity’s Rainbow will detect that 
behind his sadistic Nazi technocrats, Pynchon shifts his focus to “that succession of 
the criminally insane who have enjoyed power since 1945, including the power to do 
something”, 492 to the nightmarish realisation of the American Dream that was soon to 
be perceived as harbouring, as Berman puts it, the “world’s most virulent engines of 
destruction”. 493  His depiction of the destructive megalomania of human self-
apotheosis as intrinsic to the American quest for supremacy thereby connects him to 
contemporaries from the New Left and to authors such as Schapiro or Mailer. The 
latter, in Of a Fire on the Moon (1970), for instance, would not be content with seeing 
Faustus put on trial after the Second World War but point to the complicity of the 
damnable scholar and the elite of the land of the elect. Discussing the appeal of the 
inventor and SS member Wernher von Braun, who is best known for his work on the 
ballistic missile A4, “the ur-model for U.S. and Soviet spaceflight and warfare rocket 
programs”,494 Mailer muses:   
 
Who would begin to measure the secret appeal of the Nazis by now? […] America was this 
day mighty but headless. America was torn by the specter of civil war, and many a patriot and 
many a big industrialist […] saw the cities and the universities as a collective pit for black 
heathen, Jewish revolutionaries, a minority polyglot hirsute scum of nihilists, hippies, sex 
                                                                                                                                           
the first guidebook writer, which, in turn stands close to Foppl’s hermetically sealed community in the 
German southwest African protectorate (cf. Smith, Pynchon and History, 26). Thus, while The 
Recognitions, although equally averse to tourism, treats the opposition of “northern/Protestant/ 
intellectual against Mediterranean/Roman Catholic/irrational” (V., 190) to a great extent in favour of 
the latter, Pynchon less than subtly correlates both mass movements with the Fascist imperialist model 
that subjugates its members to an enforced conformity and excludes everything outside the community: 
“Tourism […] is supranational, like the Catholic Church, and perhaps the most absolute communion 
we know on earth […]; their Bible is clearly written and does not admit of private interpretation” (V., 
409). 
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maniacs, drug addicts, liberal apologists and freaks. Crime pushed the American public to 
give birth to dreams of order. Fantasies of order had to give way to lusts for new order. Order 
was restraint, but new order would call for […] an exceptional effort, a unifying dream.495 
 
Gaddis, although in a different context, summarises this tendency neatly: “I’m talking 
about fascism, that’s where this compulsion for order ends up”.496 Fully in accord 
with such assertions, Pynchon provides in the “proto-Fascist” discourse of some of his 
early characters an adequate representation of that style of politics described in 
Richard Hofstadter’s seminal essay.497 Like Mailer and others he also identifies the 
insidious interlocking of such politics and the rise of an unprecedented military-
industrial complex. When Pynchon, as an essayist, returns to the subject in “Is It OK 
to Be a Luddite?”, he comments: 
 
By 1945, the factory system—which, more than any piece of machinery, was the real and 
major result of the Industrial Revolution—had been extended to include the Manhattan 
Project, the German long-range rocket program and the death camps, such as Auschwitz. It 
has taken no major gift of prophecy to see how these three curves of development might 
plausibly converge, and before too long. Since Hiroshima, we have watched nuclear weapons 
multiply out of control, and delivery systems acquire, for global purposes, unlimited range and 
accuracy. An unblinking acceptance of a holocaust running to seven- and eight-figure body 
counts has become—among those who, particularly since 1980, have been guiding our 
military policies—conventional wisdom.498 
 
The “romance of the West with technology” owes “much to the German example” 
here, as Cowart notes.
499
 Yet in such a vision the Holocaust does not appear as the 
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culmination of mankind’s inhumanity but as the opposite. As the synthetic human 
SHROUD asks Benny Profane in V.:  
 
Remember the photographs of Auschwitz? Thousands of Jewish corpses, stacked up like those 
poor car-bodies. Schlemihl: It’s already started. 
“Hitler did that. He was crazy.” 
Hitler, Eichmann, Mengele. Fifteen years ago. Has it occurred to you there may be no more 
standards for crazy or sane, now that it’s started? (V., 295) 
 
Secondly, other than most other Faustiana, V., and Gravity’s Rainbow rather daringly 
suggest that the pervasiveness of the Faustian condition is to a certain degree owed to 
a dialectic of domination and fatalism. As Shawn Smith and others have indicated,
500
 
those characters who accept the power-game by having themselves gathered into the 
Faustian machineries in V. and Gravity’s Rainbow, are not merely the latter’s raw 
material but often consciously complicit with them. As Pynchon’s Sado-anarchist 
Miklas Thanatz points out, the structure “needs our submission so that it may remain 
in power. It needs our lusts after dominance so that it can co-opt us into its power 
game” (GR, 737). If Pynchon addresses here the Weberian hypothesis about the iron 
cage, into which we are born always already alienated, the Marcusean civilization of 
repression, in which surrender to those in power is instilled from the beginning, or 
even the Faustian course to doom, he does not fail to point out that such structures are 
based on a volitional wager: “The Man has a branch office in each of our brains  […] 
We do know what’s going on, and we let it go on” (GR, 712).  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
500
 Shawn Smith, Pynchon and History: Metahistorical Rhetoric and Postmodern Narrative form in the 
Novels of Thomas Pynchon (New York: Routledge, 2005), 85-86. 
 152 
Chapter 5: Pynchon’s Faust, Part One 
FABIUS.  What are these numbers supposed to mean? 
PRUDENTIUS.  Oh they mean all sorts of things - the downfall 
of the Pope, the Refomation of the Church, the freeing of all goods, 
the scornful laughter of Moloch. 
—Johann Valentin Andreae, Turbo, sive, Moleste et frustra per 
cuncta divagans ingenium (Helicone: iuxta Parnassum, 1621) 
 
As indicated, Pynchon’s V. is not only close to The Recognitions in that it satirises the 
decadent narcissism and “phony, Greenwich Village way[s]” (V., 35) of mid-
twentieth-century American art communities.
501
 This satire is substantiated in both 
cases by a wider-reaching critique of a mechanised and commoditised culture and a 
concurrent sense of social entropy, alienation and epistemological fragmentation. In 
his debut novel Pynchon expounds to such an extent on “the collapse of everything, of 
meaning, of language, of values”, the threat of “disorder and dislocation wherever you 
look, entropy drowning everything” (AA, 3), to use Gaddis’s words, that critic 
Deborah Madsen speaks of a “V.-metaphysic”, a general breakdown of social and 
ethical values.
502
 While a character in Pynchon’s short story “The Secret Integration” 
can still maintain that the “only thing a machine can’t do is play jokes. That’s all 
they’ll use people for is jokes”, such hope in a weak remainder of human potential 
seems practically eradicated in his debut novel.
503
 There is no doubt that Pynchon, as 
Judith Chambers notes, continually alludes to a social ethic of care or ‘love’.504 Yet he 
makes also clear that they prefer to renounce such ethic and rather see their humanity 
“lost on inanimate objects and abstract theories” (V., 405). With these two moments 
of loss, the augmentation of human power by means of technologies gone wrong 
(presented on the novel’s synchronic axis) and an epistemological impasse 
(negotiated on its diachronic axis), Pynchon traces the “entropic energies of a 
civilization on its last legs”, as Cowart holds.505  But he thereby also addresses a 
situation that is more than contiguous to the Faust myth.
506
 Of course, the novel’s 
Weberian portrait of an American post-war generation born into an iron cage of 
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“mechanized petrification” and pure utilitarianism, in which material goods and 
technologies have gained such dominance over humans that any potentially humane 
development is always already undercut, renders the question of soul-selling partly 
obsolete.
507
 Nevertheless, the response of Pynchon’s characters to the unavailability 
of life as an integrated whole is invariably Faustian. When Victoria Price argues that 
man is too powerless in this world to take God’s place and thus merely plays with the 
thought, like Benny Profane, who muses “suppose I was God” (V., 31), she fails to 
acknowledge the sheer violence of such mind-games, as I will demonstrate in the case 
of Herbert Stencil.
508
 And as regards those who refrain from rebellion against their 
powerlessness, Pynchon leaves no doubt that only very few engage in the “slow, 
frustrating and hard work” (V., 365) against this condition while the majority 
embraces yet further dehumanisation. 
 
 
1. Dehumanisation  
“Technology and comfort—having these, people speak of culture” 
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus509 
 
On its synchronic axis, as Kathleen Fitzpatrick argues, the novel explores a threatened 
“inversion of the traditional cultural dominance of human over machine”.510 Not only 
is the link between machine and human literalised; even the ability to think outside 
this link has become impossible. Pynchon thereby not only describes processes of 
automation and mechanisation that intrude on the sphere of the organic but exposes a 
tendency toward self-chosen dehumanisation, a literal transformation of self into 
object, as in the case of Fergus Mixolydian, whose “sleep-switch” (V., 56), a remote 
control in his arm that connects him with his TV set that ironically twists Marshall 
McLuhan’s notion of media as the extensions of man. Behind the trope of reverted 
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mastery, the “dominance of technology and the willing subjugation of the human to 
it”, 511  lies the suggestion that despite their anxiety about being gathered into a 
technological order most of V.’s cast attribute the ability to heal their ontological and 
epistemological alienation to the very forces engendering the latter. 
Such a dialectic of unreason comes most explicitly to the fore in the case of the 
aesthetic surgeon Shale Schoenmaker, who receives his vocational impetus to enter 
the “medical freemasonry” from the First World War (V., 97, 101), when the face of 
the liaison officer Evan Godolphin is disfigured and insufficiently restored. Shocked, 
Schoenmaker dedicates himself to repair the havoc caused by those “who undid the 
work of nature with automobiles, milling machines, other instruments of civilian 
disfigurement” (V., 101). Despite his pose, however, there is nothing humane about 
his impulse, as Shawn Smith argues, for he casually accepts “cruelty and the 
ideological systems that foster violence”.512 Convincing himself that he cannot do 
anything against “things-as-they-are”, the surgeon professes a “conservative laziness” 
(ibid.) and a technological rationality epitomised in a ‘nose job’ he does for Esther 
Harvitz, an associate of the Whole Sick Crew. Esther self-loathingly wants her 
“figure-6 nose” changed into what “all wanted”, an “Irish” retroussé nose (V., 103). 
Although tremendously painful, the operation itself, described in sexual (V., 105) and 
imperialist (V., 103) terms, is experienced by Esther as a relief. When Schoenmaker 
saws off the hump on her nose, she feels herself “drifting down, this delicious loss of 
Estherhood, becoming more and more a blob, with no worries, traumas, nothing: Only 
Being” (V., 106). Esther, to paraphrase Benjamin, appears so self-alienated that she 
finds pleasure in her own ‘annihilation’.513 Pynchon expounds this trait in having 
Esther fall in love with Schoenmaker, who subsequently assimilates her physis to the 
‘idea’ of her ideal self. A modern day Pygmalion, he justifies his narcissistic project 
with pseudo-Platonic notions: 
 
It was her soul he loved. […] Well, what is the soul. It is the idea of the body, the abstraction 
behind the reality: What Esther really was, shown to the senses with certain imperfections 
there in the bone and tissue. Schoenmaker could bring out the true, perfect Esther which 
dwelled inside the imperfect one. Her soul would be there on the outside, radiant, unutterably 
beautiful. (V., 296-97) 
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Schoenmaker proceeds to engineer those parts of Esther that do not harmonise with 
this ideal. Rather than bringing her inner being into appearance in a genuine process 
of poiesis, however, his re-territorialisation of her ‘soul’ to the surface is a 
dehumanising enclosure of Esther’s ‘Being’ into the boundaries set by the parameters 
of a “cultural harmony”, derived from “movies, advertisements, magazine 
illustrations” and not least racial stereotypes (V., 103), that eventually leaves her soul 
entirely disfigured. In his Platonism, Schoenmaker, like Wyatt Gwyon, advocates 
what Brown terms a reality-negating “Apollonian form”: 
 
Apollo is the god of form—of plastic form in art, of rational form in thought, of civilized form 
in life. But the Apollonian form is form as the negation of instinct. […] Hence Apollonian 
form is form negating matter, immortal form; that is to say, by the irony that overtakes all 
flight from death, deathly form. Thus Plato […] is a son of Apollo. (LD, 174) 
 
The rationale of both ‘artists’ turns out to be a failure. But whereas Wyatt’s toying 
with Platonic forms in The Recognitions remains a private exercise in quasi-
totalitarian anamnesis contra popular culture that is eventually discredited by its own 
commoditisation, Schoenmaker’s love of his own skills, which extends into the sphere 
of the human physis,
514
 thrives on pervasive technical and aesthetic ideals, the 
character of which can be inferred from the surgeon’s conceptualisation of the 
culturally valued “Irish” nose as a “Jew nose in reverse” (V., 103). Thus, the notion of 
the ‘beautiful soul’ appears as bitter as calling Mixolydian a “universal man” (V., 56). 
In V., even those most opposed to technology and the inanimate seem unable to 
escape such a rationale. Benny Profane, for instance, a “[Great] Depression Kid” (V., 
358), drifter, and member of the Whole Sick Crew, is entirely in discord with the 
world. A schlemihl who cannot “live in peace” with inanimate things (V., 37), he 
constantly fears falling prey to accidents, being dominated by objects. Believing that 
“a schlemihl was hardly a man: somebody who lies back and takes it from objects, 
like any passive woman” (V., 288), Benny occasionally vents his discontent about his 
‘feminisation’ (i.e. disempowerment) by attempting to urinate “on the sun to put it out 
for good”: “Inanimate objects could do what they wanted. Not what they wanted 
because things do not want; only men. But things do what they do, and this is why 
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Profane was pissing at the sun” (V., 26). Without a steady job and unable to commit 
himself to a permanent partner, Benny leads a nomadic, pedestrian lifestyle, spending 
his days yo-yoing on the underground and cultivating an object-like passivity. Early 
in the novel, he has a nightmare about his own dissolution in the form of a story of a 
boy who has a golden screw where his navel should be. After years of unsuccessful 
endeavours to remove the screw, he eventually manages to do so with the aid of a 
voodoo doctor, and as he “looks down toward his navel, the screw is gone. That 
twenty years’ curse is lifted at last. Delirious with joy, he leaps up out of bed, and his 
ass falls off (V., 40)”.515 
Benny’s dream expresses the dilemma that the human union with or dependency on 
technology is felt to be oppressive, yet an existence or even a conceptualisation of self 
without the latter has become impossible: “maybe he was looking for something too 
to make the fact of his own disassembly plausible as that of any machine” (ibid.).516 
However, Benny’s dream also contains a distinct wish to be objectified. This 
phantasmal transformation of self into machine, in some sense a foreshadowing of 
Slothrop’s adventures in Gravity’s Rainbow expresses less a desire to be dominated 
than a wish to be integrated in a stable conceptual framework. As Stefan Mattesiech 
argues, if the punch line of the dream about the golden screw “can be read as 
disclosing his unconscious wish, it isn’t only to be a machine […] but also […] to 
gain control over the machine he is”.517 Indeed, like Esther, he is “half victim, half in 
control” (V., 50). In this seemingly paradoxical wish, Benny clearly prefigures 
Tyrone Slothrop. Although V. does not yet feature the distinction between preterite 
and elect as a designation of power relations, what Joseph Slade observes in the 
context of Gravity’s Rainbow holds here as well: “Rationalized systems bind and 
afflict but also reward: the elect with power and money, the damned with order and 
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security”. 518  Wondering if there was any kind of theory of history, for instance, 
Profane muses that   
 
all political events: wars, governments and uprisings, have the desire to get laid as their roots; 
because history unfolds according to economic forces and the only reason anybody wants to get 
rich is so he can get laid steadily […] (V., 214) 
 
However abhorrent he finds this vision of inanimate money buying “inanimate 
warmth” (ibid.), his getting laid theory causes him to get an erection, which in turn, 
directs his attention to an the advertisement of an employment agency in the 
newspaper covering his crotch. The agency will later offer him a job at a research 
facility where he encounters two humanoid automata, SHOCK and SHROUD, who 
tell him (in their imaginary conversations) that they already are what “everybody will 
be someday” (V., 286). The point is not that Profane only aimlessly drifts from one 
version of perceived inhumanity, refusing to take any form of conscious control but 
that he, almost a living mechanism, whose “only function [is] to want” (V., 37), has 
himself directed. Only an instant before being offered the job as night watchman, does 
his tumescence subside, which is commented on as follows:  
 
Any sovereign or broken yo-yo must feel like this after a short time of lying inert, rolling, 
falling: suddenly to have its own umbilical string reconnected, and know the other end is in 
hands it cannot escape. Hands it doesn’t want to escape. Know that the simple clockwork of 
itself has no more need for symptoms of inutility, lonesomeness, directionlessness, because 
now it has a path marked out for it over which it has no control. That’s what the feeling would 
be, if there were such things as animate yo-yos. (V., 217) 
 
The marking of paths does not only provide Profane with predetermined parameters 
but equally relieves him from responsibility. This attitude comes most explicitly to the 
fore in his relation to women, who “happen” to Benny “like accidents” (V., 134), and 
each of whom demand of him in vain to get a grip on himself and his troubles. When 
he meets Fina, for instance, a secretary and spiritual leader of a youth gang, Benny 
happily considers himself “another means to grace or indulgence” (ibid.) for her. On 
being asked to make something out of himself, however, he is unable to accept that 
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she insists on treating him as “a human being” rather than “just an object of mercy” 
(V., 137). In contrast to Mattesiech, I understand Benny’s refusal to commit to 
Fiona’s demands not as motivated by his intuition that the discourse of love is 
territorialised by an “Oedipalized social machine” but as a willing submission to the 
passivity required by the soteriological category of grace.
519
 “I am a descendant of 
schlemihls, Job founded my line” (V., 224), Profane propounds, and his identification 
is conclusive as regards his renunciation of an active, responsible life: a schlemihl 
(etymologically derived from shelômî and el, ‘God is my salvation’) is a good-for 
nothing, an unlucky person who always expects happiness and salvation to come from 
God.
520
 And as Benny muses: “A schlemihl is a schlemihl. What can you ‘make’ out 
of one?” (V., 147). 
 
 
2. Devilish Intellect 
Perhaps the mind’s a void? A void always asking for something 
that doesn’t exist? 
—Paul Valéry, Môn Faust521 
 
The depiction of this state of affairs in V.’s diegetic present is accompanied by a 
second, and according to most critics central, thematic strand. The world of V. is not 
only one in which the Great Chain of Being has been replaced by a “long daisy chain 
of victimizers and victims, screwers and screwees” (V., 49), in which there is no 
essential difference between Catholic communities, tourism, and organised mob 
violence, but also one in which a holistic view of the world has given way to an 
“intolerable double vision” (V., 468) the two branches of which, the hermetically 
sealed ‘hothouse’, a closed system of absolute order and control, and the ‘street’, a 
vision of openness and contingency, are exploited by the political right and left. As 
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Christine Brooke-Rose observes, the multiplicity of interpretative systems emergent 
in an anthropocentric world make it impossible “to envisage a whole form of which 
the fragments would be part”.522 Matching Deleuze and Guattari’s incredulity towards 
“the myth of the existence of fragments that […] are merely waiting for the last one to 
be turned up, so that they may all be glued back together to create a unity”, Pynchon 
thereby presents not so much his dramatis personae as failed Platonists, as Molly Hite 
argues, but the futility of totalising gestures in general.
523
 Even when most needed, as 
the ‘lapsed’ priest and ex-modernist poet Maijstral observes, “there are no epiphanies 
[…], no moments of truth” (V., 337).524 Like in The Recognitions, total visions keep 
lingering around the corner in V., yet without ever appearing. This is not merely owed 
to anti-Platonism but equally to an opposition against normative theological narratives 
and a hostile attitude towards modernism, especially the latter’s insistence on a “quest 
for an authentic, higher reality beyond the arbitrary signs of culture”.525 Such radical 
negation of totalising knowledge indicates that the most fundamental and overarching 
theme of V. “is the inability to know”, as Alan W. Brownlie notes.526 Truth in V. (and 
even more so in Gravity’s Rainbow) is not an objective universal but dependent on 
power, that is, on those who pronounce and legitimise it, as Michel Foucault would 
have it.
527
 Yet the positing of this inability, in many respects a postmodern stance 
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against modernity’s “fantasy of pure and total vision”, 528  does not hinder the 
characters of V. from pursuing such knowledge. Faced with “epistemological 
barriers” and “superhumanly scaled atrocities” that constantly challenge their beliefs, 
if not sanity, as Cooper argues, they construct fictions in order to satisfy their need to 
understand.
529
 Unfortunately, the latter too readily results in apocalyptic visions that 
foster a Spenglerian fatalism.  
Paradigmatic in this respect is Herbert Stencil Junior, the “century’s child” (V., 52), 
significantly ‘motherless’, a mock secret agent and historical detective in search of the 
great cabal that would reveal the organising principle of history and with that his own 
identity. In his quest into history, a mind-adventure “in the tradition of The Golden 
Bough or The White Goddess” (V., 61), Stencil moulds a series of women associated 
by “an initial and a few dead objects” (V., 445) into the ominous Lady V., whom he 
believes to be the driving force behind a “Plot Which Has No Name” (V., 226). One 
never learns who or what she is. Her accessories, an ivory comb, a wig, a tattoo of the 
crucifixion, prosthetic feet, a star sapphire in her navel, false teeth, and a glass eye 
with an iris in the shape of a clock, associate her equally with Gravesean goddess 
figures and Henry Adam’s notion of the dynamo as the modern divinity. With both 
narratives shining through these associations, critics have suggested that she signifies 
lost spirituality and fertility in a purely industrialised and festishised world.
530
 
Observing the Lady V. merely from a purely mythical viewpoint, however, is 
problematic, not only because the old myths, as Tanner has observed, “no longer 
serve significantly to frame […] the contemporary world” in Pynchon.531 V., who 
merely ‘appears’ in the Stencilised chapters and the epilogue of the novel, is never 
validated as a subject outside the ratiocinations of Stencil and his father. Like 
Godolphin’s Vheissu, V. is a “symptom […] always alive, somewhere in the world” 
(V., 473), always in another version. Yet while V. may be in some respect a “free-
floating signifier with a potentially inexhaustible range of reference”, as Molly Hite 
argues, it is one with a clearly delimited purpose.
532
 V., as Tiina Käkelä-Puumala 
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notes, is not a person but an epistemological object that can only be “understood in 
relation to the strategies of power and knowledge” she exposes and enacts. 533 
Spengler’s Decline of The West, or more precisely the criticism it was subjected to, 
provides an illuminating parallel here. If Musil’s butterfly-analogy is to show that 
Spengler’s system reveals more about the observer than what is observed, Pynchon 
uses the same mechanism in the depiction of his Lady V. to lay bare the operative 
forces emergent in V.’s diegetic present. For this reason, it makes more sense for 
critics and readers to shift the “perspective from mysterious textual codes to creative 
subjects, or, more specifically, from V. as ‘pure signifier’ to Stencil as the signifier, 
‘the one who signifies V.’”.534 In his “adventure of the mind” Stencil resorts to a 
principle that would make “a good historical and poetic sense”, in Robert Grave’s 
terms.
535
 His simplification, coordination, and motivation of historical facts, however, 
his projection of a Spenglerian plot, soon turns into an exercise in historical 
determinism. 
As much as Wyatt’s Puritan-cum-authoritarian upbringing takes place between the 
two World Wars, Stencil’s formative experience takes place during the “interregnum 
between kingdoms-of-death” (V., 54). At a first glance, V., whose different 
incarnations (under the names of Victoria Wren, Veronica Managnese, Vera 
Meroving, and the ‘Bad Priest’) appear at moments of historical crises between the 
Fashoda incident and the outbreak of the Second World War, demands to be read like 
an aetiology of the latter.
536
 Yet as Cowart points out, V. does not personify the 
Fascist Zeitgeist,
537
 and neither can she be read as a Caesarean force. Her presence at 
these events, if one can speak of V. as a single person, is merely accidental, and so are 
eventually the events themselves. What seems to be an active principle of ‘evil’ is 
eventually nothing but the absence of an ordering principle in history: her “particular 
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shape [was] governed only by the surface accidents of history at the time” (V., 
155).
538
  
The discrepancies between the entries in his father’s journals, where he comes in 
contact with V. for the first time, and his ratiocinations leave no doubt about the 
lengths to which Stencil will go to create order. Although Pynchon generally leaves it 
to characters such as Eigenvalue and Maijstral to comment on Stencil and his doings 
and them, the latter’s exposition in the novel—“the world adventurer […] waggled his 
shoulderblades like wings” (V., 52)—is indicative enough, subtly associating him 
with the labyrinth builder Daedalus but also with “leather-winged Lucifer” (V., 339). 
Both Stencil’s mindset and such allusions suggest, as John Dugdale notes, a Freudian 
paranoid-cum-Faust.
539
 In his well-known study of Judge Daniel Schreber, Freud 
conceives of the ‘mechanism’ of paranoia as a withdrawal of the self’s libido from the 
outside world. In doing so, it collapses into itself, and everything outside becomes 
indifferent and irrelevant.
540
 Trying to establish new cathexes, the paranoid inhabits a 
complex delusional system with which he recreates the world in his “own image”, as 
it were, which is often informed by a “power-image” of the self.541 Freud illustrates 
this mechanism with a quotation from Goethe’s Faust in which the scholar, cursing 
all human values, ‘destroys’ the world only to rebuild it in his bosom (F, 1617-21). 
Although Dugdale’s analysis should be taken cum grano salis, the characterisation of 
Stencil’s doings as megalomaniac is fairly precise.542 Stencil withdraws all libido 
from the outside world (“what love there was for Stencil had become directed entirely 
inward”, V. 55) and opts, as Brownlie notes, “for Narcissism, acting safely within his 
own mind”.543 Stencil lives in a closed circle that precludes any access to being, but 
while characters like Hugh Godolphin eventually concede to their constructivism in 
terms of suspecting a genius driving the forces of history, Stencil’s vision “extends on 
past the threshold of sleep” (V., 323). Acting within a ‘hothouse’, as much as 
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Gaddis’s Wyatt does in his one-person re-enactment of the Flemish guild of painters, 
he seeks an absolute in the past with significance for and in the present. Conjuring up 
a merely apparent meaningfulness “of transhistorical connections”, 544  however, 
Stencil’s reconstruction is a forcible dislocation from both present and past reality and 
as such also a “deeply reactionary retreat into methodology”.545 Where Wyatt finds 
the parameters of perfection already pre-established in Flemish painting, Stencil uses 
the “traditional tools and attitudes” (V., 62) of espionage, employing a pseudo-
scientific methodology of inference and ratiocination. Neither interested in objectivity 
nor in finding official data, since he “would rather depend on the imperfect vision of 
humans” (V., 388), Stencil disregards the impossibility of an objective view of 
history, what Hilary Putnam calls the ‘God’s eye point of view’, but claims such a 
position for himself.
546
 In contrast to Wyatt, who tries to point to a point of view 
alternative to the single-minded materialism of his contemporaries by referring to 
God’s gaze, Stencil consciously fosters a single vision in order to eliminate potential 
multiplicities that threaten to impede his agency. When he ‘discovers’ V., his previous 
“random movements”, his apathy and irresolution, suddenly give way  
 
to a great single movement from inertness to—if not vitality, then at least activity. Work, the 
chase—for it was V. he hunted—far from being a means to glorify God and one’s own 
godliness (as the Puritans believe) was for Stencil grim, joyless […] (V., 55) 
 
Conceding that “V.’s is a country of coincidence ruled by a ministry of myth (V., 
450), he seems to acknowledge an inseparable connection between accident and 
intention in history, yet he continues with a double consciousness of knowing that his 
pursuit is aimless while doing it nevertheless. The content of his search thereby 
appears ultimately irrelevant, for his work is to sustain a “sense of animateness” that 
he can hardly release, unwilling to think “about any end of the search. Approach and 
avoid” (V., 55). In this grim chase, V. exists to be hunted, to establish and maintain 
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Stencil as “He Who Looks For V.” (V., 226). History itself thereby “becomes an 
object to be manipulated” at will, as Fitzpatrick argues. 547  Inscribing himself by 
“inference, poetic license, forcible dislocation of personality into a past he didn’t 
remember and had no right in” (V., 62), he projects his ego and will onto history, 
writing himself into its texture.
548
 In brief, it appears that Stencil’s quest is not one for 
knowledge as such but a mechanism of constructing a fiction of self beyond the 
limitations of the conditio humana, a fantasy of an evil genius presiding over the 
processes of history and of exerting control over this genius. He may be riddled by V., 
but he is also able to grant her attributes, “willing to let the key to his conspiracy have 
a few of the human passions” (V., 407), modelling her into a fetish construction, 
adding and subtracting features at will:
549
  
 
Stencil even departed from his usual ploddings to daydream a vision of her now, at age 
seventy-six: skin radiant with the bloom of some new plastic; both eyes glass but now 
containing photoelectric cells, connected by silver electrodes to optic nerves of purest copper 
wire and leading to a brain exquisitely wrought as a diode matrix could ever be. (V., 411)  
 
V. thereby becomes a purely determined organism and at the same time an idealised 
object of desire, unattainable and constantly deferred. Hence, such aspirations have 
little in common with the desire for “an absolute signified, an absolute meaning” that 
Rosemarie Jackson attributes to Faust.
550
 His agenda may not be Fascist like that of 
the engineer Kurt Mondaugen, whose embrace of Nazism out of discontent with the 
given I will discuss in the context of Gravity’s Rainbow. Nevertheless, his 
historiographical imperialism, as it were,
551
 and his creation of a ominous genius that 
simultaneously serves as a scapegoat (cherchez la femme!), are close to the political 
paranoia described by Hofstadter or in Adorno and Horkheimer’s “Elements of Anti-
Semitism”.552 Moreover, his obsessively ordering random “cluster[s] of phenomena” 
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 165 
(V., 154) into a “grand Gothic pile of inferences” (V., 226), as Zofia Kolbuszewska 
observes, “awakens the ghosts of modern European civilization and by idealizing, 
renders its lethal tendencies innocent”.553 Such implications are all the more urgent 
because Pynchon suggests that the organising principle behind Stencil’s identity is 
also that of his time.
554
 The nature and amount of control he “exercises in creating” V. 
clearly points to “the foundations of his control in the culture he is part of”.555 
 
 
3. Soul-Selling as Liberation: “The Confession of Fausto Maijstral”  
Phenomena must once and for all be removed from their gloomy empirical-
mechanical-dogmatic torture chamber and submitted to the jury of plain 
common sense. 
—Goethe, Maxims and Reflections556 
 
Stencil’s exhausted soaring above the dust finds a complementary half in the 
confessions of his “figurative brother”, the Maltese poet Fausto Maijstral.557 Fausto’s 
poetic documentation of the events on Malta during the Second World War is a mise 
en abyme of the whole novel. The text serves him as an inquiry into what he considers 
in hindsight as sin and a loss of his humanity, and as a “poetic function” (V., 321), to 
appropriate his expression, it negotiates the two-edged character of the human gift for 
constructing fictions in order to cope with an apparently meaninglessness world. As 
an expression of such ambivalence, it eventually also poses a challenge to the reader’s 
own sense of recognition. A highly contradictory palimpsest of poems, journal entries 
and annotations written at different stages of Fausto’s life, it undercuts any notion of 
continuity and coherence to such an extent that it has prompted Judith Chambers to 
argue that any reading of it will be a misreading.
558
 Yet while one might dismiss his 
writings as the record of his increasing madness, possibly even ‘edited’ by another 
madman, Stencil, they are, like the latter’s concoctions, a fruitful basis for examining 
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the forces Fausto is exposed to and the strategies the poet devises in order to account 
for these events.  
Fausto, whose name of course alludes to the myth, falls victim to Faustian 
Westerns in two respects: firstly as a torn soul engendered by the irreconcilable clash 
of Maltese and British imperialist culture and secondly as a victim of Fascist military 
expansionism. Initially “slated to be the priest” (V., 306), Maijstral dithers in his 
youth between Caesarism and religion and eventually renounces priesthood in favour 
of becoming a poet, a part of the “grand School of Anglo-Maltese Poetry—the 
Generation of ’37” (V., 305), a group of friends educated in the language of the 
British colonisers and inspired by Pound, Eliot, and Yeats.
559
 Fausto impregnates and 
later marries Elena (Helena) Xamxi. Their “terrible misalliance” (V., 314), as she 
calls it, produces his daughter Paola, an incident, coinciding with the outbreak of the 
war, that marks the emergence of Fausto’s second ‘character’. Fausto II considers 
himself rendered by British Colonialism “a dual man, aimed two ways at once: 
towards peace and simplicity on the one hand, towards an exhausted intellectual 
searching on the other” (V., 309). He makes this duality appear as a matter of 
linguistic determinism but also an irreconcilable dilemma, an abyss between two 
realities. These two realities are put to the test during the endless air raids in the Siege 
and thereby come to represent two polar extremes of how to live through this state:  
 
To be merely Maltese: endure almost mindless, without sense of time? Or to think—
continuously—in English, to be too aware of war, of time […] (V., 309) 
 
Striking is not only the Manichean quality of Maijstral’s hybridity but also the 
valorisation of both halves of his ‘soul’. Educated in English, he conceives the 
Maltese part of himself as subaltern, a depraved ‘uncultivated’ form of life “at the 
threshold of consciousness” (V., 309). Having neither a concept of metaphor nor a 
vocabulary as ‘rich and subtle’ as English, not even a word for mind, the Maltese 
language appears to him as a restricted ‘animal’ code unsuitable for poetry and 
meaningful communication. Nevertheless, he sees in the temporal orientation of 
Western thought and language a comparable shortcoming. While “English and its 
emotional nuances” may be better suited for the requirements of his vocation, he 
assesses his education in the language as a “curse” that “alloyed what was pure in us” 
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(ibid.). Questions of linguistic determinism aside, it is the two modes of temporality 
that come to be crucial in Fausto’s negotiation of humanity. Fausto’s preoccupation 
with time establishes a link with the novel’s repeated treatment of temporality, 
specifically ‘clockwork time’ as an expression of a mechanistic understanding of the 
universe and as a symbol of entropic processes, like in the Mondaugen chapter. Yet it 
also establishes a clear link to the tradition of the Faust myth beyond Spenglerian 
resonances.
560
  
Confronted with the question of how to stay sane in a universe of sheer 
contingency, both halves of Fausto wish for integration into a greater order that would 
provide him with the means to cope. Challenged by constant bombings, the poet and 
his island are in ‘retreat’, hammered “inch by inch” (V., 317) into the sea and 
desperation. Distancing himself from his British part, he begins to drift into religious 
abstraction, “towards that island-wise sense of communion” he considers “the lowest 
form of consciousness” (V., 315). Significant here is a ‘pact’ he makes with God. 
Although doubting that the war can be reconciled with notions of theodicy, he never 
does anything “so complex as drift away” (V., 330) from the divinity. Mocked by the 
radical poet-engineer Dnubietna (Maltese for ‘our sins’) as an apostate, he purports to 
have made an “agreement” (V., 328) with God specifying that if he ceases to question 
and simply survives, he will be forgiven his renunciation of the priesthood. This 
agreement is to vouchsafe that the divinity suspends the “laws of chance” by which 
                                                 
560
 Plater notes, unfortunately without providing details, some “similarities between Fausto and his 
artistic counterpart in Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus”, the most conspicuous of which is that both are 
rather representations of ideas than conventionally ‘realistic’ characters (The Grim Phoenix, 46). 
Serracino-Inglott, on the other hand, sees a correlation between Fausto’s notes on temporality and the 
discussion of art and time in Doctor Faustus (“The Faustus of Malta”, 40). A brief clarification seems 
to be in order. As shown in the analysis of The Recognitions, the association artist-Faust by far exceeds 
the context of Mann’s novel, and while the characteristic of representing ideas rather than being 
‘realistic’ figures holds not only for most Fausts but also for most of Pynchon’s characters. Secondly, 
the stress on time is, again, as crucial a component of the Faust myth as of many sources of Pynchon’s 
early work, say, Wiener, Spengler, or Brown. Obviously, like in Doctor Faustus, art and the political 
merge in Fausto’s confessions. There are, however, crucial differences as regards the micro-politics of 
both artists. Fausto is not taken to poetic heights by diabolical inspiration but driven, like Leverkühn’s 
precursors, by curiosity, and his infatuation with Anglo-Saxon modernist poetry is followed by 
disillusionment and an increased colonial awareness. The most striking parallel between the two artists 
is their attitude toward the function of elements (notes, metaphors) of their craft. Like Leverkühn, 
Fausto “breaks through” to a new artistic paradigm that utilises its elements in a novel way, but, again, 
his narrative is inverted to that of Adrian. While the latter wants to resolve “music’s magical essence 
into human reason” (DF, 207), Fausto purports to bereave language of its metaphysical characteristics 
(V. 318). Moreover, while Mann, following Adorno, describes a reversal of free music into subjugation 
on formal grounds, Fausto, following Robbe-Grillet, describes liberation from the enchaining 
universality invested in figurative speech. Fausto’s break with metaphor restricts the value attributed to 
figurative speech outside its use as a “device”. Eventually, his poetological stance rejects any ‘logical’ 
relations and thereby determinism therefore deviates crucially from Leverkühn’s. 
 168 
Fausto could be killed during an air raid (V., 330). In order to keep a “working 
relevancy to God” and to simply survive, he thus continues jury-rigging. Only later 
will he realise that he has devised a fiction and that “the old covenants, the old 
agreements” have to “change too” (ibid.).  
Concomitant with his religious retreat is a retreat into poetry (V., 315). The poems 
he and his friends write in this phase, nationalistic and romantic, conflate the island’s 
past with its present, glossing the Siege with imagery of the first Siege of Malta 
(1565), “when personal combat was more equal, when warfare could at least be gilded 
with an illusion of honour” (V., 316). This evocation, highly reminiscent of 
Huizinga’s description of the consoling “illusion of a […] heroic life” (WMA, 78) 
that finds expression in Gaddis’s deluded painter, is also a “wish-fulfillment” in that it 
establishes an illusion of the “true absence of time” (V., 316). The Maltese sense of 
“timelessness”, as Serracino-Inglott explains, “reflects the dominant Muslim 
occasionalism – the view that, apart from God’s will, there is no historical continuity 
in the sense of a causally connected chain between one event and another, but only a 
sequence of critical moments”.561 Yet in this belief in God’s will lies also the belief 
that redemption is still possible amidst the ‘random’ incidents of war. Fausto II notes 
in his journal during the Italian air raids: 
 
There is, we are taught, a communion of saints in heaven. So perhaps on earth, also in this 
Purgatory, a communion: not of gods or heroes, merely men expiating sins they are unaware 
of […] (V., 315)   
 
With the notion of communion in Purgatory Fausto can, paradoxically, believe that 
when “the bombs fall” he is “sheltered” (V., 316).  
Opposed to the Maltese sense of timelessness is the “other great image” (ibid.) 
capturing the imagination of the Maltese community, the Western narrative of 
entropic decline. Sharing with the other literati a “sensitivity to decadence”, Fausto 
perceives of the island’s history as a “slow apocalypse” (V., 317), an approximation 
to a state when humanity would “be finally subject to the laws of physics” (V., 321). 
This image emanates from Dnubietna, who, driven by tastes running to “apocalypse 
in full gallop”, creates a world in which such ‘truth’ has “precedence” over anything 
else (V., 316). Their apocalyptic sensitivity, however, is more than a way of making 
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sense of the world, as a reading from the perspective of Frank Kermode’s Sense of an 
Ending would imply.
562
 First of all, it expresses scepticism against the religious 
narrative that presents the war as “a great struggle between the laws of man and the 
laws of God” (V., 321). Moreover, it is ethically charged as ‘decadence’, as a 
“falling” (V., 317) into death and “non-humanity”, which Fausto associates with the 
matriarchy represented by his island: “Mothers are closer than anyone to accident” 
(V., 321). The latter association is striking. On the one hand, it can be read as 
embedded in the manifold references to Malta as a formerly matriarchal island, in 
images of fertility and female deities. One other hand, it also betrays a certain anxiety 
about losing (male) control.563  
Fausto’s “delusions of grandeur regarding the importance of poetry”, as Fitzpatrick 
argues, and his illusions about chivalry and masculinity enable him to continue during 
the Siege.
564
 Yet his notion of the poet as exempt from the ‘power’ of language 
eventually brings his downfall from abstraction to “the most real state of affairs” (V., 
317), the non-humanity of Fausto III. At the root of this reversal, as Serracino-Inglott 
notes, is a Faustian wager, the refusal to “accept the process of diminution to the zero-
point” and receive the divine gift of grace offered to those willingly embracing death, 
that is, to give up the present fulfilment of desire for the “sake of a hypothetical 
future”.565 This logic is expressed in early literary versions of the myth in the devil’s 
function as a seller of time. Faust is granted a certain period of service at the cost of 
his eternal soul. Fausto does not strictly follow this logic, but the basic principle 
remains: the war exhausts his poetic and intellectual abilities, and he trades in his 
notion of finding the eternal life promised (as his notion of purgatory and his 
imagined agreement with God indicate) for an illusion of strength and immortality 
that enables him to explore the realm of death on the island’s surface. Like in most 
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versions of Faust, however, this liberating move has more than a “propensity for 
dialectic reversal” (DF, 203), to use Leverkühn’s words.  
A key to this reversal is found in Fausto’s encounter with the Bad Priest. The 
Priest, who according to rumours confederates with the “Dark One” and is “prowling 
for souls” (V., 313), makes his first appearance when he lures the pregnant Elena into 
confession.
566
 ‘Sin’, also that of sex outside wedlock, as Fausto implies, has hitherto 
been for Elena “as natural a function as breathing” (ibid.). Under the influence of the 
Bad Priest, however, it takes on the “shape of an evil spirit; alien, parasitic, attached 
like a black slug to her soul” (V., 314). Appropriating the notion of the nun as the 
spouse of Christ, he tries, using highly eroticised language, to lure Elena into entering 
a convent and be cured of her “spirit’s cancer” (ibid.), that is, her child. During the 
Siege he appears again and uses the population’s fear of pain and weakness for 
propagating the abandonment of all that is human:  
 
The girls he advised to become nuns, avoid the sensual extremes—pleasure of intercourse, 
pain of childbirth. The boys he told to find strength in—and be like—the rock of their island 
[…] preaching that the object of male existence was to be like a crystal: beautiful and soulless. 
(V., 340)
567
  
 
On hearing about the Bad Priest’s technocratic “Sermon on the Mount”, 568  the 
Catholic Maltese Father Avalanche muses: 
 
“God is soulless? […] Having created souls, He Himself has none? So that to be like God we 
must allow to be eroded the soul in ourselves? Seek mineral symmetry, for there is eternal 
life: the immortality of rock. Plausible. But apostasy.” (V., 340) 
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Maijstral remains elusive whether he himself subscribes to the Priest’s message but 
eventually he comes to accept the non-humanity of inanimate rock as a key to human 
strength. Malta and her inhabitants, he writes, doubting any notion of theodicy and 
divine scheme, 
  
stood like an immovable rock in the river Fortune, now at war’s flood. The same motives 
which cause us to populate a dream-street also cause us to apply to a rock human qualities like 
“invincibility,” “tenacity,” “perseverance,” etc. More than metaphor, it is delusion. But on 
strength of this delusion Malta survived. 
Manhood on Malta thus became increasingly defined in terms of rockhood. This had its 
dangers for Fausto. (V., 325) 
 
The confessing Fausto is aware that the wish to overcome vulnerability and to gain 
some “sense of home or safety” (V., 324) also underlies the power of identification 
with the inanimate, and he is eager to point out the perils entailed in metaphoric 
transfer. The poet is painfully aware, Maijstral holds in the manner of Robbe-Grillet, 
that metaphor has “no value apart from its function” as a device (V., 326): 569  
 
while others may look on the laws of physics as legislation and God as a human from with 
beard […], Fausto’s kind are alone with the task of living in a universe of things which simply 
are, and cloaking that innate mindlessness with comfortable and pious metaphor, so that the 
“practical” half of humanity may continue in the Great Lie, confident that their machines, 
dwellings, streets […] share the same humane motives […] as they. (Ibid.)  
 
Yet Fausto II is not immune from this “Lie” and succumbs to the illusion of rockhood 
as a metaphoric shield against despair. This is Faust succumbing to the promise of 
Mephistopheles, the renouncement of everything spiritual for the sake of strength.
570
 
What is of immediate benefit, however, soon turns as its opposite, for his 
renouncement of human frailty comes at the cost of Fausto’s humanity. Alienated, he 
begins to “detect signs of lovely inanimateness in the world around him” (V., 322), 
and while “everything civilian and with a soul” goes underground (V., 323), he roams 
the streets during the raids, leaving his wife and child alone. What eventually drives 
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him is a wish to know. Valuing his vocation as poet as higher than his obligation 
toward other humans, he feels compelled to explore extremes: 
 
in dream there are two worlds: the street and under the street. One is the kingdom of death and 
one of life. And how can a poet live without exploring the other kingdom, even if only as a 
kind of tourist? (V., 325) 
 
On one of these tours, Fausto becomes witness to an incident that will whirl him into 
his third incarnation, that closest to the non-humanity of the debris (V., 307), from 
which he will only slowly resurface to humanity. The children of Malta, having lost 
their faith in theodicy during raids, project (with a Maltese proclivity toward literality) 
their sense of betrayal by God onto the Bad Priest. Chance provides them with an 
opportunity to vent their anger when they find him trapped under a fallen beam in an 
abandoned cellar.  The children take the Priest apart, taking from ‘him’ several items 
identified with previous ‘incarnations’ of the Lady V., until they have laid bare a 
young woman under the prosthetic layers of combs, wigs, false limbs and a glass eye. 
Fausto observes the scene without intervening, which allows for the Priest’s death but 
also the children’s “complete loss of innocence”, as Chambers notes.571  
Although the events on the Day of the 13 Raids have “no clear lines drawn” (V., 
322), Fausto knows later that his behaviour was caused by a sensitivity that suggests 
he has succumbed to a similar temptation preached by the Bad Priest. His hesitation is 
neither motivated by hatred nor by pity but, as he assumes later, by a “passiveness. 
The characteristic stillness, perhaps, of the rock” (V., 445). He conceives of his failed 
intervention as a sin committed out of a mindset that is already as non-human as 
Fausto III will be. The confessor writes: “I know of machines that are more complex 
than people. […] To have humanism we must first be convinced of our humanity” 
(V., 322). Eddins argues that this “transvaluation of the machine” is a “falling away 
from the ‘true’ religion centered upon the spiritual potential of the animate as 
manifested in humanity”, in brief, an embracement of the “inanimate heresy”.572 I 
would agree, were Fausto’s statement not aimed at evaluating the transvaluation of 
the human through the concept of rockhood. The logic behind this is still a matter of 
technological rationality, a theme Pynchon returns to in Laszlo Jamf’s propagation of 
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crystalline strength in Gravity’s Rainbow. The point Fausto makes in this specific 
context, however, is that the willed identification of manhood and rockhood on Malta 
may enable the island to persevere, but that it simultaneously reduces the self-image 
of the Maltese to a degree at which such ‘complex’ concepts as humanism are deemed 
impossible. It is only after the Priest has been stripped of all inanimate features and 
the children have left that Fausto acknowledges his obligation and commits himself to 
care, yet again, not as a human but in his ‘office’ as priest, offering to pray for her. 
Inferring from her inchoate sounds “regrets” of having sinned and the fear of having 
lost “Him”, Fausto administers extreme unction and stays with her until she dies.  
The “Confessions” end antithetically to Goethe’s text. While in Faust religion and 
science are unable to provide a unified concept of the world, urging the striving 
scholar to resort to magic’s assistance, the claims of both are perceived to be too 
horrifying in V. since their universalism introduces absolutism and determinism. The 
poetic view Fausto resorts to is also antithetical to the performative act of magic that 
calls facts and circumstances into being. Thus, while Stencil seeks a single genius 
behind history, Fausto dismisses the notion of the human face and embraces the idea 
that the world merely is, and the poet’s calling is to exist in such a world, recording its 
truth:  
 
“Truth” I mean, in the sense of attainable accuracy. No metaphysics. Poetry is not 
communication with angels or with the “subconscious”. It is communication with the guts, 
genitals and five portals of sense. Nothing more. (V., 318) 
 
As regards his relation to history, Fausto’s agenda is similar. Considering memory “a 
traitor: gilding, altering […] based as it is on the false assumption that identity is 
single, soul continuous” (V., 307), he dismisses any notion of continuity in both 
history and personal identity. In doing so, he act antithetically to Gaddis’s Wyatt, who 
purportedly seeks unity in God, and Herbert Stencil, who forges unity in his secular 
self-apotheosis. Ironically, Pynchon presents this acquisition of ‘truth’, or clarity, as a 
matter of soul-selling: 
 
So we do sell our souls: paying them away to history in little installments. It isn’t so much to 
pay for eyes clear enough to see past the fiction of continuity, the fiction of cause and effect, 
the fiction of a humanized history endowed with ‘reason’. (V., 306) 
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These words ironically invoke Goethe’s Faust, especially the latter’s discontent with 
theological and scientific and explanations of the world. Their message, however, 
points to the exact opposite of the impulse that drives Faust to his pact. Rather than 
vainly seeking binding principles, a force holding together the universe, Fausto 
dismisses the assumption that even a concept such as unity or continuity could exist. 
Arguing from a Wittgensteinian perspective, Serracino-Inglott sees in this gesture a 
“withdrawal of the Hegelian claim that the universe as a whole has a substantial unity 
of rational nature constituted by its empirically discoverable orientation in a given 
direction”.573 According to the Western narrative Fausto’s British half subscribes to 
this direction is clearly one of decline, so it is no wonder that Fausto frees himself 
from the fear of these processes by choosing an artistic perception of the world.
574
 
While critics have pointed out possible relations to Robbe-Grillet’s anti-humanist 
theory of metaphors or Wittgenstein’s logical positivism behind this agenda, the 
distinctly Nietzschean tenor of these lines is generally overlooked. Fausto’s statement 
of soul-selling refers to three thematic areas pivotal to Nietzsche’s work on 
epistemology and historiography: the identification of reason as ‘fictitious’ (The Will 
To Power, § 12b), the renunciation of cause and effect (ibid., § 551), and humanised 
history.
575
 In the second essay of Untimely Meditations, “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life”, Nietzsche argues that man’s ability to act depends 
on his ability to forget, to brace “himself against the great and ever greater pressure of 
what is past”. 576  Nietzsche opens his discussion with a comparison between the 
unhistorical life of the animal contained in the present and eventually divested of 
meaningful action through the inability to remember or plan with the human historical 
sense, which, taken to insomniac extremes, is unwholesome in that it discourages men 
to act. Nietzsche relates these modes not only to individuals but also to entire cultures. 
Discussing the perceived inability of German culture to fully flower, for instance, he 
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cites Grillparzer’s statement that the predominance of Shakespeare partly undercut the 
development of modern culture: “‘Shakespeare has ruined all of us moderns’”.577 The 
very same logic stands behind Fausto’s dictum, which Pynchon seems to have taken 
from Nietzsche, that “Shakespeare and T.S. Eliot ruined us all” (V., 308). The cultural 
past, cherished by Eliot (see, for instance, “Tradition and the individual talent”), 
hinders development. What is needed, in Nietzsche’s opinion, then, is the ability to 
forget without drifting into an eternal present.
578
 Nietzsche continues his discussion 
with a distinction between three historical modes, the monumental, the antiquarian, 
and the critical mode.
579
 The monumental conceives of history as a repository of the 
deeds of great personalities, the antiquarian the present as a culmination of the past. 
Hayden White relates these modes to metonymy and synecdoche: “By means of 
Metonymy men create agents and agencies behind phenomena; by means of 
Synecdoche they endow these agents and agencies with specific qualities, and most 
especially the quality of being something other than what they are”.580 This describes 
very concisely Stencil’s assumption of an agent behind history and Fausto’s reference 
to history with a human face. Nietzsche introduces a third historical mode, the critical, 
that follows the human impulse to break up with the past in order to live. The critical 
historian brings history “before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally 
condemning it”.581 As White notes, he “possesses the power to penetrate through the 
myths of past greatness and values […] and to deny the claims of the past on the 
present”. 582  Ironically, Nietzsche illustrates this attitude with the words of 
Mephistopheles: “‘For all that exists is worthy of perishing. So it would be better if 
nothing existed’”.583  
Nietzsche neither describes this critical (in White’s nomenclature ironic) mode in 
metaphysical terms nor as entirely positive (for its most radical manifestation, the 
conscious total devaluation of history for the sake of the present, leaves man equally 
without orientation). Yet the concept can be used to elucidate Maijstral’s turn. Where 
“soul” (as personal identity and as history as the world-soul) becomes an oppressive 
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construct, soul-selling becomes a critical mode of liberation, of assuming and 
rejecting “successive identities […] by the writer as a function of linear time” (V., 
306). A closer examination of Fausto’s allegedly metaphor-free and discontinuous 
universe against this background also reveals that he has by no means entirely 
abandoned such concepts, not even the (remote) notion of personhood.
584
 Contrary to 
his poetological demand, he exchanges the metonymic conception of history with a 
human face for one that is, strictly speaking, metaphorical (i.e. analogical): 
 
The present Fausto can look nowhere but back on the separate stages of his own history. No 
continuity. No Logic. ‘History,’ Dnubietna wrote, ‘is a step-function.’ (V., 331) 
 
Just like Dnubietna conceptually frames history as a “step-function”, Fausto reads his 
own life as a succession of stages engendered by random incidents (the outbreak of 
the war, the Day of the 13 Raids, the encounter with the Bad Priest).
585
 Ironically, 
Fausto even resorts in this viewpoint to the renounced logic of cause and effect by 
considering Fausto II as “generated” and Fausto IV as “produced” out of external 
events. Fausto does thereby not fully propound that the world is entirely without 
cause and effect.
586
 Moreover, he does not aspire to an entirely atemporal state but 
chooses a pattern of analogies as a heuristic horizon within which to act.
587
 History, in 
this view, ceases to be subject of mechanistic or organicist explanations and is 
presented, in a Nietzschean manner, as a series of moments related to the former and 
determined by the actions of the agents present at the time, yet without resorting to 
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teleology and determinism.
588
 Fausto’s trope of soul-selling, in turn, is thereby less a 
renunciation of metaphoricity or causality but a dismissal of teleological models 
available for political agendas: it is not the Maltese literal-mindedness but the 
narrative of decline and decadence that opens the gates to the Bad Priest’s 
propagation of strength and immortality. Thus, the anti-humanistic bias as expressed 
in Fausto’s poetology and historiography can become a critique of the imperial 
dominion of all too human British culture.
589
  
While Stencil has to learn painfully that he “has never encountered history at all, 
but something more appalling (V., 450), that is, his own imagination, and finally ends, 
like V., as a “remarkably scattered concept” (V., 389), Fausto passes the “acid test” 
(V., 324), while staying ‘sane’ in a meaningless world. If Pynchon uses the quest 
motif in Stencil’s case as a “calculated assault” on fatalism, as David Cowart points 
out,
590
 then Fausto’s claim as regards his own personal history—“No continuity. No 
Logic” (V., 331)—needs to be read with equal suspicion, for Fausto’s renunciation of 
continuity and teleology is also part of the strategy he devises to come to terms with 
his “sin of omission” (V., 345). Michael Begnal argues that “Fausto may keep too 
cool as he watches the children dismantle the inanimate Bad Priest, but he cares 
enough to offer the rites of confession to the victim and to deplore his own 
passivity”. 591  Fausto’s immediately apologetic tone, however, indicates that the 
confessor feels “guilty of murder” (V., 345). The confessing Fausto is still haunted by 
guilt. Never quite abandoning his theological education, and never quite turning away 
from God, the notion of being in the world to expiate sins accompanies Fausto 
throughout his successive incarnations, and he incessantly tries to relate his 
experiences during the Siege with his former actions, his renunciation of the office, 
his marriage to Elena, and later his administration of extreme unction. Since he 
considers his apologia a “first step in exorcising the sense of sin” (V., 447) that hangs 
with him, his rejection of formers selves and their actions is thereby also a part of this 
exorcism. To argue from the standpoint of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, bad 
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conscience is nothing but the inability to accept one’s past deeds as one’s own, that is, 
the impulse to see them as acts of another agent.
592
 Fausto attempts to create a new 
version of ‘self’ dislocated from these actions, as if he could achieve to become a 
linguistic simulacrum of the ‘new man’ in St. Paul’s sense. Yet Fausto’s account ends 
in resignation, and when he tells Stencil years later “We are western men” (V., 451), 
his words bear a distinctly Spenglerian connotation. He may, like Wyatt, turn from his 
past, but unlike the latter, his sense of sin remains. His divine tribunal waiting “far 
away” (V., 345) and his soul still torn, all he is able to do is to persevere in his 
disunity and pass a wish, a prayer for closeness to God and unity on to his daughter 
(V., 314).
593
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Chapter 6: Pynchon’s Faust, Part Two - Gravity’s Rainbow 
[I]n the centre is the position of the Homo Dei, between 
recklessness and reason 
–Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain594 
 
Spanning from seventeenth century New England to Nazi Germany and, implicitly, 
America’s military engagement in Vietnam, juxtaposing Puritan and neo-Romantic 
notions of destiny, mystical and neo-Freudian tropes of transcendence, technologies 
of social organisation and physical extinction, all of which inevitably point toward a 
final Zero, the synoptic vision of Gravity’s Rainbow indeed suggests a Faustian 
continuity in about 400 years of Western history. Although Joel D. Black rightly 
observes that Pynchon “describes a Nature which has been ruthlessly violated, 
quantified, and technologically transformed by the irreversible, exhaustive processes 
of History”,595 one should be careful in capitalising history and thereby presenting it 
as a dehumanised and depoliticised process of decline, unless one wants to subscribe 
to the same principles Pynchon’s paranoids and inhabitants of the hothouse thrive on. 
Just as Pynchon shows an ironic distance to the narrative of entropic decline in his 
early stories, rendering it an exercise in self-immobilisation,
596
 and just as he satirises 
Robert Graves’s mythopoeic lament of disenchantment, it is safe to suggest that he 
shows an equal distance to the Spenglerian plot in Gravity’s Rainbow. With the stance 
“[y]ou will want cause and effect” (GR, 663), he presents a vision of “pan-cultural 
destiny” so absurdly thorough that it is hard to take it at face value. 597  Firmly 
entrenched in a framework inspired by Weber and Marcuse, however, the novel does 
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not naively deny the economic superstructure that determines the ever-increasing 
growth of industrial and military technologies. Even though the concoctions of some 
of his characters about ‘invisible’ markets existing in a secret conspiracy with a 
nefarious shadow regime of ‘Them’ tend to mystify such relations, their paranoid air 
castles are certainly caricatures of real cartels and economies.
598
 Behind Pynchon’s 
self-conscious jocularity, then, stands the project of documenting the underbelly of 
modern history, in which technological, totalitarian, and capitalist rationales of 
repression and exploitation go hand in hand for the sake of domination and profit—if 
not in terms of causality or continuity, then at least as emergent epiphenomena that 
mutually comment on each other. As Cowart argues in his work on the ‘Dark 
Passages of History’ in Pynchon, German (read Faustian) culture “remains a 
paradigm” and “part of a much broader spectrum” for the author.599 
Thus, rather than implying a teleology in my presentation, I will first present the 
Faustian themes Pynchon depicts in the German setting of Gravity’s Rainbow, 
focusing on the industrial and political processes that culminate in Major 
Weissmann’s engineering project, and then I will present their ‘correlatives’ in the 
American ‘setting’ as represented in Slothrop’s memories. In doing so, I demonstrate 
where Pynchon draws and deviates from Goethe and Spengler, using both narratives 
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to comment on his characters while simultaneously subverting and thereby re-
politicising the myth of Faust. 
 
 
1. Modus Vivendi 
In the first episode of Gravity’s Rainbow, Pynchon suggests that the world is a closed 
system: there is no “disentanglement from”, but only “a progressive knotting into” 
(GR, 3). Immediately after this nightmarish vision of Captain Pirate Prentice, dreamt 
in a London ghosted by V-2s, Pynchon describes a modus vivendi within this system, 
without fear of extermination and the consequent need for escape. The latter is 
epitomised in Prentice’s greenhouse on the top of a Special Operations habitation. In 
the rooftop garden of the requisitioned hotel, tree leaves, manure, and human detritus 
amalgamate into “unbelievable black topsoil” in which bananas grow (GR, 5), and 
these bananas, a counter-image to the V-2 rockets, are equally ‘magical’:  
 
Pirate has become famous for his Banana Breakfast. Messmates throng here from all over 
England, even some who are allergic or outright hostile to bananas, just to watch—for the 
politics of bacteria, the soil’s stringing of rings and chains in nets only God can tell the meshes 
of, have seen the fruit thrive often to lengths of a foot and a half, yes amazing but true. 
(GR, 5-6)
600
 
 
Such stringing, is nothing but “life’s whole life” (F, 457), in Goethe’s words, or, in 
the alchemical terms of Mann’s Magic Mountain, warmth 
 
generated by a form-preserving instability, a fever of matter, which accompanied the whole 
process of ceaseless decay and repair […] that were too impossibly complicated, too 
impossibly ingenious in structure […] the existence of the actually impossible-to-exist […] 
(MM, 275) 
 
What Pynchon describes here is the working of nature as a living, conscious alma 
mater, the all-nourishing “mindbody” (GR, 590), and it is the “assertion-through-
structure” (GR, 6) of living genetic chains, as represented in this case by bananas, by 
which “Death is […] clearly told to fuck off” (GR, 10). How nature does this is of no 
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interest for Prentice and his messmates, as long as it possesses such power. For 
Prentice, thus, the smell of bananas even becomes an apotropaic spell against sudden 
peril, and although there is no causal relationship between such ‘magic’ and the 
“premature Brennschuss” (GR, 8) of an approaching V-2 rocket, the fiction enables 
him to persevere.  
Yet such bucolic life with the positive forces of nature constitutes an exception, a 
counter-entropic “island” in a sea of decline, in Norbert Wiener’s terms.601 The other, 
dominant mode of existence is introduced in an almost casually deceptive manner. 
The first part of Gravity’s Rainbow opens with the often-cited epigraph: 
 
Nature does not know extinction; all it knows is transformation. Everything science has taught 
me, and continues to teach me, strengthens my belief in the continuity of our spiritual 
existence after death.  
—WERNHER VON BRAUN (GR, 1) 
 
These words are taken from von Braun’s apologia pro scientia sua “Why I Believe in 
Immortality”. The short piece has itself an epigraph that ventriloquizes a creed by 
Benjamin Franklin, expressed in a letter to Ezra Stiles on March 9, 1790: “I believe ... 
that the soul of Man is immortal and will be treated with justice in another life 
respecting its conduct in this”. 602  Expressing his belief in the continuity of our 
spiritual existence after death, von Braun forfeits allegations of immorality in a world 
that has allegedly replaced religion with science. Yet the fact that he tacitly omits any 
mentioning of the ethical implications of the latter science is revealing, for the notions 
of ‘afterlife’ and ‘Last Judgment’ become obsolete in his immanentist vision. If 
Dalsgaard, although in a different context, points to the loss of “naïveté which cannot 
fail to inform knowledgeable readings of Braun today”, 603  such a reading cannot 
ignore the discrepancy between von Braun’s rhetoric of physics as metaphysics and 
his actual work. Establishing a dialogue between the first and last epigraph of the 
novel, Joel D. Black argues that von Braun’s assertion that nature does not know 
extinction “is totally incomprehensible to the technocratic manipulator Richard M. 
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Nixon who, in the epigraph to the last part of the book, can only respond, ‘What?’”.604 
Against the background of von Braun’s factual contribution to the German and 
American military-industrial complexes, however, such a reading tends to 
overemphasise the engineer’s mystifications. Von Braun “knew that his established 
reputation as a technological genius […] would create interest around his person”,605 
and one is tempted to add that with about 1000 V-2 rockets fired to London during the 
final years of the Second World War, this reputation could not have been more 
dubious. Indeed, despite his later PR alchemy, partly in cooperation with Walt 
Disney, the “fictional product” von Braun, “created by himself, the US Army, NASA 
and his autobiographers [sic] in the decades following World War Two”,606 could not 
gloss over his former life as a producer of retaliatory weapons and SS 
Sturmbandführer, a fact that was given vocal expression in literary fiction, most 
notably in Mailer’s aforementioned A Fire on the Moon. Musing whether von Braun, 
whose name alone he considers “attractive and repellent at once”, is of the Lord’s or 
of the devil’s party, he concludes that the charismatic engineer falls into the latter 
category—the “Apollo-Saturn was still a child of the Devil”.607 Yet if such moralizing 
mystifications were only gradually replaced by more informed works, such as 
Michael J. Neufeld’s, the latter still concludes that the engineer was indeed a 
“twentieth-century Faust”,608 not least because the V2 became a “delivery system for 
global catastrophe” when “combined with America’s own contribution, the atomic 
bomb”, as Hite points out.609 Thus, it is hardly a coincidence that when von Braun and 
his avatars have just left the Zone, Pynchon states:
610
  
 
We must also never forget famous Missouri Mason Harry Truman: sitting by virtue of death in 
office, this very August 1945, with his control-finger poised right on Miss Enola Gay’s atomic 
clit, making ready to tickle 100,000 little yellow folks into what will come down as a fine vapor-
deposit of fat-cracklings wrinkled into the fused rubble of their city on the Inland Sea […] 
(GR, 588)  
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It is this “vapor-deposit”–the annulment of metaphysics that had begun in Auschwitz–
that stands between von Braun’s “[n]ature does not know extinction” and the 
American technocratic order of the 1970s. Von Braun’s dream, eagerly received in 
America, demonstrates the destructive potentialities of scientific enlightenment. 
Norbert Wiener, writing in the beginning of the Cold War, comments back on such 
alchemy in an account of the entropic effects of inanimate weapons that do not release 
any material or information that can be reintegrated into a wider life-system. As 
Wiener writes, in a manner invoking Mephistopheles and Freud’s death-drive:  
 
The effect of these weapons must be to increase the entropy of this planet, until all distinctions 
of hot and cold, good and bad, man and matter have vanished in the formation of the white 
furnace of a new star.
611
 
 
It is this vision of death that frames the narrative of Gravity’s Rainbow, for if Pirate 
Prentice sees a “new star, nothing less noticeable” (GR, 6) at the novel’s beginning, it 
is a star that hangs beneath the sky-risen feet of one of innumerable victims at its 
ending (GR, 760). The novel’s last rocket descends onto the New World. Frozen in an 
infinitesimally small distance over the Los Angeles “Orpheus Theater”, it “constitutes 
a permanent threat to America,” as Kolbulszewska holds.612 It does so, however, less 
as a signifier of National Socialist military aggression than of an assembly of 
processes also constituent of an ascending American technocracy of the sixties 
“grasping for empire”.613 If nature does not know extinction, neither does mankind’s 
aspirations to violate her cycles of transformation by repressing, replacing, and 
annihilating all that is natural for the sake of its own aggrandisement, in short, the 
Faustian project of grasping life’s forces at the cost of life itself.  
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2. Suicidal Systems 
What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in 
order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the 
only aim. 
—Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment614  
 
Toward the end of Gravity’s Rainbow the witch Geli Tripping announces the most 
pessimistic assessment of human life on earth:  
 
This is the world just before men. Too violently itched alive in constant flow ever to be seen 
by men directly. They are meant only to look at it dead, in still strata, transputrefied to oil or 
coal. Alive, it was a threat: it was […] an overspeaking of life so clangorous and mad […] that 
some spoiler had to be brought in before it blew the Creation apart. So we, the crippled 
keepers, were sent out to multiply, to have dominion. God’s spoilers. Us. Counter-
revolutionaries. It is our mission to promote death. […] It was something we had to work on, 
historically and personally. (GR, 720) 
 
This ‘mission’, in its systemic industrial manifestation, is first of all to unlock nature’s 
secrets and systematically exploit them for the sake of human emancipation from 
nature. As Marcuse writes: “History is the negation of Nature. What is only natural is 
overcome and recreated by the power of Reason” (ODM, 248). The history of 
industrial capitalism emergent in Gravity’s Rainbow depicts a systematic recreation of 
the natural in the service of instrumental reason, which, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
terms, turns nature into “mere objectivity” (DE, 9). The mystery of natura naturans 
itself is thereby sacrificed. Pynchon’s narrator describes this transformation when the 
financial magnate and honorary freemason Lyle Bland beholds “Earth’s mindbody” in 
a mystical voyage to the “holy center” (GR, 590). There, “the wastes of dead species” 
are “gathered, packed, transmuted, realigned, and rewoven” to be “taken up again 
[…] boiled off, teased apart, explicated to every last permutation of useful magic” and 
finally recombined “into new synthetics” (ibid.). On an industrial scale, such 
technological rationale is inaugurated in Friedrich August Kerkulé von Stradonitz’s 
“great Dream that revolutionized chemistry and made the industrial cartel IG Farben, 
one of the novel’s major promoters of death, “possible” (GR, 410). Kerkulé, “looking 
for […] hidden shapes”, 
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dreams the Great Serpent holding its own tail in its mouth, the dreaming serpent which 
surrounds the World. But the meanness, the cynicism with which this dream is to be used. 
(GR, 412) 
 
In its secularised version, such alchemy betrays the same ludicrousness as Gaddis’s 
modern makers of gold. Broken loose from the religious framework, in which the 
artifex works within a God-given order, the technological aspect inherent in 
transmutation now fully operates in the spirit of technocracy.615 The assembly of “new 
molecules” from the “debris of the given”,616 the narrator explains, tongue in cheek, 
 
brought us directly to nylon, which not only is a delight to the fetishist and a convenience to 
the armed insurgent, but was also, at the time well within the System, an announcement of 
Plasticity’s central canon: that chemists were no longer to be at the mercy of Nature. (GR, 
249) 
 
Recombined, structured, and rationalised,
617
 the polymerisation of hydrocarbon bonds 
describes first of all a shift from working what is “found in Nature, unquestioning” 
(GR, 413) to a technological mode of production. Instead of bringing forth what 
emerges, as in Prentice’s greenhouse, man orders by analysing, separating, and 
reorganizing the given according to a technological schema merely directed by utility.  
In such a system, as Friedrich Kittler argues, metaphysics “comes to an end and is 
perfected” as what Heidegger terms enframing.618 Such disenchanted alchemy is not 
aimed at the perfection of potentials in nature in order to redeem them, but their 
potentiality is turned toward human ends, or “convenience”, as it were, that is, to 
regulate and secure.
619
 Synthesised “to order, bent […], clasped, and strung” (GR, 
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250), synthetics become a universal substance, a technocratic lapis philosophorum, 
with which to supersede nature’s limitations, an entirely artificial world obeying 
human command.
620
 While plasticity’s uses for fetishism and insurgence remain 
distinctly marginal, its central function, liberation from nature, is rendered by 
Pynchon a paradigmatic example of how emancipation by means of reason easily 
evolves into a destructive endeavour. More apodictically, in the words of Horkheimer 
and Adorno: domination invariably leads to alienation from what is dominated.
621
 If 
in the IG’s case such alienation is desired, as an establishment of power hierarchies, it 
also directly nourishes a fatal misconception. All attempts to dominate nature, as 
Heidegger has shown, “arise from the illusion that we are separate from the natural 
order of things”.622 Embedded in a multinational cartel under the maxim of profit, 
however, the petrochemical system exceeds further and further the necessary 
alienation from nature that enables free human self-realization (cf. EC, 227). In her 
analysis of relations between Marcuse and Pynchon, Hite writes:  
 
The organization of Western societies under patriarchal capitalism, the monogamous family, 
and the work ethic is for Marcuse always defined by the requirement of transcendence—that is, 
of exceeding the present moment and thrusting into the future in order to dominate and control 
further. And for Marcuse the most poignant symbol of such transcendence is the ascending 
curve, a visual representation of endless progress.
623
  
 
Within the framework of advanced industrial societies, then, man’s dominion depends 
on constant increase and augmentation, congruent with the principles of economic 
gain with which the IG operate. Since this ‘progress’ is based on the exploitation of 
natural resources, however, the curve of progress is bound to bend. The IG does not 
merely deaden what it analyses but, dependent on natural resources, it becomes an 
“enterprise driven to systemic destruction by the very instruments with which it 
secured its dominion”.624 Pynchon’s narrator remarks: 
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The Serpent that announces, “The World is a closed thing, cyclical, resonant, eternally-
returning,” is to be delivered into a system whose only aim is to violate the circle. Taking and 
not giving back, demanding that “productivity” and “earnings” keep on increasing with time, 
the System removing from the rest of the World these vast quantities of energy to keep its 
own tiny desperate fraction showing a profit: and not only most of humanity—most of the 
World, animal, vegetable and mineral, is laid waste in the process. The System may or may 
not understand that that it’s only buying time. And that time is an artificial resource to begin 
with, of no value to anyone or anything but the System, which sooner or later must crash to its 
death, when its addiction to energy has become more than the rest of the World can supply, 
dragging with it innocent souls all along the chain of life. Living inside the System is like 
riding across the country in a bus driven by a maniac bent on suicide… (GR, 412) 
 
The Spenglerian tenor of this section is unusually direct. Spengler writes: 
 
The Western industry has diverted the ancient traditions of the other Cultures. The streams of 
economic life move towards the seats of King Coal and the great regions of raw material. 
Nature becomes exhausted, the globe sacrificed to Faustian thinking in energies. (DW, 2:505) 
 
Instrumental ‘rationality’ thereby betrays a Faustian character, by which short-term 
gratification is bought at the cost of existence on the long-term. The anthropocentric 
shift from alchemy to chemistry endows humans with power, seemingly liberating 
them from contingency and limitation but eventually delivering them from the mercy 
of nature to a full negation of life. The second delusion of the System is that it thereby 
disregards basic natural limitations that prevent a salvation of sorts in the first place.  
Therefore, if the cartel, as Eddins argues, embodies “absolute and man imposed 
control, […] an entirely artificial System that will make nature obsolete”,625 it all too 
readily forgets that its attempted liberation is bound to physical realities. Ironically, as 
Tabbi shows, it is again the Other Side that brings the laws of nature “more forcefully 
to bear against any dream of transcendence or unconstrained progress through 
technology”. 626  In the well-known séance scene, the spirit of Walter Rathenau, 
“prophet and architect of the cartelized state” (GR, 164), implies, as Tabbi argues, 
that “there is an order in nature that determines the possible uses we can make of it, 
and beyond which no social, political or technological order can go”.627 It is “the 
technology of these matters”, the “hearts of certain molecules […] which dictate 
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temperatures, pressures rates of flow, costs” (GR, 167). The constant re-organisation 
of molecules thereby remains in the service of  
 
Death converted into more death. Perfecting its reign, just as the buried coal grows denser, 
and overlaid with more strata—epoch on top of epoch. City on top of ruined city. This is the 
sign of Death the impersonator. (Ibid.) 
 
Thus, just as the war merely shows a “cruel, accidental resemblance to life” (GR, 
131), the “growing, organic Kartell” of the IG Farben, as the spirit of Rathenau points 
out, is not life but a “very clever robot. The more dynamic it seems to you, the more 
deep and dead, in reality, it grows” (GR, 167). Any real transmutation is impossible:  
 
The real moment is not from death to any rebirth. It is from death to death-transfigured. The 
best you can do is to polymerize a few dead molecules. But polymerizing is not resurrection. 
(GR, 166) 
 
Plasticity, and its entire production system, as Pynchon’s allusions to Brown 
elsewhere indicate, represents nothing but an Apollonian dream. The latter, a “fiction 
empowered wholly by technical simulations”, is “ultimately incapable of reflecting 
any reality outside itself”, as Joseph Tabbi in his discussion of technologies in 
Pynchon points out.
628
 Reason, just like Goethe’s Faust, tries to abandon Care and as 
a consequence is struck blind. And like Spengler’s Faustian man it embarks on a 
flight in which the course of self-realisation becomes identical with annihilation. 
 
 
3. Immortality 
A technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself. 
—Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment629 
 
The question concerning technology, to use Heidegger’s phrase, is symptomatic in 
this respect, especially in terms of the ‘protagonist’ of Gravity’s Rainbow, the V-2 
rocket. At the centre of the suicidal “System”, feeding on everything natural, from 
steel and hydrocarbon to potatoes (for fuel: GR, 550) and permanganate (GR, 375), it 
is a metonymic expression of the project of progress for the sake of domination and 
                                                 
628
 Tabbi, Postmodern Sublime, 85. 
629
 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenmnent, 121. 
 190 
financial gain that is bound to exhaust its sources and collapse into itself.
630
 As Hite 
observes in her Marcusean reading, it is the uncontrolled fall of the rocket that is “the 
major image in Gravity’s Rainbow of the tendency of the performance principle”, in 
Marcuse’s terms the mode of organisation in capitalist societies that emphasises 
productivity, “to fall into service of the death drive”.631 Finally, even if Pynchon’s 
Rocket-Manichaeans “see two Rockets, good and evil […] a good Rocket to take us 
to the stars, an evil Rocket for the World’s suicide” (GR, 727), that is, even if he 
points to a “utopian potential” of technology that cannot be eradicated by its 
dystopian uses, as Sascha Pöhlmann argues,
632
 the cynicism with which his characters 
abuse the former is immense. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, V. holds no fire in suggesting connections 
between the German and the American industrial complex, in which the always-
already alienated readily do away with their ‘souls’. In Gravity’s Rainbow, the 
Faustian grasping for immortality and strength similarly progresses from the aegis of 
Fascism to that of post-war technocracy. Symptomatic in this respect is the chemist 
Laszlo Jamf, inventor of the most fiendish and ubiquitous ‘aberration’ of plasticity, 
the polymer Imipolex G.
633
 After a career in organic chemistry, Jamf, ‘infected’ by 
the Zeitgeist of “National Socialist chemistry” (GR, 578), develops a hatred for the 
“covalent bond”, which he wants to have improved, if not “transcended” (GR, 577), 
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as some of his students believe. In the manner of the Bad Priest in V., Jamf wants to 
“move beyond life, toward the inorganic. Here’s no frailty, no mortality—here is 
Strength, and the Timeless” (GR, 580). Such a move, however, is invariably 
concomitant with dehumanisation. Feeling humiliated by the fact that something “so 
soft” as carbon “should lie at the core of life, his life”, he directs his aim towards the 
“mineral stubbornness” of the ionic bond (ibid.). For Jamf, the latter appeals to a wish 
for clarity and structure, but it also represents a scenario for an imperial will to 
possession and power, where “electrons are not shared, but captured” (ibid.). In his 
Munich lectures during the Weimar era, Jamf tells his class: 
 
“Whatever lip-service we may pay to Reason, […] to moderation and compromise, 
nevertheless there remains the lion. A lion in each one of you. He is either tamed—by too 
much mathematics, by details of design, by corporate procedures—or he stays wild.” 
(GR, 577) 
 
Such striving to become an Übermensch rather than finding a way of life within 
human limitations is, albeit tongue in cheek, identified as a “SI-N” (GR, 580), as 
Pynchon expresses it in the theologico-chemical formula of Jamf’s propagated 
inorganic Silicon-Nitrogen bond. Unlike the Bad Priest, however, Jamf is not 
dismantled but his propagations will inspire the world-view of a whole generation of 
chemists and engineers. For the latter, an amalgamation of scientism and volk-
ideology becomes the credo for a suicidal violation of the Ouroboric cycle. Although 
Pynchon’s imagery is hyperbolic, it perfectly reflects the “twentieth-century German 
conditions issued from the interplay between Volk-ish charisma and technologised 
rationality” that led to the barbarism of the Third Reich, as Moore holds.634 While in 
the Magic Mountain Schubert’s “Linden Tree” epitomises a sentiment “worth dying 
for” (MM, 653), followed by Hans Castorp and his fellows, in Gravity’s Rainbow a 
Rilkean “once, only once” is twisted into a fatalist “No return, no salvation” (GR, 
413).
635
 And while the younger generation falls prey to a “perverted science, laden 
with death” (MM, 715), Jamf silently returns to organic chemistry in his new adopted 
country America.  
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3.1. Weissmann/Blicero – Faust as Engineer 
 
In a repressive civilization, death itself becomes an instrument of repression. 
Whether death is feared as constant threat, or glorified as supreme sacrifice, 
or accepted as fate, the education for consent to death introduces an element 
of surrender into life from the beginning—surrender and submission.  
—Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization636  
 
They are only pretending Death is Their servant—faith in Death as the 
master of us all—is to ask for an order of courage that I know is beyond my 
own humanity, though I cannot speak for others. 
—Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow637  
 
The most spectacular misappropriation of both myth and soteriology in Gravity’s 
Rainbow can be found in the building project of the rocket engineer and SS Officer 
Weissmann (aka Dominus Blicero). Hardly any character in Pynchon’s work is more 
valorised, and hardly any is more frequently termed Faustian or Mephistophelian. If 
Wernher von Braun is the modern historical Faust working in the dearest interest of 
death while dreaming of flying to the moon, this caricature represents the bloody 
underbelly of such a schizophrenic existence. Dwight Eddins, for instance, describes 
him as “a figure of such portentous evil and insidious capability that his creator 
Pynchon occasionally seems, like Milton, to be of the Devil’s party without knowing 
it”.638 Such readings are legitimate to some extent, for Weissmann shows, like Mann’s 
Germans, a combination of technological skill and a “psychological state threatened 
by the poison of loneliness, […] neurotic involution, unspoken Satanism” (DF, 326). 
Indeed, a homosexual, paranoid, sadistic Nazi, who fires his young lover deathwards, 
Weissmann/Blicero is a Blonde Beast hyperbolic to the point of caricature. An all too 
ready invocation of the category of metaphysical evil, however, tends to naturalise the 
wider criticism at work in Gravity’s Rainbow that not only includes the economic and 
political superstructure in which Weismann operates but also those specialists and 
moderate men such as Kurt Mondaugen and Franz Pökler, who help realising his 
dream and eventually carry it “into the corporate culture of post-war America”.639 
Weissmann hears his ‘calling’ in the German southwest African protectorate. In 
“love with empire, poetry, his own arrogance” (GR, 660), he arrives in the German 
southwest African protectorate carrying with him a copy of the Duino Elegies, “just 
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off the presses, […] a gift from Mother at the boat” (GR, 99). “Self-enchanted by […] 
bookish symmetries” (GR, 101), this “scholarly white” (GR, 99) wanders there in a 
universe of poetry and art myth, “all alone, terminally alone, up and up into the 
mountains of Primal Pain, with the wildly alien constellations overhead” (GR, 98), 
while his perusal of Rilke feeds into his romantic yearning for transcendence and 
megalomaniac self-apotheosis. Finding his “night-flower”, whom he names after a 
word of Rilkean purity “Enzian”, he has an ‘initiatory’ experience:    
 
The boy wants to fuck, but he is using the Herero name of God. An extraordinary chill comes 
over the white man. […] Tonight he feels the potency of every word: words are only an eye-
twitch away from the things they stand for. The peril of buggering the boy under the resonance 
of the sacred Name fills him insanely with lust, lust in the face—the mask— of instant talion 
from outside the fire . . . but to the boy Ndjambi Karunga is what happens when they couple, 
that’s all: God is creator and destroyer, sun and darkness, all sets of opposites brought together, 
including black and white, male and female […] (GR, 100) 
 
What Weissmann has in mind here is the position of homo dei, in whose mastery all 
opposites are reconciled. While Pynchon does not fail to refer to a factual relation 
between creation and destruction in the southwest protectorate, where a railroad is 
being built through the desert at the same time as sixty per cent of the Herero people 
are exterminated, Weismann’s narcissism and his indefinite yearning for guilt appear 
entirely dissociated from reality (cf. GR, 323). However, he soon will have lost “all 
his innocence on this question” (GR, 98). 
During the eternal Fasching at Foppl’s besieged villa, some pages before he gives 
Mondaugen the fateful message that there is nothing beyond the given, a cross-
dressed Weissmann enters the electrical engineer’s room, his eyelashes, larded with 
mascara. The latter has “left dark parallel streaks” on his glasses “so that each eye 
looked from its own prison window” (V., 261). In this image he resembles Goethe’s 
Faust, who, in the second study scene with Mephisto, does present himself as a 
pitiable victim of the conditio humana: “The earth’s a prison—one can’t get away/ 
From it, whatever clothes one wears” (F, 1544-5). Like Faust, Weissmann will 
explore the very edges of the world (GR, 722) and his own self, attempting to 
transcend them, seeking to transform the external world in order to transform himself 
and thereby become godlike. And like Faust’s vision of a realm of unrestrained 
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human activity, his will be based on despotic rule and the sacrifice of human “raw 
material” (V., 242). 
Embracing the Reich’s Flame (GR, 98), Weissmann comes to work with the 
dominant political and economic forces of his time. Concomitant with this wager is a 
re-interpretation of his initiatory experience with Enzian. Having learned that God is a 
creator and destroyer, the message he draws from this knowledge is that “every true 
god must be both organizer and destroyer” (GR, 99). If Weissmann is redefined by a 
word, a mechanism resembling the Puritan magic Pynchon describes in the episodes 
about Slothrop’s ancestors and Slothrop’s renaming as Rocketman, he twists this 
word into his own service while dismissing the category ‘creation’ entirely. Returned 
to Germany and working in the rocket development group, Weissmann is all “things 
to all men, a brand-new military type, part salesman, part scientist”, with the ability 
“to talk, with every appearance of sympathy and reason, to organized thinker and 
maniac idealist alike” (GR, 401). He is the “mind” that holds the machine “together”, 
to employ Spengler’s phrase (DW, 2:505), a manager, constructor and social engineer 
who knows how to arrange the raw materials of his project, forming alliances where 
necessary, dividing and ruling his staff of specialists. Hitherto a political enthusiast 
with an almost juvenilely naïve fascination for Hitler, whose name he utters as if it 
were that “of an avant-garde play” (V., 241), he now uses the same appropriations of 
both völkisch mythology and technological rationality as the latter. His eyeglasses 
turned into “Wagnerian shields” (GR, 416), he incessantly works towards the 
assembly of his very own rocket, the 00000, driven by eschatological notions of 
Erwartung (GR, 101), Schicksal (GR, 416), and “Destiny” (GR, 98) and assessing 
everything he encounters in terms of its utility for this end. Mondaugen, already 
singled out as valuable in V., is made use of, and so is Pökler, who will work toward 
his ‘special destiny’ of designing a shroud which is to provide the interface between 
the rocket and human. The rationale behind Weissmann’s assembly of the 00000, as 
has been widely observed, is to transcend the natural world by means of technology. 
The rocket is for him, as Enzian explains, “an entire system won, away from the 
feminine darkness […] of lovable, but scatterbrained Mother Nature” (GR, 324). 
Dreading nature and chance, technology (material and as technique) constitutes for 
him a means to retain control. Such “phallic” (cf. LD, 280) technology does thereby 
only partially mean “masculine victory over what he fears”, as Lance Schachterle 
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holds.
640
 The connotations of Imipolex G, Weissmann’s nihilistic pleasure at the sight 
of misfiring rockets, in which the delight of destruction fuses with that of self-
annihilation (GR, 96), and not least the manner in which he engineers machine and 
human alike bespeak nothing but domination. He gives testimony to the latter by 
assuming the SS-codename Dominus Blicero (‘Lord Death’). Like Mephistopheles, in 
the Freudian interpretation, the latter appears as the “arch-enemy” of the “ever-
stirring, wholesome energy” of life (F, 1379-80), a part of the darkness that prevailed 
before “light was born” (F, 1350-51). The “night”, a state of primal, lifeless unity, is 
in Weissmann’s “dearest interest” (GR, 666). And like Mephistopheles, his element is 
the flame:  
 
I’ve buried millions—they’re no sooner underground 
Than new fresh blood will circulate again. 
So it goes on; it drives me mad. The earth, 
The air, the water, all give birth: 
It germinates a thousandfold, 
In dry or wet, in hot or cold! 
Fire is still mine, that element alone— 
Without it, I could call no place my own. (F, 1371-78) 
 
Despite all references to Teutonic Märchen (GR, 98, 322) or Freudian categories, 
however, Blicero is first and foremost and example how the mythical fuses with the 
political in that Pynchon’s mythography is clearly pre-empted by Nazi ideologists. 
When Blicero, dreading the contingency of war, for instance, is said to have “reverted 
to some ancestral version of himself, […] into the Urstoff of the primitive German” 
(GR, 465), Pynchon describes a flight into pre-rational atavism which considerably 
fuelled Fascist appropriations of mythology.
641
 However bestial and mythic Blicero 
may appear, Pynchon makes an important point in having the Major’s former lover 
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Enzian suggest that he is “still human” (GR, 660). While Enzian’s proposition, uttered 
in a moment of loneliness, is a form of “ideological humanization” aimed at excusing 
the inexcusable, a manoeuvre that prefigures that pursued by the first-person-narrator 
of Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones (2009), the reminder of his humanity deflates 
Weissmann’s self-mystifications.642 Blicero remains a name chosen, chosen for its 
etymological value and mythological ‘authority’, and what it eventually signifies is 
how death and fear of death are pressed into the service of totalitarian rule. Such fear 
grants Weismann a power that seems to verge on omnipotence during his time at the 
Mittelwerke, as Pynchon indicates in a brief post-war episode. When a group of 
former inmates cannot let go of the structure of the Dora camp, they invent a 
“hypothetical […] chain of command” (GR, 665), a “phantom SS” (GR, 666), at the 
top of which they place Weissmann, whose presence during their imprisonment had 
grown so powerful that it crossed impenetrable walls: 
 
What the 175s heard from their real SS guards there was enough to elevate Weissmann on the 
spot […] When prisoners came in earshot, the guards stopped whispering. But their fear kept 
echoing: fear not of Weissmann personally, but of the time itself, a time so desperate that he 
could now move through the Mittelwerke as if he owned it, a time which was granting him a 
power different from that of Auschwitz or Buchenwald […] (ibid.) 
 
Eddins argues that he thereby attains “freedom from the limitations of physicality 
[…]. Gnosis brings ubiquity, a permeation of the structure of events by an evil 
presence that has successfully completed its Faustian compact”.643 What Eddins fails 
to acknowledge in his reading of this episode is that such ubiquity is by no means 
literal. What Weismann has achieved is a successful self-elevation into the ranks of 
myth. More convincingly, Moore points in this context to paranoia of the 
megalomaniacal kind described by Freud in the Schreber case.
644
 Like Freud’s 
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Schreber, and like Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s political paranoid, however, 
Weissmann “remains a mocking image of divine power” (DE, 191). Immersed in and 
drawing from an ultimately repressive superstructure, Weissmann’s struggle for self-
aggrandisement invariably perpetuates the former. Pynchon indicates such a mode in 
Blicero’s sex games with Katje and Gottfried during the air raids on the V-2 rocket 
battery in Holland. Despite their sheer brutality, these are not simply expressions of 
sadism. Highly organised rituals, they are meant to establish “some formalized, 
rationalized version of what, outside, proceeds without form”, preserving a routine 
and “shelter against what […] none of them can bear—the War, the absolute rule of 
chance, their own pitiable contingency here” (GR, 96). 645  Rendered along the 
narrative of Grimm’s fairy-tale Hänsel and Gretel, his sadism is a technique 
channelling his irrational urges into a formalised system; it is sublimation, his very 
“own ‘Hexeszüchtigung’” (GR, 95). The most terrifying aspect of these rituals is, 
however, that Blicero’s sublimating move into the fiction of the “Oven’s warmth, 
darkness, steel shelter” (GR, 98) mirrors the politics of organised destruction of the 
systems in which he operates, the petro-chemical industry and the 
Reich.
646
Eventually, Blicero’s games, like the entropic politics of Nazism, this 
“paradox of this […] Little State, whose base is the same Oven which must destroy it” 
(GR, 99), can thereby by no means be a “way out” but merely a “foreplay” (GR, 98) 
of his Firing of Gottfried, the “ultimate expression, […] terminus, and 
                                                                                                                                           
superbeings, and his dream of transcendence may represent the “final building of sexual cathexis, 
through Gottfried and the V2, with death” (ibid.). Such analogies, however, are soon exhausted. 
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[…] transubstantiation” of the all-devouring Fascist order that will forge the world in 
its image and thereby undo it, as Dale Carter puts it.
647
 
At the end of Gravity’s Rainbow, after a career which rises and falls with the Reich, 
Weissmann/Blicero is again where he began. He has climbed in “terminal” solitude 
the peaks of “primal pain” (GR, 97), driven to discover “the edge”, to find out that 
“there is an end” (GR, 722), but he realises that the discovery of ever-new edges 
merely perpetuates the “cycle of infection and death” (GR, 723). Europe discovered 
the edge of the world, America, but refused this gift and established a new “site for its 
Deathkingdom” (GR, 722). But as “Death and Europe are separate as ever” (GR, 722-
23), for Death “has never, in live, become one with” (GR, 723), the drama of 
separation continues and with that the human “mission to propagate death, the 
structure of it” (GR, 722). The next line of flight, he wonders, then leads to the moon, 
“our new Deathkingdom” (GR, 723). Blicero identifies this “obsession, addiction” 
with death as a fall from the life-affirming “savage innocences” (GR, 722), in 
Freudian terms the lost original unity of Eros and Thanatos that compels humans to be 
eternally Faustian. Now, as an old man, he purports to have become weary of his 
striving, yearning for a final way out, a resurrection: 
 
“I want to break out—to leave this cycle of infection and death. I want t be taken in love; so 
taken that you and I, and death, and life, will be gathered, inseparable, into the radiance of 
what we would become…” (GR, 724) 
 
Blicero wants to transcend the cycle, to exit the cycle of repression that creates history 
as an “infection” by death and separation. He claims to overcome the state of eternal 
division, the disunity of Eros and Thanatos that came with “Europe’s Original Sin”, 
the “latest name” for which is “Modern Analysis”, and that leads to the “Subsequent 
Sin” (GR, 722) of domination.648  
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Ironically, however, Blicero’s notion of freedom leads to yet further repression, 
fully in accord with an observation Mann expresses in The Magic Mountain:  
 
Freedom, indeed, was a conception rather romantic than illuminating. Like romanticism, it 
inevitably limited the human impulse to expansion; and the passionate individualism in them 
both had similar repressive results. (MM, 695) 
 
Not only does it transpire that Blicero’s dream of escape is intimately related to a 
colonial fantasy of sorts, the vision of a giant glass sphere in space inhibited by a male 
community. His entire conception of flight is based on and bound to revert into 
repression. As Hite demonstrates, Pynchon has Blicero speak “textual and Marcusan 
truths” about the course of the “special Death the West had invented” (GR, 722), 
leading from Europe to the edges of the world and back.
649
 Already dying, allegedly, 
Blicero intends to fire his lover Gottfried (‘God’s peace’) skyward in order to grant 
him “immortality” (GR, 723). Gottfried conceives of his sacrifice as a gift of love: 
Blicero “wants to give, without expecting anything back, give away what he loves” 
(GR, 721). There is infinite cynicism entailed in this offer, and when Blicero states “I 
want to get through it as honestly as I can” (GR, 723), this is more than ample 
indication that his speech to Gottfried can by no means taken at face value.
650
 
The Great Firing, or “Easter Rising” of the 00000, significantly taking place on 
April Fool’s Day, is indeed everything but innocent, both as regards Blicero’s 
intentions and the poetic ‘justifications’ of the firing. Pondering on Katje’s suitability 
as a sacrificial victim, for instance, Weissmann thinks of the jubilant propagation of 
the “Flame” in Rilke’s Sonnet II, xii: 
 
“Want the Change,” Rilke said, “O be inspired by the Flame!” To laurel, to nightingale, to wind 
… wanting it, to be taken, to embrace, to fall toward the flame growing to fill all the senses and 
… not to love because it was no longer possible to act… but to be helplessly in a condition of 
love… (GR, 97) 
 
                                                 
649
 Hite, “Fun Actually”, 688. 
650
 A gesture of love, Eros, aimed at establishing immortality, Blicero’s offer directly relates to the 
miniature interpretation of Faust in Eros and Civilization. Faust, according to Marcuse, demands the 
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This image of transformation in fire recurs in his comment on the death of multiple 
thousands of soldiers since 1939. Asking himself if any of them, any of “this raw 
material, ‘want the Change’”, Blicero concludes that their reflexes were “only being 
used” by those in power the “Flame has inspired” (GR, 98), including himself. It is 
such reflexes, the ability to plunge into submission, that Blicero seeks in Katje, but as 
her “masochism […] is reassurance”, a means to remind her of the human capability 
to feel pain, he eventually chooses Gottfried as the perfect victim because the boy is 
capable of “true submission, of letting go the self and passing into the All” (GR, 662). 
This ‘letting go’, however, is meant neither in a mystical nor romantic sense but is a 
matter of true submission to the technological order, of Gottfried dwelling in a cage 
(GR, 102) and dreaming to become an engineer, of considering the rockets as “pet 
animals”, and of getting erections when the word bitch is spoken “in a certain tone of 
voice” (GR, 103). Gottfried’s ability of feeling “taken, at true ease” (ibid.) expresses 
hardly more than a state where, in Marcuse’s words, “repression has become so 
effective that, for the repressed, it assumes the (illusory) form of freedom” (EC, 224).  
Against the background of this discrepancy, Blicero’s allegedly romanticised 
notion of transcendence betrays a much more calculating character, and when he 
purports to grant Gottfried a unification of life and death in a terminal act by which 
the cycle of infection with death is overcome, behind this romantic topos of Liebestod 
stands nothing but a totalitarian gesture.
651
 As Žižek argues, the  
 
“Death Drive” is not a biological fact but a notion indicating that the human psychic apparatus 
is subordinated to a blind automatism of repetition beyond pleasure-seeking, self-preservation, 
accordance between man and his milieu. Man is—Hegel dixit—‘an animal sick unto death‘, an 
animal extorted by an insatiable parasite (reason, logos, language). In this perspective, the 
‘death drive‘, this dimension of radical negativity, cannot be reduced to an expression of 
alienated social conditions, it defines la condition humaine as such: there is no solution, no 
escape from it; the thing to do is not to ‘overcome’, to ‘‘abolish‘ it, but to come to terms with it, 
to learn to recognize it in its terrifying dimension and then, on the basis of this fundamental 
recognition, to try to articulate a modus vivendi with it.  
All ‘culture’ is in a way a reaction-formation, an attempt to limit, canalize—to cultivate this 
imbalance, this traumatic kernel, this radical antagonism through which man cuts his umbilical 
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cord with nature, with animal homeostasis. It is not only that the aim is no longer to abolish this 
drive antagonism, but the aspiration to abolish it is precisely the source of totalitarian 
temptation: the greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name 
of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension.
652
 
 
Žižek’s comment on totalitarian logics, I think, is crucial as regards Pynchon’s 
treatment of notions of antagonism and unity. Especially passages like Roger 
Mexico’s remark that the “[t]he War, the Empire, will expedite […] barriers between 
our lives. The War needs to divide this way […] it wants a machine of many separate 
parts, not oneness, but a complexity” (GR, 130-31) easily lead one to assume that the 
author betrays a nostalgia for lost unity and a tensionless mode of being. As Hanjo 
Berressem attentively argues, however, Pynchon also continually stresses “that the 
aporia of the human condition is exactly that the subject cannot regain a naturality it 
has irretrievably lost”. 653  And as argued earlier, where Pynchon’s characters 
propagate holistic harmonious visions, paranoia and hubristic messianism are not far. 
By manner of analogy, I argue, Weissmann’s pseudo-romantic symbolism cannot 
distract from the literalness of his murder. In this ghoulish antithesis to Christ’s 
resurrection, Pynchon blends hermetic imagery, totalitarian ideas, and, significantly, 
allusions to Brown’s Love’s Body. The minuscule chapters “Isaac”, “Pre-Launch”, 
“Countdown”, and “Ascent” are permeated with arcane symbolism, from Merkabah 
Mysticism to hermetic imagery, Cabbala, and allusions to freemasonry. Although 
attempts have been undertaken to unify these allusions in a coherent mythological 
framework, these remain eventually inconclusive.
654
 For Brown a return to symbolism 
would be the end of Protestant literalism that informs the modern historical 
consciousness (LB, 191, 198) and a revival of the sprit killed by the letter. It is in the 
Christian redemption as symbolism (LB, 202) that we rise from “history to mystery”, 
experiencing a resurrection of the body and spirit, a second “coming in us” (LB, 214). 
Where Brown lauds that “[e]verything is symbolic, everything is holy” (LB, 239), 
however, Pynchon counters with “Weissmann has engineered all the symbolism 
today” (GR, 750), and when the “last gestures toward the possibility of magic” (GR, 
750) have been made before the firing, Pynchon’s narrator shifts from exuberant 
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symbolism to a technical description of the hardware surrounding Gottfried. With “no 
return channel to the ground” (GR, 751) installed in the rocket, Blicero is not 
interested in sharing Gottfried’s experience of total consummation, for the boy is to 
be pharmakos, a victim of repression and Apollonian sublimation.
655
 As mentioned, 
Brown discusses Apollo as the god of sublimation, of the life negating flight from the 
unity of instinctual opposites such as life and death, male and female, Self and Other 
(cf. LD, 175). Gottfried, one reads, is strung into the “Apollonian dream” (GR, 754). 
Shrouded in Imipolex G, the erectile polymer (genital organisation) that determines 
the shape and sensations of the “creature” encased in it (GR, 699-700), he waits in 
total submission, dreaming, and “waiting for whatever will fall on him” (GR, 754). 
Like Enzian, however, Gottfried will not transcend, and if he is “elevated” (GR, 661), 
then it is only to meet his death, the “exact moment” of which “will never be known” 
(GR, 751). The Apollonian dream in which Gottfried is strung is thereby overtaken by 
the same irony as the Apollonian form of the chemists Kerkulé, Carothers, and Jamf 
in that its flight from death becomes deathly (cf. LD, 157). The rocket becomes an 
epitome of the world of technical simulations incapable of reflecting any reality 
outside, and Gottfried a white wall of the narcissistic psychology behind Blicero’s 
technological rationale: “the flame is too bright for anyone to see Gottfried inside, 
except now as an erotic category, hallucinated out of that blue violence, for purposes 
of self-arousal” (GR, 758). As much as Gottfried’s turns out to be a masturbatory 
fantasy, Blicero’s Apollonian dream transpires to be a sterile mirror of unification. In 
the moment before his ascent, Gottfried will awake from his dreaming “into the 
breath of what was always real” (GR, 754), the same breath Pökler experiences in the 
darkest corner of Dora Mittelbau. The Apollonian dream becomes reality for 
Gottfried—“At last: something real” (ibid.)—in that he experiences for an instant the 
promise of the god Apollo who told man “to look at the stars” (LD, 174). At the 
moment of Brennschluss that initiates the rocket’s descent, the “first star hangs 
between” Gottfried’s feet (GR, 760). In this transition to the ‘real’, Pynchon’s narrator 
dismantles any spiritual import, and as brilliantly overcharged with symbolism as the 
firing is, Blicero’s switchboard sorcery at the fire-control car (GR, 757-58) remains a 
technicality, the operation of a disenchanted Spenglerian “sorcerer” (DW, 2:500) in 
the service of technological progress. The very ‘materials’ serving his gesture of 
                                                 
655
 Prompted by the title “Isaac” of one of the launch sections, Eddins sees in Blicero a parodic 
Abraham, who sacrifices without the intervention of God (The Gnostic Pynchon, 148). 
 203 
liberation gained by repression (steel, Imipolex G, Gottfried), and the 00000 being 
first and foremost destructive hardware, his Great Firing does nothing but perpetuate 
the “dialectic of cumulative repression, guilt, and aggression” (LD, 174).656 Just as the 
rocket’s “promise of escape” will be “betrayed to” the force of “Gravity” (GR, 758), 
his performance will remain in the service of death. 
Weissmann/Blicero disappears from the Zone. Enzian thinks: “Whatever happened 
at the end, he has transcended. Even if he’s only dead. He’s gone beyond his pain, his 
sin” (GR, 660). But Pynchon suggests:  
 
If you’re wondering where he’s gone, look among the successful academics, the Presidential 
advisers, the token intellectuals who sit on boards of directors. He is almost surely there. Look 
high, not low. (GR, 749) 
 
Weissmann’s future is “The World”. 
As Pynchon writes sub rosa about the totalitarian dangers of his own culture, it is 
no wonder that he alludes to post-Freudian, countercultural discourse in Weissmann’s 
soteriological project. As the latter has not been paid much attention in Pynchon 
scholarship, a brief treatment is necessary here. Blicero, in some senses, is not only 
working with the prevailing hegemony but also expresses countercultural thought, as 
Pynchon indicates: he is a “Wandervogel in the mountain of Pain” (GR, 99).657 That 
Blicero, this representative of the death drive, thereby partly becomes a spokesperson 
for Marcuse and Brown is by no means arbitrary. For Brown (like for Freud and 
Marcuse), the Fall of Man is caused by the division of original unity, the splitting of a 
unitary psyche, or mind-body. In Life Against Death, Brown proposes that a real 
“possibility of redemption lies in the reunification of the instinctual opposites […] 
Life (Eros) and Death” (LD, 86), which he renders an open challenge in the last 
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chapter about the resurrection of the body. In the fragmentary and symbolic Love’s 
Body Brown lays out an answer. There, he sees “the distinction between inner self and 
outside world, between subject and object” (LB, 253) dissolved by a fusion in “fire”. 
The poetic pieces of the chapter of the same name not merely prefigure Blicero’s idea 
to have the individual “united with the all, in a consuming fire” (LB, 177) but also his 
notion of sacrifice: “The true sacrifice is total, holocaust. Consumatum est” (ibid.). 
Pynchon, then, as I contend, does not use Rilke’s image of the flame merely to expose 
the ‘German’ idolisation of transcendence, as Hume argues,658 but he also ironically 
questions the symbolism of unification in Brown’s Love’s Body, which features the 
very same quotation by Rilke: 
 
Learn to love the fire. The alchemical fire of transmutation: Wolle die Wandlung. O sei für die 
Flamme begeistert. To be content with the purgatorial fire. The fires of hell […] (LB, 178-79) 
 
However, to say that by making Weissmann a spokesman for a ‘Nazified’ Rilke and 
Brown exposes a Fascist strain in the latter’s discourse would fail to acknowledge the 
acrid irony of Gravity’s Rainbow. If the mixture of mythological allusions and 
technological descriptions Pynchon uses in association with the rocket reflect the 
interplay between folk-mysticism, völkisch consciousness and instrumental rationality 
that fuelled the Third Reich, then Pynchon’s allusions to Love’s Body in the midst of 
the firing of rocket that will fly to a Los Angeles movie theatre in 1973 seriously 
probe into the viability of the latter’s mysticism. While Gravity’s Rainbow 
predominantly follows Brown as regards the analysis of the state of repression, for 
Pynchon, who employs Freudian concepts only tongue-in-cheek, Brown’s symbolism 
must have appeared as puzzling as for Marcuse, who held in response to Love’s Body 
that Brown  
 
obliterates the decisive difference between real and artificial, natural and political, fulfilling and 
repressive boundaries and divisions. […] The sinister images of ‘burning’ and ‘sacrifice’ recur 
in Brown’s vision” but “[n]o symbolism can repulse the repressive connotation: one cannot love 
in fire”.659  
 
Although Pynchon avoids indicators of jocularity in his reductio ad absurdum of 
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Brown’s aphorisms, other sections of Gravity’s Rainbow show a critical distance to 
the subject matter, specifically the ironic comment on the “Oedipal situation in the 
Zone” (GR, 747) and Enzian’s musing about the “true nature” of war. For Brown the 
“fires of war are a Satanic parody” of the true fire (LB, 181), but although he does not 
share any “Fascist inclination to dismiss the reality of horror as ‘mere propaganda’” in 
the designation ‘phoney war’,660 his notion of ‘parody’ tends to obfuscate politics and 
human responsibilities.
661
 Pynchon follows suit in this respect in that he has Enzian 
dismiss the ‘truth’ that the war “was never political at all, the politics was all theatre, 
all just to keep the people distracted” (GR, 521). Yet Pynchon does also leave no 
doubt that concoctions of this kind, whether Platonic or conspiratory, are paranoid. 
Given his critical treatment of Brown, and that of metapsychology in general, it is 
therefore no wonder that the scathing satire of Gravity’s Rainbow does not spare the 
latter’s soteriology. In juxtaposing Brown’s mythical resolution of the basic tension 
between Eros and Thanatos with a Fascist perversion of homo dei, then, Pynchon 
demonstrates how thin the line is between libertarian and totalitarian ideals. There is, 
in Weismann’s words: “always the danger of falling” (GR, 723). 
 
 
3.2 Mondaugen, Pökler “and evidently quite a few others”  
It was not four days after the astounding landing in Normandy that our new 
retaliatory weapon to which our Führer frequently alluded in advance with 
genuine elation, made its appearance in the western theater of war: the robot 
bomb, such an admirable piece of ordnance that only sacred necessity can 
have inspired the genius who invented it.  
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus662  
 
Like Fascism itself, the robot[-bombs] career without a subject. Like it they 
combine utmost technical perfection with total blindness” 
—Adorno, Minima Moralia663  
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In the following sections, I want to further my examination of those strands of 
Gravity’s Rainbow that radically demystify the image of Faustian man. Drawing from 
Tabbi, I will demonstrate how a romantic quest for transcendence and a 
“Schwärmerei” (GR, 238) for control make it possible for characters in the novel to 
be gathered into a totalitarian technological order. My focus will be on Kurt 
Mondaugen and Franz Pökler, who best represent what Spengler calls the “priest of 
the machine”, the “quiet engineer […] who is the machine’s master and destiny” 
(DW, 2:505). In both character’ vitae, Pynchon shows how politically naïve 
discontent with the given and the desperate attempt to remain impartial in the face of 
the inacceptable constitute a fatalist pact with the ‘devils’ of the Third Reich. In his 
juxtaposition of the diametrically opposed drives of both men, Pynchon thereby gives 
an account of two seemingly contradictory sides of Nazism: an atavistic völkisch 
irrationalism directed against modernity and a rationalised socio-political order 
marked and enabled by organisation and technology. In doing so, he dispenses with 
one-sided accusations and a simplistic economy of domination but provides a highly 
differentiated picture of the mechanisms of ‘evil’ that does not fail include the share 
of the seemingly innocent ‘cogs’ in the system. Again, like in the case of the IG 
Farben, his stress is not simply on transgressive individuals but entire structures. As 
already suggested, the main intertextual correlative Pynchon chooses for portraying 
their bargain is not Faust, but, quite aptly, Mann’s The Magic Mountain. Enacting an 
ironic inversion of Castorp’s divination of the human self-mastery that negotiates the 
position between death and life, recklessness and reason, and mystic community and 
individualism, he transposes this polarity into the mindset of the contributors to 
Weissmann’s dream of annihilation. The parallels between the novels of Pynchon and 
Mann are not only relevant in terms of Mondaugen’s dallying with death or Pökler’s 
fatalism. Since Mann’s novel is also crucial for my reading of Slothrop’s pseudo-
Grail-quest through the Zone, I give a brief overview of The Magic Mountain before 
discussing the ‘seduction’ of both engineers into the Faustian machineries of Nazism. 
The protagonist of Mann’s novel, the young engineer Hans Castorp, is a child of his 
time, a ‘perfectly normal product of North German life’ and the expanding 
technocratic empire of Hamburg.
664
 While visiting his tubercular cousin in a 
sanatorium in Davos, Castorp falls in love with Madame Chauchat, the Lady Venus of 
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his personal Magic Mountain, where he has to come to terms with one the most 
alluring power on earth, death,
665
 and as a holy fool in search of meaning amongst 
death, he is as much antithesis to the Grail hero as Mondaugen and Slothrop in that he 
fails to revitalise a wasteland but falls into the stupor of apolitical naivety instead. As 
much as the sanatorium is a vacuum in which Castorp dwells for seven years unaware 
of the passage of time, it is also a political microcosm of pre-WWI Central Europe, a 
mélange of philistinism, spiritualism, humanism, and radicalism. Taken as a protégé 
by both the Humanist Settembrini and the radical Jesuit Naphta (modelled after Georg 
Lukács), Castorp is continually exposed to seemingly irreconcilable opposites (life-
death, illness-health, spirit-nature), which cast him into turmoil, at the height of which 
he has a dreamlike moment of recognition in the famous chapter “Snow”. There, 
Castorp comes to think: 
 
The recklessness of death is in life, it would not be life without it—and in the centre is the 
position of Homo Dei, between recklessness and reason, and his state is between mystic 
community and windy individualism. (MM, 496)   
 
Man, in his aristocracy as homo dei, masters these opposites. He cannot forget death, 
but “For the sake of goodness and love, man shall let death have no sovereignity over 
his thoughts” (MM, 496-97)—a thought which itself is soon forgotten. The excellent 
management of the sanatorium allows for the acquisition of a gramophone, the 
operation of which is entrusted to Castorp. Frustrated with his inability to reach 
Chauchat, he becomes an avid listener of Verdi’s Aida, Bizet’s Carmen, Gounod’s 
Faust, and Schubert’s Lieder, and thereby develops highly romanticised notions of 
love and death. Charmed by the “attitude of mind, […] so profoundly, so mystically 
epitomized” in Schubert’s “Lindenbaum”, he constructs a “whole world of feeling” 
(MM, 651) around the song. The narrator asks: 
 
What was the world behind the song, which the motions of his conscience made to seem a world 
of forbidden love? 
It was death.  
What utter and explicit madness! That glorious song! An indisputable masterpiece, sprung 
from the profoundest and holiest depths of racial feeling; a precious possession, the archetype of 
the genuine, embodied loveliness.  
                                                 
665
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[…] 
Yes, self-conquest—that might well be the essence of triumph over this love, this soul-
enchantment that bore such sinister fruit! […] kingdoms might be founded upon it [the 
“Lindenbaum”], earthly, all-too-earthly kingdoms […] But its faithful son might […] be he who 
consumed his life in self-conquest, and died, on his lips the new word of love, which as yet he 
knew not how to speak. Ah, it was worth dying for, the enchanted lied! But he who died for it, 
died indeed no longer for it; was a hero only because he died for the new, the new word of love 
and the future that whispered in his heart. (MM, 652-53) 
 
While Chauchat leaves for good, Castorp stays on, listening to Schubert and the 
never-ending arguments between Settembrini and Naphta, eventually falling into 
stupor, from which he is woken at the outbreak of WWI. Descending the mountain 
and joining the army, he eventually goes to fight in a war for his all-too-earthly 
‘kingdom’ with lines from the “Linden-tree” on his lips (MM, 715). His ‘fate’ thereby 
gives a bitter twist to Chauchat’s prediction that he will help make his country great 
and powerful.  
 
 
3.2.1. Kurt Mondaugen 
In the besieged political microcosm of the German protectorate of southwest Africa, 
V.’s Hugh Godolphin muses that between the wars the “world frowns now on youth in 
a vacuum, it insists youth be turned-to, utilized, exploited” (V., 249). Pynchon 
allegorises this utilisation in two fragmentary miniature ‘novels of education’ about 
the young Weimar Republic engineers Mondaugen and Pökler, who both develop 
rocket technology for Major Weissmann in Gravity’s Rainbow. In Mondaugen’s case 
the co-optation by the Nazi technocrat becomes a dubious matter of destiny, for 
Mondaugen will not only fulfil Weissmann’s prediction that “[s]omeday we’ll need 
you […] Specialized and limited as you are, you fellows will be valuable” (V., 244). 
Attempting to escape the European ambience of chaos, decadence and death, 
Mondaugen embraces a Fascist mysticism that effectually perpetuates what he intends 
to transgress. In V., Pynchon covers the onset of this bargain with intertextual echoes 
from The Magic Mountain.
666
 Having left “depression-time in Munich” where he read 
with Pökler at the T.U. for the “mirror-time” (V., 230) of the German southwest 
African protectorate in 1922, in which he is to record atmospheric radio disturbances 
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(Sferics), Mondaugen arrives in the onset of the Bondelswarts ‘rebellion’. 
“[S]omething of a coward” (V., 232), he takes recluse in Foppl’s villa and stays there 
for two and a half months hermetically sealed off from the rest of the district (V., 
235), drifting into stupor. Just like Castorp, he struggles with a seductive power. This 
power is not death itself but the suspicion that there is nothing beyond the “Kingdom 
of Death” (V., 273) surrounding him. As Mondaugen falls ill, Weissmann assumes 
the role of decoding the Sferics transmissions, successfully extracting a jumbled 
message. He obtains an anagram of Mondaugen’s name, and the rest of the message 
is: “DIEWELTISTALLESWASDERFALLIST” (V., 278), the opening proposition of 
Wittgenstein’s Tracatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). The irony of this message lies, 
according to Tanner in that fact that the secret Mondaugen had been looking for (that 
there must be something beyond the given) is that there is no secret (that is, only the 
given).
667
 More alarmingly, however, as Samuel Thomas notes, this message means: 
“there is no legitimate social or political alternative”.668 As Dugdale has pointed out, 
it would be advantageous for Weissmann if Mondaugen “accepted the philosophy 
condensed in the proposition” since the assumption of pure immanence weakens 
“resistance to totalitarianism”.669 Any interpretation of the message as a confirmation 
of absolute integration, however, as Thomas points out, does not fully acknowledge 
that “the very presence of the message in the sferics suggests” that the world is not all 
that is the case.
670
 The two messages thus contained in the recording (immanence and 
transcendence), despite the fact that it has been ‘decoded’ (maybe even manufactured) 
by Weissmann, in fact opens a realm of personal choice for Mondaugen.
671
  
In Gravity’s Rainbow, one learns that the engineer seems to have made his choice: 
during the months of stupor and debauchery at Foppl’s, Mondaugen becomes 
“haunted by a profound disgust for everything European” (GR, 403). This “soul-
depression” of decadence and cruelty he anticipates to “infest Europe as it infested” 
the enclave in the Southwest protectorate (V., 277) drives Mondaugen into exile in the 
Kalahari, with Weissmann notably being “one of the people who had driven” him 
there (GR, 408). Living in the bush with the poorest of the Hereros, he has a 
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transformative experience. Enlightened with “electro-mysticism”, he begins to see 
himself as a “radio transmitter of some kind” (GR, 404). Moore comments his 
‘conversion’ as follows: Mondaugen has “heard Puritanwise, in Südwest, the voice of 
his calling: to work on means for penetrating those heavens out of which angels have 
spoken to him”. 672  If Mondaugen’s conversion shows parallels with the Puritan 
‘election’ by divine word, however, he does not penetrate the heavens. I would rather 
argue that Pynchon models his character’s turn along Mann’s “Snow”-chapter, with 
the difference that Mondaugen divines a vision of future inhumanity in which Mann’s 
notion of blood sacrifice at the core of civilization is cruelly inverted (cf. my chapter 
6.5). In Gravity’s Rainbow, Mondaugen has returned to Germany and reunites with 
his former T.U. fellow Pökler in the A4 development project at Kummersdorf in 
1934.
673
 There he appears as one  
 
of these German mystics who grew up reading Hesse, Stefan George, and Richard Wilhelm, 
ready to accept Hitler on the basis of Demian-metaphysics, he seemed to look at fuel and 
oxidizer as paired opposites, male and female, principles uniting in the mystical egg of the 
combustion chamber […] (GR, 403)
674
 
 
Such metaphysics inform Mondaugen’s sense of alienation among the European 
‘sickness’ of the 1920s and his wish to break through the limits imposed by his 
destiny as designated by Weissmann. In Hesse’s Demian, as Giovanni Filoramo 
points out, the Gnostic sentiment of alienation within the world is merged with  
 
the Romantic sentiment par excellence: the sentiment of the limits imposed by destiny and the 
desire to break through these limits, to destroy the human condition, to break out of 
everything.
675
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The parabola of Mondaugen’s romantic flight from Weissmann’s proposition of total 
integration, and thus from his ‘destiny’, however, leads him back to the very 
alternative to the pre-war vacuum and ‘soul-depression’ offered by Nazis like 
Weissmann.
676
 Rather than blandly presenting his turn as analogous to Faust’s 
renunciation of Christianity,
677
 Pynchon’s mythography aims at a concrete Fascist 
psychopathology.
678
 When three men are accidentally killed at the rocket test stand, 
Mondaugen takes this as a sign: “First blood, first sacrifice” (GR, 403). This notion of 
bloodshed as a human sacrifice to higher causes is the kind of rhetoric Adorno 
observed “during the first years of Hitlerism in Germany”, when murder was invested 
with the aura of sacrament.
679
 And as in totalitarian violence, this sadistic impulse, as 
represented in the firing of the rocket, has a masochistic counterpoint: “The act is 
undivided. You are both aggressor and victim” (GR, 403). 680  Mondaugen 
“understands” this act of becoming “one with” the rocket’s forces. Conceptualising 
the rocket development in terms of Orphic cosmogony, he crudely misconstrues the 
inhumane ends for which his mimicry of “life’s essential activity” is used in the V-2 
research and development group:
681
 in the service of Eros, as Freud writes, the death 
drive finds expression in an urge to destruction directed against the external world.
682
 
Where Pökler considers the rocket as a “technolgique” with “its own vitality” (GR, 
401), Mondaugen perceives the work of Thanatos as the live-giving creativity of 
Phanes/Eros, and his contribution to the pursuit of technological aggression, is 
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accompanied by a reduced sense of guilt.
683
 If the masses following National 
Socialism, as Adorno writes, felt “themselves part of a mystic community and filled 
with the certainty of forgiveness for their sins”,684 Pynchon, significantly, hints at 
Mondaugen’s subjective guiltlessness by fusing the language of electrical engineering 
with allusions to Brown’s contrastive analysis of archaic and modern conceptions of 
time. In the engineer’s mysticism, the triode is as “basic as the cross in Christianity”:  
 
Think of the ego, the self that suffers a personal history bound to time, as the grid. The deeper 
and true Self is the flow between cathode and plate. The constant, pure flow. Signals—sense-
data, feelings, memories relocating—are put onto the grid, and modulate the flow. We live lives 
that are waveforms constantly changing with time, now positive, now negative. Only at 
moments of great serenity is it possible to find the pure, the informationless state of signal zero. 
(GR, 404) 
 
In Brown’s exegesis of Freud, time is “neurotic and correlative with instinctual 
repression” (LD, 274). While time belongs to the ego (LD, 275), in the “unconscious 
there is no time” (LD, 274). An abolition of the Protestant/Faustian complex of guilt 
and repression enables humans to transcend historical consciousness and lay their 
Faustian strife to rest (LD, 277-78). Under conditions of general repression only 
“mystical consciousness” is able to discard time (LD, 274). Pynchon satirises this 
proposition in Mondaugen’s mysticism, but as in the case of Slothrop’s shrinking 
temporal bandwidth, formulated in Mondaugen’s Law (GR, 509), the abandonment of 
time is not only concomitant with an increased sense of guilt but also of obligation.
685
 
While Slothrop’s receding sense of obligation presents a case of breaking with the 
“historical destiny” imposed on modern societies by the guilt complex (LD, 278), as I 
will argue later, Mondaugen’s mystic retreat into atavism is presented as a plunge into 
instinctual urges (cf. LD, 276). Thus, like his fellow engineer Achtfaden, who decides 
to work for the seedy filmmaker von Göll as submissively as he served Weissmann 
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before,
686
 Mondaugen stays amongst the “champions, adepts, magicians of all ranks 
and orders [who] will be in the field more than ever before in the history of the game” 
(GR, 508), continuing the Apollonian (read Faustian) dream. And just as Castorp lives 
up to his fate of becoming ‘useful’ by sacrificing himself, so does Mondaugen— in 
and beyond the Zone. 
 
 
3.2.2. Fate and Fatalism: Franz Pökler  
If the Faustian dream interlocks with the mystified Fascism of Mondaugen, it does 
equally so with the psychological predisposition of the chemical engineer Pökler, one 
of Spengler’s “hundred thousand talented, rigorously schooled brains” upon which 
industry and progress depend (DW, 2:505). His talent, limited political interest (GR, 
400), fascination with space-travel and obsession with control make this moderate 
movie-going bourgeois the “type they want” (GR, 154), an example par excellence of 
how “technology can create separate identities that are all too readily gathered into a 
totalitarian order”. 687  A political allegory of the Weimar Republic German, he 
surrenders his “personal identity” to “impersonal salvation” (GR, 406) in order to 
overcome the poverty and confusion of bureaucratised democracy.
688
  
Like Mondaugen, Pökler is a “youth in a vacuum” (V., 249) between wars. 
Infatuated with a dreadful sense of Destiny, “darkness latent in the texture of the 
summer wind” (GR, 162), he swims under the surface of his rationality in “fantasy, 
death-wish, rocket-mysticism” (GR, 154), developing a “contradictory urge toward 
personal security and collective extinction”, as Tabbi notes.689  Pynchon does not 
present these urges as mystified Freudian categories, however, but first and foremost 
as ideological constructs conveyed in university lecture theatres and expressionist 
cinema. In Munich, Pökler sits in the lectures of the aging Jamf, fascinated by the 
latter’s heresies and his pursuit of the Faustian “absolute” (GR, 577). What especially 
sticks in Pökler’s mind is Jamf’s rhetoric of unleashed inner forces that transcend 
compromises and restraint. In the spectacle of the Weimar Republic’s cinema, Pökler 
again encounters a harsh polarity between unleashed chaos and tyrannical leadership. 
In recording the engineer’s reception of Fritz Lang movies, the depiction of which is 
                                                 
686
  See Tabbi, Postmodern Sublime, 97. 
687
 Tabbi, Postmodern Sublime, 104.  
688
 Moore, The Style of Connectedness, 95. 
689
 Tabbi, Postmodern Sublime, 94. 
 214 
greatly informed by Kracauer’s analysis From Caligari to Hitler (1947), Pynchon 
combines this polarity with a Spenglerian sensibility. Kracauer writes of the post-war 
period, that between 1920 and 1924 Germans apparently held that “they had no 
choice other than” a tyrannical regime or the “cataclysm of anarchy”, the world 
turning “into a chaos with all passions and instincts breaking loose” (CH, 88).690 
Since either possibility was pregnant with doom, the popular German imagination 
resorted to the concept of fate, as this “majestic event […] stirred metaphysical 
shudders” and “at least had grandeur” (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, Kracauer discusses 
Spengler’s sweepingly successful The Decline of the West in this context, the vision 
of which not only “seemed to derive its timely prophecy of decline from laws inherent 
in history itself” but also “conformed to the emotional situation so perfectly” (ibid.). 
Considering such notions of fate as pre-Fascist ideology, Kracauer correlates the 
depiction of tyranny and chaos in Fritz Lang’s Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler (1922) with 
the political situation in Weimar, condensing Lang’s message to the assertion that 
while “chaos breeds tyrants like Mabuse who, for their part, capitalize on chaos”, not 
the “slightest allusion to true freedom interferes with the persistent alternative” of 
these two forces (CH, 84, 83). In a discussion of Der Müde Tod (1921) and Die 
Nibelungen (1924), both of which are of particular significance for Pökler in 
Gravity’s Rainbow, Kracauer then relates tyranny and chaos to Spenglerian notions of 
fate. In his analysis, the plot of Der Müde Tod “forces” one crucial message upon the 
audience, namely “that, however arbitrary they seem, the actions of tyrants are 
realizations of Fate” (CH, 90), which eventually demand the individual’s self-
renunciation, an ideological feat Kracauer sees glossed over by the film’s concluding 
message that “He who loses his life gains it” (ibid.). While fate manifests itself here 
through the actions of tyrants, it does so “through the anarchical outbursts of 
ungovernable instincts and passions” in the orgy of destruction in The Nibelungen, 
most conspicuously so in Attila’s suicide (ibid.).  
In Gravity’s Rainbow, these ideologemes become for Pökler a correlative to his 
political and social environment. While Bernhard Goetzke (as Death in Der müde Tod 
and State Attorney von Wenk in Mabuse) represents for him the “great Weimar 
                                                 
690
 Scholarly work on Gravity’s Rainbow and film is extensive, from Charles Clerc’s almost 
comprehensive account of film in Gravity’s Rainbow to Hanjo Berressem’s lucid analysis of “Film as 
Text” (Pynchon’s Poetics, 151-190), I will merely focus on aspects of Pökler’s Faustian “compact” 
with fatalism in relation to Kracauer’s From Caligari to Hitler. Significantly, Murnau’s Faust (1926), 
dismissed by Kracauer as lukewarm, is not alluded to in Gravity’s Rainbow. 
 215 
inertia” (GR, 579) of bureaucracies, hierarchies, and exhausting routines, Pökler 
senses in the disruptive characters and outcasts played by Rudolf Klein-Rogge, King 
Attila and Mabuse, the affirmation of untameable power, passion, and a drive to 
extinction. It is Klein-Rogge’s face that he attaches to Jamf’s idea of an inner lion 
(GR, 578) and onto which he projects a masochistic feeling of  
 
ritual submissions to the Master of this night space and of himself, the male embodiment of a 
technologique that embraced power not for its social uses but just those chances of surrender, 
personal and dark surrender, to the Void, to delicious and screaming collapse […] (GR, 578) 
 
Fritz Lang’s spectacle, as Pynchon depicts it, prefigures Fascism as a “cult of the 
archaic completely fitted out by modern technology”, in Debord’s terms, a 
“degenerate ersatz of myth” that appeals to the inner lion by the “violent resurrection 
of myth calling for participation in a community defined by archaic 
pseudo­values”.691 These master fantasies of the UFA spectacle, however, do not 
merely mediate an irrational call for masochistic nihilism and bloodshed but also a 
“social relationship”, at the root of which lies a “specialization of power” and 
propagation of charismatic leader figures.
692
 Pökler, “and evidently quite a few 
others” (GR, 578) see in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927) the ideal of a  
 
Corporate City-state where technology was the source of power, the engineer worked closely 
with the administrator, the masses labored unseen far underground, and ultimate power lay 
with a single leader at the top, fatherly, and benevolent and just […] (ibid.) 
 
As a youth in Jamf’s lecture hall Pökler had longed to be a “mad inventor […] 
indispensable to those who ran the Metropolis, yet, at the end, the untameable lion 
who could let it all crash” (GR, 578), and in the collective loneliness of the cinema he 
has found a human face to attach to this inner lion. However attracted he may be to 
Klein-Rogge’s unrestrained power and will to extinction, Pökler nevertheless falls 
asleep during Nibelungen (GR, 159), and his fascination with the Void remains a 
“nervous drive toward myth he doesn’t even know if he believes in” (GR, 579). For 
Pökler, the “pornographies” of love and destruction remain an experience within the 
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“Absolute Comfort” (GR, 155) of the cinema so detested by his wife’s comrade 
Vanya, for even when the Rocket’s call to extinction will later catch him at his worst 
“loneliness and failure” he still isn’t “quite convinced” (GR, 405-6).693  Although 
Pökler will follow the Nazi trajectory as Mondaugen does, the Rocket remains for 
him as radically other as Fascist metaphysics. Yet this “poor harassed German soul” 
(GR, 426) is not an innocent “Victim in a Vacuum” (GR, 414) who, seduced by the 
master fantasies of UFA productions, falls into the hands of a totalitarian regime. To 
resort to Pynchon’s technical metaphor, it is his attempt to reduce “the Rocket’s 
terrible passage […], literally, to bourgeois terms” (GR, 239), that will have him 
actively contribute to the Oven State’s terror. In Nietzsche’s words: “When the 
German ceases to be Faust, there is no greater danger than that he will become a 
philistine and go to the devil – heavenly powers alone can save him”.694 
If “[r]ational sobriety had the merit of […] protecting the Puritan from the 
corruption of the world’s […] disorganization”,695 and the extension of this quality 
guaranteed a stability of the authoritarian social compact, then the bourgeois 
moderation and proclivity toward analysis of the German engineers fulfils the same 
purpose. Pynchon uses a technical metaphor to express the narrow state of mind of 
young Pökler and his associates, in which edges are “hardly ever glimpsed, much less 
flirted at or with” (GR, 239). The demon of Maxwell and other beasts in the “true 
forest” of physics and life are avoided (like in Hawthorne), which hints at the 
“correspondence between the deep conservatism” of the feedback in the rocket’s 
cybernetic control mechanism “and the kinds of lives” these engineers “were coming 
to lead” (ibid.). As his wife Leni knows, Pökler’s fear of brooding Destiny will 
eventually drive him to “fly from pain to duty, from joy to work, from commitment to 
neutrality” (GR, 162). Passive, reliant, and without opinion, the “fear of extinction 
named Pökler” (GR, 406) refuses to take sides. Hunting, “as a servo valve with a 
noisy input will, across the Zero,” he is caught “between the two desires, personal 
identity and impersonal salvation” (ibid.). Pynchon’s metaphoric description of 
Pökler’s position is an ironic rendition of Mann’s “Snow” chapter – if Castorp fails to 
attain the status of homo dei as “lord of [the] counter-positions” recklessness and 
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windy individualism (MM, 496), then so does Pökler. In his attempt to retain a 
position between both, the latter develops a kind of Spenglerian fatalism, thereby 
offering his soul and service to his “ally” Death/Weissmann. 
Seeing himself faced with the choice “between building what the army wanted—
practical hardware—or pushing on in chronic poverty, dreaming of expeditions to 
Venus” (GR, 400-1), Pökler becomes a “practical man” (GR, 401), developing rocket 
technology for Weissmann. His factual collaboration, then, is informed by a careful 
navigation between the “Scylla and Charybdis” (GR, 239) of reality and the closed 
system of myths and misplaced rationalisations. Not only does Pökler dutifully ignore 
that his development funds are provided by the Nazis but he also belies the device’s 
potential as a weapon. Accused by Leni of helping to kill people, the VfR member 
argues that rocket technology will one day enable man to “transcend” to the moon and 
create a borderless utopia where “they won’t have to kill” (GR, 400).696 Pynchon is 
explicit as regards such ignorance: 
 
Pökler, the all-seeing […] must have known that what went on in the VfR committee meetings 
was the same game as being played in Leni’s violent and shelterless street. […] And he also 
knew at first hand what happens to dreams with no money to support them. So, presently 
Pökler found that by refusing to take side, he’d become Weissmann’s best ally. (GR, 401) 
 
Despite his integration in the military-industrial complex, as it were, Pökler begins to 
mystify the inhumanity of his work. In the infant days of the project, when “no one 
was specializing yet”, Pökler glorifies the workgroup as a brotherhood, in which all 
men throughout the social spectrum, from von Braun to Pökler, are “equally at the 
Rocket’s mercy” (GR, 402). In conceiving of the construction as work on a 
democratic basis, he utterly depoliticises hierarchies in the development group and his 
own function as a cog in the system. Pökler is aware of the politics of the rocket field, 
knows that “others had the money, others gave the orders”, and willingly fulfils the 
tasks set by his “ally” Weissmann, who is “sure of Pökler’s role” (GR, 401) and 
“special destiny” (GR, 431) of designing the Schwarzgerät. This is the wager of 
Fascist Germany described in Mann’s Doctor Faustus, the surrender to the promise 
that the world was “to be renewed” under the “emblem of military socialism”, that 
                                                 
696
 In his utopia in outer space does not only resonate the dream of liberty of Goethe’s Faust but 
Spengler’s notion of a soul “intoxicated” by technological hubris: “Man would free himself from the 
earth, rise to the infinite, leave the bonds of the body” (DW, 2:503). 
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was by no means completely defined at the time the compact was made (DF, 318). In 
compromising and playing this game, Pökler enters the trajectory of the rocket’s 
“Folgsamkeitsfaktor” (GR, 403) and renders himself a part of the military machine. 
As Norbert Wiener writes: 
 
When human atoms are knit into an organization in which they are used, not in their full right 
as responsible human beings, but as cogs and levers and rods, it matters little that their raw 
material is flesh and blood. What is used as an element in a machine, is an element in the 
machine.
697
  
 
In his servitude, he is not simply used as an “instrument, as a thing”, in Marcuse’s 
terms (ODM, 36), but dismisses his full right as a responsible human being. Pökler 
goes from Peenemünde to the Mittelwerke in 1944 to oversee the production of raw 
material for the mass production of the V-2. Immersed in work, he there dwells in 
isolation, but while he paradoxically “can enjoy a sense of personal identity” in this 
outer vacuum, “such displaced identity prevents him from connecting” with his 
environment.
698
 Holding on to this deprived sense of identity, the “fear of extinction 
called Pökler” (GR, 406) continues to contribute to extinction on a grand scale, using 
his “gift of Daedalus” to “put as much labyrinth as required between himself and the 
inconveniences of caring” (GR, 428).699 Such lack of “care” comes fully to the fore in 
his annual meetings with his daughter Ilse at Zwölfkinder. Weissmann arranges these 
meetings to manage the engineer’s discontent and keep him in the game. Trying to 
save her in brief moments of courage, Pökler goes ‘insane’ for a little while, thinks of 
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114). In this sense, Pökler not only enframes himself but belies the use and abuse of his work. 
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killing Weissmann and seeking asylum in England; but preserving himself “from love 
he couldn’t really risk” (GR, 408), he returns to the routine of work and continues to 
meet her in successive annual stills, telling her stories about escaping to the moon—
“Should he have told her what the ‘seas’ of the moon really were?” (GR, 410)—while 
wondering whether she is not better off as a ward of the Reich. If Weissmann coerces 
Pökler into collaboration, then the latter readily accepts, rationalising the horror 
underneath the surface of the Oven State: “He’d heard there were camps, but he saw 
nothing sinister in it: he took the government at their word, ‘re-education’ … they 
have qualified people there… trained personnel” (ibid.). In Adorno’s terms, this 
Daedalus gift describes both his depersonalised technical perfection and blindness. 
It is Ilse who has to break the spell of his “Venusberg” (GR, 430) by pointing out 
that she is a prisoner. “Close to losing control”, he finally commits an “act of 
courage” and quits Weissmann’s game (ibid.), looking for Ilse in the labour camp 
Dora that lies only a few hundred meters from the Mittelwerke. The repressed 
knowledge that his moon fantasies dwell within a system based on the extinction of 
human lives returns at the single narrative moment in Gravity’s Rainbow when the 
Holocaust unfolds before him.
700
 As the Reich crumbles, and Pökler finally gains 
access to Dora, the narrator again foregrounds the engineer’s self-deception enabled 
by his Daedalus gift: “He may have felt that he ought to look, finally. He was not 
prepared. He did not know. Had the data, yes, but did not know, with senses or heart” 
(GR, 432). In the “odors of shit, death, sweat, sickness, mildew, piss, the breathing of 
Dora” (GR, 432), however, he finally has a moment of recognition. Seeing that “all 
his vacuums, his labyrinths, had been the other side of this […], this invisible 
kingdom […] in the darkness outside” (GR, 432-33) he vomits and cries, but realising 
that the “walls did not dissolve […], not from tears […]” (ibid.), he feels obligation, 
slipping his wedding ring onto the finger of a barely alive woman and finally leaving 
to wait in the ruins of Zwölfkinder for Ilse. If there is a sense of belatedness, and if 
Pynchon accordingly refrains from granting the engineer an ‘eleventh-hour salvation’, 
he nevertheless has him develop a certain “awareness of his involvement with other 
human beings and a sense of his responsibility” for his previous actions.701 
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Chapter 7: Life against Death: Slothrop and the Quest for Redemption 
If Weissmann represents a successful transatlantic migration of the culture of death, 
Slothrop, as Kolbuszewska holds, is a symbol of the whole American post-war 
generation “betrayed by the corporate America which conspired with the enemy to 
champion the development of the more and more bureaucratic military-industrial 
complex”.702 A simple fool (cf. GR, 742) stumbling from adventure to adventure in a 
plot beyond his influence, if there is one, and a disempowered preterite ready to be 
sacrificed, he seems ill suited to taking part in the race for technological supremacy in 
the Zone. His role as a pawn in ‘Their’ game, however, is by no means 
straightforward. Slothrop may be simple, but he is also a “point-for-point microcosm” 
of this culture (GR, 738),
703
 and if the suggestion that “[t]echnology only responds” 
(GR, 521) serves to expose the totalitarian rationale behind Weissmann’s technocratic 
search for transcendence, then the lieutenant, in whom libidinal responses to 
technology and a Puritan longing for order merge, is mapped onto the very coordinate 
system of the Western libido dominandi. 
As argued, if there is one prominent mythographical reference point to this, then it 
is neither Faust nor Wagner’s Parsifal but in many respects Mann’s Magic Mountain, 
whose combination of political allegory and Grail Quest motif Pynchon extends into a 
farcical quest for salvation. Since Hume, Moore and others have already elucidated 
the vast scope of Pynchon’s mythography in its relations to socio-political thought 
(Weber, Arendt, and others), I restrict myself to observing the parallels Gravity’s 
Rainbow draws between Slothrop and the legacy of the Faust myth (Goethe, Mann, 
Brown), correlating them with the narratives provided by his Puritan background and 
his ‘Orphic’ dispersal into the texture of the novel. I thereby show how Pynchon uses 
Slothrop’s quest to expose the most seductive myths of self-empowerment of his own 
culture. In a complementary analysis I then argue that he also questions the viability 
of various countercultural narratives of redemption and transcendence, thereby 
undercutting the proposition that freedom outside the “system” is anything other than 
mythical. 
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1. Beyond Simple Erection 
Genital organization is the tyranny of the genital 
—Norman O. Brown, Love’s Body704 
 
The most conspicuous characteristic of Pynchon’s pseudo-Bunyan allegorical 
lieutenant is his ‘reflex’ of having sexual encounters at locations where V-2 rockets 
are about to strike. Although the local correlation between the two events is 
eventually revealed to be accidental, Slothrop’s habitual erections at the presence of 
anything related to military technology, in particular the synthetic polymer Imipolex 
G, prompt several explanations, the most ‘credible’ of which is related to his alleged 
conditioning by the chemist Jamf. Drawing from Pavlovian theories and Brown’s 
concept of genital organisation, Pynchon playfully presents the aetiology of these 
‘responses’ as a tale of a soul that has, in Slothrop’s words, been “sold like a side of 
beef” (GR, 286).705 In order to finance his son’s education at Harvard, Slothrop’s 
father struck a deal with Jamf, who used the infant for experiments with Imipolex G. 
Conditioned with the polymer, Slothrop has erections in the presence of any piece of 
technology that represents death and domination. Slothrop is slave to his penis, a 
penis, as Brown would suggest, that “is not our own, but daddy’s” (LB, 57). Grown 
up in a world where rebellion against the father has failed, the project of attaining 
power, at least over oneself, seems impossible. Thus, the lieutenant, in all senses, is a 
“hyperbolic signifier of the phallic order”.706 Having internalised the supremacy of 
the latter, he works analogously with the guidance system of the V-2, serving as a tool 
of the military and economic elite.
707
 His “perfect mechanism” (GR, 48), instilled by 
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the country that has sent him to war, also has a distinctly totalitarian touch. As 
Hannah Arendt writes: 
 
Men insofar as they are more than animal reaction and fulfilment of function are entirely 
superfluous to totalitarian regimes. Totalitarianism strives not toward despotic rule over men, 
but toward a system in which men are superfluous.
708
   
 
Such a reaction is ruthlessly exploited by the “Firm”, especially by the Pavlovian 
behaviourist Ned Pointsman.
709
 The latter wants to fulfil his “brown realpolitik 
dreams” and find in Tyrone the “ideal” of “the true mechanical explanation’ (GR, 89), 
a universal scientific principle that is to serve him as a means of imposing control: 
“When we find it, we’ll have shown again the stone determinacy of everything, of 
every soul” (GR, 89). As much of a victim as Slothrop seems to be, however, the 
facticity of his conditioning with Imipolex G might merely be “Bull Shit” (GR, 286). 
Not only does he turn out to be a “thermodynamic surprise” (GR, 143), invalidating 
the perfect correlation sought after by Pointsman and Mexico;
710
 his white Anglo-
Saxon, male, racist, and sexist mindset also suggests that the “Penis He Thought Was 
His Own” (GR, 216) is at least partly “his, own” (GR, 217).711 His conditioning is 
                                                                                                                                           
struggle against freedom reproduces itself in the psyche of man, as the self-repression of the repressed 
individual, and his self-repression in turn sustains his masters and their institutions” (EC, 16). 
708
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 
457. 
709
 Slothrop is assigned to the SOE, or “Firm”, Pynchon’s take on the British Special Operations 
Executive. Paul Fussell provides an excellent contextualisation and reading of this institution. The real 
SOE, more an “eccentric club” than a formally military executive, performed espionage and sabotage 
during the Second World War, from producing exploding pencils to, allegedly, “casting spells on the 
German civil and military hierarchy”. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York/ 
London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 328. In Gravity’s Rainbow the SOE appears comically 
refracted as a bunch of “lunatics, […] spiritualists, vaudeville entertainers, wireless technicians, 
Couéists, Ouspenskians, Skinnerites, lobotomy enthusiasts, Dale Carnegie zealots” (GR, 77), who 
synthesise science with religion, occultism, Schrödingers psi-function, and folklore “to get at the 
German soul from whatever came to hand” (GR, 74). Pointsman, part of the institution, makes his first 
appearance in Gravity’s Rainbow (GR, 42) in association with a black dog, which may be an ironic 
allusion to Mephistopheles. As much as Gaddis’s Basil Valentine, he is a sterile, ‘anal’ character, who 
dwells in an ivory tower, dreaming of winning the Nobel Prize (GR, 142) by finding the ultimate 
mechanical explanation for everything. His mechanistic approach, however, also becomes his nemesis. 
Faced with the impracticality of his theories as regards the “thermodynamic surprise” (GR, 143) 
embodied in Slothrop, whom he considers “psychologically, historically, a monster” (GR, 144), the 
mechanics of his own psyche eventually cracks up in schizophrenia. 
710
 As Brian McHale points out, “we later learn from Slothrop himself that at least some of these 
conquests were simply erotic fantasies”. Brian MacHale, “Modernist Reading, Post-Modern Text: The 
Case of Gravity’s Rainbow”, Poetics Today 1, no. 1-2 (1979): 94.  
711
 The account of his conditioning, mainly reconstructed from cryptic dossiers with an enormous 
amount of inference, has to be taken cum grano salis, for however suitable Slothrop’s theory about the 
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thereby by no means reduced to puns on Freudian theories but is embedded in further 
reaching criticism. The lieutenant’s “Schwarzphänomen” (GR, 513), as one character 
calls it, these “sub-Slothrop needs They know about, and he doesn’t” (GR, 490) that 
prompt him to detect destructive technology, go hand in hand with his second most 
notable characteristic. Slothrop, like Gaddis’s Wyatt, is a product of Puritanism, and 
as critical towards the religious foundations of his country as Gaddis, Pynchon uses 
this circumstance to satirise its authoritarian and capitalist traits. Interspersing 
Slothrop’s progress with several ‘flashbacks’ to the lieutenant’s family history, 
Gravity’s Rainbow expounds if not a strict genealogy, then at least, to paraphrase 
Marcuse, a ‘hidden trend’ at the basis of his own culture that is as Faustian as that of 
the Oven State. 
 
 
2. Work Ethic and Authoritarianism – Puritans, Pigs, and Paper 
[C]ivilization has progressed as organized domination. 
—Marcuse, Eros and Civilization712  
 
It has often been pointed out that Pynchon portrays institutionalised religion as the 
theocratic twin of totalitarianism,
713
 be it in his mockery of Catholic communities in 
V. or more explicitly in Mason & Dixon’s proto-Fascist Jesuits, like Father Zarpazo, 
“Lord of the Zero”, whose love of technology and the beauty of absolutes puts them 
in the same circle as the Lady V and Blicero.
714
 In Gravity’s Rainbow the decidedly 
anti-Puritan tenor is focused on two specific soteriological themes, the authoritarian 
spirit emergent in the dialectic between election and preterition and the regime of 
accumulation emergent in the Protestant work ethic.
715
 
Pynchon intersperses his narration with several accounts of Slothrop’s New 
England roots that operate in the spirit of both these mechanisms. In a vignette about 
the first ‘transatlantic’ Slothrop, William, Pynchon immediately points to the social 
                                                                                                                                           
Slothrop) to Jamf at Harvard may appear, however, Pynchon, with a “[c]lever sense of humor”, does 
never exclude the possibility that such musings themselves are “Bull Shit” (GR, 286). 
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corruption of theological doctrines among the Puritan settlers in America.
716
 Already 
on board the Arabella, where William works as a “mess cook or something” some of 
the saints appear “more elect” (GR, 204) than others. The binary theological 
distinction between elect and reprobate has already been transformed into a secular 
classification that allows for graduation.
717
 The overall social organisation of the early 
days in Boston, this “Winthrop machine” (GR, 555), then, is nothing but a mechanism 
of repression. Just after settling in Berkshire, William starts a “pig operation” (ibid.), 
transporting pigs to a Boston slaughterhouse. Pondering on their “nobility and 
personal freedom”, their natural “grace”, he comes to love these animals, who, 
“possessed by […] trust for men, which the men kept betraying”, rush “into extinction 
like lemmings” (ibid.). Being a good puritan, he takes this “squealing bloody horror” 
as “a parable” that presents Boston as an omnivorous mechanism feeding on the 
happiness of the preterite. As William’s ‘ghost’ explains to Slothrop, Jesus “saw it 
from the lemming point of view. Without the millions who had plunged and drowned, 
there could have been no miracle” (GR, 554).  
As if it were not suggestive enough that William’s version of the covenant, in 
which salvation is based on the extinction of millions, can be read alongside Blicero’s 
conjectures on the thousands of soldiers burned by the “Reich’s flame” for the sake of 
the “royal moths” of the German Oven State (GR, 98), Pynchon draws further 
parallels between Puritanism and totalitarianism in a cognate account of Katje’s 
ancestor Frans van der Groov. Frans, a seventeenth century “crazy Dutchman”, 
spends thirteen years on Mauritius systematically killing dodos (GR, 109). Overcome 
by loneliness after some time, he joins some Puritan settlers. The latter appear to him 
as “[l]osers, impersonating a race chosen by God” (GR, 110), killing the birds in a 
mood of “universal hysteria” (GR, 109). Yet they are driven by a spirit that renders 
each killing a devotional, if not necessary act. Considering “the stumbling birds ill-
made to the point of Satanic intervention, so ugly as to embody argument against 
Godly creation”, they hold that the dodos must be eradicated, lest Christians should 
perish (GR, 110). Pynchon insinuates here a fatal self-apotheosis inherent in early 
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English Puritans’ belief that they were God’s chosen people. The latter, according to 
Zafirovski, 
 
is a likely source as well as a putative sanctification of the Puritan “ethnical mistrust” and 
consequent subjection, persecution, and extermination or “ethnic cleansing” (“salvation”) of 
other, “ungodly” or “damned” foreign peoples, cultures and religions.718 
 
The adventurer Frans suspects that the settlers merely sanctify “genocide” (GR, 545) 
but, since “God could not be that cruel” (GR, 111), engages in a wilful suspension of 
disbelief, a dream vision of a miraculous conversion of the dodos in order to maintain 
this perverse theodicy. In the end, however, only the “steel reality of the firearm” 
(ibid.) prevails, irrespective of whether the killings were a matter of election.
719
 
If Frans sanctions the genocide by devising a consoling fiction, William, as Shawn 
Smith argues, also betrays a certain willingness to comply when he is waiting “for 
that one pig that wouldn’t die” (GR, 555) while facilitating the “squealing bloody 
horror”.720 Eventually grown tired of the Winthrop machine, however, he comes to 
challenge the hegemony and writes his tract On Preterition, printed in England and   
 
to’ve been not only banned but also ceremonially burned in Boston. Nobody wanted to hear 
about all the Preterite, the many God passes over when he chooses a few for salvation. 
William argued holiness for these ‘Second Sheep,’ without whom there’d be no elect. You can 
bet that the Elect in Boston were pissed off about that. (Ibid.)  
 
William’s (and William Pynchon’s) argument that “election emerges dialectically 
from preterition, and for the sake of it” is considered heretical.721 Even more so, it is 
furthered by his plea to see in Judas Iscariot the saint of the preterite. His thought may 
ultimately be flawed since it retains the schism, but William’s heresy raises a crucial 
question: “Could he [William] have been the fork in the road America never took, the 
singular point she jumped the wrong way from? […] Might there have been fewer 
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crimes in the name of Jesus, and more mercy in the name of Judas Iscariot?” 
(GR, 556). Like his descendant Tyrone later, William is presented as a crossroads, a 
potential historical tipping point.
722
 
The majority of his descendants, however, abandoned William’s countercultural 
model and sold out to the American Dream. Gravity’s Rainbow captures their 
subscription to the soteriological economy of the Winthrop machine in a panning shot 
over a congregational churchyard in Massachusetts, where the ancestry of Slothrop 
appears condensed in epitaphs. The first one in sight contains the lines: “‘Death is a 
debt to nature due,/ Which I have paid and so must you” (GR, 26).723  Pynchon, 
writing in the spirit of Spengler, Weber, and Brown, satirises the Puritan violation of 
this natural ‘economy’ of death and (possible) rebirth described in this epitaph. In 
Puritanism, to briefly recapitulate Weber’s well-known hypothesis, the accumulation 
of good works is a means of getting rid of the fear of damnation. In a secularised 
context, their nature assumed a purely economic character that eventually became 
identified with life itself: time is money, and the more the better. Tyrone’s family 
surrenders to this regime of accumulation, 
 
[e]ach one in turn paying his debt to nature due and leaving the excess to the next link in the 
name’s chain. […] The money seeping its way out through stock portfolios more intricate than 
any genealogy: what stayed at home in Berkshire went into timberland whose diminishing green 
reaches were converted acres at a clip into paper—toilet paper, banknote stock, newsprint—a 
medium or ground for shit, money, and the Word. […] Shit, money, and the Word, the three 
American truths, powering the American mobility, claimed the Slothrops, clasped them for good 
to the country’s fate. (GR, 27-28)724 
 
Having long deviated from the religious impetus of vouchsafing an individual 
certitudo salutis, the accumulation of money, and the handing over of economic 
surplus has turned into a matter of extending life, and economic power.
725
 However, 
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Marx’s hypothesis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Doug Haynes, “‘Gravity Rushes through 
Him’: Folk and Fetish in Pynchon’s Rilke”’ Modern Fictions Studies (forthcoming). 
725
 Spengler argues: Economic activity is never found in a religion or a philosophy, always only in the 
political organism of a church or the social organism of a theorizing fellowship; it is ever a 
compromise with ‘this world’ and an index of the presence of a will-to-power (DW, 2:473). Similarly, 
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in describing the material process underlying the production of power, of “mobility”, 
Pynchon mocks an industry as insanely lethal as the German petro-chemical cartel:
726
 
 
Slothrop’s family actually made its money killing trees, amputating them from their roots, 
chopping them up, grinding them to pulp, bleaching that to paper and getting paid for this with 
more paper (GR, 553) 
 
Being paid for paper with paper, the Slothrop business does not merely exemplify 
how paper money “distort[s] our ‘natural’ understanding of the relationship between 
symbols and things”.727 As raw material for “toilet paper, banknote stock, newsprint” 
is put to practical application for “[s]hit, money, and the Word, the three American 
truths, powering the American mobility” (GR, 28), the medium paper points to the 
faecal quality, the “absolute worthlessness” (LD, 254) of the latter. 728  The 
excremental tenor of this section invariably evokes Brown’s reading of secular 
economies as a Faustian surrender to the devil,
729
 but also on a much more concrete 
level this very transformation of life and soil into fortune, is nothing but the work of 
Spengler’s Faustian man. While the mobilising quality of money, a mere category of 
thought, is based on the very delusion offered by a Mephistopheles, its production 
generates a “necropolis” (GR, 27). However strong their faith, the Slothrops lost their 
wager and do not share their country’s prosperous fate but merely “persist” (GR, 28) 
throughout a long line of decline:  
 
The profits slackening, the family ever multiplying. Interest from various numbered trusts was 
still turned, by family banks down in Boston every second or third generation, back into yet 
another trust, in long rallentando, in infinite series just perceptibly, term by term, dying… but 
never quite to the zero…  (ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                           
Brown holds: the “ultimate category of economics is power; but power is not an economic category” 
(LD, 251).  
726
 With money as a medium, Spengler argues “the old possession, bound up with life and the soil, 
gives way to fortune, which is essentially mobile” (DW, 2:483). 
727
 Shell, Money, Language, Thought, 7.  
728
 In an earlier account on the manipulation of German stock markets by the ominous Weimar 
Republic rogue Hugo Stinnes by means of vast amounts of emergency money produced by a “certain 
Massachusetts paper mill” and contracted by the Slothrop Paper Company (GR, 285), Pynchon crudely 
draws the reader’s attention to the consequences of such money-magic dispelled: “[t]hose were the 
days when you carried marks around in wheelbarrows to your daily shopping and used them for toilet 
paper, assuming you had anything to shit” (GR, 248). 
729
 As Brown associates money, which is at the “heart of the […] accumulation complex” (LD, 281), 
with excrement (LD, 254, 279) and accumulation with phallic aggression (LD, 280), however, the 
economic endeavour is in the last instance nothing but a surrender to the “Devil and to death” (LD, 
223). 
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Hanging “at the bottom of his blood’s avalanche” (ibid.), Slothrop, the “[l]ast of the 
line, and how far-fallen” (GR, 569), is among the preterite, in religious and economic 
terms.
730
 Despite having been granted an education at Harvard, aimed at initiating him 
into the ranks of the powerful and presumably also “into the Puritan Mysteries” (GR, 
267-68), he appears disfavoured, fallen through the system, in the diegetic present of 
Gravity’s Rainbow.731 Providence frequently gives him “the finger” (GR, 461), and 
his paranoia is not ruled by a divine Word but the fear of a “rocket with his name 
written on it” (GR, 25). Yet, although “no other Slothrop ever felt so much fear in the 
presence of Commerce” (GR, 569), he shares with his ancestors a “love for the Word” 
(GR, 207) and is especially alert to trees (GR, 522) and various economies of paper 
and excrement (GR, 571).
732
 As much as his penis responds in advance to the devices 
Slothrop fears most, his “Puritan reflex of seeking orders behind the visible, also 
known as paranoia” (GR, 188) will paradoxically lead him along the underground 
nodes of commerce, the black markets of post-war Germany.
733
 Given the 
obsessiveness with which he will come to trace these hidden orders, it is no wonder 
that some critics, specifically Cowart, Hume, and Grim, have compared Slothrop with 
Goethe’s Faust. Like Faust, he is financially and intellectually bankrupt, almost proud 
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 Rather than using the common designation ‘reprobate’, Pynchon opposes the elect with a 
subcategory of the ‘damned’. Mackey gives a concise delineation of the latter: “The first discrimination 
in the divine decrees is between Elect and Reprobate. But some writers subdivide the Reprobate. There 
are the Reprobate […], whom God designates for damnation. And there are the Preterite, whom he 
passes over and does not sign either for salvation or perdition, but who are of course damned anyway 
by the inertia of sin. All men are drowning. A few of them God mercifully plucks out of the water and 
revives. Some are pushed down and held under. The rest are allowed to sink on their own”. Louis 
Mackey, “Paranoia, Pynchon, and Preterition”, SubStance 10, no. 1 (1981): 18. 
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 Eddins gives a concise analysis of Pynchon’s satiric take on this ‘secret’ arch of power at Harvard. 
As mentioned, in the historical flashbacks, the Puritan libido dominandi becomes the motivation of 
scriptural practice aimed at delimiting interpretations of reality and rewriting social hierarchical 
relations. Eddins sees this process reiterated by the Harvard elite’s Wille zur Macht that presses the 
Word in its service (The Gnostic Pynchon, 132). But as much as the Mauritian settlers and the New 
England entrepreneurs operate with an essentially vacuous principle, so do the Harvard boys elevate 
“to the status of spiritual center” (ibid.) a void, “Vanitas, Emptiness” (GR, 267). See in this context 
also Gaddis’s comments on the Ivy League and the Skull and Bones society in The Recognitions (TR, 
734). 
732
 Slothrop’s obsession with everything anal and excremental is most spectacularly established in his 
drug-induced nightmare about an ‘Orphic descent’ into a toilet in the Roseland ballroom, where he 
escapes anal rape by the “Negro” Malcolm X and reads “patterns thick with meaning” (GR, 65) in 
crusted faeces. A similar image complex (death-wish, phallic aggression, and excremental economy) 
underlies the technical device, the S-Gerät, he later traces in the Zone. The hint to the device gained 
from rocket blueprints found in a toilet, the Gerät itself made of Imipolex G, it invariably attracts 
Slothrop (cf. “What do I need that badly?”: GR, 490). Eventually, also his relationship with the child 
Bianca (‘the white one’) circulates around similar allusions; cf. Duyfhuizen, “‘A Suspension’”, § 22. 
733
 Entering the Zone, Slothrop “feels his own” belief “stronger now as borders fall away and the Zone 
envelops him, his own WASPs in buckled black, who heard God clamoring to them in every turn of a 
leaf” (GR, 281). 
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to be damned, and willing to accept this damnation for the sake of attaining some 
ever-elusive knowledge. It is noticeable that Slothrop is by no means a hubristic 
transgressor forfeiting his immortal part.
734
 On the contrary: as much as Weissmann, a 
reckless individual, is directed by an infinite thirst for guilt, Slothrop is haunted by his 
ancestors’ ‘phylogentic curse’ of collective guilt, a Puritan albatross around his 
neck.
735
 This ‘curse’, however, is of an ambivalent nature, for Slothrop quite clearly 
validates Thanatz’s sado-anarchist argument that the structure of the ‘System’ needs 
not only our lust for dominance so that it can co-opt us but also “our submission so 
that it may remain in power” (GR, 737). As Sascha Pöhlmann argues, the “will to 
power is here also the will to be overpowered, liberated from the obligation to act, 
finding comfort in narratives [and practices] offered by sovereignty”. 736  It is this 
inability to abandon the coordinates of his New England origins and to accept 
responsibility with which he eventually forfeits not his ‘soul’ but any means of 
formulating one of his own. Unable to rid himself from the internalised polarity 
between elect and preterite, and unable to operate outside the soteriological regime of 
accumulation, he deludes himself into thinking that his search for military technology 
is a search for a Holy Grail with which to replenish both inner and outer wasteland. 
Yet the object he craves has neither much in common with the sacred object of the 
classical legends described in Jessie Weston’s From Ritual to Romance (1920) nor 
with Hans Castorp’s vision of the ‘purest’ and ‘highest’.  
                                                 
734
 Cowart argues that Slothrop’s insatiable search for knowledge leads “to the peril of his ‘personal 
destiny’ […], if not his soul” (The Art of Allusion, 129). 
735
 In Brown’s psycho-historical account, the “sense of guilt in the human species”, caused by the 
killing of the primal father, “causes the nightmare of history”, the progressive development of 
civilization, and “the compensatory rituals of cyclical regeneration and messianic redemption” (LD, 
277), by which this guilt is to be expiated. Tracing archaic types of economies against the background 
of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, Brown posits that the “money complex is constructed out 
of an unconscious sense of guilt” (LD, 270). While economies embedded in religion are limited, as the 
divinity promises a removal of indebtedness and guilt via redemption, the increased sense of guilt in 
the modern consciousness brings about the emancipation of economic processes from divine ends 
(according to Brown, drawing from Freud, guilt increases with civilization work, that is, the 
accumulation of historical correlates with that of guilt). With secularisation the illusion that work 
achieves redemption is abandoned, while at the same time the “compulsion to work is retained and 
intensified” (LD, 272), resulting in “an economy driven by the pure sense of guilt, unmitigated by any 
sense of redemption” (ibid.). Money and its accumulation becomes a “substitute for the religious 
complex, an attempt to find God in things” (LD, 240), and “the process of producing an ever expanding 
surplus” (LD, 261) becomes an end in itself that “makes man eternally Faustian and restless” (LD, 
259). Being is sacrificed for the sake of limitless accumulation, which eventually precludes any 
possibility of an “economy of abundance” (ibid.). For Brown this Faustian trait is not a matter of 
individual choice. As in modernity guilt has increased to a point where the safety valve mechanisms of 
redemption have become irrelevant, he argues, guilt has accumulated to a degree that it “imposes on 
modern societies a historical ‘destiny’”, by which the sins of the fathers are visited upon the following 
generations (LD, 278).  
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 Pöhlmann, Pynchon’s Postnational Imagination, 302. 
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3. Grail Quest 
Equipped with an assortment of disguises and this twofold ‘gift’ of paranoia and 
erectile response, Slothrop is sent first to a basic education programme in rocket 
technology in the French Riviera and then to the Zone. It is as soon as he sets out to 
find the rocket that Pynchon associates him with the scholar part of the Faust myth. 
The lieutenant’s thirst for knowledge, his curiositas, comes fully to the fore during his 
training. Reading all the material available about the device, his knowledge is at the 
pinnacle of the time,
737
 but by succumbing to the promise of Rocket technology and 
getting erections after his perusal of handbooks full of runic symbols, his curiositas 
becomes insatiable: “He goes around assuming they’ve assigned him a limitless Need 
To Know” (GR, 243). Slothrop discovers in this “pornography of blueprints” (GR, 
224) a hint about a mysterious S-Gerät (GR, 252), presumably made of Jamf’s 
Imipolex G and used in Weissmann’s Rocket 00000. Intuiting a connection between 
the synthetic, the device, and his erectile responses, Slothrop’s makes it his mission to 
find it. His Puritan progress here converges with the Faustian tale. 
Just having entered the Zone, Slothrop meets Geli Tripping, an “apprentice witch” 
(GR, 329), who “posed once for a rocket insignia” (GR, 293), lover of Slothrop’s 
Soviet counterpart, the intelligence officer and “rocket maniac” Tchitcherine (GR, 
290). She, as one learns toward the end of Gravity’s Rainbow, effectuates one of the 
few instances of real ‘magic’ in the novel (GR, 735), an act of love that will allow 
Tchitcherine to let go of the “personal doom he carries with him” (GR, 566). While 
such miracles are reserved for her partner, she nevertheless opens to Slothrop the vista 
to an alternative to his quest. He receives a twofold message from Geli, a hint to the 
S-Gerät but also the assertion that the Zone, not yet split into zones of occupation, 
constitutes an interregnum of possibilities, in which frontiers and subdivisions do not 
count: “Its all been suspended” (GR, 294). The witch demonstrates her claim with a 
spectacular act of love on top of a Harz mountain. The scenery on the Brocken evokes 
the Nordic Walpurgis Night featured in the first part of Faust.
738
 ‘’However, the 
historical dimension by far overshadows the mythical here:  
                                                 
737
 See Cowart, The Art of Allusion, 129. 
738
 There, a grotesque-carnivalesque witches Sabbath, an extraordinarily saucy “sensual orgy” (Luke, 
“Introduction”, Faust: Part One, xxxix) provides Faust with a ‘vulgar’ diversion from his 
misadventures with Margareta but also served Goethe as a pretext to satirise many of his 
contemporaries. In Mann, a carnival celebration in the chapter “Walpurgis-Night”, in which Castorp 
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Though May Day Eve’s come and gone and this frolicking twosome are nearly a month late, 
relics of the latest Black Sabbath still remain: Kriegsbier empties, lace undergarments, spent 
rifle cartridges, Swastika-banners of ripped red satin, tattooing-needles and splashes of blue 
ink […] (GR, 329) 
 
Geli shows Slothrop the Brocken spectre. Amongst the relics of the last ‘official’ Nazi 
ceremony,
739
 held at the night of Hitler’s suicide, they have sex at the break of dawn, 
casting giant shadows over the land, not ordinary shadows but “three-dimensional” 
(GR, 330) ones, with spectra at all their edges. Their act can be read as an attempt to 
re-appropriate and re-enchant the “plexus of German evil” (GR, 329) on which Nazi 
transmitters still tower while the area is already occupied by American and Soviet 
troops. Confined to “dawns slender interface”, the “Brockengespenstphänomen” (GR, 
331) symbolises the brief period of openness in the German post-war parenthesis. The 
question here is not about restoring origins, for as romantic as their unification 
appears, and as magically as their shadows spread over the land, under “the clouds out 
there it’s all as still, and lost, as Atlantis” (ibid.). It is a question of what to do at the 
slender interface, how to retain possibilities rather than petrifying choice. As the 
Argentine anarchist Squalidozzi explains: “In the openness of the German Zone, our 
hope is limitless. […] So is our danger” (GR, 315). The ‘pedagogical’ import of 
Geli’s act for Slothrop, who “is as properly constituted a state as any other in the Zone 
these days” (GR, 291), is to attain an alternative view to the closed circuit of his 
mythical/Puritan quest. Immersed in the Brockengespenst, Slothrop casts his own 
‘fuck you’ spell, raising “his middle finger to the west, the headlong finger darkening 
three miles of cloud per second” (GR, 330). The gesture, however, is soon forgotten. 
Slothrop visits Raketen-Stadt, the Mittelwerke in Nordhausen, a war construction 
built “To Avoid Symmetry, Allow Complexity, Introduce Terror” (GR, 297). His 
descent to the tunnels, as much a crude pun on the Oedipal return to the womb of the 
mother as to Faust’s descent to the Mothers, turns out to be a failure. 740  There, 
Slothrop does not unveil a creative principle but only the “miasma of evil in Stollen 
41” (GR, 305), the place in the Mittelwerke where the assembled V-2 were tested 
                                                                                                                                           
finally confesses his love to his Chauchat, similarly constitutes a mixture of frivolity and exposure of 
the grotesquery of the social microcosm on the mountain. 
739
 The Nazis, as Grim points out, established the Walpurgisnacht as an official ceremony at the 
beginning of their regime (The Faust Legend, 2:80). 
740
 See Grim, The Faust Legend, 2:78. In Goethe, Faust descends to the realm of the ‘Mothers’, a 
subterranean region associated with the creative principle, to recover Helena and Paris, the ideals of 
classical beauty. 
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before being delivered to the launching batteries. He meets U.S. Army Ordnance 
Major Duane Marvy and his team of “Mothers”, the “meanest-ass technical 
intelligence team” (GR, 287). Cooperating with “some Project Hermes people from 
General Electrics” (ibid., cf. 307, 565), the Mothers scavenge rocket parts and 
construction plans to ship them across the Atlantic. As Marvy asserts later: “there’s a 
great future in these V-weapons” (GR, 558). Denied (Oedipal) unification with the 
Mothers and chased by Marvy, Slothrop flees to Berlin where he takes on his next 
persona, the mock-hero figure Rocketman, transformed by the underworld figure 
Säure Bummer’s “act of naming” (GR, 366). A crude mixture of hyperbolic GI and 
comic hero, he appears as an inheritor of Western culture, as Hume observes.
741
 As 
such, however, he is not merely a harbinger of chewing gum and “American 
enlightenment” (GR, 359) as he himself would have it. Dressed in Wagnerian opera 
rags and a Siegfried helmet that, without horns, “would just look like the nose 
assembly of the Rocket” (GR, 366), Rocketman, a technocrat posing as a Wagnerian 
knight, is also associated with von Braun’s nickname ‘missile man’. Slothrop’s pose 
as Wagnerian hero is more than superficial mockery. Pre-empted by National 
Socialist appropriations of Wagnerian art-myth, it follows the same principles 
mystifying political and military interests.742 Slothrop’s strongest delusion is that he 
comes to think of the S-Gerät as a kind of Holy Grail (GR, 275). Yet as Thomas 
rightly notes, the “whole business of questing […] looks like an unlikely and unstable 
basis for some so-called political fiction” but should rather be understood as “a gloss 
on the grand narratives of domination”.743 
With this mythical gloss framing Slothrop’s actual task Pynchon not merely 
brilliantly connects the lieutenant’s story with that of Hans Castorp, but also provides 
a satirical parable of the political situation of the summer of 1945 that exposes the 
discrepancy between the tarnish of soteriological myth and the real outcome of the 
interregnum of possibilities in the Zone. In the traditional legends the cornucopian 
grail, as Marc Shell explains, symbolised an “extraordinary gift both infinitely large 
and free, which was said to be able to lift men out of the ordinary world of exchange 
into a world in which freedom and totality were possible”. 744  At a first glance, 
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 Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography, 96. 
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 Kuberski points out that “one of the antiaircraft rockets the Nazis were testing at the moment of 
their surrender was called the “Rheintochter” (“Gravity’s Angel”, 144). 
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 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 73. 
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 Shell, Money, Language, Thought, 24-25. 
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Slothrop’s quest would suggest the pursuit of such a gift, both an attempt to replenish 
the ‘wasteland’ of the Zone and to rid himself of his Puritan legacy, the albatross 
around his neck, and restore, in Brown’s terms, Being outside the temporal schema of 
history as accumulated guilt. If Slothrop’s legendary conditioning by Jamf may be 
merely distraction, however, so are the mythical promises of his Grail hunt, especially 
if one takes into consideration that Slothrop’s Perceval pose is, like his Rocketman 
persona, pre-empted by Nazi mythography. 745  In the last instance, the S-Gerät 
remains, despite all its symbolical implications, a piece of military hardware available 
on the (black) market and its pursuit a metonymy of the Western race for military and 
economic supremacy. Even Slothrop’s “dumb idling heart” (GR, 364) loses its 
naivety in this respect. Uncomfortable with the mythological roles pressed onto him, 
he comes to realise that he is not suited for playing the redeemer. He feels “burdened” 
in his Rocketman “turnout” (GR, 458, cf. 379), the rocket-nose helmet imposing such 
a weight onto him that it is occasionally “pulling him straight down” (GR, 460). In the 
same vein, he has tremendous difficulties to live up to the role of the “Swine-hero” 
Plechazunga he is urged to play later, eventually fleeing from the scene, rescued by a 
girl, who “[p]rovidentially” shows up (GR, 571). Slothrop knows that he is not a 
knightly hero, that he has embarked “on somebody else’s voyage” (GR, 364). Yet he 
also realises that what he pursues is no means of redemption: “The Schwarzgerät is no 
Grail, Ace, that’s not what the G in Imipolex G stands for” (ibid.). He also knows that 
he is used as a pawn in an “evil game” of scavenging military intelligence while the 
‘wasteland’ of the Zone is in bitter need of aid. Aware that any notion of salvation in 
this context is mockery, he immediately assumes the opposite extreme, the position of 
the preterite, comparing himself with Tannhäuser, the “Singing Nincompoop” under 
the spell of Lady Venus in a “sucking marshland of sin” (ibid.). The function of myth 
here converges with that of Puritanism and paranoia, a closed system that precludes 
any interaction deviating from the plot, that negates any investment outside its 
economy, and eventually displaces all basic human obligations towards an imaginary 
higher power.
746
 But despite all renunciations of agency, he eventually admits to 
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 As Bruno Arich-Gerz and Luc Herman point out, Heinrich Himmler “elaborated an occultist scheme 
streamlining the Teutonic legend of Percival for the so-called aryosophic ideology of Nazism. He 
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 John Farrell has excellently documented the intersection between Puritan ideas of covenant and the 
delusions of paranoia. Paranoia empties the world of contingency and accident, it is anti-mimetic in 
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himself: “you know that in some irreducible way it’s an evil game. You play because 
you have nothing better to do, but that doesn’t make it right” (ibid.). This realisation 
renders Pynchon’s World War II-cum-Vietnam allegory a dire comment on the 
facilitators of American military intervention. Unlike his ancestor William, Tyrone 
has learned to think outside the system. Remembering the “fork in the road”, 
constituted by the latter’s heresy, he muses:  
 
maybe for a little while all the fences are down, one road as good as another, the whole Zone 
cleared, […] and somewhere inside the waste of it a single set of coordinates from which to 
proceed, without elect, without preterite […] (GR, 556)   
 
As Pöhlmann writes, the Zone allows such a moment “since it lacks repressive 
unifying ideology”.747 In an environment of constantly changing alliances, Tyrone has 
the chance to determine his actions, to choose an ideology, like Katje does when she 
quits Blicero’s “game for good” (GR, 104). But even though his own game has ceased 
to be fun for him, he decides to follow his “historical destiny” (LD, 278), conforming 
to the narrative of the soteriological plot.
748
 He knows that such paranoia is nothing 
but an exercise in devising “perfect methods of immobility” (GR, 572) and clearly 
realises that not one plot leads to liberation but many ways, that navigating a 
complicated system “may yet carry him to freedom” (GR, 603).749 However, he is 
unable to let go and continues, to quote the spokesman of the Counterforce, as 
“schizoid, as double-minded […] as any of the rest of us” (GR, 712). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
that it puts meaning and value in place of the world, and it establishes a relation between what one 
takes for the world and oneself. The by-products of such a distorted relationship of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence are commonly delusions of grandeur and a decreased sense of 
responsibility, as paranoia displaces human agency and obligations toward an imaginary higher power, 
relieving the subject from the “burden of responsibility” (Paranoia and Modernity, 309-10); cf. David 
Trotter, Paranoid Modernism: Literary Experiment, Psychosis, and the Professionalization of English 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 58-59. 
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 Pöhlmann, Pynchon’s Postnational Imagination, 175; cf. GR, 177. 
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 At one point, for instance, he crosses paths with Ludwig, a boy in search of his pet lemming. What 
Ludwig experiences in his search is a “fate worse than death” (GR, 729). Rather than helping the boy, 
however, Slothrop makes a pious wish on an evening star: “Let that Ludwig find his lemming and be 
happy and leave me in peace” (GR, 553). 
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 Pöhlmann, Pynchon’s Postnational Imagination, 175. 
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4. Metanoia 
Slothrop’s double-minded approach is nowhere more clearly conveyed than in his 
encounter with one of the Zone’s children. In Berlin he meets Bianca (‘the white 
one’) and her mother Margherita Erdmann, a former star, who, featuring in a “string 
of dirty movies” (GR, 461), represents little more than a fetish construct of male 
fantasies. The twelve-year old girl “produces the most profound change in Slothrop’s 
behavior in that it frees him from his erectile conditioning”, as Bernard Duyfhuizen 
points out.
750
 The gesture of love that seems to trigger this change, however, is highly 
misleading. Bianca and Slothrop have sex on board the ship Anubis during a 
“Walpurgisnacht” (GR, 463) party. The intercourse itself, conveyed to the reader only 
in a reconstruction in Slothrop’s memory, presents him at the apex of the phallic 
order. Here, he perceives himself being “inside his own cock”, the “metropolitan 
organ entirely, the colonial tissue forgotten”, filled with an “extraordinary sense of 
waiting to rise”, while he remembers his orgasm as an announcement of the “void, 
what could it be but the kingly voice of the Aggregat itself?” (GR, 470). 751 
Afterwards Bianca suggests: “We can get away. I’m a child, I know how to hide. I 
know how to hide you too”, and it is through this suggestion that Slothrop realises 
“she exists, love” (ibid.). It is Bianca’s love, an agapistic gift offered without the 
expectation of anything given return, which seems to cause a complete metanoia of 
Slothrop. Both the event and its effects, however, are at least as ambiguous as in the 
case of Gaddis’s Wyatt. 
In the depiction of Slothrop’s metanoia, or reversal, Pynchon again alludes to 
Brown and Marcuse, and given his critical distance to countercultural mystifications 
in the context of Weissmann’s Great Firing, it is no surprise that the treatment of 
Slothrop’s ‘redemption’ is equally complicated by critical undertones. A meta-
psychological reading against the background of Brown’s Life Against Death would 
suggest that the loss of his erectile conditioning constitutes liberation from the phallic 
order and the pleasure principle he has hitherto represented (cf. LD, 27, 91). His penis 
                                                 
750
 Duyfhuizen, “A Suspension”, §4. Given Bianca’s age, the sex scene is one of the most unsettling in 
Gravity’s Rainbow. Against this background it is all the more alarming that Slothrop is able to perceive 
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 In Love’s Body Brown presents sexual organisation as a “political organization” of the body (LB, 
126): “Genital organization is the tyranny”, or rather “monarchy” of the genital (LB, 127). 
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no longer “trying to point up at what was hanging there in the sky for everybody […]” 
(GR, 490), Slothrop escapes from the parabolic trajectory of Western civilization. 
Leaving the “albatross of self” (GR, 623), the ego and his accumulated guilt, he is 
freed from genital organisation and abandons his obligation to the teleological plot, 
“sliding into the anti-paranoid part of his cycle” (GR, 434). Concomitant with this 
change, Slothrop also loses his sense of historical time, a process Pynchon’s narrator 
formulates in Mondaugen’s Law: “The more you dwell in the past and the future, the 
thicker your bandwidth, the more solid your persona. But the narrower your sense of 
Now, the more tenuous you are” (GR, 509). Schachterle, in a Heideggerian reading, 
interprets this loss of coherence as a possible escape from both the enframing “that 
hitherto has trapped everybody in the story itself” and the Puritan-induced technique 
of reading the world with a vested interest “that has conditioned him before”.752 
Slothrop’s anti-paranoia, as a form of existential rootlessness, as it were, makes him 
vulnerable,
753
 for as the narrator suggests, this state, “where nothing is connected to 
anything” cannot be borne by many for long (GR, 434). Back home in Berkshire, 
during “days when in superstition and fright he could make it all fit, seeing clearly in 
each an entry in a record, a history”, he found instruction “in ways deeper than he can 
explain” (GR, 626). Now he is bereft of a guideline. This state, however, just like 
Wyatt’s in The Recognitions, also enables him to develop openness to Being. Just as 
the breakdown of the Puritan-cum-paranoid frame appears as a form of liberation, so 
does the shrinking of Slothrop’s temporal bandwidth. As indicated in the analysis of 
Dominus Blicero, for Brown, the state of Being without historical time represents an 
abolishment of repression. With an abolishment of repression, then, that is, a turn 
from genital organisation:   
 
man could enjoy the life proper to is species, the regressive fixation to the past would 
dissolve; the restless quest for novelty would be reabsorbed into the desire for pleasurable 
repetition; the desire to Become would be reabsorbed into the desire to Be. (LD, 93) 
 
In such a state “the restless career of Faustian man came to an end, because he would 
be satisfied” (LD, 91), and humans would be “ready to live instead of making history” 
(LD, 19). The tyranny of the ego/genital and the Faustian flight from death seem to be 
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overcome. Having won “freedom from the individual will”, as Hume argues, 754 
Slothrop is freed from his obsession, no longer defined by trying to satisfy his 
indefinite desire, no longer willing to play a pretend hero figure. In losing his 
temporal consciousness he leaves the religion of guilt, the soteriological economy of 
his Puritan legacy and with that, as the allusions to Brown imply, the fate to continue 
the guilt-work of his ancestors: “the grip of the dead hand of the past on life in the 
present would be loosened, and man would be ready to live” (LD, 19). Slothrop is 
freed from the ‘phylogentic curse’ of his consciousness, exits the trajectory of 
accumulated time and guilt. 
A closer reading of Slothrop’s turn to a atemporal consciousness and ‘pure’ Being, 
however, suggests that Pynchon depicts the latter also as a missed chance to become a 
‘person’ and develop an ability to care.755 Slothrop is ‘ready to live, but he fails “to 
formulate his own identity” at the moment of liberation.756 He literally just is, lets 
things be, for better or for worse. He may have dismantled his ego, but without self-
recognition he is incapable of mutual recognition. Sitting in Säure Bummer’s kitchen 
and finding “in every bone and cabbage leaf paraphrases of himself” (GR, 625) is one 
of the last things he does before he ultimately (dis-)integrates. And even when he is 
urged to acquire the “physical grace” that keeps things “working” (GR, 741) as a form 
of last minute intervention, he is unable to accept. Moreover, when the novel suggests 
that Slothrop’s waning bandwidth is concomitant with “negligence”, concluding 
“likewise groweth his Preterition for sure” (GR, 509), it neither points to possibilities 
of pure being outside historical time, nor to the attainment of freedom as an ‘invisible’ 
preterite, as Moore argues,
757
 but to narcisstic blindness and eventually a loss of care. 
Arguing from the perspective of information technology, Schachterle holds that the 
metaphor of shrunken bandwidth indicates an inability to communicate. But it 
signifies more: “[a]s Goethe reminds us”, he notes, alluding to Faust,  
 
we can never point to a present perfect Moment; our present is fused with a sense of organic 
unfolding from the apprehended past to some unapprehended afterwards. Only this sense of 
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time in motion permits us to be conscious of self vis-à-vis world. Without this conscious of 
self, we could not transmit information.
758
  
 
While the lieutenant’s empathetic abilities have already been problematic in 
London—“[o]nce upon a time Slothrop cared”, but now he finds “himself making 
small bets” about where the doodlebugs hit (GR, 21)—they are further complicated in 
the Zone, where he finds it increasingly difficult to connect to others. This lack of 
affect comes fully to the fore in the ‘redeeming’ scene with Bianca. She, like Ilse and 
Gottfried, represents before anything else the plight of children in the Zone, and her 
gift, as Duyfhuizen argues, “is also a plea for help”.759 Slothrop understands her offer, 
her ability to hide him, and eventually her plea, but he disentangles himself: “Sure 
he’ll stay for a while, but eventually he’ll go, and for this he is to be counted, after all, 
among the Zone’s lost” (GR, 470). Suggesting a causal relationship between this 
renunciation and his later fate, the narrator points to a missed chance of ‘redemption’, 
it seems, not because Slothrop renounces her gift of selfless love but neglects his own 
obligation. He feels the urge to bring her out, constantly asks whether she is going to 
be safe with her mother, but rather than taking the chance to exit the game with her, 
he reverts to the plot he has devised for himself. Dismissing his emotional impulse to 
rescue her as an “Eurydice obsession”, he muses that it would be “much easier just to 
leave her there […] Why bring her back? Why try?” (GR, 472). If one can identify a 
mythical correlative to such behaviour, it is that of Faust in the Gretchen-tragedy.
760
 
Like Faust, Slothrop hides entirely behind rhetoric and mystifications, dismissing his 
own potentials to help her, as if asking what can a preterite do after all? Having lost 
Bianca for good, then, Slothrop entirely dismisses care:  
 
Even a month ago, given a day or two of peace, he might have found his way back […] But 
nowadays, some kind of space he cannot go against has opened behind Slothrop, bridges that 
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might have led back are down for good. He is growing less anxious about betraying those who 
trust him. He feels obligation less immediately. (GR, 490-91) 
 
This drifting into carelessness considerably complicates a positively biased reading of 
Slothrop’s redemption. Slothrop, to summarise, is a pawn in ‘Their’ game, as so many 
other characters in the novel are. Yet he not only deliberately choses to play his part 
as a hyperbolic representative of the phallic order; most bitterly, his turn also presents 
certain countercultural rationales as doomed to failure.
761
 The essence of technology 
may divest humans of the capability to care, but so does the essence of pure Being 
that has ‘transcended’ reality.   
 
 
5. Scattering  
Goethe’s warning: “Do not, I beg you, look for anything behind the 
phenomena. They are themselves their own lesson.” had become 
incomprehensible to the century of Marx and Darwin. 
—Spengler, The Decline of the West762  
 
In terms of mythological allusions, Pynchon indicates Slothrop’s metanoia with an 
increasing number of allusions to the Orpheus myth. No other mythological figure, 
especially mediated through Rilke, suggests itself as a more potent counter-model to 
Slothrop’s previous striving. In Eros and Civilization, for instance, Marcuse names 
Orpheus (and Narcissus) as a counter-figure to the Western culture hero Prometheus, 
the “archetype-hero of the performance principle”, whose “unceasing effort to master 
life” is both a blessing and curse (EC, 161). Orpheus, akin to Dionysus, “the 
antagonist of the god who sanctions the logic of domination, the realm of reason” 
(EC, 162), is the polar opposite to Prometheus. He represents “joy and fulfilment; the 
voice which does not command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the 
deed which is peace and ends the labor of conquest” (EC, 162). As a cultural hero, 
Orpheus is thereby the figure of ultimate liberation, committed to “the redemption of 
pleasure, the halt of time, the absorption of death”, reconciling Eros and Thanatos, not 
“as destruction but as peace, not as terror but as beauty” (EC, 164). Just as the orphic 
Eros awakens potentials in things animate and inanimate, it transforms, liberates (EC, 
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171), and releases their telos of being “just […] what they are” (EC, 165), Orpheus 
himself is the proponent of the Great Refusal; he “establishes a higher order in the 
world—an order without repression” (EC, 170). In the same vein, Rilke’s poetry, 
especially his Sonnets to Orpheus and the ninth Duino elegy, are considered to be a 
counterpart to the Western Promethean model or even as a reversal of “Faust’s 
creed”.763 
At the end of his ‘pilgrimage’ Slothrop finds his old Hohner mouth harp again, 
making “audible the spirits of lost harpmen” and coming “closer to being a spiritual 
medium than he’s ever been yet” (GR, 622). Drawing from Rilke’s Sonnets to 
Orpheus (II, 29), Pynchon glosses this state: 
 
 Like that Rilke prophesied, 
  And though Earthliness forget you, 
  To the stilled Earth say: I flow, 
  To the rushing water speak; I am. (Ibid.) 
 
He turns from enframing to openness and fulfils Geli and Squalidozzi’s assertion of 
the openness of the Zone. One is inclined to take the suggested poetic transcendence 
at face value, especially since the intertextual parallel is unmarred by appropriations 
or misreading by the character, as is the case in Weissmann’s Rilkean connection. 
Yet, despite the establishment of the parallel by an authorial voice, the simple fact 
that Pynchon radically exploits and subverts any mythical correlative in Gravity’s 
Rainbow is indicator enough that Slothrop’s ‘transformation’ may not be exempt from 
a tongue in cheek use.
764
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Just before his eventual dissolution, Slothrop sees a rainbow and appears to have a 
redeeming moment: 
 
Slothrop sees a very thick rainbow […], a stout rainbow cock driven down out of pubic clouds 
into Earth, green wet valleyed Earth, and his chest fills and he stands crying, not a thing in his 
head, just feeling natural… (GR, 626) 
 
The vision, more pornographic than biblical, is hardly reminiscent of the symbolic 
celestial bridge, the covenant of God with man (Genesis 9:12), nor fully viable as a 
symbol of reintegration in the manner of Jung or D. H. Lawrence. Accordingly, in 
their discussions of Goethean traces in Gravity’s Rainbow, both Hume and Grim 
relate Slothrop’s rainbow encounter with that of Faust, reading the former as a neo-
Platonic epistemological allegory from the perspective of the latter.
765
 Against the 
background of Slothrop’s turn from totalising epistemologies to anti-paranoia such a 
comparison appears convincing. However, both critics tend to overlook that the 
ethical-aesthetical formula comprised in Gravity’s Rainbow is crucially different to 
that of Faust and in many respects closer to that of The Magic Mountain. 
Comparing the scene with that in Faust as described in the first chapter, the 
difference to Gravity’s Rainbow is apparent. Like in Goethe, the rainbow vision 
marks one stage in the change of the protagonist’s attitude, but in contrast to the 
former, the irony in Pynchon is that Slothrop takes no ‘message’ from the vision: 
there is not a thing in his head. As Madsen holds, “Slothrop simply refuses, finally, to 
interpret”.766 Thus, rather than serving as an elaborate allegory of human striving, the 
rainbow vision in Gravity’s Rainbow is foremost a plain affirmation of vital forces: 
“cock”, “green wet valleyed earth”, “feeling natural”. In many respects this image is a 
‘response’ to The Magic Mountain (bearing in mind that Mann’s novel heavily draws 
from the first part of Goethe’s drama). At an early stage in the novel, Castorp muses 
about the nature of life, assuming that it “was not mater and it was not spirit, but 
something between the two, a phenomenon conveyed by matter, like the rainbow on 
the waterfall, and like the flame” (MM, 275-76). In the midst of his snow-dream, in 
which he also divines the Grail, Castorp sees such a phenomenon: 
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A rainbow flung its arc slanting across the scene, most bright and perfect, a sheer delight, all 
its rich glossy, banded colours moistly shimmering down into the thick, lustrous green. It was 
like music, like the sound of harps comingled with flutes and violins. (MM, 490) 
 
As his dream continues, Castorp’s heart opens “in a responsive love, keen almost to 
pain” (MM, 491) to a vision of the ‘Grail’, that is, a future humanity living in spite of 
death and disease. Castorp’s dream leads him through a Mediterranean bucolic idyll 
of joyful children playing in the sun at the heart of which stands a temple, in which he 
finds two witchlike women dismembering a child. Castorp comes to understand that 
one cannot have beauty alone but “must have the other half of the story, the other 
side” (MM, 495), that behind man’s “courteous and enlightened state” the “horrible 
blood-sacrifice” is consummated (ibid.). This insight leads him to divine an image of 
man as true homo dei, the “lord of counter-positions”, too “aristocratic for death” and 
free in mind, neither directed by desire nor reason but love: 
 
It is love, not reason, that is stronger than death. Only love, not reason, gives sweet thoughts. 
And from love and sweetness alone can form come: form and civilization, friendly, 
enlightened, beautiful human intercourse—always in silent recognition of the blood-sacrifice 
(MM, 496) 
 
Like Faust, Castorp is granted the vision of an ideal humanity, a future civilization. 
But while Goethe’s scholar ultimately misunderstands the ‘message’ of the rainbow, 
trying to achieve mastery in a loveless quest, Castorp soon forgets his pledge to defy 
the lure of death, naively following the ‘call of his blood’ (MM, 712) and the neo-
romantic mystification of dying. In the battlefield of Flanders, with Schubert’s 
“Lindenbaum” on his lips, Castorp then encounters the opposite of the ‘grail’:  
 
He [Castorp] lies with his face in the cold mire […] The product of a perverted science, laden 
with death, slopes earthward thirty paces in front of him and buries its nose in the ground; 
explodes inside there, with hideous expense of power, and raises up a fountain high as a 
house, of mud, iron, molten metal, scattered fragments of humanity. Where it fell, two youths 
had lain, friends who in their need flung themselves down together—now they are scattered, 
comingled and gone. (MM, 715)  
 
Castorp survives this scattering, but his “prospects are poor” (MM, 716). Like the two 
youths, he will end as a sacrifice for the future of his nation but not a better humanity. 
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Despite its contiguity to Faust, Slothrop’s end appears to be more an ironic version of 
Castorp’s story. As Slothrop’s scattering plainly indicates, the ‘result’ of his 
encounter is not a pedagogy of personal unity or self-mastery, no image of homo dei. 
Slothrop, after a life-long adherence to rationales of power, domination, and death, is 
finally freed from the “terrible politics of the Grail” (GR, 701). Just feeling natural, he 
no longer asks: “What do I need that badly?” (GR, 490) and dissolves into the texture 
of Gravity’s Rainbow some hundred pages before the novel’s ending. Although he has 
“begun to thin, to scatter”, “as noted”, at least “as early as the Anubis era” (GR, 509), 
he now fragments “all over the Zone. It’s doubtful if he can ever be ‘found’ again, in 
the conventional sense of “positively identified and detained” (GR, 712). Trying to 
press the ending into the Faustian correlative, Grim notes: in “an age in which Dr. 
Faust’s feats of necromancy are being actualized, the wisest course of action for any 
Faust to take may be a disappearing act”.767 As aptly as the formulation “disappearing 
act” describes the volitional basis of Slothrop’s disintegration, it does not fully 
acknowledge that he does not merely give in but also gives back. In contrast to the 
Faustian characters Weissmann or Mondaugen, whose striving for unity leads to 
destruction, he has himself broken down, vanishes out of sight, but some of his 
“fragments” may “have grown into consistent personae of their own” (GR, 742). 
Its ambiguous character makes Slothrop’s act available for interpretation in the 
manner of Paul Mann, who sees in Slothrop’s “disappearance from the tracking 
systems of Gravity’s Rainbow” a gesture of resistance, an “unprecedented silence, 
exile and cunning; samizdat networks, amnesiac and subhistorical”. 768  Thus, Paul 
Mann writes: “Hardly gone: in fact it is everywhere”, and this is exactly Slothrop’s 
transformation.
769
 Invisibility becomes a figure of resistance, both to Christian 
eschatology and entropic telos. With his ‘disappearance’, I contend, Slothrop enacts 
what Agamben describes as the benefit of those in limbo:  
 
The greatest punishment—the lack of the vision of God—thus turns into a natural joy: 
Irremediably lost, they persist without pain in divine abandon. God has not forgotten them, 
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but rather they have always already forgotten God; and in the face of their forgetfulness, 
God’s forgetting is impotent. Like letters with no addressee, these uprisen beings remain 
without a destination. Neither blessed like the elected, nor hopeless like the damned, they are 
infused with a joy with no outlet.
770
    
 
Ironically, in Slothrop’s hermetic tale of humanity sacrificed for the science of death 
thus resides an indication that replenishment is possible. His ‘withdrawal’ does not 
bear many connotations of Žižek’s notion of being at home on the surface of earth, of 
being able to realise one’s “potential through an active, productive exchange with 
it”,771 and in this respect it is antithetical to Wyatt Gwyon’s call for simplification and 
conscious ‘living through’. What both characters share, however, is that the eventual 
import of Slothrop’s end is not a question of pure Being or of redemption. As 
Marcuse argues, Orpheus remains a symbol and never represents real existence: the 
images of the Orphic “world are essentially unreal and unrealistic”; they designate an 
“‘impossible’ attitude and existence” and do neither “convey a ‘mode of living’” nor a 
message, at least only the negative one that “one cannot defeat death” (EC, 165). I 
contend that Gravity’s Rainbow takes this very notion as the basis for inverting the 
lethal message Mondaugen receives, for indicating another world is possible. The 
fragmentation marking the end of “Slothrop qua Slothrop” (GR, 738) also marks a 
beginning, the continuation of life despite death, of paying due debts to nature and 
being transmuted to new life in the multiplicity of his ‘offshoots’. Thus, to draw from 
Pöhlmann, Slothrop’s ending is “admittedly ambivalent, but it can nevertheless be 
read as a positive narrative”.772 
 
 
6. By Means of Conclusion: Descent 
Unlike Goethe, Pynchon does not project a utopia onto heaven, but his focus remains 
on the given. While the Chorus Mysticus proclaims at the end of Faust that “[a]ll that 
must disappear/ is but a parable” (F, 12104-05), alluding to Platonic realms and 
possibilities of reconciliation, Gravity’s Rainbow points to another direction, not 
disentangling from but reaching into reality and thereby turning aesthetics into a 
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political claim. After Slothrop’s tale ends, the story of Gravity’s Rainbow follows the 
trajectory of the V2. When the pseudo-Faust has been “weeded out” (GR, 508), the 
Brocken-complex bureaucratised, and a political utopia erased, the markets will have 
taken over, the bureaucrats, and the priests of the machine, melting all that is mythical 
into dreams of control. Slothrop ironically turns to the ‘open’ at the time when the 
openness of the Zone vanishes, Orpheus lays down his harp, and the Apollonian “sun 
will rule all enterprise” (ibid.). What remains after the end of the German Oven State, 
then, is the assembly of what Lewis Mumford calls the megamachine, the interlocking 
of political, economic, military, and bureaucratic systems into a “final totalitarian 
structure” that supersedes all organically grown culture.773 Tchitcherine divines an 
industrial covenant, a “structure cutting across every agency human and paper that 
ever touched it”:   
 
Oh, a State begins to take form in the stateless German night, a State that spans oceans and 
surface politics, sovereign as the International or the Church of Rome, and the Rocket is its 
soul. (GR, 566) 
 
And however non-linear and fragmented the last section of the novel is, the trajectory 
of the rocket, this soul of the emergent post-war cartel conglomerate, spans directly to 
the very last page of the novel. If both Castorp and Slothrop are inspired by life’s 
forces, death and repression nevertheless prevails. Thus, Slothrop’s vision of the 
“rainbow cock” is succeeded by an image of a “white genital onset in the sky”, the 
“pale Virgin” rising over Hiroshima (GR, 694), and the remaining ‘fragments’ of 
Gravity’s Rainbow are mostly devoted to the progress of death as described in 
Blicero’s Marcusean ‘prophecy’. Some of Slothrop’s offshoots, just like Weissmann 
and the Rocket, may have found their way back to America. The spirit of harpmen 
inspires the Neo-Orphic “freaks” (GR, 755) of 1973 LA, but a thinly disguised 
Richard Nixon has already “come out against what he calls irresponsible use of the 
harmonica” (GR, 754) and dreams of relocating the harpmen to a “nice secure home” 
right “next to Disneyland” (GR, 756)—whether for their ‘re-education’ or other 
purposes is unclear.
774
 Nazi Germany and post-war America conflate. The Rocket 
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“reaches its last unmeasurable gap above the roof of this old theatre” (GR, 760) run 
by Zhlubb. “There is time” (ibid.) to gain comfort, enough time to sing a hymn by 
William Slothrop forgotten for centuries. Heidegger notes in “Why Poets?” that in the 
world’s night, in which the gods have fled and all “radiance of divinity” is 
extinguished, poetry and song is to “attend to the track of the fugitive gods”, to utter 
the sacred,
775
 but in the radically disenchanted world of Gravity’s Rainbow song is 
not always a “magic cape” (GR, 701). It establishes solidarity amongst the audience 
in the night of the Orpheus theatre, a memory of the path not taken, but it cannot 
substitute for the missing light. Myths, as Thomas notes, whether the neo-pagan rites 
in the Zone or that of Orpheus, “will not bring back the dead or heal a ruined face”,776 
and eventually Gravity’s Rainbow itself does not escape the pull of what it is written 
against. Although it is certainly ‘Bad and Big enough’ to challenge the Faustian 
machineries of Western civilization, it cannot be, to draw from Leo Bersani, outside 
the systems against which it writes.
777
 Thus, as the slices of film in the Orpheus 
Theatre have “broken, or a projector bulb has burned out”, the reader is not released 
with the memory of a consoling fiction but addressed before the novel violently ends 
in a dash: “Now everybody—” (GR, 760). 
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Conclusion: Satire, Myth, and Ethics 
 Ego non baptizo te in nomine patris, filii et spiritus sancti sed in nomine diaboli 
―Herman Melville778 
 
This is what we want: to sabotage history. They won’t know whether we’re 
serious or whether we are writing fiction . . . they can’t tell whether our 
fictions are the real thing or whether they’re merely fictional. Always keep 
them guessing. That’ll bug them, probably drive them up the walls. 
—Ishmael Reed779 
 
Gaddis and Pynchon extensively draw from the Faust myth in their investigations into 
the lapses of Western civilization. What sets them apart from the earliest literary 
versions of the myth is the refusal to measure the destructive effects of human hubris 
against religious or other absolutes. Their worlds do not need a devil, as they suspect, 
like Valéry’s Mephisto, that people are “clever enough to damn themselves by their 
own devices”.780 
At a first glance, the individual emphases of The Recognitions, V., and Gravity’s 
Rainbow vary, with Gaddis focusing more directly on the alchemy of capitalism as 
expressed in the domain of art and Pynchon on that of technologies in the service of 
power. Whereas Gaddis remains less political, although subtly indicating totalitarian 
sensibilities in some of his characters, Pynchon depicts self-aggrandisement in 
decidedly political terms. Equally, while Gaddis prefigures Pynchon’s complex 
allusiveness, self-conscious style, and his use of black humour, the latter does show 
less nostalgia for grand narratives and a greater stress on pop-cultural elements. In 
essence, however, their agenda remains the same, for both provide comprehensive 
satirical surveys of an omnipresent Faustian machinery comprising individual 
pathologies, collective structures, religious, political, and even countercultural forces 
are shown to work in complicity with the ‘System’. Both describe a fully 
‘rationalised’ and administered world subjugated to the libido dominandi of political 
and economic elites. Enlightenment ideals (human autonomy, individualism, 
commitment to reason, a belief in progress and science) as subsumed under the 
primacy of capitalism are portrayed to foster an ultimately inhumane logic. At the 
same time both make charges against Puritanism’s claim on absolutes and its 
soteriological economy that substantially contributed to the ultimately hubristic claim 
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of mastering the natural and social world. In Gaddis, capitalism feeds on spiritual 
insecurity and the longing for redemption; in Pynchon, the doctrine of unconditional 
election is held responsible for supplying the ideological basis of domination. In 
summary, both present the pursuit of salvation for better or worse as a Faustian 
bargain. 
In terms of how Pynchon and Gaddis tackle the ‘devilish’ traits of the West, both 
display an astonishingly similar method. Both make substantial use of elements from 
various Faust versions for modelling their plots and additionally employ patterns and 
allusions taken from Spengler, Wiener, Huizinga, and Adams in order to convey a 
sense of decline. Yet they also contravene the teleological drive and deterministic 
vision of these plots by means of indirection, aporia, and pre-emptive ‘self-
deconstruction’, that is, the imposition of rival systems of order, be they scientific, 
mythological or pathological, without resolving the conflict between them.
781
 Writing 
in the spirit of Nietzsche (and Vaihinger, or Heisenberg, for that matter), they thereby 
point to the “inexorable provisionality of all truth conditions”, as Heffernan notes,782 
while refusing to let their narrations stabilise into a “fixed interpretation from a self-
confident ideological standpoint”.783 Mythopoesis plays a crucial part in this agenda 
in that it challenges one-dimensional world-views and ethically valorises what is 
narrated. As Safer notes, Gaddis (and Pynchon) alludes to earlier literature and myth 
“in order to show an ironic contrast with the precepts of his era”.784 The present is 
judged by means of mythological associations. While modernist writers used allusions 
to strengthen connections between themes and values of their works, however, Gaddis 
and Pynchon’s major means of ridiculing contemporary “society is through ironic 
allusiveness”. 785  This establishes a harsher contrast between mythic past and 
disenchanted present, but it also allows for exploiting myth while simultaneously 
undermining it. Like Joyce or Mann, they are consciously and self-consciously 
mythopoeic, but while the modernist story alludes to a “prior myth that is a key to its 
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meanings”,786 as Brook-Rose observes, the major sources in Gaddis and Pynchon are 
called upon and subverted.
787
 Yet although the truth claim of myth (or any other 
epistemological system) is not accepted as objectively valid, both authors 
substantially utilise its provision of ethically valorised perspectives onto the narrated 
present. In a world of “reason in insomniac overdrive”,788 myth, as a category of ‘as 
if’ in Vaihinger’s terms, is used to suggest a worldview outside the parameters of 
instrumentality, utility, controllability, and profitability. It thereby provides a heuristic 
horizon, a self-consciously devised operational framework conveying value and 
orientation without naturalising and depoliticising its assertions. Thus, alchemy 
provides in Gaddis a perspective on what Brown calls its “pseudosecular heir, modern 
capitalism” (LD, 258). Thus, in Pynchon, where magic may not be enough to change 
the world and is always on the verge of being rationalised and incorporated by 
capitalist principles, it is “not necessarily fantasy” (GR, 735) but “still there, though 
latent, needing only to touch the right sensitive head to reassert itself” (GR, 588). 
While what Pynchon calls the Luddite ‘Badass’, big and bad enough to act against the 
machine, may only be found outside fiction, literature’s insistence on the miraculous 
represents at least a mode of problematizing the machine.
789
 
Against this background it also becomes clear why the myth of Faust is chosen as a 
dominant correlative. This myth is not simply a further layer in a playful multiplicity 
but central to an ethically informed mythography. Since it negotiates human self-
apotheosis gone wrong, it makes itself available to both authors’ critique of Western 
modernity. Yet it is also the double-edged character of the myth that renders Faust 
suitable for their novels. Since hardly any other myth has been so extensively made a 
site of ideological trench-fights, it gives testimony to how easily mythical narratives 
can be appropriated for paranoid, if not totalitarian endeavours. The aversion to such 
dialectics, clearly manifest in Gaddis and Pynchon, is expressed in a subversive 
inversion of seemingly self-evident notions of saintliness, a radical questioning of 
soteriological agendas, and a utilisation of the heretical material conveyed in the 
tradition of the magus. It eventually also entails, however, that both do not fully 
                                                 
786
 Brook-Rose, The Rhetoric of the Unreal, 354. 
787
 See Safer, “Ironic Allusiveness”, 76. 
788
 Ibid., 200. 
789
 As Elias notes, mythical and other visions in Pynchon serve as a “counter-history to the rationalistic 
monovocal Anglo-European history of technocratic capitalism” (“History”, 133). Yet, as shown in my 
discussion of mythical allusions in Weissmann’s Great Firing and Slothrop’s dispersal, such visions 
have to be read cum grano salis. 
 250 
subscribe to the totalising narrative of the Faust myth. As Cowart argues in the case of 
Pynchon: the latter “deconstructs myth, and with it the modernist pretense of 
postreligious metanarrative”.790 Although Pynchon is more radical in the latter respect 
than Gaddis, they do not share David Hawkes’s claim that “it is impossible to avoid 
the conclusion that the Western world has sold its soul to Satan”,791 and neither do 
they resort to Spenglerian fatalism. Leaving it unresolved whether their Fausts are 
redeemed or damned, they suggest that mankind, although fallible, is not yet fallen. 
Unlike Spengler (or even Goethe), they also refuse to make predictions or state 
‘solutions’. Religious doctrines are dismissed as supportive of the human libido 
dominandi, overt political commitments cannot be found, and social ideals, such as 
Gaddis’s agapistic communities or Pynchon’s notions of keeping cool but caring or of 
living in accord with nature, are hardly posited as absolute normative horizons.
792
 The 
pre-Protestant era is by no means portrayed as an economy-free Eden, for as much as 
Gaddis’s Flemish painters are working for the culture industry, Pynchon’s mandrake-
digging magicians are aware of the significance of capital. Even more so, when 
Gaddis’s characters lament that a specific mode of community has been lost in 
society, this mode is first and foremost undermined by its proponents. Similarly, 
Pynchon’s critique of industrial and military technology does not seriously propose a 
return to a preindustrial ‘idyll’ (or any origin, which his novels dismiss as 
impossible), and his countercultural forces are eventually swallowed by the ‘System’. 
Thus, while The Recognitions, V., and Gravity’s Rainbow see their protagonists 
disintegrate, the Faustian machineries keep rolling. 
Depictions of real chances of freedom are tentative and at best ambiguous, 
remaining at a ‘slender interface’. As regards what to do at this interface, Pynchon 
points to a simple life and love.
793
 Love, not as panacea, as Gaddis suggests, neither as 
an opposition to war and death, but as ethical commitment and the will to choose, in 
recognition of the slow hard work entailed, a game “full of light and kindness” (GR, 
622), to cite Pynchon’s dope fiend Bummer. Thus, even though Gravity’s Rainbow 
(and V.) engages in the most radical criticism of Western civilization, frequently 
hinting at missed chances, lost routes back, and waning hopes, it includes an inquiry 
into counterpoints to the conditio Faustiana, presenting a micrology of persistence, 
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finding possibilities in chance and growth in detritus: “But in each of these streets, 
some vestige of humanity, of Earth, has to remain. No matter what has been done to 
it, no matter what’s it been used for” (GR, 693).794 The logic here, as in Slothrop’s 
scattering and Mann’s divination of the Grail, is that life needs to be lived not against 
but despite death. Here lies, as Moore points out, a chance for human freedom:  
 
Recognition—the exceedingly difficult job of discerning from the inside the lines of the force-
fields that binds us—remains our only practically possible freedom: the Weberian freedom 
that consists simply in the realistic awareness of whatever options remain open to us within 
our condition.
795
  
 
The same point can be made for Gaddis in that although The Recognitions does not 
allow for a real escape, it never abandons the search for transcendence. Despite the 
omnipresent logic of inflation and collapse, it points to a social, fully human mode of 
development, of living deliberately in recognition of the things worth being, not only 
those worth having. His message of humane fulfilment of potentials and non-
commoditised social interaction (the ‘self who can do more’) conforms in this respect 
with Goethe’s notion of continual ‘betterment’.  
To conclude, the novels of Gaddis and Pynchon do not make any claim that they 
are written in order to edify or betray any pretensions that they themselves would 
exist outside the ‘System’. Despite their fantastic digressions, these peculiar 
Jeremiads remain ‘realistic’ in that they do not point to a ‘better way’ for the mere 
fact that no better way has been taken. Thus, when both authors refrain from 
establishing false reconciliation, they thereby concede that, as Pynchon puts it, 
 
[e]xcept for that succession of the criminally insane who have enjoyed power since 1945, 
including the power to do something about it, most of the rest of us poor sheep have always 
been struck with simple, standard fear. I think we all have tried to deal with this slow escalation 
of our helplessness and terror in the few ways open to us, from not thinking about it to going 
crazy from it. Somewhere on this spectrum of impotence is writing fiction about it.
796
 
 
This does not mean that their readers need to conclude with Benny Profane: “offhand 
I’d say I haven’t learned a goddamn thing” (V., 454). If anything, a refusal to provide 
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ready-made answers or sanctimonious moralising fosters a mode of resistance to 
impotence and passivity. If their fiction thereby meets Brooke-Rose’s demand of 
stretching our horizons to breaking point, it also fulfils a crucial function Gaddis 
described in his unpublished 1978 essay “Literature and Crisis”:  
 
It is, in short, a time of crisis. But it has always been a time of crisis, and it is not the purpose 
of literature to solve it, as a mathematical problem finds a solution. …  It is …  the 
permanent crisis of the human condition, these areas of intuitive as well as rational knowing, 
of individual frailty and sheer perversity, that literature has never ceased to explore, and so 
long as we have it, never will.
797
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